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Document 940 18th May 1983 
AGENDA 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 6th-8th June 1983 
I. Report of the Council 
Twenty-eighth annual report of the 
Council to the Assembly 
11. Political Questions 
1. Political activities of the WEU Council 
- reply to the twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council 
2. China and European security 
Ill. Defence Questions 
1. Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council 
2. Burden-sharing in the alliance 
IV. Technical and Scientific Questions 
The law of the sea 
V. Relations with Parliaments 
Analysis and evaluation of the action 
taken on Assembly Recommendations 
383 on the problem of nuclear weapons 
in Europe and 388 on the problems 
for European security arising from 
pacifism and neutralism 
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Report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Defonce Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin 
on behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments 
Document 941 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 6th-8th June 1983 
!\10NDA Y, 6th JUNE 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the twenty-ninth ordinary session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
20th May 1983 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of twenty-ninth ordinary session. 
7. China and European security : 
4p.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
8. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
9. China and European security: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 7th JUNE 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
1. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
10.30 a.m. 
2. Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council : 
presentation by Mr. Cheysson, French Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council. 
3. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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4. Political activities of the WEU Council - reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the 
Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Burden-sharing in the alliance: 
3.30 p.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander'Europe. 
3. Burden-sharing in the alliance: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 8th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
The law of the sea : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly Recommendations 383 on the prob-
lems of nuclear weapons in Europe and 388 on the problems for European security arising 
from pacifism and neutralism : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin on behalf of the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Document 942 14th March 1983 
Twenty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1982 
INTRODUCTION 
I. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the twenty-eighth annual 
report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1982. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters: 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
11. Activities of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Ill. Armaments Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee............................................... 39 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
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CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
Presenting the Council's twenty-seventh 
annual report to the Assembly, the Chairman-
in-Office, the Belgian Minister for External 
Relations, Mr. Tindemans, stated: 
" ... the Council appreciate the very consi-
derable services which your Assembly ren-
ders to Europe's cause by regularly study-
ing the basic problems affecting the secu-
rity and essential unity of Europe, and by 
submitting its views to the governments of 
the member states. 
Your Assembly, ... " he recalled, "is the 
only European parliamentary body em-
powered, by virtue of a treaty, to discuss 
defence matters which are of crucial impor-
tance to our countries, and of which - as 
the current climate requires - the general 
public in our countries must be made more 
aware." 
In their reply to Recommendation 3 79, the 
Council referred to the proposals put forward 
by the French Government, which take account 
of this unique position of the Assembly. They 
stated that, having regard to the questions legiti-
mately voiced by public opinion in the WEU 
member countries and the importance of demo-
cratic dialogue, through which peoples reach a 
better understanding of the defence efforts 
needed, the Council supported the notion 
expressed in the Assembly on 1st December 
1981 by the State Secretary to the French 
Minister of Defence, that the Assembly should 
extend its debates to all the extremely varied 
themes which raise the problems relating to the 
security of European countries. 
Throughout 1982 the Council, for their 
part, continued to assist the Assembly to fulfil 
its role effectively. To this end, they have 
maintained their dialogue with it on questions 
relating to the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty including - in accordance with 
the undertaking given in 1972 and subsequently 
renewed - those dealt with by member govern-
ments of WEU in other international fora. 
A. Twenty-seventh annual report 
of the Council to the Assembly 
1. The activities of the ministerial organs of 
WEU during 1981 were described in the 
twenty-seventh annual report of the Council. 
The progress of co-operation between the WEU 
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member states in other international fora in 
areas in which the Assembly is particularly 
interested was also referred to in that report. 
Moreover, as regards armaments control, 
additional information was provided to the 
Assembly in accordance with the procedure 
applied since 1971, which was set out in the 
Council reply to Written Question 123. 
2. The Council welcome the fact that the 
Assembly noted with satisfaction the inform-
ation thus provided. 
B. Informing the Assembly about the Standing 
Armaments Committee's study 
on the armaments sector of industry 
in the member countries of WEU 
Following their communication of 1981, 
the Council addressed to the Assembly on lOth 
May 1982 a document containing the revised 
legal part of the study carried out by the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee as well as the up-
dated presentation of the first section of 
the economic part of that study. 
In accordance with their undertaking, the 
Council will not fail to inform the Assembly 
adequately once the SAC study has been com-
pleted. 
C. Assembly debates - Assembly 
recommendations to the Council 
and written questions put 
to the Council by members of the Assembly; 
replies by the Council 
1. The Council took note, with interest, of the 
reports presented by Assembly committees 
during the two parts of the twenty-eighth ordi-
nary session and carefully followed the debates 
on those reports. They welcome the fact that 
in response to the call by the State Secretary to 
the French Minister of Defence, the Assembly, 
on the basis of reports submitted to it by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments and by the General Affairs Committee, 
examined in depth the problem of nuclear wea-
pons in Europe and the problems for European 
security arising from pacifism and neutralism. 
As a number of reports were submitted at a 
late stage, the Council wish to point out that 
earlier receipt of committee documents would 
be desirable, particularly in order to provide 
fuller information to the ministers participating 
in the Assembly's debates. 
2. The Council gave careful consideration to 
the sixteen recommendations 1 adopted by the 
Assembly during the second part of the twenty-
seventh ordinary session and the first part of 
the twenty-eighth ordinary session and to three 
written questions 2 put by members of the 
Assembly. 
3. With the assistance of the national admin-
istrations, the working group and the Secreta-
riat-General, the Council drew up substantial 
replies to all these recommendations and ques-
tions. They took account of co-operation 
within the various bodies in which the member 
states of WEU participate. Thus they gave the 
Assembly as much information as possible 
about consultations in which representatives of 
the member states had taken part in the frame-
work of European political co-operation and in 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
D. Meetings between the Council 
and Assembly bodies 
1. Three informal meetings took place in 
London on 19th May 1982 after the ministerial 
session held under the chairmanship of Lord 
Belstead, United Kingdom Minister of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 
At a working lunch organised by the 
United Kingdom Chairman, the members of the 
Council met the Assembly Presidential Com-
mittee. 
During the afternoon, the Council met two 
Assembly committees in succession and dis-
cussed with each the matters which it had pro-
posed. Exchanges of views with the General 
Affairs Committee covered WEU activities, 
political co-operation in Europe, co-operation 
between Europe and the United States on secu-
rity matters arising inside and outside Europe, 
the situation in Poland, the Falklands crisis, 
and those with the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments covered the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty, questions 
concerning disarmament, co-operation on 
armaments matters, the Falklands crisis. 
On the same day, Lord Belstead, repre-
senting the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
received the Chairman of the General Affairs 
Committee. 
l. Nos. 372 to 387. 
2. Nos. 229 to 231. 
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2. The Council remain favourable to such 
annual contacts with representatives of the 
Assembly. Indeed they consider that these 
contacts are useful insofar as they enable the 
participants to speak regularly and freely about 
the evolution of the complex problems dealt 
with by the Assembly. Hence the Council 
have given a positive reply to the requests sub-
mitted to them for the year 1983. 
E. Speeches made by the Chairman-in-Office 
and other ministers of WEU member countries 
at the Assembly 
1. Each year it is customary for the Chair-
man-in-Office to present to the Assembly the 
annual report of the Council's activities. 
The Council moreover encourage the parti-
cipation of government representatives, parti-
cularly defence ministers, in the Assembly's 
debates. The Council's aim is to meet the 
Assembly's legitimate desire to be better 
informed in this way of the respective views of 
the governments of WEU member countries on 
the questions appearing on its agenda. 
2. In 1982, the Chairman-in-Office and five 
other ministers addressed the Assembly. 
During the first part of the twenty-eighth 
ordinary session, Mr. Tindemans, the Chair-
man-in-Office, outlined the main aspects of the 
activities of the WEU ministerial organs in 
1981 and added certain information on the first 
months of the current year. Speaking as Bel-
gian Minister for External Relations, he 
conveyed to the Assembly his thoughts on the 
security policy of Europe. Questions affecting 
the security and defence of European countries 
were the theme of speeches by Mr. Cheysson, 
French Minister for External Relations, and 
Mr. Leister, State Secretary at the Ministry of 
Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
During the second part of the session, 
Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, out-
lined to the Assembly the main aspects of his 
country's defence policy ; on this occasion he 
recalled the suggestions made to the Assembly 
in December of 1981 by the State Secretary to 
the Minister of Defence. Lord Belstead, Minis-
ter of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs of the United Kingdom, indicated the 
fundamental trends in United Kingdom defence 
policy and stated his government's position on 
the Falkland Islands. Mr. Fioret, Italian State 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, informed the 
Assembly of his government's views on co-
operation between Europe and the United Sta-
tes, East-West relations, the situation in the 
Middle East, the situation in South-East Asia, 
as well as on European unification. 
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The Ministers all reaffirmed the impor-
tance which their respective governments 
attached to Western European Union and they 
emphasised that the Assembly, the only Euro-
pean parliamentary forum competent to deal 
with defence questions, had an essential role to 
play in the examination of such questions. 
Some of them referred on this occasion to the 
wishes expressed by the Assembly in its 
Recommendation 380 with regard to the 
control of armaments. 
After their speeches, the ministers answered 
questions put by members of the Assembly. 
F. Colloquy on international aeronautical 
consortia 
The Council were represented at the 
colloquy organised by the Assembly on 9th and 
lOth February 1982 in London and they fol-
lowed the work with interest. 
16 
At the inaugural sitting Lord Trenchard, 
United Kingdom Minister of State for Defence 
Procurement, summarised the British Govern-
ment's attitude to matters of collaboration 
in the procurement of defence equipment. 
Mr. Lemoine, French State Secretary to the 
Minister of Defence, made a speech in which, 
after recalling that his government considered it 
necessary to develop co-operation in the WEU 
framework, he presented the guidelines of 
French aeronautical policy. 
Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
spoke at the end of the colloquy. He noted 
that since WEU remained the sole European 
grouping with a treaty-based authority to dis-
cuss defence matters, the Assembly had a par-
ticularly useful role to play. He observed that 
the excellent work done by the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions was a valuable example in this respect. 
Following their speeches, the Ministers replied 
to questions from the participants. 
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CHAPTER 11 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
Introduction 
1. The Council and the ministers who addres-
sed the Assembly in 1982 reaffirmed the 
importance that the governments of the mem-
ber states attach to WEU, the only European 
organisation which by treaty has been given 
competence in defence matters. 
In presenting the twenty-seventh annual 
report of the Council, the Chairman-in-Office 
reaffirmed WEU member countries' attachment 
to the modified Brussels Treaty and its Proto-
cols and their determination to fulfil all their 
obligations. He stressed that the commitment 
to collective self-defence contained in Article V 
of the treaty was one of the cornerstones of the 
European security system. 
2. During 1982, the Council ensured that the 
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
its Protocols were applied and observed and 
were concerned to avoid - as is indeed required 
by the treaty - duplication of work with that 
in which the member states of WEU partici-
pate, in other international fora. 
3. The Council met at ministerial level in 
London on 19th May under the chairmanship 
of Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs of the United 
Kingdom. 
They held twelve meetings at permanent 
representative level. Their working group met · 
twenty-five times. 
4. Various aspects and phases of the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreements have appea-
red twenty-four times on the Council's agenda. 
The discussions at ministerial level covered 
the development of East-West relations, the 
situation in the Mediterranean, the study of the 
Standing Armaments Committee on the arma-
ments sector of industry in the member coun-
tries of WEU. 
5. Lastly, the dialogue with the Assembly, 
which constitutes an important part of the 
Council's activity, was continued, the Council 
giving careful consideration, for example, to the 
suggestions of the Assembly which were con-
tained in Recommendation 3 72 on European 
union and WEU, Recommendation 3 79 on the 
political activities of the Council, imd Recom-
mendation 380 on the application of the Brus-
sels Treaty, as shown by the replies given, 
particularly in respect of armaments control. 
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6. As the Council stated to the Assembly, 
they will continue to exercise the responsibili-
ties incumbent on them, and in so doing assert 
the European approach in consultations on 
security, armaments control and disarmament. 
They consider it desirable that in these spheres 
the provision of information and the harmoni-
sation of attitudes should take place in various 
bodies and at various levels, avoiding as 
far as possible any duplication. As pointed out 
by the Council, the fact that all WEU member 
countries are members of the Atlantic Alliance 
and share the conviction that defence of the 
continent of Europe and global defence are 
inseparable, does not affect the specificity of the 
mandates and the respective approaches. The 
Council attach great importance in the present 
circumstances to a deepening of the under-
standing existing between themselves and the 
Assembly. 
A. Political questions 
1. East-West relations 
(a) As stated in their reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 374 the Council pay parti-
cularly close attention to the various aspects of 
the development of East-West relations. 
In the detailed discussions by the Council 
at their meeting at ministerial level in London 
on 19th May 1982 they noted with concern 
that these relations remained subject to severe 
tensions as a result of the continued build-up 
of Soviet military potential, the continuing 
occupation of Afghanistan by the USSR, the 
repression imposed in Poland with the encour-
agement and the support of the USSR, and 
the destabilising activities of the Soviet Union 
in other parts of the world. 
The ministers stressed that improvements 
in East-West relations depend on the readiness 
of the Soviet Union to be seen to exercise 
restraint and act with responsibility in the 
conduct of international affairs. 
They stated that, for their part, the govern-
ments of WEU member countries would perse-
vere in their efforts to establish a more con-
structive East-West relationship through dia-
logue, negotiation and mutually advantageous 
exchanges with the Soviet Union and the other 
members of the Warsaw Pact. 
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The ministers reaffirmed that their govern-
ments attached fundamental importance to the 
co-ordination of their positions in this matter in 
the framework of European political co-opera-
tion and within the Atlantic Alliance. 
(b) In the context of their dialogue with the 
Assembly the Council kept the latter regularly 
informed of the continuing consultations bet-
ween the member countries of WEU and their 
European and Atlantic partners in 1982 concern-
ing the development of the situation in Poland 
and the discussions at the Madrid CSCE 
follow-up meeting. 
(1) In their previous annual report, the Coun-
cil called the Assembly's attention to the decla-
ration of the Ten on Poland on 15th December 
1981, immediately following the grave measures 
taken by the Polish leaders on 13th December 
in defiance of the provisions of the final act of 
Helsinki, the Charter of the United Nations and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
As indicated in their reply of 3rd February 
1982 to the statement by the Presidential 
Committee of the Assembly dated 8th January 
1982, the Council fully supported the declara-
tion by the Foreign Ministers of the member 
states of the European Community on 4th 
January 1982 and the declaration by the North 
Atlantic Council meeting in extraordinary 
ministerial session on 11th January, in Brussels. 
They pointed out that the governments of 
the WEU member countries totally denounced 
the repression imposed in Poland, and urged 
the Polish authorities to live up to their declared 
'intention to end the state of martial law, to 
release those arrested and to restore immedi-
ately a dialogue with the church and Solidarity ; 
these governments also called upon the Soviet 
Union to respect Poland's fundamental right to 
solve its own problems free from foreign inter-
ference. 
The member countries of WEU participa-
ted in the close and active consultation which 
took place throughout 1982 within the Euro-
pean Community and the Atlantic Alliance to 
co-ordinate their policies in the face of develop-
ments in the situation in Poland. 
In response to suggestions by the Assembly 
in its Recommendation 378, the Council out-
lined the measures taken concerning humanita-
rian aid for the Polish people, the suspension of 
financial and economic assistance to Poland, 
the restriction of imports from the Soviet Union 
decided within the EEC framework and the 
conclusions of the meeting of the European 
Council on 29th and 30th March regarding 
East-West economic and commercial relations. 
The Council were deeply concerned to 
learn of the outlawing of the Polish trade 
unions, including Solidarity, on 8th October. 
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In their reply to Assembly Recommenda-
tion 384, they pointed out that this retrograde 
step, inconsistent with the final act of Helsinki 
and contrary to various statements made by the 
Polish leadership since 13th December 1981, 
would render more difficult the restoration of 
normal relations between Poland and the West. 
On this occasion, the Council assured the 
Assembly that the member states of WEU 
would continue their efforts within European 
political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance 
to persuade the Polish Government to honour 
their undertaking to re-establish civil liberties 
and the process of reform and to permit the 
revival of a genuinely free trade union 
movement. 
The events of 31st August and the mass 
protests that followed the dissolution of Solida-
rity were further reminders that only through 
genuine dialogue could Poland achieve lasting 
political and economic stability. 
Noting with concern and disapproval the 
serious external pressure and the campaign 
directed by the USSR and other eastern coun-
tries against the efforts for renewal in Poland, 
the Council informed the Assembly that they 
would continue to follow closely the effect of 
measures applied to Poland and the Soviet 
Union by western governments. 
The Council supported the positions set 
out in the declaration published by the Euro-
pean Council following its meeting on 3rd and 
4th December in Copenhagen and in point 3 of 
the final communique of the ministerial session 
of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels 
on 9th and 1Oth December1• 
The Council noted the suspension of mar-
tial law and the release at the end of the year of 
a large number of internees in Poland. They 
hoped that these measures would be followed 
without delay by other developments needed to 
meet the demands of the WEU member 
countries. 
(iz) With regard to the discussions which took 
place between 9th February and 12th March 
1982 at the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, 
the Council, in reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 3 78 noted with regret that the violation 
of the principles of the final act of Helsinki, of 
which the repression in Poland constituted a 
particularly grave element, had not only pre-
vented the Madrid meeting achieving positive 
results, but had even put at risk the entire 
CSCE process. The Council stated that the 
WEU member countries remained committed 
to the continuation of the CSCE process and 
hoped that, 'when the Madrid meeting resumed 
l. See Annex I. 
on 9th November, circumstances would be 
more conducive to the achievement of a posi-
tive outcome. 
In their reply of 9th November to Recom-
mendation 384 - the very day of the resump-
tion of the meeting in Madrid - the Council 
reaffirmed the importance attached by WEU 
member countries to the CSCE process as a 
useful tool for furthering their objectives both 
with a view to better implementation of the 
final act of Helsinki and in order to develop a 
management of relations in general with the 
East. 
As regards the sixth phase of the Madrid 
meeting, the WEU member countries expressed 
their preoccupation about the situation in 
Poland during the review of implementation of 
the final act of Helsinki. They continued their 
efforts to arrive at a substantial and balanced 
concluding document based on the draft sub-
mitted by the neutral and non-aligned countries 
in December 1981. The allies introduced a 
number of amendments to bring it up to date 
with realities in Europe and to call for progress 
on human rights, free trade unions and a freer 
movement of people, ideas and information. 
The Council regret that it was in large 
mesure because of the negative effects of the 
situation in Poland the Madrid negotiations 
could not be successfully concluded in 
1982. They noted however that when the 
meeting broke up on 17th December, the parti-
cipants had at least agreed to resume work on 
8th February 1983. 
They recall that in accordance with the 
aims stated in the declaration of the European 
Council following its meeting of 3rd and 4th 
December in Copenhagen and in point 13 of 
the final communique of the ministerial session 
of the North Atlantic Council held on 9th and 
lOth December, in Brussels, the WEU member 
countries are resolved to continue their efforts 
to arrive at a substantial and balanced conclud-
ing document which would contain the follow-
ing two elements: a precise mandate for a 
conference on disarmament in Europe to nego-
tiate in a first phase militarily-significant, poli-
tically-binding and verifiable confidence and 
security-building measures applicable to the 
whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the 
Urals; progress in the application of the provi-
sions of the final act of Helsinki relating to 
humanitarian aspects of East-West relations. 
(c) The Council also wish to point out that, 
following the change of_leadership in the USSR, 
the WEU member countries in concert with 
their European Community and Atlantic 
Alliance partners emphasised that their rela-
tions with that country would continue to be 
based on firmness and dialogue and that they 
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were ready to respond positively to the efforts 
expected from the Soviet Government to 
improve confidence in international affairs and 
to work together with the USSR and other East 
European countries for a more constructive 
East-West relationship. 
2. Situation in Afghanistan 
The Council confirm the views expressed 
on this subject in their previous annual report 
to the Assembly. 
The Council deplored the continuation 
into 1982 of the military occupation of Afghan-
istan by the Soviet Union in the face of deter-
mined resistance by the Afghan people, the 
repression of the civilian population, and the 
forced exile of more than three million people 
since the intervention of the Soviet army. 
The Council recalled that in a declaration 
published on 30th March, after the internatio-
nal day of Afghanistan, the European Council 
had reaffirmed the need to hasten the search for 
a political solution based on the complete with-
drawal of the Soviet troops and respect for the 
independence, sovereignty and non-alignment 
of Afghanistan. 
They welcomed the sustained efforts by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations and 
his personal representative to reach a solution 
in accordance with the principles of the resolu-
tions adopted by an overwhelming majority of 
the General Assembly. 
The Council associate themselves with the 
declaration published following the meeting on 
3rd and 4th December in Copenhagen by the 
European Council' which expressed the view 
that the new Soviet leadership would reassess 
its position, again expressed its readiness to 
support any realistic effort to achieve a political 
solution based on the principles mentioned 
above and recalled the European Council pro-
posal of 30th June 1981 for such a solution. 
3. Situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East 
(a) With regard to the evolution in 1982 of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, the Council welcomed the 
final withdrawal of Israel from Sinal which took 
place on 25th April ; this was an important step 
forward not only for the development of peace-
ful relations between Israel and Egypt but also 
for efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in 
the Middle East in accordance with Security 
Council Resolution 242. 
On the other hand, the Council deplored 
the policy pursued by Israel in the occupied 
I. See Annex 11. 
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territories, which is not only illegal under inter-
national law but is a serious obstacle to the 
creation of the climate of confidence required 
for any negotiations. They also strongly deplored 
the tragic events that occurred in the Leba-
non and in this connection recall the following: 
The European Council on 29th and 30th 
March and the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 
Ten on 25th April, the day following the Israeli 
bombardment of the Lebanon, urged all the 
parties involved to renounce the use of force 
and to assure conditions for the respect of the 
full sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
country. 
In view of the sharp deterioration in the 
situation and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon at 
the beginning of June, the governments of the 
WEU member countries firmly supported the 
resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council on 5th and 6th June (Nos. 508 
and 509) and the subsequent resolutions on this 
question. They welcomed the declaration of 
6th June by the representatives of the industrial-
ised countries at their summit meeting in Ver-
sailles. They also played an active part in the 
consultations between the member countries of 
the European Community whose position was 
stated in the declaration published by the 
Foreign Affairs Ministers at their special session 
in Bonn on 9th June and by the European 
Council after its meeting of 28th and 29th June 
in Brussels. In view of the massacre of Pales-
tine civilians in Beirut they gave their full 
support to the resolution adopted by the United 
Nations Security Council on 19th September 
(No. 521) and to the resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted on 24th 
September. They also expressed their pro-
found shock in the declaration published by the 
Ten on 20th September. 
In reply to Assembly Recommendation 
386, the Council strongly condemned the cycle 
of violence, especially the Israeli invasion of the 
Lebanon. They affirmed the WEU member 
countries' solidarity with a friendly country 
whose population had suffered so cruelly and 
whose stability was dangerously threatened. 
They expressed their profound revulsion at the 
crime perpetrated against Palestinian civilians 
in Beirut. 
The Council stated that the WEU member 
countries hoped that the Lebanese people 
would be able to bring about national reconci-
liation ; these countries were prepared to assist 
in the relief and reconstruction of the Lebanon. 
Furthermore, the Council welcomed the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 521 and 
the significant contribution to the security of 
the civilian population of Beirut made by the 
deployment of the multinational force in which 
forces belonging to two WEU member coun-
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tries, France and Italy, were participating along 
with the United States. 
The Council said that they were convinced 
that a return to lasting peace in the Lebanon 
and the restoration of its national sovereignty 
required the rapid and complete withdrawal of 
all foreign forces, except those authorised by 
the Lebanese Government, whose authority 
should be fully re-established over all its natio-
nal territory. All efforts designed to achieve 
these objectives would be supported by the 
Council. 
In their reply to the Assembly, the Council 
reaffirmed their conviction that, looking beyond 
the solution of the Lebanese problem the 
Middle East could only enjoy lasting peac~ and 
true stability through the participation of all 
parties in a comprehensive settlement which 
should be based on the principles of security for 
all states, justice for all peoples of the region 
and renunciation of force ·by all parties 
concerned. The Council emphasised that such 
a settlement should be founded on mutual 
recognition by all the parties involved of 
Israel's right to exist within secure and interna-
tionally-recognised frontiers and also of the 
right of self-determination for the Palestinians 
with all that this implied. For such negotia-
tions to be possible, the Council considered that 
the Palestinian people must be represented and 
the PLO would have to be associated with 
negotiations. 
In view of the principles mentioned above 
the Council welcomed President Reagan's ne~ 
initiative contained in his speech on 1st Sep-
tember 1982, which offered an important 
opportunity for peaceful progress towards a 
solution of the Palestinian question and the 
reconciliation of the parties involved. In this 
connection, they underlined the importance of 
the statement adopted by the Arab heads of 
state and government at Fez on 9th September, 
which they saw as an expression of the unani-
mous will of the participants, including the 
PLO, to work for the achievement of a just 
peace in the Middle East encompassing all 
states i.n the area, including Israel. Finally, the 
Council expressed the view that discussions of 
the F~nco-Egyptian draft treaty by the Security 
Council could play a useful part in establishing 
a common basis for a solution of the problems 
of the area. . 
The Council endorsed the appeal to each 
of the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the urgent recommendation for the withdrawal 
of foreign troops from the Lebanon expressed in 
the declaration issued by the European Council 
at its meeting in Copenhagen on 3rd and 4th 
December1• 
I. See Annex Ill. 
The Council hope that the negotiations 
between Israel and the Lebanon, which began 
on 28th December, will soon achieve positive 
results. 
(b) With regard to the conflict between Iran 
and Iraq, the Council recall that in 1982 the 
WEU member countries, in concert with their 
partners of the European Community, on seve-
ral occasions expressed their grave concern at 
the continuation of this violent and destructive 
conflict between the two countries. They 
endorsed the wish, expressed in the declarations 
published by the Foreign Affairs Ministers of 
the Ten on 24th May, by the European Council 
on 29th June as well as by its Chairman-in-
Office in the speech which he made at the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 
28th September, namely that there should be an 
immediate settlement based on the principles 
adopted by the international community, such 
as those defined by the Security Council in its 
resolutions of 28th September 1980 and 12th 
July 1982. The Council recall that the WEU 
member countries are prepared to help towards 
attaining this objective. 
4. Falklands crisis 
As stated in reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 373, the Council are convinced of the 
need to find political· solutions to crises and 
conflicts that may occur in the world, parti-
cularly in the South Atlantic, and in so doing 
abide fully by the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
The Council, therefore, deplore the grave 
events which occurred in the South Atlantic, in 
which force was used against a member country 
of WEU, contrary to the principles of the Uni-
ted Nations Charter - especially that of the 
peaceful settlement of disputes - and in defiance 
of the Security Council resolutions. 
With respect to the attitude of WEU mem-
ber countries to the Falklands crisis, the Coun-
cil recall the following: 
Immediately after the Argentine fleet set 
out to the Falklands, the United Kingdom 
began urgent consultations at the United 
Nations Security Council, within the framework 
of European political co-operation and within 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
On 2nd April, the day of the invasion by 
the Argentine forces, the Foreign Affairs Minis-
ters of the Ten stated that they condemned the 
armed intervention of the Argentinian Govern-
ment and called upon the latter to withdraw its 
forces immediately and to abide by the United 
Nations Security Council appeal asking it to 
refrain from the use of force and to continue 
efforts towards a diplomatic solution. 
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In their declaration of lOth April' the Ten 
stressed that they attached the greatest impor-
tance to the immediate and effective implemen-
tation of Security Council Resolution 502, 
namely an immediate cessation of hostilities, an 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces 
from the Falkland Islands and a search for a 
diplomatic solution to their dispute by the 
Governments of Argentina and the United 
Kingdom. 
To these ends, and in a spirit of mutual 
solidarity, the governments of the Ten applied a 
complete embargo on the export of arms and 
military equipment to Argentina and, a few 
days later, they applied an embargo to imports 
of Argentine origin, agreed in the context of the 
application of the Treaty of Rome. 
In the final communique of 18th May 
issued after the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Luxembourg, the representatives of 
the member countries of the alliance also 
condemned Argentina for its aggression against 
the Falkland Islands, in view of the fundamen-
tal importance which they attached to the prin-
ciple that the use of force to resolve internatio-
nal disputes should be resolutely opposed by 
the international community. They called for 
a continuation of the efforts by the parties 
concerned to achieve a satisfactory negotiated 
settlement in accordance with Security Council 
Resolution 502 in its entirety. 
The WEU Council discussed the Falklands 
crisis with representatives of the Assembly at 
the joint meetings held on 19th May in London 
with the General Affairs Committee and the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments. They noted carefully the reports drawn 
up by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments and the views expressed on this 
matter at the second part of the twenty-eighth 
ordinary session of the Assembly. Lord Bel-
stead, Minister of State, Foreign and Common-
wealth Office of the United Kingdom, informed 
the Assembly in his speech on 1st December of 
his government's position with respect to the 
Falkland Islands. 
5. Co-operation between Europe and the United States 
The Council refer to the declaration issued 
by the European Council in Brussels on 30th 
March 1982 concerning transatlantic relations ; 
the text of this declaration is annexed to this 
report2• 
In their reply in November to Recommen-
dation 387 on European-United States eo-
1. See Annex IV. 
2. See Annex V. 
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operation for international peace and joint 
security, the Council stated that they attached 
particular importance to the consultations with-
in the framework of existing machinery and 
recalled that in the event of a specific crisis the 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance had 
at their disposal a wide variety of facilities for 
adequate consultation, enabling them to react 
accordingly. 
The Council expressed the opinion that 
informal meetings at ministerial level could 
contribute to an improvement in transatlantic 
relations. Such a meeting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the alliance took place on 
2nd and 3rd October at Val David (Canada). 
In this same reply, the Council acknow-
ledged that divergent views may have arisen 
between western countries as regards their eco-
nomic relations with the eastern countries. 
The Council recalled that since the beginning 
of 1982, the western countries had met in 
various fora in order to reach a common 
approach remaining consistent with their politi-
cal and security interests ; the Council also 
stressed that a concerted, realistic and cautious 
approach towards the eastern countries was one 
of the major concerns of the WEU member 
countries. 
B. Defence questions 
In the course of the year under review, 
questions relating to European defence and 
security have continued to play an important 
role in the Council's activities. 
Thus, on the occasion of the presentation 
of the twenty-seventh annual report of the 
Council in June, Mr. Tindemans, Minister for 
External Relations of Belgium and Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, recalled that the 
Council pursued its activities with the objective 
of ensuring that the obligations defined under 
the modified Brussels Treaty were properly ful-
filled. He emphasised that the Council conti-
nued to maintain a close watch over the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the treaty and its 
protocols relating to the levels of forces and 
armaments in the member states, and that the 
procedures laid down for this purpose func-
tioned normally. The Minister confirmed once 
again the importance attached by member 
countries to the commitment to collective self-
defence contained in Article V of the treaty. 
He observed that, in the matter of armaments 
control, the Council had repeatedly indicated 
their wish to take account of the changing 
situation in Europe and could always take 
advantage of the procedural rules which em-
powered them to make whatever adjustments 
might be required as a result of technical 
advances in the armaments field. 
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Answering a point raised by a member of 
the Assembly following his presentation, Mr. 
Tindemans explained the provisions of the 
treaty and its protocols governing armaments 
control adding that, if the Council were to re-
examine the relevant lists, they would do so in 
total compliance with the procedures laid down 
by the treaty. 
The Council paid particular attention to 
the report on the application of the treaty, pre-
pared by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments as a reply to the twenty-
seventh annual report, and to the debate lead-
ing up to the vote by the Assembly on Recom-
mendation 3801• 
1. Level of forces of member states 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU 
place under NATO command are fixed in Art-
icles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Article Ill of the protocol 
provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to 
enable these levels to be increased above the 
limits specified in Articles I and 11. 
· So that they may satisfy themselves that 
the limits laid down in Articles I and 11 of 
Protocol No. 11 are not exceeded, the Council 
receive information every year concerning the 
levels in question, in accordance with Article 
IV of that protocol. This information is 
obtained in the course of inspections carried out 
by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
and is transmitted to the Council by a high-
ranking officer designated by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end of 1981, 
which was conveyed by this officer at the 
appropriate time, was considered by the Coun-
cil on 24th March. Information indicating the 
status as at the end of 1982 was called for in 
December and is expected to be presented to 
the Council at the usual time. 
Furthermore, the Council take the neces-
sary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in their resolution of 15th September 
1956 whereby the levels of forces under NATO 
command are examined in the light of the 
annual review. 
For the year 1981, at a meeting held on 
18th January 1982 in Brussels, the permanent 
representatives to the North Atlantic Council of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom examined the levels of forces 
1. See 4 (a) below. 
of WEU member states and reported to the 
Council. 
The Council, at their meeting of 24th 
February, noted that the level of forces of the 
member states of WEU, as set out in the 
NATO force plan, fell within the limits speci-
fied in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as in 
force at that time. They also took note qf a 
declaration on French forces made by the 
representative of France. 
On 15th October, the Council examined 
the report of a further meeting of the same six 
permanent representatives to the North Atlantic 
Council, and approved the acceptance by one 
member state of the increase in its force level 
recommended by SACEUR. 
The first steps to implement the procedure 
laid down in the resolution of _15th September 
1956 have been taken for the year 1982. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national com-
mand - internal defence and police forces, 
forces for the defence of overseas territories, and 
common defence forces - are fixed each year in 
accordance with the procedure specified in the 
agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957 in implementation of Article V of Proto-
col No. 11. 
* 
* * 
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By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have 
been able, in 1982, to carry out their obliga-
tions under Protocol No. 11 to the modified 
Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed 
on the continent of Europe 
In accordance with the Council's reply to 
Assembly Recommendation 331 the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom have informed the 
Council that the average number of British land 
forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 
1982 in accordance with the commitment in 
Article VI of Protocol No. 11 of the modified 
Brussels Treaty was 59,567. The continued 
need for the presence of troops in Northern 
Ireland made it necessary for units of the 
British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for 
short tours of duty there. In 1982 there were 
on average 909 men in Northern Ireland. As 
has been previously stated these units would be 
speedily returned to their duty station in an 
emergency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Coun-
cil's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348 
the Government of the United Kingdom have 
informed the Council that the strength of the 
United Kingdom's contribution to the Second 
Allied Tactical Air Force in 1982 was: 
Role 
Strike/ Attack 
Aircraft/Equipment 
Buccaneers 
Squadrons 
2 
Jaguars 
Offensive support Harrier 
Reconnaissance 
Air defence 
Jaguars 
Phantom 
4 
2 
1 
2 
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 4 
Air transport Puma 
Ground defence RAF regiment 
3. Study of the situation of the armaments sector 
of industry in member countries' 
The Permanent Council, with assistance 
from the head of the international secretariat of 
the SAC, prepared this question for consider-
ation by Ministers at their meeting on 19th 
May. 
1. See also Chapters I, Band IV, A. I. 
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At this meeting, Ministers were informed 
of the successive stages to date in the imple-
mentation of the mandate given to the SAC by 
the Council on 20th April 1977. 
A declassified version of the SAC's study 
had been transmitted by the Council to the 
Assembly on lOth May. 
Ministers agreed that work should continue 
on updating the economic part of the study. 
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Ministers also referred to possible ways of 
giving new direction to and reactivating the 
Standing Armaments Committee. 
4. Replies to Assembly recommetulations 
and written q•estions 
(a) Following the adoption by the Assembly at 
its June part-session of Recommendation 380 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty, the 
Council held a number of discussions on the 
proposals contained in this particular recom-
mendation. 
The Council welcomed the fact that the 
Assembly recognised that the provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty retained their full value and 
that it stressed the importance of WEU in the 
sphere of security. 
Recalling that Annex Ill to Protocol No. 
Ill had been amended on several occasions 
since 1958, the Council stated in their reply 
that they had received with great interest and 
were considering the Assembly's recommenda-
tion to cancel paragraphs IV (Long-range missi-
les and guided missiles) and VI (Bomber aircraft 
for strategic purposes) to the list at Annex Ill 
according to the procedure laid down in Article 
11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. As regards varying the list at Annex 
IV to Protocol No. Ill, they were considering 
the technical, military and political aspects of 
the problem. 
They added that the overall system organ-
ised under the treaty and its protocols, the 
implementation of which, as regards level of 
forces, regularly appeared in the annual report, 
enabled the Council to be informed of and to 
assess the situation of the level of forces and 
their armaments assigned to SACEUR for the 
common defence. The level of forces thus 
assigned resulted from the undertakings made 
by the member states within the framework of 
the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in 11.5 
and 6 and IV of the final act of the Nine-Power 
Conference, held in London between 28th Sep-
tember and 3rd October 1954. The forces 
assigned by the various countries to the com-
mon NATO defence were in fact defined on the 
basis of a plan which was kept up to date 
within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces 
resulted from the joint effort of the member 
countries in accordance with the capacity of 
each to contribute and with the aim of ensuring 
at all times an adequate level of forces. 
Consequently, there appeared to be no 
need to invite the states concerned to make uni-
lateral declarations to the WEU Council 
concerning a matter which was already dealt 
with in the multilateral context of NATO. 
Nor did there appear to be any possibility of 
including in future annual reports any state-
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ments on the level of forces other than those 
which were already given. 
(b) In their reply to the suggestions in Recom-
mendation 3 72 regarding consultations on 
matters relating to disarmament or the limita-
tion of both conventional and nuclear weapons, 
the Council recalled that the member countries 
consulted regularly and effectively on such 
matters in different fora; and in particular 
concerning INF, the Special Consultative 
Group brought together all the countries which 
took part in the decision to modernise these 
forces. They also stated that it was within the 
framework of NA TO's long-term defence plan, 
which provided for the strengthening of certain 
fundamental sectors of allied conventional for-
ces, that direct participation by certain Euro-
pean countries had assumed importance. The 
Council endorsed the Assembly's desire that 
Europe should provide itself with the means 
necessary for playing an effective part in mea-
sures taken in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance for its own security. 
(c) The theme of European security was taken 
up again by the Council in responding to 
Recommendations 373, 374, 375, 382, 383 and 
387, and to Written Questions 230 and 231. 
Thus, their reply to Recommendation 375 
stated that it was the declared intention of the 
NATO allies concerned that they would move 
ahead with the December 1979 two-track deci-
sion on intermediate-range nuclear force 
modernisation and arms control. 
The Council recalled that they attached the 
greatest importance to the positions and atti-
tudes of the publics in member countries on the 
subject of nuclear weapons and their arms 
control. They believed that an important and 
continuing task was the explanation of the 
defensive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
the rationale behind the strategy of deterrence 
and the essential role of arms control. The 
task of explanation was all the greater in the 
light of the sustained Soviet propaganda cam-
paign which aimed to undercut public support 
for agreed objectives and policies of the 
alliance. 
The Council consider that it is essential to 
put the case for western security forcefully. 
They welcomed, therefore, at the part-session in 
December, the Assembly's debate, arising from 
a detailed report of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, on the problems 
arising from pacifism and neutralism. 
In their detailed reply to Recommendation 
382 on disarmament, the Council reaffirmed 
their full commitment to support all efforts to 
guarantee respect for the principles set out in 
the United Nations Charter, and in particular 
the principle of non-use of force in interna-
tional relations, the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, the right of security and legitimate 
defence and the right of all peoples to self-
determination. The Council shared the view 
that enhanced respect for these principles 
contributed to creating favourable conditions 
for success in the disarmament process. 
They observed that a substantial reduction 
in the level of nuclear weapons can only be 
attained by balanced agreements, while only 
mutually agreed reductions would promote sta-
bility. Concerning the INF talks, only the 
"global approach", put forward by the United 
States and supported by the European allies, 
was a realistic point of view. 
In their reply to Recommendation 383, the 
Council asserted that NA TO's resolve in imple-
menting its 12th December 1979 decision was 
the key factor in persuading the Soviet Union 
to enter into arms control negotiations in 
Geneva and would continue to be crucial to 
achieving concrete results. WEU member 
countries that participated in the December 
1979 decision would continue to do all within 
their power to promote early progress towards 
negotiated agreement on the basis of the so-
called "zero option" or "zero-level outcome" 
for American and Soviet longer-range land-
based INF missiles. These countries considered 
that the negotiations should, as a priority, 
relate to those systems which constituted the 
greatest threat. They did not rule out the pos-
sibility that in the event of agreement, sub-
sequent phases of the negotiations might relate 
to other INF systems. They believed that it 
would be premature to prejudge the forum in 
which any arms control agreement covering 
short-range or battlefield nuclear systems might 
be considered. The opening of the START 
talks was also welcomed and the Council 
endorsed the Assembly's concern to see effective 
verification measures in any arms control agree-
ment. 
In the course of their answer to Recom-
mendation 387 on European-United States co-
operation for international peace and joint 
security, the Council recalled that, in spring 
1982, NATO had published for the first time 
an official comparison of the forces of the 
NATO integrated military structure and of the 
Warsaw Pact. The Council regarded it as of 
great importance that the alliance countries 
concerned should continue to base their public 
statements about the balance of forces as much 
as possible on such a commonly agreed docu-
ment and that they were in agreement that new 
decisions in the armaments field needed to be 
explained in relation to the threat to which 
they were designed to respond. 
In their answer to Written Question 230, 
the Council repeated that close consultations on 
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the nuclear arms limitation negotiations bet-
ween the United States and the Soviet Union 
took place between the former and other 
NATO partners, parties to the decision of 12th 
December 1979, who made an active contribu-
tion in the Special Consultative Group towards 
establishing the INF negotiating position of the 
United States. A suitable procedure of consul-
tation on a regular basis had been estab-
lished within the alliance with regard to the 
START negotiations. 
The Council took the opportunity afforded 
by Written Question 231 to state that member 
countries participating in the MBFR negotia-
tions had played a full part in developing in 
NATO the western proposal for an integrated 
agreement announced at the Bonn NATO sum-
mit in June. These countries were convinced 
that the common collective force ceilings 
proposed would permit sufficient United States 
and other allied conventional forces to remain 
in the area of reductions in Central Europe to 
guarantee the alliance's collective deterrence 
and defence capability. 
(d) The various aspects of, and problems asso-
ciated with, the development of co-operative 
armaments programmes were set out in the 
Council's substantial reply to Recommendation 
385 where the aims and tasks of the various 
bodies working in this sphere were explained. 
With regard to the Standing Armaments 
Committee, it was pointed out that this body 
was set up in 1955 with the aim of increasing 
the efficiency of the forces of the countries of 
WEU by improving their logistics and the use 
of the resources available to them for equipping 
and supplying their forces and, by sharing, in 
the best interests of all, the research on, deve-
lopment of, and production of armaments. 
The Committee had carried out its task in a 
variety of ways for many years. 
Insofar as the SAC study on the "Arma-
ments sector of industry in the WEU member 
countries " was concerned, the Council, as 
stated in their reply to Recommendation 374, 
would examine, at the appropriate moment, in 
depth and with the aim of efficiency, the action 
to be taken on this study, which, it was hoped, 
would assist member governments to move 
towards greater co-operation in their program-
mes and military investment expenditure. 
Moreover, in their reply to Recommenda-
tion 379, the Council observed that if the inter-
national secretariat of the SAC were occa-
sionally to assist the Assembly in the study of 
clearly-defined themes, this could only be done 
under a procedure involving a case-by-case 
examination by the Council, under whom the 
SAC was placed. It was clear that such work 
could not have the effect of relieving the SAC_ 
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of its responsibilities nor could it atfect its 
competences, these being the Council's exclu-
sive responsibility. 
S. Meeting between the Council and the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments 
of the Assembly 
On the occasion of the joint meeting of 
19th May, the Council discussed with the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
several subjects which the latter had proposed•. 
6. Contacts with SHAPE 
In the context of maintaining the long-
established links between the Council and 
the military authorities of NATO, and at 
SACEUR's invitation, arrangements were set in 
train for the Council to visit SHAPE for a 
briefing and to attend SHAPEX 83. Council 
representatives were also present as observers at 
certain NATO military exercises. 
7. Military archives of the Brussels Treaty Organisation 
The Council agreed that an ad hoc group 
of experts should meet in spring 1983 to con-
sider releasing for research purposes the 
1948-19 50 military archives of the Brussels 
Treaty Organisation. 
C. Scientific, technological 
and aerospace questions 
The Council noted with interest the views 
expressed in the conclusions of the high-quality 
reports produced by the Committee on Scienti-
fic, Technological and Aerospace Questions, 
during the sessions of the Assembly, and at the 
colloquy on international aeronautical consortia 
organised by the committee. The Council 
noted with satisfaction that these views corres-
ponded broadly with their own. 
In their replies to Recommendations 376, 
377, 381 and 385, the Council provided detailed 
information regarding the policies of WEU 
member countries on energy, aeronautics, and 
space questions. They also stated the position 
of these countries regarding the work of the 
third Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
1. The energy problem 
The Council fully recognise the necessity of 
increasing the security and independence of 
energy sources of member countries. 
l. See Chapter I, D. I. 
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In their reply to Recommendation 381, the 
Council recalled that these countries were 
already studying, within the framework of the 
European Communities and, for those who are 
members of it, the International Energy Agency 
(lEA), the possibility of increasing supplies 
through concerted action, to enable each of 
them to reduce its vulnerability to possible 
sudden crises. 
The Council also pointed to the measures 
taken by member countries to encourage greater 
autonomy in the energy field, through reduc-
tion of the extent of their dependence on oil 
imports and more rational and efficient use of 
energy, as well as increased use of nuclear 
energy ; in this connection the Council noted 
that, in accordance with recommendations of 
the INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation) study, the value of the use of fast-
breeder reactors had been recognised. 
Finally, the Council stated that to ensure 
greater continuity in energy supplies, they 
believed that sources of supply should be diver-
sified to the greatest degree possible. 
The Council welcome the fact that one of 
the priority goals stated in the conclusions of 
the European Council meeting in Copenhagen 
on 3rd and 4th December should be the pursuit 
of a vigorous energy policy with a view to 
saving energy and diversifying supply, and that 
consequently it was decided to speed up the 
adoption of the Commission's current and 
forthcoming proposals in that field. 
2. European aeronautics 
The Council welcome the interest that the 
Assembly displays in European aeronautical co-
operation. The colloquy on international 
aeronautical consortia held in London on 9th 
and lOth February 1982, under the auspices of 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions, is further evidence of this 
interest, as is Recommendation 385 on the 
conclusions of this meeting, which the Council 
has studied attentively. 
As pointed out in their reply to the Assem-
bly, the development of co-operative arma-
ments programmes, particularly in the field of 
aeronautics, is a lengthy task calling for a prag-
matic approach and patient efforts. The seek-
ing of consensus between industrial, economic, 
military and political interests explains why 
progress is difficult. Nevertheless, as recog-
nised unanimously by the participants in the 
London colloquy, co-operation is an absolute 
necessity. The exorbitant and ever-increasing 
burden of the research, development and pro-
duction costs of aeronautical programmes is an 
argument for European co-operation, parti-
cularly through suitable consortia, whenever 
such co-operation, with all the diversity required, 
is possible. Airbus Industrie, Euromissile and 
Panavia are illustrations of such an approach. 
Inspired by a constantly reaffirmed politi-
cal will, the various competent international 
bodies, each within the framework of their res-
ponsibilities, have a particular role to play in 
this co-operation. In the Council's opinion, 
the machinery available for consultation must 
function as efficiently as possible within the 
Independent European Programme Group, the 
Standing Armaments Committee of WEU and 
the Conference of National Armaments Direc-
tors of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Like the European institutions, the govern-
ments are fully aware of the emergence of a 
civil aircraft industry within Europe and are 
endeavouring to advance along the difficult 
path towards harmonising legal and fiscal sys-
tems. As regards the armaments industry, and 
in particular military aircraft, the Council 
pointed out that the security interests of the 
WEU member countries cannot be ignored. 
The latter consider, therefore, that questions of 
a structural nature should remain within the 
province of the bodies competent in defence 
matters. 
The Council noted that the governments of 
the WEU member countries are also fully 
aware of the importance of the family of air-
craft concept, of which the Airbus is a striking 
reality. In the military sphere, the application 
of this concept is undoubtedly more difficult, 
but the variety of prospects that it offers will 
nevertheless be thoroughly explored. 
Furthermore, in their reply to Written 
Question 229, the Council gave certain details 
on the Franco-German second generation Tran-
sall programme and the Franco-Italian regional 
transport aircraft A TR-42. 
3. Space questions 
In reply to the Assembly's Recommenda-
tion 376 on United States-European co-opera-
tion, the Council gave the following details: 
The diplomatic missions in the United 
States of the WEU member countries continue 
to follow developments in respect of the inter-
national solar-polar mission. 
Under an agreement signed in 1973 the 
United States Government are committed to 
using European-built Spacelabs, components 
and spares, where these are available, in accord-
ance with agreed schedules and at reasonable 
prices. The United States Government has 
also agreed not to duplicate the Spacelab deve-
lopment. 
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The European Space Agency is completing 
definition studies of a programme for an 
oceanic observation satellite ERS-1, which 
could be launched in 1987. The European 
countries welcome international collaboration 
in the development and utilisation of remote-
sensing of the earth. Later, as these develop-
ments become operational, the establishment of 
reciprocal arrangements for the exchange of 
data or mutual access will be an important 
goal. 
The space telescope is due to be launched 
from the shuttle in late 1985 and will enable 
extensive stellar investigation to be made from 
outside the earth's atmosphere. NASA has 
indicated that it attaches high priority to this 
project for which ESA will be supplying the 
solar arrays and faint-object camera. 
In its Recommendation 381, the Assembly 
recalled the importance attached to the deve-
lopment of European co-operation in space 
matters. 
Accordingly, in their reply, the Council 
pointed out that WEU member countries had 
for several years played an active part in the 
work of the European Space Agency, whose 
purpose is to promote scientific and applied 
research in the space field and to make Euro-
pean industry in this sector competitive in 
world markets. 
They noted that ESA is actively involved 
in many scientific meteorological and earth 
observation satellite projects, and also in tele-
communications and data-processing systems 
projects. They added that the ESA member 
countries are considering setting up an opera-
tional European meteorological satellite system. 
Negotiations have been in progress since January 
1981 and are expected shortly to reach a posi-
tive conclusion. 
4. Law of the sea 
In their reply in April to Recommendation 
3 77 the Council stated that they shared the 
Assembly's view that the third United Nations 
Law of the Sea Conference was of the greatest 
importance for the political, economic and 
security interests of the WEU member states. 
They stated that the aim pursued by the 
governments of these states in the intensive 
consultations held among themselves and with 
all other states and groups of states represented 
in this conference, was to reach a universally 
accepted international convention on the law of 
the sea. They stated the advantages such a 
convention might have with respect to a better 
establishment of the rule of law on the world 
oceans: it could forestall in the future many 
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difficulties and therefore would constitute a 
factor in maintaining peaceful and friendly rela-
tions between states. It would also be impor-
tant for relations between western industrialised 
countries and developing countries of the third 
world. 
The Council pointed out that a satisfactory 
international regulation of deep seabed-mining 
was strategically and economically of great 
importance especially for industrialised Western 
European countries which are highly dependent 
on imports of raw materials to be extracted 
from the deep seabed. A generally acceptable 
treaty was also important to the developing 
countries, inter alia because of the financial 
benefits they would gain from the sharing of 
revenue resulting from the exploitation of the 
raw materials concerned. WEU member coun-
tries have participated constructively in all the 
consultations and negotiations that have taken 
place on this subject, with a view to setting up 
a fair regime for exploitation of the seabed, 
comprising a system of adequate access that 
takes into account all interests concerned. 
The Council regret therefore that the 
conference did not achieve acceptable results 
for several WEU member countries, which did 
not sign the convention submitted to the coun-
tries represented on 1Oth December at Montego 
Bay (Jamaica). 
* 
* * 
The Council have examined carefully the 
request made at the end of the year by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions which, on the basis of the 
reply to Assembly Recommendation 381, asked 
for the assistance of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and its international secretariat in 
order to prepare the second part of its report on 
the harmonisation of research in civil and mili-
tary high technology fields1• 
D. Secretariat-General 
The Secretariat-General assisted the Coun-
cil and its working group in all their activities 
during 1982. 
The Secretary-General or his principal offi-
cers, representing WEU, attended a number of 
meetings of other international organisations 
when questions of concern to WEU were under 
consideration. As in previous years the most 
frequent of the Secretary-General's contacts 
were with the authorities of the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Council of Europe. 
l. The Assembly was informed of the Council's decision 
on 28th January 1983. 
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* 
* * 
Deputy Secretary-General of WEU 
The Council noted with regret the depar-
ture of Ambassador Joachim Schlaich who was 
recalled by the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to take up a new post. 
The Council paid tribute to the high quality of 
the Ambassador's services to the organisation 
over a period of five years. 
The Council appointed Ambassador Dr. 
Jiirgen Diesel to succeed Mr. Schlaich in the 
post of Deputy Secretary-General of .WEU. 
Mr. Diesel took up his post on 25th November 
1982. 
ANNEX I 
Declaration on Poland issued by the European 
Council following its meeting on 3rd and 
4th December 1982 in Copenhagen 
The European Council discussed recent 
developments in Poland and noted with regret 
that a large number of persons remain in deten-
tion, that martial law continues, and that the 
free trade union, Solidarity, has been dissolved. 
It also noted, however, that the recent 
release of some internees, including the leader 
of Solidarity, might constitute a step towards 
the fulfilment of the appeal made by the Ten 
on 4th January 1982. 
The Ten will continue to follow develop-
ments in Poland closely and in particular study 
the implications of the possible lifting of mar-
tial law, including the conditions under which 
this will take place. 
Extract from the final communique 
issued by the North Atlantic Council 
following its meeting 
on 9th and lOth December 1982 in Brussels 
3. The violations in Poland of the Helsinki 
final act and of the conventions of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, in particular by the 
banning and dissolution of trade unions inclu-
ding Solidarity, continue to cause the gravest 
concern. 
The allies call upon the Polish authorities 
to abide by their commitment to work for 
national reconciliation. Recalling their decla-
ration of 11th January 1982, the criteria of 
which are far from being fulfilled, the allies 
have noted the recent release of a number of 
detainees and continue to follow closely deve-
lopments in Poland, including possible relaxa-
tion of military rule. They emphasise that in 
this regard the actions of the Polish authorities 
will be judged by their practical effects. The 
allies consider that the improvement of rela-
tions with Poland depends on the extent to 
which the Polish Government gives effect to its 
declared intention to establish civil rights and 
to continue the process of reform. Freedom of 
association and the rights of workers to have 
trade unions of their own choice should not be 
denied to the Polish people. The dialogue 
with all sections of Polish society must be 
resumed. The allies call on all countries to 
respect Poland's fundamental right to choose its 
own social and political structures. 
ANNEX 11 
Declaration on Afghanistan issued 
by the European Council following its meeting 
on 3rd and 4th December 1982 in Copenhagen 
The European Council in particular ex-
pressed the view that the new Soviet leadership 
could make an important contribution to the 
improvement of international relations in gene-
ral and of East-West relations in particular by 
reassessing its position on the question of 
Afghanistan. It endorsed the verdict of the 
international community on the situation in 
Afghanistan, embodied in the fourth successive 
vote of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. The people of Afghanistan should be 
permitted to regain their national sovereignty 
and independence and the status of a non-
aligned state. 
It expressed its readiness to support any 
realistic efforts to achieve a political solution 
and recalled the European Council proposal of 
30th June 1981 for a comprehensive settlement 
of the conflict. 
ANNEX Ill 
Declaration on the situation in the Middle 
East, including Lebanon, issued by the 
European Council following its meeting on 3rd 
and 4th December 1982 in Copenhagen 
Following a report by the Presidency on 
recent contacts the European Council discussed 
events in the Middle East where two aspects in 
particular continue to cause deep concern. 
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First, as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the European Council expressed its disappoint-
ment at the delay in grasping the political 
opportunity created by the initiative contained 
in President Reagan's speech on 1st September 
1982 and the will to peace expressed in the 
declaration of Arab heads of state meeting at 
Fez on 9th September 1982. 
It called upon each of the parties to assume 
its international responsibilities without fur-
ther hesitations. It expects each of the parties 
to cease to ignore the United Nations security 
resolutions and explicitly make known their 
approval of these resolutions. 
Secondly, the European Council continued 
to view the situation in Lebanon with the great-
est concern. It particularly noted that in spite 
of the various efforts made by the negotiators 
on the spot, no significant progress had yet 
been achieved towards the withdrawal of the 
Israeli, Syrian and other foreign forces. The 
persistence of this situation would constitute a 
threat to the integrity and unity of Lebanon, 
carrying serious dangers for the whole region. 
The withdrawal of foreign forces could be 
of a progressive nature, but should take place 
within a fixed and short period of time and 
under conditions which would permit the Leba-
nese authorities to exercise fully their rights of 
sovereignty over all of Lebanon. 
The Ten have already demonstrated their 
willingness to contribute to the solution of the 
problems, especially by giving their support to 
the United Nations forces and United Nations 
observers established by the Security Council as 
well as the multinational force in Beirut to 
which two of their members contribute. The 
Ten and the Community are equally prepared 
to continue to contribute to the reconstruction 
of Lebanon. 
ANNEX IV 
Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
of the member countries of the European 
Community issued on lOth April1982 in Brussels 
1. Representatives of the Ten discussed the 
grave situation resulting from the invasion of 
the Falkland Islands by Argentina. 
2. They recalled that in their declaration of 
2nd April the Ten had already condemned the 
flagrant violation of international law which the 
Argentine military action constituted. 
3. The Ten remain deeply concerned by the 
continuation of this crisis, which endangers 
international peace and security. They there-
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fore attach the greatest importance to the 
immediate and effective implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 502 in all its 
aspects, namely an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, an immediate withdrawal of all 
Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, and 
a search for a diplomatic solution by the 
Governments of Argentina and the United 
Kingdom. 
4. To these ends, and in a spirit of solidarity 
among the member countries of the Commu-
nity, the Ten decide to take a series of measures 
with respect to Argentina which should be put 
into operation as soon as possible. They will 
likewise take the measures necessary to ban all 
imports of Argentine origin into the Commu-
nity. In this context the Ten noted that their 
governments have already decided to apply a 
complete embargo on the export of arms and 
military equipment to Argentina. 
5. With respect to economic measures, these 
will be taken in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Community treaties. 
6. Given that the situation resulting from the 
invasion of the Falkland Islands by the Argen-
tine armed forces is a cause of grave concern for 
the entire international community, the Ten 
call on other governments to associate them-
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selves with their decisions, so as to ensure the 
full implementation of Security Council Reso-
lution 502 with the least possible delay. 
ANNEX V 
Declaration on transatlantic relations 
issued by the European Council following 
its meeting on 29th 
and 30th March 1982 in Brussels 
The European Council discussed the state 
of transatlantic relations. 
It emphasised the importance which it 
attaches to the links of the Ten with the United 
States and its willingness to develop further 
consultations between Europeans and Ameri-
cans. 
It valued the statement made by President 
Reagan on the occasion of the 25th anniversary 
of the Treaties of Rome, in which the United 
States confirmed its wish to co-operate closely 
and on the basis of partnership with a united 
Europe and in accordance with Europe's econo-
mic and political importance, and its role in the 
world. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic of 
Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
Subject to the restrictions referred to under 
points B.2 below, the Agency's control activities 
in 1982 were performed at a satisfactory level. 
B. General remarks on control activities 
1. General operating methods 
The methods used by the Agency are deter-
mined by the provisions of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and by Council decisions on the 
subject. During the year under review they 
remained basically unchanged. 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of 
field mesures for the control of levels and of 
the non-production of certain categories of 
armaments. This aspect covers all activities 
concerned with processing, for the purposes 
defined above, any useful documentary material 
including, in particular, countries' replies to the 
Agency questionnaire, and the results of field 
control measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and ins-
pections, and all that is linked with these func-
tions, constitutes that part of control carried out 
physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information supplied is correct and that under-
takings are observed. 
The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the purpose 
of field control measures being to verify, physi-
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cally, the accuracy of all the information collec-
ted in implementation of Part Ill of Protocol 
No. IV. 
Documentary and field control measures 
are complementary, and equally essential for 
the accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control mea-
sures separately, in the interests of both conve-
nience and clarity. However, it must not be for-
gotten that these measures together make up a 
single control function. 
The Agency draws great benefit from 
the continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-
growing knowledge of the organisation of the 
forces of each member state, of the progress of 
armaments production or procurement pro-
grammes, the Agency develops its control acti-
vity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing 
of levels and quantities of armaments and 
in the choice and assessment of its control 
measures. 
2. Atomic, chemical and biological weapons 
The position described in the last annual 
report of the Council has remained unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency cover neither 
nuclear nor biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these two 
categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only 
non-production controls take place ; no quanti-
tative controls are made since the member sta-
tes have always declared they possessed no such 
armaments (in this connection, for 1982, see 
point E.5 of this report). 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member states with the levels fixed by 
the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. 
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1. lnfomuztion processed by the Agency 
During 1982, documentary controls were 
carried out in the normal way by studying, pro-
cessing and collating documents and informa-
tion obtained from various sources. 
The principal source of information avail-
able to the Agency is the reply sent by each 
member state to its annual questionnaire which, 
when processed in the light of data provided by 
NATO concerning the forces placed under 
allied authority, allows the fixing of appro-
priate levels. 
The second source is the national defence 
budgets which, when cross-checked with the 
data provided by member states in their replies 
to the questionnaire, make it possible to eva-
luate expenditure on armaments and to moni-
tor the financing of production programmes. 
Finally, published material assembled by 
the Central Documentation Office, provides a 
source of valuable information for cross-
checking data obtained through official chan-
nels and for updating the knowledge of the 
experts. 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire 
and replies by member states 
Follow-up action on the replies to the 
questionnaire sent to member states as in all 
previous years was twofold. Some of the facts 
reported were checked physically by means of 
field control measures. In addition, all the 
replies were studied by the Agency experts who 
compared them with the other sources of 
information available, including member coun-
tries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO ques-
tionnaires and budgetary documents. 
(b) Request for annual information 
Control of undertakings by one of the 
member states regarding the non-production of 
certain types of armaments takes the form of 
field control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from a 
study of documents based on the replies of the 
country concerned to the annual questionnaire 
and to the Agency's requests for annual inform-
ation. 
As in previous years, the replies received 
from the country concerned in 1982 were taken 
into consideration for selecting and preparing 
visits, inspections and agreed control measures 
for inclusion in the Agency's programme of 
control measures. 
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(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2(a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of 
the United States and Canada concerning their 
programmes of external aid in military equip-
ment to the forces of member states stationed 
on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these 
countries have provided no aid to the forces 
concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
Within the context of the documental 
control carried out in accordance with the pro-
visions of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the 
Agency has pursued its budgetary studies in 
1982 under the same conditions as in previous 
years. 
The processing of the member states' 
replies to its questionnaire and of unclassified 
documents (general studies, reports of finance 
committees of national parliaments, articles in 
the specialist press) has enabled the Agency to 
identify, in broad outline, the development and 
trends expected by the governments of the 
member countries in the field of defence and to 
monitor more particularly the allocation and 
use of credits assigned to the production of 
equipment subject to control. 
The conclusions of the budgetary studies 
have confirmed, insofar as they are related, the 
results of the Agency's work on the control of 
armament stock levels. 
(f) Use of published material 
The Agency's Central Documentation Office 
has made every effort to provide the Directo-
rate and its experts with information of value 
for their activities by a systematic study of the 
daily press, the official journals of the member 
countries, about sixty specialised magazines and 
technical brochures as well as bulletins from 
NATO and, as the case may be, from other 
international organisations. 
The daily press review, prepared by the 
office, was also sent to the international secreta-
riat of the SAC. 
The constant acceleration of technical pro-
gress and the increasing complexity of copro-
duction agreements, makes this documentary 
work increasingly necessary. 
2. Verifrcation of appropriate levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments 
for forces placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation (Article VII, 2(a), of Protocol No. IV) 
and, in particular, by the NATO international 
staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the 
annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol 
No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
16th November 1982, attended by Agency 
experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, 
and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 13th 
December 1982 ; at this meeting, which was 
attended by the representatives of the Agency, 
of SHAPE and of the international military 
staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels 
of armaments for the forces of member states 
placed under NATO authority and stationed on 
the mainland of Europe represented appropriate 
levels for the control year 1982 within the 
terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for 
those armaments over which the Agency has so 
far been placed in a position to exercise its 
mandate of controlling levels. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
In accordance with the procedure in force 
for the implementation of the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the 
Council with the elements of information 
gathered on the quantities of armaments for 
these forces, notified to the Agency by the 
member states in their replies to the 1982 
questionnaire. 
Under the same procedure, the Council 
accepted or approved for 1982 the maximum 
levels of armaments of these forces and notified 
the Agency accordingly of the purpose of the 
drawing-up of the final tables of the abovemen-
tioned forces. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general methods of execution 
As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency: 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not 
to manufacture certain types of arma-
ments are being observed ; 
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- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1982 on the same basis as during previous 
years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, 
in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. 
IV. 
(a) Initial studies 
The accumulated experience and informa-
tion and the results of its controls in 1981 led 
the Agency to draw up a 1982 programme on 
the same scale and lines as those of recent 
years, i.e.: 
- for non-production field control mea-
sures, a limited programme was considered 
adequate for verifying the undertakings 
of a member state not to manufacture 
specified armaments. The Agency was 
again aided in this task by the reply to its 
request for information from the member 
state concerned ; 
- for quantitative field control measures, 
sampling methods were again thought 
adequate to verify the accuracy of data 
declared by member states and so to pro-
vide an acceptable level of confidence in 
the Agency's documental control. No 
factor had emerged to vary significantly 
the distribution of the field control mea-
sures. However, continuing national 
budget problems were increasingly limit-
ing or slowing down procurement and 
so stretching programmes with repercus-
sions on the pattern of the 1982 pro-
gramme of control measures in produc-
tion plants. 
(b) Programme definition 
Depot and unit stock patterns were reasses-
sed in the light of known organisational changes 
and of declared re-equipment programmes. 
The basic programme of quantitative field 
control measures then emerging was examined 
in the light of production declarations. Where 
these studies suggested the need to extend such 
controls to factories, their production program-
mes were reviewed to ensure that each inspec-
tion was planned to take place at the most 
appropriate time. For those factories where 
non-production and/or repair depot stock 
controls were also indicated, all types of 
control measures were co-ordinated, so keeping 
the frequency of the Agency's measures at these 
private concerns to an acceptable minimum. 
To avoid duplication, Article VIII of Pro-
tocol No. IV provides for control measures to 
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be undertaken by the appropriate NATO 
authorities themselves for those forces placed 
under NATO authority. Thus, the forces 
under the control of the Agency vary from 
country to country, a factor weighed in the pre-
paration of the programme. Depots, to which 
Article VIII equally applies, are subject to dif-
ferent considerations. Since logistic support for 
forces under NATO authority remains a wholly 
national responsibility, difficulties could arise in 
defining which armaments in some depots are 
or will be assigned to forces under NATO 
authority and which armaments remain under 
national command. Accordingly, the system of 
joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in, 
and used each year since, 1957 was again 
authorised for 1982 and certain of these depots 
were therefore programmed for inspection by 
Agency/SHAPE teams. 
As the Convention for the due process of 
law• has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to 
take the form of" agreed control measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency has to give a few 
weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never 
been withheld, the 1982 programme of control 
measures at privately-owned plants was there-
fore drawn up with full confidence that it could 
be implemented as in previous years. 
In May, the Director presented the Agency's 
annual report for 1981 to the Council and 
outlined the programme for 1982. Very few 
changes were necessary following further 
reviews and analysis of the replies by member 
states to the Agency's questionnaire. 
l. Methods, type ad exttmt of field colltrol metiiiiii'U 
In 1982, no major changes were made in 
the Agency's established procedure for the 
conduct of its field control measures. 
The teams selected for the Agency's field 
control measures all included one member of 
the nationality of the establishment visited, 
the head of mission and other experts all of 
different nationalities. 
The total number of control measures was 
sixty-nine. 
l. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively and making provision for due process of 
law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels 
Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd 
October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957). 
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These measures fall broadly into the 
following categories: 
(a) quantitative control measures at 
depots; 
(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command ; 
(c) control measures at production plants: 
(i) quantitative control measures: 
In 1982, these control measures 
were carried out at plants manufac-
turing aircraft or aero-engines, 
equipment for the army, munitions 
and at shipyards ; 
(iz) non-production control measures: 
These control measures related to 
chemicals and missiles. 
It should be stressed that the reports on 
field control measures are protected by the most 
stringent security measures at all stages of their 
preparation, custody and subsequent analysis. 
3. Conclusio1111 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exer-
cise its mandate, the Agency was able effec-
tively to carry out its task of applying control 
measures. Such problems as arose in this very 
complex field of inspections were dealt with 
satisfactorily through the excellent relations 
maintained with the national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control mea-
sures carried out in 1982, the Agency was able 
to report to the Council: 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
stocks of armaments at depots, units 
under national command and production 
plants amply confirmed the data obtained 
from documentary control measures ; 
- the measures taken for the control of 
non-production revealed no production 
contrary to undertakings. 
E. Production and procurement of various types 
of armaments in the member countries of 
WEU and control activities of the Agency 
1. At7lllllllelltsfor land forces 
(a) Production and procurement 
The programmes to modernise the equip-
ment of the land forces have continued in 1982, 
although some have been slowed down as a 
result of budgetary problems. 
With regard to the Federal Republic of 
Germany, mention should be made of the pro-
duction of Leopard 11 battle tanks, of a wheeled 
(TPZ) armoured vehicle for command and 
communications purposes and deliveries of the 
tank-mounted Roland anti-aircraft system. 
In France, the production of AMX-30-B2 
battle tanks and tank-mounted Roland systems 
has continued and a substantial number of 
AMX-10, in the tracked and wheeled version, 
have been delivered. The programme to re-
equip units with the VAB (vehicule de l'avant 
blind€) is drawing to a close and deliveries were 
well advanced by the end of the year. A sub-
stantial number of 155 mm AUF-1 (GCT) self-
propelled guns have been produced for the 
artillery. The changeover from the older 
smooth bore 120 mm mortars to a more 
modern and a more accurate rifled version has 
continued. 
In Italy, the land forces have received the 
remainder of their order of 155 mm FH-70 
guns during the year and a quantity of 155 mm 
self-propelled Palmaria guns were manufac-
tured for the national forces. The latter have 
also received a further delivery of Leopard I 
tanks and M-133 armoured personnel carriers. 
The Netherlands have imported a substan-
tial number of Leopard 11 tanks. 
(b) Control activity in 1982 
Control measures have been carried out at 
a number of depots, at a number of units under 
national command and at factories manufactur-
ing armaments for land forces. A production 
control and a depot inspection was carried out 
at one of these factories. 
2. G11illed mi.rsilea 1111d other ael/-propelled missiles 
(a) Production and procurement 
There have been no significant changes in 
1982 to the guided weapon and other self-
propelled missile inventories of WEU member 
countries. 
Despite a somewhat static stockholding 
situation overall, there have been discernible 
increases in some specialised areas, notably in 
the anti-tank and air-to-surface fields. Vir-
tually every member state which uses one or 
other of the Milan, Hot or Dragon anti-tank 
weapons has to some extent increased its 
stockpile of these weapons. As for air-to-sea 
weapons, the main additions have occurred 
with the French navy receiving their first 
Exocet AM-39 missiles and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany increasing its holdings of the 
Kormoran anti-shipping missile. 
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The following guided missiles were manu-
factured in 1982: anti-tank missiles Milan and 
Hot (manufactured jointly by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and France) and SS-11 anti-
tank missiles (France); surface-to-air missiles 
Roland (manufactured jointly by the Federal 
Republic of Germany and France), Matra 
R-440, Crotale and Masurca (France); ship-to-
ship missiles Exocet MM-38 and MM-40 
(France), Sistel Seakiller MK-2 (Italy) and Oto-
mat (manufactured jointly by France and 
Italy); air-to-ship missiles Exocet AM-39 
(France) and Kormoran (Federal Republic of 
Germany); air-to-air missiles Matra Super 530 
and Matra Magic 550, and Sidewinder AIM-9L 
(manufactured jointly by the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom); 
the Aspide surface/ship-to-air missile (Italy). 
In addition to the guided weapons listed 
above, other self-propelled weapons were manu-
factured i.e.: Zuni air-to-ground rockets (Bel-
gium), 210 mm rockets (Federal Republic 
of Germany), ASM-375 mm rockets (France) 
and 105 mm rockets for the navy (Italy). 
During 1982, a number of guided weapons 
were imported by WEU member countries from 
the United States: Tow anti-tank weapons by 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, Dragon 
anti-tank and Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles by 
the Netherlands, Sidewinder and Seasparrow 
air-to-air missiles and Tartar ship-to-air mis-
siles by the Federal Republic of Germany. 
(b) Control activity in 1982 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at several depots, at units under national 
command and at a factory at which a non-
production control measure was jointly carried 
out. 
3. Air fort¥ tu'1fiiiRieRt:s 
(a) Production and procurement 
Events in 1982 have confirmed yet again 
the determination of member countries to 
improve and modernise the armament of their 
air forces by the procurement of aircraft such as 
the F-16, Tornado, Mirage F-1, and the 
Alpha-Jet, the scrapping of the oldest aircraft 
such as the G-91 and the F-104G, the procure-
ment of engines of the RB-199 and Larzac type 
and of missiles such as Sidewinder 9L, Matra 
Super 530, Crotale and, lastly, by the study of 
new programmes. 
This drive for modernisation has been 
supported by the industries involved in the pro-
duction of the Tornado, F-16, Alpha-Jet and 
Mirage aircraft. For example, mention should 
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be made of the Tornado programme which is 
progressing well in the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. 
In France, the Mirage F-1 - in the recon-
naissance version - has begun flight trials and 
series production of the Mirage 2000 has also 
started. 
The Federal Republic of Germany has 
received its last Alpha-Jet and has scrapped the 
ageing G-91-Rs from its operational forces. 
Production and deliveries of the F-16 have 
progressed normally ; the Netherlands have 
ordered a further consignment and Belgium has 
decided to procure an additional batch of F -16s. 
(b) Control activity in 1982 
Control measures were carried out at 
depots, at units under national command and at 
factories. Both a production control and a 
depot inspection were carried out at some of 
these factories. 
4. NaWJI~nts 
(a) Production 
In France, the nuclear submarine Rubis, 
first of a series, became operational and others 
of the SNA-72 type are being built. The des-
troyer Montcalm, the third of the C-70 type, 
became operational and further vessels are 
under construction. The underway replenish-
ment ship Var, the third vessel of the Durance 
class, was commissioned. New Super-Etendard 
attack aircraft were also delivered in 1982. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, 
F-122 class frigates came into service. Work 
was also completed on the Gepard, the first of a 
series of fast attack craft of the 143-A type. A 
number of F-104 Starfighters were replaced by 
Tornado fighter/attack aircraft. 
In Italy, the Marconi submarine - last of 
the Sauro class boats - became operational. 
Construction work on the Garibaldi helicopter 
carrier continued. As regards frigates, the 
Maestrale, the first of a class, became operatio-
nal and others began sea trials. Work has been 
completed on a number of Sparviero class fast 
attack craft (hydrofoils). 
In the Netherlands, a further Kortenaer 
class frigate has entered service and new Orion 
maritime patrol aircraft have been delivered. 
(b) Control activity in 1982 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at naval shipyards. 
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S. Chemical weapons 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to 
renew in 1982 the list of chemical weapons 
subject to control. 
The member countries agreed to this 
renewal. This was reported to the Council 
who duly noted the fact. 
The Agency has therefore continued to use 
this list for its control activities during 1982. 
(b) Control activity in 1982 
In application of Article Ill of Protocol No. 
Ill, which lays down conditions to enable the 
Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that 
may be held on the mainland of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the 
right to produce them, and in accordance with 
the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked 
the countries concerned in its questionnaire 
whether production of chemical weapons on 
their mainland territory had passed the experi-
mental stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 1982. 
In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous years, 
asked the member states to declare any chemi-
cal weapons that they might hold, whatever 
their origin. In reply to this questionnaire, no 
country reported holding any chemical weapons 
and, because of this, the quantitative control of 
weapons of this nature raised no problems. 
As each year, in accordance with the reso-
lution approved by the Council in 1959 and in 
application of the Council directive extending 
to chemical weapons the provisions laid down 
for the control of non-production of the arma-
ments listed in Annex Ill of Protocol No. Ill, 
the competent authorities of the country 
concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, 
precise and complete reply. In addition, the 
temporary procedure applied with these autho-
rities since 1973 was again used with success in 
1982. On the basis of the information thus 
supplied, the Agency was able to select the fac-
tories at which to carry out agreed control mea-
sures in 1982. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indi-
cation of production of chemical weapons with-
in the terms of Annex 11 to Protocol No. Ill. 
6. Biological weapons 
All the member countries reported their 
agreement on the renewal in 1982 of the list of 
biological weapons subject to control as accep-
ted by the Council in 1981. The Council 
noted the fact. 
However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 
of this chapter) that the Agency exercises no 
control in the field of biological weapons. 
7. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation has remained the same 
as in previous years, the Agency is unable (as 
stated in point B. 2 of this chapter) to exercise 
any control in the atomic field. 
F. Studies and technical information visits 
by experts of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments 
1. As in previous years the experts have been 
engaged in various studies relevant to the 
mission of the Agency with the aim of updating 
their knowledge and improving the methodo-
logy of control. One of the principal activities 
in this area has been the preparation of a series 
of well-documented " overviews " of the armed 
forces of member states. These provide the 
structure and evolution of the forces and prove 
of great value to experts when processing natio-
nal replies to the Agency questionnaires. 
2. The Agency considers that technical inform-
ation visits play an important role in maintain-
ing the expertise of its specialists. 
(a) The Agency attaches particular importance 
to the technical information visits for its biolo-
gical and chemical experts in view of the poten-
tial, as weapons of war, of various bacteria and 
chemicals used for civilian purposes. These 
experts were invited to the two factories of 
Rhone-Poulenc in France: the factory at Saint-
Fans produces fine chemicals, phenols and 
vanilline being of particular interest to the 
experts ; the installation at Pont-de-Claix is 
concerned with the production of selective 
herbicides without dioxine. The Rhone-Pou-
lenc management subsequently proposed that 
the experts attend a symposium on dioxine, 
which was very instructive. The Federal 
Republic of Germany authorities invited the 
biological and chemical experts to visit the 
university of Hohenheim-Stuttgart where the 
discussions provided information on certain 
major aspects of the resistance of bacterial 
spores and on the dissemination of biological 
agents in the atmosphere. Finally, very useful 
visits were made to the Committee on Disarma-
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ment and the World Health Organisation in 
Geneva. 
(b) The Agency land force experts visited the 
British Army Equipment Exhibition (BAEE) at 
Aldershot. They had very interesting discus-
sions with the staff at this exhibition about the 
features of various armaments and their recent 
deployment in the Falklands campaign. 
(c) The naval experts attended the Mostra 
Navale at Genoa (Italy), and the Salon Naval at 
Le Bourget (France), where the naval ship-
building and aerospace industries of each nation 
displayed their respective wares and their 
approach to combating the naval threat. They 
also attended the International Naval Techno-
logy Exhibition at Maastricht (Netherlands). 
(d) The air armament experts were able to call 
at the Hanover Air Show (Federal Republic of 
Germany) and certain experts attended the 
SBAC exhibition and flying demonstrations at 
Farnborough (United Kingdom), which were 
particularly interesting from a military point of 
view. The Agency was invited to visit the 
Centre d'Essais des Propulseurs at Saclay 
(France) where test facilities were seen in opera-
tion. Two experts also attended the colloquy 
on international aeronautical consortia organ-
ised by the WEU Assembly in London. 
G. Director of the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments 
On completion of General Vittorio Leonelli's 
term of office on 31st January 1982, the 
Council paid tribute to the excellent work that 
he had accomplished in his five years as Direc-
tor of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments. 
General Eugenio Rambaldi, who was 
appointed by the Council to succeed General 
Leonelli as Director of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments, took up his duties on 
1st February 1982. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Articles VII and XIX 
of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council that, as a result of the 
control exercised in 1982, the figures obtained 
in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol 
No. IV: 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article 
XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the 
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terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of 
Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, concluded in exe-
cution of Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1982 and for 
each of the member states, the appropriate 
levels of armaments subject to control for these 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol No. 
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of 
field control measures carried out at force units 
and military depots and during agreed control 
measures of production plants, it did not detect 
for the categories of armaments which it 
controls: 
- either the manufacture of a category of 
armaments that the government of the 
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member state concerned had undertaken 
not to manufacture ; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1982 the Agency again applied controls 
in those fields which are open to it in an 
effective,. simple and inexpensive manner. As 
in the past, the help and co-operation of natio-
nal and NATO authorities, and of heads and 
staff of both the private firms and the military 
establishments visited played an important part 
in the accomplishment of its mission. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
In 1982, the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee met in plenary session on 22nd January, 
19th March, 25th June, 21st September, lOth 
December and as an ad hoc group on 21st Sep-
tember. 
The main items on the agenda were: the 
study of the situation in the armaments sector 
of industry in the member countries of WEU ; 
the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on 
trials methods for wheeled vehicles and the 
question of drawing up a similar agreement for 
tracked vehicles; the activities of Working 
Group No. 8 on operational research ; relations 
with the FINABEL Committee. 
A. Study of the situation 
of the armaments sector of industry 
in the member countries of WEU 
1. As instructed by the Council, the Standing 
Armaments Committee, with the assistance of 
the international secretariat, drew up a report 
comprising the updated legal part and an 
updated presentation of the first section of the 
economic part of its study on the armaments 
sector of industry in the member countries of 
WEU. This document was sent to the Council 
which, in turn, forwarded a copy to the Assem-
bly on lOth May 19821• 
2. Following the Council's decision taken at 
the ministerial meeting on 19th May2, the SAC 
- meeting as an ad hoc group and in plenary 
session - examined a number of general ques-
tions concerning the updating of the classified 
version of the first section of the economic part 
of its study. 
Following this examination, based on 
documents drawn up by the international secre-
tariat, it was decided that the updating would 
cover the period from 1972 to ·1981, that the 
authorities concerned would supply the requi-
site statistical information to the international 
secretariat as soon as possible, and that the 
Committee would endeavour to complete its 
work on the subject in time for the next 
meeting of the Council at ministerial level in 
1983. 
3. With regard to the preparation by the SAC 
of the second section of the economic part of its 
1. See Chapter I, B. 
2. See Chapter 11, B.3. 
39 
study - dealing with the capabilities of the 
industrial sector of the WEU member countries-
it is recalled that since a similar study has 
been undertaken by the IEPG, and in order to 
avoid unnecessary work, the SAC has decided 
to wait for the data provided by countries for 
the IEPG study to be made available. 
B. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods 
for wheeled 'ehicles 
1. Since the forwarding of the agreement to 
the United States' authorities in 1981, in res-
ponse to their request•, the question of co-
operation between WEU and the United States 
on harmonising trials methods for wheeled 
vehicles has still not been settled. 
2. Apart from this question, the SAC dis-
cussed at its meeting on 1Oth December the 
updating of the agreement and the advisability 
of drawing up a similar agreement for tracked 
vehicles. The Committee decided to resume 
this discussion at its first meeting of 1983. 
C. Acti,ities of the working groups 
1. Working GroiiJJ No. 8 011 operatiolllll research 
The remit of Working Group No. 8 is to 
exchange the findings of national operational 
research studies, to organise symposia on opera-
tional research methods and techniques and to 
arrange visits to national operational research 
centres. The group has also done considerable 
work over five years to produce a five-language 
glossary of operational research terms. 
The group held two meetings in 1982, on 
11th May and 5th October. These were linked, 
respectively, to a seminar on methodology 
in Paris and to a visit to the Electronics Centre 
for Armaments (CELAR) at Bruz (France). 
(a) Exchanges of information 
During the year, the delegations presented 
sixteen information forms, four of which related 
to new studies and twelve to updatings. The 
total number of studies presented by the mem-
ber countries has therefore now reached 337. 
1. See the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 
Chapter IV, A.2. 
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(b) Eighth symposium on methodology 
The theme of the eighth symposium organ-
ised by the group, held on 11th May at the 
WEU offices in Paris, was "the use of multiple 
criteria for selecting equipment". 
Three countries presented papers, and 
these were followed by discussions. A fourth 
country reported on the progress reached in 
updating the method which had formed the 
basis of the work on the "evaluation of military 
equipment". 
(c) Visit to Bruz (France) 
At the invitation of the French authorities, 
the group visited the Electronics Centre for 
Armaments (CELAR) at Bruz. 
Talks were given by experts from CELAR, 
and these were followed by a number of tech-
nical demonstrations and discussions. 
(d) Lexicographical activity 
The international secretariat, acting on the 
authority given by the SAC to continue work 
on the five-language glossary of operational 
research terms, has embodied in this document 
the corrections given in the lists of errata sub-
mitted by the delegations. 
As to the pilot study designed to assess the 
work needed to prepare a second improved and 
extended edition of the glossary, the group 
reached agreement on the general criteria to be 
adopted although they would still have to 
consider the matter in more detail. 
The delegates also took note of a dictionary 
of terms used in war games published in 1982 
and decided to devote future group meetings to 
an examination of the translations of terms 
missing from the work. 
(e) Exchange of documentation with NATO 
At the request of NATO Panel VII, a copy 
of the report by Working Group No. 8 on their 
visit to CELAR was sent to them together with 
the proceedings of the group's eighth sympo-
sium on methodology. The committee was 
asked to send to the SAC - on a reciprocal 
basis - a copy of the report by its Chairman 
and the other documents relating to its work. 
2. Group of experts on the eMiuation of military equipment 
The group of experts is still awaiting a 
decision by the SAC to proceeded with the 
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second stage of its work, i.e. the "evaluation, 
using different methods, of new equipment 
which has not yet been evaluated". 
However, in accordance with the SAC's 
decision, the question of the evaluation of mili-
tary equipment could be put back on the Com-
mittee's agenda at the request of any govern-
ment wishing to submit a work proposal. 
D. Relations with FINABEL 
It will be recalled that the task of FINA-
BEL, a co-ordinating committee between the 
army chiefs of staff of the WEU member coun-
tries, is to promote agreements between them 
on the military characteristics of future land 
forces' equipment, whereas the SAC is an offi-
cial body of an international organisation with 
a tri-service competence. In 1973, a joint meet-
ing was held between FINABEL and the SAC 
in order to allocate the work and set up close 
contacts between the two secretariats. These 
contacts enable the international secretariat of 
the SAC to encourage the study of certain 
FINABEL agreements in order to stimulate co-
operation between member countries; since that 
time a range of questions has been discussed 
within the SAC. 
Relations between the secretariats of the 
SAC and FINABEL have continued in 1982 in 
accordance with the provisions for co-operation 
between these two bodies worked out in 
1973. At its meeting of lOth December, the 
SAC was apprised of the points raised at a meet-
ing on 23rd November between its interna-
tional secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat. 
It noted that FINABEL wished to receive 
information, particularly on new methods of 
obstacle building and the trials methods cur-
rently used by the member countries of WEU 
for wheeled vehicles ; also, that FINABEL's 
requirements would be specified once it had 
completed its reorganisation based on a restruc-
turing of its working groups. 
E. International secretariat 
1. The international secretariat has assisted 
the SAC in all its work. 
2. On 28th April 1982, the head of the inter-
national secretariat presented his annual oral 
report to the Council on the activities of the 
SAC in 1981. 
3. He informed the SAC of the discussions on 
armaments questions which had taken place in 
the second part of the twenty-seventh ordinary 
session and in both parts of the twenty-eighth 
ordinary session of the Assembly. 
Extracts from speeches, reports, debates 
and recommendations on these questions were 
consolidated by the international secretariat in 
a series of documents which have been sent to 
SAC members. 
4. Relations between the secretariats of the 
SAC and FINABEL have continued normally 
in 1982. As already stated in point D above, a 
co-ordinating meeting was held between the 
two secretariats on 23rd November, a report on 
which was made to the SAC on 1Oth December. 
5. As regards contacts with NATO, a member 
of the international secretariat was present, as 
observer, at the meetings of the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors which took 
place in April and October in Brussels. A 
member of the international secretariat also 
took part in the June and December meetings 
in Brussels of the NATO Naval Armaments 
Group. 
6. The Council noted with regret the depar-
ture of Mr. Alain Plantey and paid tribute to 
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the high quality of his services to the organisa-
tion over a period of ten years. 
The Council appointed Mr. Eric Hinter-
manu to succeed Mr. Plantey in the post of 
head of the international secretariat of the 
SAC, Assistant Secretary-General of WEU. 
Mr. Hintermann took up his post on 1st 
November 1982. 
F. Assembly colloquy 
During the colloquy on international aero-
nautical consortia organised by the Assembly 
on 9th and lOth February in London, the Bel-
gian delegate to the SAC and the Chairman-in-
Office presented a communication on the links 
between the Belgian Government and its aero-
nautical defence equipment industry; the head 
of the international secretariat of the SAC, 
Mr. Plantey, also presented - in a personal 
capacity - a communication concerning the 
legal arrangements relating to international 
consortia. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the committee 
In 1982, the Public Administration Com-
mittee held its annual meetings, which take 
place in each of the member countries in turn, 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bamberg) 
from 27th to 29th April, and in France (Albi) 
from 12th to 14th October. In both cases, the 
meetings provided an opportunity for contacts 
with local authorities, which are useful in the 
context of the committee's work. 
As in previous years, the meetings were 
devoted mainly to exchanges of information on 
significant administrative developments in the 
member countries during the preceding six 
months and the preparation of the next multila-
teral course for government officials organised 
in the autumn of each year under the auspices 
of the committee. 
Among the many subjects mentioned in the 
exchanges of information in the committee, it is 
interesting to note the development of long-
term exchanges of A-Grade officials between 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France and 
the United Kingdom. These exchanges enable 
officials to enter the administration of one of 
the other countries to work for a period of nine 
months. In the same field, the tenth anni-
versary of the Anglo-German agreement on 
in-service training was celebrated in 1982. 
This is an agreement under which more than 
900 officials have already benefited. 
Generally speaking, political and adminis-
trative life has continued to be dominated in all 
the member countries by the economic situa-
tion, which has called for more rigorous and 
restrictive budget policies. In several coun-
tries, the government has been invested with 
special powers to take the measures which it 
considered essential. In most countries, the 
civil service has been affected by the stabi-
lisation or reduction of staff, part-time work, 
early retirement. As regards remunerations, 
purchasing power has stagnated or even been 
reduced. 
At the same time, the crisis facing govern-
ments has caused them, in most countries, to 
intensify their efforts to achieve greater effec-
tiveness and efficiency in the civil service by 
better use of the staff and resources available. 
The problem of providing efficient govern-
ment services on a reduced budget was in fact 
the subject chosen by the committee for the 
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multilateral course for government officials in 
1982. It is becoming particularly clear today 
that the greatest possible number of senior 
government officials should have adequate 
experience of financial management. The 
importance of proper training is thus para-
mount and the training services or institutes are 
called upon to adapt their programmes along 
these lines. 
The foregoing remarks illustrate once more 
the extent to which certain problems preoccupy 
the government and administration of all mem-
ber countries, and one of the most valuable 
aspects of the exchanges of views and informa-
tion within the committee is that they reveal 
these common problems and permit the solu-
tions implemented in the various countries to 
be examined. 
B. Courses for government offrcials 
It is recalled that the XXXth multilateral 
course for government officials organised under 
the auspices of the Public Administration Com-
mittee was held at Siena from 18th to 24th 
October 1981. The subject of the course 
- attended by twenty-two government officials 
from the member countries - was "unemploy-
ment among young intellectuals in Europe". 
The course proceedings were set out in the 
twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, but 
the reaction of the participants had not been 
received at the time of drafting the report. It 
may therefore be appropriate to mention now 
the particularly positive conclusions of one 
group of participants: "T~e analysis of the prob-
lems, as set out by the working groups at the 
conclusion of the course, was very satisfactory 
and can provide useful pointers for all those 
who, like ourselves, work in the economic and 
social field. We also feel that our professional 
ability as civil servants has been enhanced by 
our taking part in the course and, on a more 
general level, that our experience has been 
enriched by it. In conclusion, we consider that 
international solidarity, which is so often threa-
tened during recession such as that at present 
affecting the whole industrialised world, should 
be strengthened by meetings designed to 
increase understanding between countries and 
to revive hope of a common solution to the 
various economic and social problems. In this 
respect, the great effort made by WEU is a 
valuable example". 
The 1982 course for government officials 
was held in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
in Bad Godesberg, from 27th September to 1st 
October, and was on the following subject: 
"Providing efficient government services on a 
reduced budget, and the control of public 
expenditure". The course brought together 
twenty officials from the administrations of the 
member countries interested in the subject dealt 
with. 
The first day was devoted to an examina-
tion of the budget methods and control techni-
ques in the various member countries, based on 
replies to a detailed questionnaire which each 
national group of participants had completed 
before the course. Multinational working 
groups were then set up to study the following 
aspects: budgetary techniques which favour the 
reconstitution of a "margin for manreuvre"; the 
problem of choices of priorities; the impact of 
ex-post control on political budget-decision 
bodies; implementation of the budget: achieve-
ment of initial targets and adaptation to new 
situations; plan and budget; modem manage-
ment methods and the budget. 
A written report was drawn up by each 
working group, but there was not sufficient time 
for a general discussion. 
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Once again, the organisation noted the 
interest that such courses aroused among parti-
cipants, many of them thus having for the first 
time the opportunity to exchange views and 
experiences with their colleagues from other 
countries within a sufficiently restricted group 
to allow genuine personal contact. 
C. Study visits 
Study visits enable an official to spend one 
or two weeks in the administration of one of 
the other member countries studying his own 
speciality. They are organised bilaterally bet-
ween the national delegations of the sending 
and host countries. However, the committee 
devotes a part of its time at each meeting to this 
subject and each delegate can comment or draw 
upon the experience of his colleagues in this 
field. 
Examples of visits organised during the 
year: the workings of the government informa-
tion service (subject studied in France); inner-
city housing (subject studied in Italy); regional 
planning machinery; parliamentary control of 
public expenditure; retail pre-packaging control 
(subject studied in the Netherlands). 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
It was noted in the 1981 annual report that 
the economic situation in member countries 
necessitated the utmost discipline in all areas of 
public expenditure. 1982 has seen little change 
in this respect. 
The budgets of the WEU ministerial organs 
have inevitably had to reflect the present cli-
mate. The achievement in the 1982 budgets of 
a measure of "negative growth" for the London 
office has, in the draft estimates for 1983, been 
extended - and to a greater degree - to the Lon-
don and Paris offices of the ministerial organs. 
The Council wish to emphasise that such 
economies were made without impairing the 
efficiency of the organisation or its ability to 
meet its commitments under the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Protocols. 
Summary tables for the budgets, as adopted 
by the Council, are annexed to this document. 
B. Social security of staff members serving 
in the United Kingdom 
Following the agreement with the United 
Kingdom authorities, concluded in September 
1981, exempting from class 1 compulsory 
contributions to the national social security 
scheme those members of the staff who are 
members of the organisation's pension scheme, 
and the conclusion, reached by the Council in 
November 1981, that members of the staff 
wishing to remain in the provident fund should 
also be exempted from such compulsory affilia-
tion, the option period for joining the pension 
scheme was re-opened for those still in the pro-
vident fund. 
This resulted in January 1982 in five out of 
fifteen staff members remaining in the provi-
dent fund, the others opting for the pension 
scheme. 
Thereupon a second agreement was 
concluded with the United Kingdom authorities 
in May 1982 which exempted also the staff 
members in the provident fund from class 1 
compulsory contributions to the national social 
security scheme. 
With the conclusion of this second agree-
ment, the negotiations on this matter have now 
been finalised. 
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All staff are henceforth exempt but may 
voluntarily pay class 3 contributions to the 
national social security scheme for a reduced 
range of benefits under the scheme. Measures 
approved by the Council to compensate some 
of the effects of exemption of the staff have 
entered into force. 
All class 1 contributions which had been 
collected from the employees and kept in a 
WEU suspense account during the negotiations 
have now been paid over to the Department of 
Health and Social Security, whilst the employer's 
contributions collected via the budgets have 
been returned to member states. 
C. Provident fund 
At present fifteen staff members are still 
fully affiliated to the WEU provident fund, the 
youngest member being 39 years old. The 
uncertainties about the required liquidity of the 
fund and its final size having been resolved 
with the conclusion of the negotiations on 
United Kingdom social security as described 
above, long-term arrangements for an invest-
ment policy, together with a more rationalised 
administration of the fund, are now being 
pursued. 
D. WEU administrative meetings 
The necessary contact between the admin-
istrative staff of the London and Paris offices 
have been maintained often by combining meet-
ings with travel already scheduled for other 
official purposes. 
E. Activities in the framework of co-ordination 
The Co-ordinating Committee of Govern-
ment Budget Experts held ten meetings in 1982, 
each of one or two days' duration. In addition 
there were seventeen meetings of the Com-
mittee of Heads of Administration, thirteen 
joint meetings of the Standing Committee of 
Secretaries-General and the Standing Com-
mittee of the Staff Associations, as well as three 
meetings of the Secretaries/Director-General. 
The main subjects dealt with at these meet-
ings, some of which are still under review, 
resulted in reports by the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee covering: 
- the periodical adjustment as at 1st January 
1982 of remuneration to take into account 
the increase in cost of living, and of the 
daily rates of subsistence allowances for 
staff travelling on duty; 
- the problems associated with any form of 
extension of co-ordination to other inter-
national organisations; 
- the triennial salary review in accordance 
with the 159th report of the Co-ordinat-
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ing Committee, to be applied to the pro-
cedure for the review of 1st July 1982; 
- a comprehensive review of the present 
procedure for the adjustment of remune-
ration, as contained in the 159th report, 
to be applicable for the .next three-year 
period, and to take into account in parti-
cular the impact of the current economic 
recession and the budgetary constraints 
of member governments; 
- the question of institutionalising staff 
participation in the framework of co-
ordination. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of WEU main budget for 1982 
A* B* C* Total B+C 
£ F. frs F.frs F.frs 
Salaries and allowances ................. 1,362,452 9,879,000 19,894,300 29,773,300 
Pensions ............................... 104,880 1,199,500 2,803,100 4,002,600 
Travel ................................. 25,860 166,300 484,700 651,000 
Other operating costs ................... 168,905 593,950 855,450 1,449,400 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . .............. 36,600 19,950 43,900 63,850 
Buildings .............................. - 44,380 79,890 124,270 
ToTAL ExPENDITURE ................... 1,698,697 11,903,080 24,161,340 36,064,420 
WEU tax .............................. 505,865 3,499,950 6,820,900 10,320,850 
Other receipts .......................... 46,000 440,000 209,000 649,000 
Pension receipts ........................ 32,875 266,500 669 500 936,000 
ToTAL INCOME ........................ 584 740 4,206,450 7,699,400 11,905,850 
NET TOTAL ........................... 1,113,957 7,696,630 16,461,940 24,158,570 
NGtiolllll contributions Cfllled for utukr the WEU mllin budget for 1982 
600ths 
Belgium ............................... 59 
France ................................ 120 
Germany .............................. 120 
Italy .................................. 120 
Luxembourg ........................... 2 
Netherlands ............................ 59 
United Kingdom ....................... 120 
TOTAL ............................... 600 
*A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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£ F. frs 
109,539.11 2,375,592. 72 
222,791.40 4,831,714.00 
222,791.40 4,831,714.00 
. 222,791.40 4,831,714.00 
3,713.18 80,528.56 
109,539.11 ./lo 2,375,592.72 
222,791.40 4,831,714.00 
1,113,957.00 24,158,570.00 
APPENDIX 
Summary ofrevised WEU budget for 1981 
A* 
£ 
Salaries and allowances ................. 1,298,672 
Pensions ............................... 116,080 
Travel ................................. 25,860 
Other operating costs ................... 225,705 
Purchase of furniture, etc. ............... 36,600 
Buildings .............................. -
ToTAL ExPENDITURE ................... 1,702,917 
WEU tax .............................. 485,195 
Other receipts .......................... 26,000 
Pensions receipts ....................... 43,985 
ToTAL INcoME ........................ 555,180 
NET TOTAL ........................... 1,147,737 
*A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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C* Total B+C 
F.frs F. frs 
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
- -
Document 943 
Analysis and evaluation of the action taken on Assembly 
Recommendations 383 on the problem of nuclear weapons in 
Europe and 388 on the problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteurs 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteurs 
Preliminary Note 
I. Introduction 
11. Analysis of Recommendations 383 and 388 
Ill. Negotiations on the limitation of armaments 
IV. Deployment of Pershing 11 and cruise missiles in Western Europe 
V. Informing public opinion 
VI. Inter-allied consultations 
VII. Conclusions 
VIII. Point of view of Mr. Page 
IX. Point of view of Mr. Dejardin 
APPENDIX 
Recommendations 383 and 388 and the replies of the Council 
48 
6th May 1983 
DOCUMENT 943 
Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Page and Mr. Dejardin, Rapporteurs) 
Preliminary Note 
The two joint Rapporteurs appointed to 
prepare the present report agreed to submit a 
purely analytical first part, for which they 
would be jointly responsible, followed by two 
chapters expressing the individual views of the 
Rapporteurs. 
I. Introduction 
1. The purpose of the present report is to 
examine action taken in the parliaments of 
member countries on recommendations adopted 
by the WEU Assembly. The Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments has therefore chosen 
two recent recommendations relating to the 
same problems from different standpoints, i.e. 
deployment by NATO of new intermediate-
range missiles in Western Europe in accordance 
with the twofold decision of December 1979 
and the development of neutralist and pacifist 
movements since that date. The link between 
the two problems is evident since doubts about 
the 1979 twofold decision have been at the 
centre of protests in Western Europe since that 
date and even now application of the decision 
is the subject of heated public debate in several 
WEU member countries and naturally in the 
parliaments. 
2. The choice of these two recommenda-
tions involved special problems, however, 
because of the very intensity and topical nature 
of the discussions on the subjects they tackle. 
Recommendation 383 was adopted in June 
1982 and the Council's reply has therefore been 
received and many questions have been put in 
parliaments. This is not so for Recommenda-
tion 388 which was adopted only in Novem-
ber. The Council's reply reached the Office of 
the Clerk in April 1983 and the questions 
already put in national parliaments have often 
not yet been answered. For this reason, your 
Rapporteurs wish to stress the drawbacks invol-
ved in the time the Council considers it neces-
sary to take in answering Assembly recommen-
dations. It is indeed difficult to speak of a dia-
logue on topical questions when some six 
months elapse between adopting a recommen-
dation and receiving the Council's answer. 
3. Second, as these matters were in fact 
important for a large section of European 
public opinion, many questions were put to gov-
ernments on the subjects raised in the recom-
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mendations without it being possible to know 
whether they were inspired directly or indi-
rectly by the recommendations adopted by the 
WEU Assembly. The fact that such questions 
were or were not put by members of the WEU 
Assembly or even of its Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments is not sufficient to prove 
that this was or was not the case. It is quite 
clear that if the committee had chosen recom-
mendations farther removed from the major 
political questions of the day your Rapporteurs 
would not have had such abundant documenta-
tion to choose from. They could probably 
then have assessed more accurately the action 
taken on Assembly recommendations. But by 
choosing such formidable subjects the commit-
tee has placed them in the position of being 
better able to elucidate the positions of the 
governments of member countries on these 
subjects. Its choice was therefore perfectly 
justified. The aim of this report will conse-
quently be to show how specific, well-chosen 
questions put in the national parliaments can 
complete the information given in the WEU 
Council's replies to the Assembly's recommen-
dations and to draw the appropriate lessons. 
4. Finally, it should be mentioned that the 
Rapporteurs have certainly not seen all the 
questions put in the parliaments of the various 
member countries on the subjects covered by 
the two recommendations. Furthermore, they 
had to choose between those which they had 
since many related to the same facts and 
received almost identical answers. Again, 
sometimes in parliament sometimes elsewhere 
and in different circumstances, governments 
have made public statements on these ques-
tions. The questions put in parliaments and 
the answers received naturally take account of 
these statements but your Rapporteurs are not 
able to report on all these texts. They consider 
nevertheless that their spot checks allow useful 
conclusions to be drawn for increasing the 
effectiveness of the work of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
11. Analysis of Recommendations 383 and 388 
5.· T.he two recommendations adopted by 
the Assembly at a six-month interval have 
many similarities, which is not surprising since 
they were adopted by the same assembly and 
consequently by similarly-composed majorities. 
Likewise, there was a fairly wide conform-
ity of views between the two committees 
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which presented one text each and some conti-
nuity of views on the part of the parliamenta-
rians, which is all to their credit. 
6. Paragraph A.l of Recommendation 383, 
which recommends that the Council: 
" Call on member governments acting in 
the North Atlantic Council, 
To continue the present much improved 
close and continuous consultations to 
ensure that an agreed allied position is 
maintained on all aspects of nuclear 
deterrence and nuclear arms control ", 
may in fact be likened to paragraph 1 of 
Recommendation 388: 
"Demand that participating [Council] 
states strive to ensure the success of the 
various ongoing negotiations on the limi-
tation or reduction of armaments and 
forces in Europe and in the rest of the 
world". 
Similarly, paragraph 2 of Recommendation 
388: 
" Announce its unambiguous support for 
any proposal for the complete renuncia-
tion by the United States and the Soviet 
Union of medium-range nuclear weapons 
or, failing that, for the establishment of a 
true balance at the lowest possible level 
and to agree to the deployment of such 
weapons on the territory of member 
countries only as long as this goal has not 
been attained within the time limit laid 
down in the NATO decision of Decem-
ber 1979 ", 
meets concerns fairly close to those expressed in 
paragraphs A.2 and A.3 of Recommendation 
383: 
"To ensure that preparations continue in 
the countries concerned for the deploy-
ment from 1983 of the agreed levels of 
ground-launched cruise and Pershing 11 
missiles less any reductions previously 
agreed in the INF talks; 
To press for the earliest agreement in the 
INF talks on the zero option for land-
based missiles, and the step-by-step pur-
suit of these talks to include other 
weapons systems, and the eventual inclu-
sion of battlefield systems in these or the 
MBFR talks ". 
Paragraph 3 of Recommendation 388: 
" Ensure that full, accurate and objective 
information on the levels of forces and 
armaments of the member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw 
Pact is regularly made public " 
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for its part corresponds to paragraphs A. 7 and 
B.l of Recommendation 383: 
"To bring up to date and publish from 
time to time on an agreed objective basis 
the NATO comparison of NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the 
Soviet Union to be equally forthcoming 
and objective in publishing force com-
parisons; 
Call on member governments to pursue 
active information policies, to ensure that 
public opinion is objectively informed 
both about the nature of the threat and 
about the purpose of allied defence and 
arms control and reduction policies.". 
Finally, paragraph 5 of Recommendation 388: 
" Effectively concert the defence policies 
of member countries and their positions 
towards disarmament with a view to 
working out a European approach to 
such matters " 
accentuates the "European" concern expressed 
in paragraph B.2 of Recommendation 383: 
" Develop a European approach to the 
political aspects of the discussions in the 
North Atlantic Council". 
7. The main differences between the two 
recommendations concern the following para-
graphs of Recommendation 383, which have no 
counterpart in Recommendation 388: 
"A.4. To welcome the resumption of 
the SALT process through the proposed 
opening of START in June, and to press 
for the closest linking of these to the INF 
talks and the continued mutual respect of 
all SALT limits during the negotiations; 
A.5. To give increased emphasis to the 
negotiation and adoption of effective pro-
cedures for verification, as essential for 
any agreement on arms control and 
reduction; 
A.6. To ask the United States Govern-
ment to examine seriously Senator Jack-
son's proposal for a joint United States-
Soviet Union command post in a neutral 
country to deter the possibility of war by 
accident or miscalculation " 
whereas Recommendation 388 contains the fol-
lowing paragraph: 
"4. Ensure that in any event Western 
Europe's development policy is pursued 
and strengthened, particularly in the frame-
work of the European Communities ". 
8. Moreover, these differences correspond to 
the specific responsibilities of the two commit-
tees and to the different subjects of the two 
reports, which is quite normal. Your Rappor-
teurs propose to group the various parts of their 
study round the topics dealt with in the recom-
mendations, i.e.: 
(i) negotiations on the limitation of 
armaments; 
(ii) the deployment of new missiles in 
Western Europe; 
(iii) informing public opinion; 
(iv) European consultations. 
Ill. Negotiations on the limitation 
of armaments 
9. The Council's reply to Recommendation 
383 was relatively detailed on this point: 
" I. The Council welcome the conti-
nued interest of the Assembly in the mat-
ter of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) 
and take careful note of the Assembly's 
views. The Council endorse many of 
the opinions expressed in the recommen-
dation and its preamble, notably the need 
for arms control and defence measures to 
complement each other in a balanced 
security policy, and the importance of the 
1979 double decision as the basis for 
redressing the imbalance in INF. 
2. The Council agree with the Assembly 
on the need to continue the current 
consultations amongst the allies on the 
subject of the INF negotiations. They 
welcome the addition of regular briefings 
of the North Atlantic Council, by the 
leaders of the United States Delegation to 
these INF negotiations, to the continued 
series of meetings of the Special Consul-
tative Group for those member countries 
which participated in the dual decision of 
December 1979. 
4. The Council are happy to repeat the 
welcome which has been given by mem-
ber governments to the renewal of stra-
tegic arms control through the opening of 
the START talks and to the assurances 
that what has been achieved through 
existing agreements will not be undercut 
pending the negotiation of a START 
agreement, subject to reciprocity. The 
Council endorse the Assembly's concern 
to see effective verification measures in 
any arms control agreement. 
5. The Council doubt that the United 
States Government need outside encoura-
gement to keep under review the existing 
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measures to prevent any possibility of 
war by accident or miscalculation and in 
this respect have noted the initiatives 
outlined by President Reagan in his 
speech in Berlin in June 1982. " 
10. However, this information may be enlar-
ged upon considerably by referring to the infor-
mation given or statements made by govern-
ment representatives in the parliaments of 
member countries. The matters referred to in 
these paragraphs were the subject of govern-
ment statements, debates and many questions in 
the parliaments of all these countries during the 
second half of 1982. It is obviously not poss-
ible to claim that these interventions were due 
to the recommendations adopted by the WEU 
Assembly, except in cases where the questions 
put referred specifically to these recommenda-
tions. The present report cannot quote all 
these statements, debates and questions; it will 
merely make brief reference to them and 
perhaps quote a few specific elements given by 
government representatives on these occasions. 
11. Generally speaking, the attitudes adopted 
by governments towards negotiations on the 
limitation of armaments are set out in govern-
ment statements, often during the presentation 
of draft foreign affairs or defence budgets, or in 
general policy statements. No major differ-
ences can be discerned between the attitudes of 
the various member countries, but a number of 
details: 
12. Replying to an oral question put by 
Mr. Daras in the Belgian Chamber of Repre-
sentatives on 16th December 1982, Mr. Tinde-
mans, Minister for External Relations, reviewed 
the situation on that date as follows. This 
reply is one of the fullest and avoids the need to 
quote many other replies: 
" ... since November 1981, three sessions 
have been held in Geneva at which there 
were statements by and exchanges of 
views between the American and Soviet 
Delegates on the possible deployment of 
medium-range missiles on European ter-
ritory. 
At the first session, the United States and 
the Soviet Union set out their views on 
the matter. 
The United States wants total elimina-
tion, i.e. no deployment of SS-20, 4 or 5 
or of cruise or Pershing 11 missiles. This 
is the American point of view which the 
United States is also upholding on behalf 
of its western allies. 
The Soviet Union holds another opinion: 
it wishes to limit the number of missiles 
of this type and on a given territory, i.e. 
from mid-Atlantic to the Urals. But the 
DOCUMENT 943 
Soviet proposals also include certain 
types of aircraft and nuclear forces which 
exist in France and Great Britain. Hence 
these are two totally different approaches. 
At the second session, the two parties set 
out and explained their proposals in 
detail. .Only at the third session did true 
negotiations begin. As I have just said, 
there are still major differences between 
the American and Soviet concepts, one 
approach being global, the others being 
territorial. 
For the Americans, it is the zero option, 
i.e. no deployment of this type of missile 
either by the Soviet Union or by the 
United States. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
wishes to reduce the number of such mis-
siles to a certain ceiling. Its proposals 
also have a geographical aspect and it 
wishes to include certain French and 
British arms and certain types of aircraft 
in the proposed system. 
So far, it has been impossible for the 
United States to accept this Soviet point 
of view for this would mean the Soviet 
Union having to be as strong as all the 
other forces combined. Hence there 
would no longer be a balance between 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
but between the Soviet Union on the one 
hand and the United States plus France 
and Britain on the other. 
In these circumstances, no agreement has 
yet been reached. Does this mean the 
negotiations are a failure? Not at all! 
They are neither blocked nor in a 
dead-lock. The negotiations are certainly 
serious. The attitude of the United 
States and the West has already in a way 
compelled the Soviet Union to give more 
details of its own proposals. We are 
convinced that.in the coming months the 
negotiations will not only be continued 
but, we hope, will produce good results. " 
13. A reply by Mr. von Staden, Secretary of 
State, to a written question put by Dr. Mertes 
in the Bundestag on 9th October 1982 explains 
how the United States' allies were consulted: 
" On 2nd February 1982, i.e. a few weeks 
after the beginning of the negotiations on 
30th November 1981, the United States 
tabled a detailed draft agreement: this 
draft, which basically proposes a recipro-
cal zero option for American and Soviet 
intermediate-range missiles, has since 
then, together with the Soviet positions 
put forward in the meantime, been the 
subject of intensive negotiations in Geneva 
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guided by a desire to succeed. All the 
points to be included in the text of the 
treaty are being negotiated in detail. 
The Federal Government receives regular 
and complete information on the state 
and progress of the negotiations, both in 
the framework of the NATO special 
consultative group (SCG) and in the 
framework of bilateral German-American 
consultations. Through these consulta-
tion procedures it can also inject its own 
ideas into the negotiations. As you 
know, it has already availed itself of 
this possibility on several occasions. " 
14. The British position was given in a reply 
by Mr. Ritkind to Mr. Robertson on 15th June 
1982, which is clearer than that of Mr. Hurd's 
reply to Mr. Page on 20th July 1982: 
"We strongly support the American pro-
posal for substantial cuts in the total 
numbers of ballistic missile warheads, but 
the strategic arms reduction talks should, 
in our view, address only the strategic 
arsenals of the two major nuclear weapon 
states. This view is shared by all mem-
bers of the alliance. United Kingdom 
forces will not therefore be involved." 
15. Finally, this position was confirmed by 
the British Prime Minister on 18th January 
1983 in reply to a question by Mr. Allaun: 
" Mr. Frank Allaun asked the Prime 
Minister whether Her Majesty's Govern-
ment have yet made any response to the 
new ideas on nuclear missile reduction 
put forward by the Soviet Union and 
mentioned by the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 
15th December 1982. 
The Prime Minister: We have made it 
clear, publicly and to the Russians, that 
their statement may be a step in the right 
direction, if it means they recognise that 
SS-20 missiles must be reduced. But to 
demand a continuing Soviet monopoly of 
such longer-range missiles, while insisting 
that the Americans alone implement a 
zero option, would be unacceptable. 
The British deterrent has no place at the 
INF negotiations. " 
Many written and oral questions have in fact 
been put on this subject in the House of Com-
mons and have elicited important ministerial 
statements which it is impossible to quote in 
the limited framework of this report. 
16. The Luxembourg position was given by 
Mrs. Flesch in answer to a question put by 
Mr. Glesener on 12th October 1982. She said 
Luxembourg subscribed to the NATO Council 
decisions and her statement was given in the 
thirty-sixth volume of collected texts issued by 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
The position was set out in much greater 
detail during a debate in the Chamber of 
Deputies on 29th October 1982. 
17. France's position has been described by 
various members of the government but gene-
rally outside parliament. As an illustration, 
your Rapporteurs have chosen a statement by 
Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, at a 
meeting of Conventions pour /'armee nouvelle 
in Paris on 23rd December 1982: 
" The priority given by France to nuclear 
armaments is decisive. France is defen-
ded. But France needs all it has and 
even a little more, not to attack but to 
defend itself. The Soviet Union and the 
United States have what they have and 
even rather too much, although unbalan-
ced. Hence, what Mr. Andropov is pro-
posing is interesting, but interesting for 
the Soviet Union and the United States. 
France 1s not concerned. Pacifists are 
now fully aware, thanks to Mr. Andro-
pov, that the arms race is not of our 
doing. The superpowers must disarm. 
France is waiting for the two super-
powers at the threshold of sufficiency. " 
IV. Deployment of Pershing ll and cruise 
missiles in Western Europe 
18. Here, the Council's reply is particularly 
vague since it refers neither to the place nor the 
date of possible deployment and merely sets 
out the conditions in very general terms: 
"3. The Council further agree with the 
Assembly on the importance to be atta-
ched to preparations for the deployment 
of ground-launched cruise missiles and 
Pershing 11 missiles. NA TO's resolve in 
implementing its 12th December 1979 
decision was the key factor in persuading 
the Soviet Union to enter into arms 
control negotiations in Geneva and will 
continue to be crucial to achieving 
concrete results. Members of the Coun-
cil who participated in the December 
1979 decision will continue to do all 
within their power to promote early pro-
gress towards negotiated agreement on 
the basis of the so-called ' zero option ' 
or 'zero-level outcome' for American 
and Soviet longer-range land-based INF 
missiles. They reconfirm that the nego-
tiations should, as a priority, relate to 
these systems which constitute the great-
est threat. They do not rule out the 
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possibility that in the event of agreement, 
subsequent phases of the negotiations 
may relate to other INF systems. They 
believe that it would be premature to 
prejudge the forum in which any arms 
control agreement covering short-range or 
battlefield nuclear systems might be 
considered. " 
19. Yet this is a matter which more than any 
other has gripped the attention of members of 
parliament of the countries where such missiles 
are to be deployed, first because the inhabitants 
of the areas under study for the possible deploy-
ment of missiles have voiced their anxiety and 
second because peace movements have often 
centred their activities on opposition to such 
deployment. 
20. Speaking about deployment arrange-
ments, Mr. Blaker threw useful light on the 
subject when replying to Mr. Marlow in the 
House of Commons on 16th November 1982: 
" My hon. friend knows the arrange-
ments in relation to cruise. They will be 
the same as those that have applied to 
American nuclear forces in this country 
for many years under successive govern-
ments - the bases cannot be used without 
the consent of both governments. " 
21. On 7th February 1983, Mr. Blaker des-
cribed the British position in reply to a ques-
tion by Mr. Roper: 
" The United States Government made it 
clear to the United Kingdom and to the 
other European countries that are accept-
ing basing of the Pershing 11 and cruise 
missiles that they were prepared to make 
the missiles available on a dual key 
basis. There is no point of principle 
here. As my right hon. friend the Secre-
tary of State made clear recently, the 
option of having a dual key was open to 
the United Kingdom if we had purchased 
the missile and supporting equipment 
and provided British servicemen to man 
them, with the United States providing 
only the nuclear warheads. This would 
have cost hundreds of millions of pounds 
and required well over 1 ,000 additional 
British servicemen ". 
22. The conditions for deploying cruise mis-
siles in Italy were spelled out by Mr. Scovacric-
chi, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, on 
29th June 1982 in reply to an oral question by 
Mr. La Valle and Mr. Pinna: 
" The Comiso base in particular must not 
be considered as a 'paying objective' in 
the sense that it is not a launching ramp 
for cruise missiles and is therefore not a 
possible target for a potential aggressor. 
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In fact, as the Minister of Defence already 
explained in the Senate during the joint 
meeting of the Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committees on 20th and 21st 
August 1981, in the event of crisis or 
emergency the squadrons carrying the 
missiles would immediately leave the 
base and disperse over a wide surround-
ing area, thus becoming practically invul-
nerable to attack. 
Once these squadrons have left, the base 
would be an empty shell of no further 
military interest, like a barracks aban-
doned by the men assigned to it in peace-
time. 
This assessment, based on unassailable 
technico-operational arguments, can but 
be that of the command posts of a poss-
ible aggressor. 
As further confirmation that the base is 
not a 'paying objective', it should be 
recalled that the families of the bases' 
military personnel will live on the base 
itself. 
Finally, to answer the last part of the 
question, it should be recalled that the 
decision to install cruise missiles in Eur-
ope was dictated solely by the need for 
NATO to counterbalance the modernisa-
tion and strengthening of the Soviet mis-
sile arsenal. 
In the eyes of the Soviet Union, cruise 
missiles therefore play a clearly deterrent 
role. The zero option provision 
confirms that such is the case. Italy was 
in effect the first European country to 
make acceptance of the cruise missile 
programme subject to a rider: if, before 
new western missiles are installed in Eur-
ope and in Italy, the Soviet Union agrees 
to destroy its new SS-20 intermediate-
range missiles, Italy will cancel its cruise 
missile programme. 
No other non-nuclear country in the vast 
area surrounding Italy therefore has any-
thing to fear from the decisions taken by 
the Italian Government. " 
23. The Belgian Minister of Defence gave 
details in his reply to a written question by 
Senator Royen on 14th September 1982: 
" ... all the member states, even those 
which do not install INF missiles on their 
territory, undertake to show solidarity in 
participating in the European installation 
costs under the NATO cost-sharing sys-
tem for joint programmes. It was also 
clear that in the event of the disarma-
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ment negotiations not succeeding the ins-
tallation of INF missiles would begin in 
1983 as provided for in the twofold deci-
sion. 
With regard to the meeting of Defence 
Ministers in May 1981, I refer to the 
NATO press communique in which the 
ministers confirm the validity of every 
aspect of the twofold decision. It was 
also stated that the ministers had paid 
increased attention to the earmarking of 
sufficient funds for NATO infrastructure 
Goint programmes) and that they had 
approved the financing of the programme 
for the current year. 
At that meeting, the ministers decided to 
earmark a sum of 70 million IAU 
(I IAU = FB 136.24) on a provisional 
basis for preparing the possible instal-
lation of INF missiles and to approve the 
exact amount needed for this programme 
at the next meeting in December 1981. 
My honourable predecessor was therefore 
acting in accordance with the government 
statement in force and the NATO two-
fold decision, approved by Belgium. 
It is true that the Netherlands Minister 
asked that this matter be handled with 
the necessary discretion. This is not my 
responsibility and I have no intention of 
giving my views on the intentions of a 
minister of a friendly country. 
In any event, the succession of facts, deci-
sions and official statements described 
above and known to the public prove 
that it is not possible to speak of a 
cover-up operation. " 
24. These details correspond moreover to 
those given on several occasions by the same 
minister answering oral or written questions by 
Belgian parliamentarians. To them may be 
added the reply by Mr. Wiirzbach, Federal 
German Secretary of State, to a written ques-
tion by Mr. Scheer in the Bundestag, admitting 
that the measures taken to deploy missiles 
under the December 1979 NATO twofold deci-
sion concern only the infrastructure and not the 
missiles themselves. 
25. The same secretary of state, replying to 
Dr. Friedmann on 12th November 1982 gave 
further details: 
" I. The methods of bringing into ser-
vice Pershing batteries of the Luftwaffe 
and the American army are defined in a 
document held by the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR). 
2. Knowing that in the event of war the 
Pershing batteries would be an ideal tar-
get for the enemy, NA TO's fundamental 
tactical concept is based on: 
- rapid evacuation of sites occupied 
in peacetime; 
- transfer to remote areas; 
- frequent movement. 
This is the only means of ensuring the 
survival capability of the Pershing bat-
teries. 
3. It is clear that the great mobility 
required for implementing this concept 
can be maintained in peacetime only at 
the cost of constant training. The trans-
port of Pershings on our roads is carried 
out principally in the framework of these 
exercises. 
4. Security measures needed for such 
transport are the responsibility of each 
country. With regard to the Luftwaffe 
Pershing batteries, these measures, which 
have just been revised at the end of last 
year, make provision, inter alia and 
independently of security provisions 
already in force for munitions, for: 
(a) an escort detachment; 
(b) the limitation of movements to 
the m1mmum required for 
conducting the exercise. 
In this connection, I would refer to the 
BMV g press release of 4th November 
1982 in which it was stated in substance 
that the transport of a Pershing missile 
was no more dangerous - on the contrary 
- than the transport of fuel or chemical 
products. " 
26. On the other hand, the governments 
concerned have always refused to supply lists of 
sites where the new missiles might be de-
ployed. In the Federal Republic, this refusal 
has been absolute and unrelenting (cf. reply by 
Mr. Wiirzbach to question 3 by Mr. Antretter 
on 24th November 1982), but it was specified 
(by the same secretary of state in reply to a 
question by Mr. Catenhusen on 28th October 
1982) that the number of Pershing lis which it 
was planned to deploy in the Federal Republic 
was 108. 
27. In the United Kingdom, the government 
has specified several times that the sites chosen 
had all been leased already to the American 
army since the second world war, including 
Molesworth and Greenham Common, where 
the deployment of cruise missiles may become 
effective in December 1983 (reply by Mr. 
Blaker to Mr. Meacher on 17th January 
1983). In Belgium, the Minister for External 
Relations confirmed that the Florennes site cor-
55 
DOCUMENT 943 
responded best to the technical requirements for 
building a base (reply to question 17 by Mr. le 
Hardy de Beaulieu of 19th November 1982), 
but the proposal to deploy missiles at U rsel was 
postponed indefinitely (reply to question 24 by 
Mr. van den Bosoche in the Chamber on 22nd 
November 1982). Questioned about the pos-
sible deployment of cruise missiles in Germany, 
at Priim and Bithug near the Belgian frontier 
(question 36 by Mr. Kuijpers), the Belgian 
Government replied in the Chamber on 14th 
December: 
" The German authorities have had no 
contact at all with the Belgian Govern-
ment about the sites for stationing cruise 
missiles. Nor, moreover, have there 
been any negotiations with NATO for 
installing these missiles on German terri-
tory." 
28. In Italy, the government has not denied 
the announcement by certain senators on 23rd 
November 1982 that it was proposed to install 
cruise missiles at Comiso in Sicily. 
V. Informing public opinion 
29. The Council's reply to the point about 
keeping public opinion informed of military 
policy in the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw 
Pact shows that the Assembly was quite right 
but gives it little concrete satisfaction: 
" 6. The Council agree that the figures 
published on the forces of the integrated 
military structure of the alliance and of 
the Warsaw Pact, such as those in the 
NATO force comparisons paper pub-
lished in the spring of 1982 may need to 
be updated from time to time. They 
also accept that member governments 
will need to continue their active infor-
mation policies to ensure that public 
opinion is well informed about alliance 
security policy, and the threat faced by 
members of NATO. " 
30. When Mrs. Knight asked for the views of 
her country's Minister of Defence, the reply by 
Mr. Blaker on 27th January 1983 merely refer-
red to Chapter 3 of the 1982 statement on 
defence estimates. The same reply was given 
to Mr. Greenway on 1st February 1983. 
31. Conversely, the British Government has 
replied to many questions about movements of 
public opinion caused by the debate on the 
deployment of nuclear weapons or proposals 
for unilateral British disarmament initiatives. 
A written question by Mr. Wigley allowed 
Mr. Hurd to specify that a booklet " The 
nuclear debate ", of which 50,000 copies were 
published by the Arms Control and Disarma-
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ment Research Unit, had given ample informa-
tion about the disarmament negotiations. Your 
Rapporteurs consider the governments of the 
other member countries might usefully also 
be asked to give information on the balance of 
forces and on matters relating to disarmament, 
as they are urged to do in the two recommen-
dations studied in the present report. 
32. A third area in which public opinion 
might be informed is that of peace movements, 
which are not limited to the World Peace 
Council, the only one referred to in Mr. Bla-
ker's reply to Mr. Atkinson on 20th December 
1982: 
•• The Soviet Union largely finances the 
World Peace Council - which has its 
headquarters in Helsinki - and its natio-
nal ancillaries. As ministers have pre-
viously stated, the WPC is a disguised 
instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Dis-
cussions of the WPC's governmental 
funding caused the withdrawal of its 
application for consultative status at the 
United Nations Economic and Social 
Council in February 1981. The British 
affiliate of the WPC is the British Peace 
Assembly. " 
33. In any event, pacifist demonstrations 
have had considerable repercussions in national 
parliaments. They have been echoed in all 
questions relating to deployment sites in the 
five countries concerned. In Italy a number of 
senators tabled a motion for a constitutional 
law on 23rd November 1982 whose main pro-
vision was: 
•• The question to be put by referendum 
is: Do you consent to the installation at 
Comiso or elsewhere on national territory 
of ground-based ballistic or cruise mis-
siles with nuclear warheads? " 
34. In the Netherlands, the new government 
formed in autumn 1982 immediately had to 
come to grips with the problem. On 22nd Nov-
ember 1982, it explained its general policy on 
a number of subjects including its foreign and 
defence policies. The Prime Minister, 
Mr. Lubbers, declared: 
•• The North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion is the main instrument of western 
collaboration. Outside Atlantic co-
operation in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation there is no foreseeable 
forum which could guarantee peace and 
security. For both political and military 
considerations, the Netherlands is obliged 
to make a reasonable contribution to the 
common defence effort. At the same 
time it will emphasise to the utmost the 
need to find solutions to armaments 
questions through consultations between 
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East and West on the mutual reduction 
of armaments. The Netherlands will 
continue to promote an active armaments 
restriction policy directed towards reduc-
ing dependence on nuclear weapons. 
The Netherlands will make every effort 
within the alliance to offer the maximum 
chances for the progress of negotiations. 
Here, East and West have a histo-
rical opportunity to master the arma-
ments race. 
To do everything possible is what those 
taking part in the peace demonstrations 
on 21st November 1982 and all others 
who pray for peace have demanded. " 
35. In the ensuing debates, several motions 
were submitted on such matters as putting a 
halt to all preparatory work for the estab-
lishment of cruise missiles, imposing a ceiling 
of 2 o/o per year on the defence budget, the 
development of the French neutron weapon, 
the nuclear tasks of the Orlon and F-16 aircraft 
and the mutual and controllable freezing of 
nuclear weapons arsenals. Mr. Lubbers then 
added that the government did not agree to a 
freeze as it did not wish to interfere in the dis-
cussions in Geneva on the Soviet Union's 
medium-range nuclear weapons and SS-20 mis-
siles. It hoped that the outcome would be to 
reduce and completely dismantle the arma-
ments concerned. The government hoped that 
the results of the Geneva negotiations would be 
acceptable to all concerned. 
36. On 13th and 14th January 1983, the per-
manent committees for foreign affairs and 
defence of the Second Chamber had a meeting 
with General Rogers, SACEUR, and Dr. Luns, 
Secretary-General of NATO. In the discus-
sions, Dr. Luns pointed out that he thought 
that both sides were trying to reach an agree-
ment in the Geneva discussions and he consi-
dered this was still a possibility. He thought 
the same was true for the START discussions 
on strategic weapons. 
37. He was not optimistic about the MBFR 
negotiations in Vienna, but nevertheless 
thought that in 1983 armaments containment 
would dominate the East-West dialogue. 
VI. Inter-allied consultations 
38. Here a distinction should be drawn bet-
ween consultations in the framework of the 
North Atlantic Council and consultations in 
more specifically European forums. On the 
first, the WEU Council replied: 
•• The Council agree with the Assembly 
on the need to continue the current 
consultations amongst the allies on the 
subject of the INF negotiations. They 
welcome the addition of regular briefings 
of the North Atlantic Council, by the lea-
ders of the United States Delegation to 
these INF negotiations, to the continued 
series of meetings of the special consul-
tative group for those member countries 
which participated in the dual decision of 
December 1979. " 
39. On 27th October, this reply was com-
pleted by the Council's reply to Question 230 
put by Mr. Giinther Miiller: 
" Consultations on the issue of nuclear 
arms limitation negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union have 
indeed taken place within the framework 
of NATO ever since this issue became 
valid. 
Accordingly, the INF negotiating position 
of the United States and in particular the 
zero option proposal, aiming at a total 
renunciation of longer-range INF missiles 
by the United States and the USSR, were 
established in close consultation and with 
the active contribution of other NATO 
partners who are parties to the decision 
of 12th December 1979 on the moderni-
sation of longer-range INF and on nego-
tiations aiming at the reductions of such 
weapons. A special forum, the special 
consultative group (SCG), was established 
in order to ensure a thorough and regular 
consultation between the United States 
and these countries, a consultation which 
in fact associates these countries to the 
negotiation. A suitable procedure of 
consultation on a regular basis has been 
established within the alliance with regard 
to the negotiations on the reduction of 
strategic arms (START). For the above 
reasons there clearly exists no need to 
have recourse to other fora for this kind 
of consultation. " 
40. It must however be borne in mind that 
while there are consultations between the 
United States and its NATO partners and bet-
ween European governments, little information 
reaches the parliaments other than through par-
liamentary initiatives such as questions put by 
members of parliament to governments. 
41. Only too often governments are perhaps 
not very spontaneous in keeping parliaments 
fully informed. 
42. The quotations in Chapters Ill and IV of 
this report give some indication of the extent 
and nature of these consultations and give an 
intimation of certain limits. 
43. On consultations in a European frame-
work, particularly WEU, the Council replied: 
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" As regards a European approach to the 
political aspects of the discussions in the 
North Atlantic Council, the .European 
members of the alliance discuss the issues 
on the agenda of the North Atlantic 
Council with each other as well as with 
their North Atlantic allies, as part of nor-
mal consultations. A number of these 
subjects are also discussed by the mem-
bers of the European Community as a 
normal part of the Community's political 
co-operation procedures. " 
44. To this should be added the replies by 
Mr. Mauroy, French Prime Minister, to Mr. 
Aubert on 28th June 1982 and by Mr. Blaker 
to Mrs. Knight on 27th January 1983 which 
bring out the widely divergent attitudes of the 
two governments towards WEU. The former 
said: 
" France's defence is independent. It is 
based on its own strategy of deterrence -
of the strong by the weak - allowing 
damage to be inflicted on an aggressor, 
even a stronger one, which is calculated 
to be greater than the stake which France 
represents for the enemy and his vital 
interests. Moreover, the French authori-
ties have begun to sound out our Euro-
pean partners about the need to discuss 
the common problems which may arise 
for our countries. For instance, France 
has recalled its attachment to the treaties 
setting up Western European Union. 
WEU, and its parliamentary Assembly in 
particular, is in fact the only existing ins-
titution where it is possible to refer to 
matters of defence. It has therefore been 
suggested to the WEU parliamentarians 
that they discuss in depth problems 
affecting Europe's security. In parallel, 
and the Franco-German summit meeting 
in February 1982 was an illustration of 
this, those in authority in France are 
doing their utmost to facilitate a rappro-
chement between European governments 
wishing to ensure their security in an 
international environment which is 
threatened by a deteriorating military 
balance." 
While the latter, on the contrary, specified that: 
" The security of Europe is the concern 
of all members of NATO and therefore it 
is the government's view that the alliance 
should remain the principal body in 
which detailed discussion of defence and 
disarmament policies takes place. How-
ever, the WEU Assembly has an impor-
tant role to play in promoting understand-
ing of the defence policies of its member 
nations." 
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45. It would obviously be most useful to 
obtain similar clarification from the other 
governments. 
VII. Conclusions 
46. Your Rapporteurs are well aware of the 
limits of their study: it was not possible for 
them to examine all parliamentary work on the 
problems raised in the two recommendations in 
question in all the parliaments of member 
countries. Nor moreover did they try to cover 
everything for fear of repetition or plati-
tudes. However, they believe that this outline 
will allow a number of conclusions to be drawn 
which should be of interest to the Committee 
for Relations with Parliaments and to the 
Assembly as a whole. 
47. (l) Such comparative studies of action taken 
on WEU Assembly recommendations are of 
real interest and should be repeated and taken 
further after this initial attempt. This would 
require greater assistance from national delega-
tions. 
48 (ii) When Assembly recommendations are 
on highly topical matters, as was the case here, 
there is a wide response to them in parliaments 
and the replies given by the Council may be 
usefully interpreted in the light of those given 
in national parliaments by the governments of 
member countries since the Council expresses 
the joint position of the Seven. 
49. (iii) In the parliaments of some member 
countries, procedure for written questions does 
not produce information of the same value as 
that for oral questions, particularly when they 
give rise to debates. It is for each individual 
member of the committee and of the Assembly 
to draw the consequences of this. 
50. (iv) The questions put have greater impact 
if they relate to matters of direct concern for 
parliamentarians and those they represent as 
was the case for the sites for deploying cruise or 
Pershing 11 missiles. This means members of 
the Assembly must adapt their questions to 
their own national and local circumstances and 
not merely reproduce the suggestions made by 
the Chairman of the committee at the close of 
each session. 
51. (v) The committee wishes the Assembly 
again to urge the Council to reply more quickly 
to recommendations, particularly when they 
relate to highly topical matters. 
52. (vi) The committee wishes the General 
Affairs Committee to be asked to prepare 
another report on nuclear weapons and the 
reactions of public opinion. 
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VIII. Point of view of Mr. Page 
53. The Assembly and its individual mem-
bers have a duty, collectively and separately, to 
inform and to warn their constituents about the 
build-up of Soviet arms, and the threat to their 
countries from the cleverly-named peace move-
ments (more properly they should be called 
pacifist movements) with their emphasis on 
unilateral nuclear disarmament and hostility 
to the United States. 
54. The comments made in the earlier part 
of this report emphasise the fundamental unity 
of WEU member states as shown by their atti-
tude towards Recommendation 383. 
55. There has not yet been time for full dis-
cussion of Recommendation 388 or general 
reaction to it, but there can be no doubt that 
Europe is only beginning to appreciate the care-
fully organised and orchestrated strategy of the 
peace movements. This will be dealt with 
later in this paper. 
Multilateral disarmament: the path of hope 
56. In the face of the Soviet Union's one-
nation arms race over the past fifteen years, the 
NATO allies now have no choice but to res-
pond in order to preserve peace. 
57. But this requirement has not caused us to 
lose sight of our overall objective - the achieve-
ment of balanced reductions in armaments by 
both sides - nuclear, biological, chemical and 
conventional - leading to general and complete 
disarmament. 
58. NA TO's initiatives for multilateral disar-
mament offer the maintenance of peace with 
freedom in the nuclear age. Two key propo-
sitions have been put to the Soviets : 
(i) a one-third reduction by both sides in 
strategic nuclear warheads; 
(ii) to stop the deployment to Western 
Europe of cruise and Pershing 11 mis-
siles, if the Soviet Union scraps its 
deployment of SS-20s which directly 
threaten our civilian populations. 
59. We must convince our fellow citizens 
that the path to peace in the nuclear age is 
exclusively in the pursuit of multilateral - not 
unilateral - disarmament. 
The nuclear build-up in Europe 
60. Since the mid-sixties, when the United 
States unilaterally withdrew its Thor and Jupi-
ter missiles from Europe, NATO has had no 
land-based missiles in Europe. The Soviets 
not only failed to reciprocate this gesture, but 
continued to build SS-4 and SS-5 missiles until 
they had some 600 deployed against Western 
Europe. At the height of detente in the late 
seventies, the Soviets introduced the mobile 
intermediate-range ballistic missile known as 
the SS-20 and the Backfire supersonic nuclear-
strike bomber. 
61. The deployment of the SS-20 alone has 
resulted in doubling to I ,200 the numbers of 
Soviet nuclear warheads aimed at the cities and 
civilian populations of Western Europe. This 
is, of course, apart from warheads carried by 
the Backfire bombers, currently being built at 
the rate of thirty-five per year and each capable 
of delivering four missiles with nuclear war-
heads. With the decommissioning this year of 
Britain's Vulcan bombers, the nuclear balance 
in Europe is tilting sharply against the western 
allies. 
Peace campaigns are sweeping Europe 
62. In spite of the facts shown above, the 
peace movements are gaining vast media and 
TV coverage throughout Europe. Their suc-
cessful demonstrations reached their climax 
during the Easter holiday period of 1983. 
63. Most of the demonstrations have an 
anti-nuclear flavour, but are basically anti-
American and anti-NA TO. 
64. In West Germany, over the Easter period, 
it is estimated that a total of 500,000 people 
will have joined in ninety events. Thousands 
have demonstrated in the Netherlands and even 
Switzerland has become a platform for demons-
trations. In Southern Italy at Comiso there 
have been continuing demonstrations and in 
Britain the women's anti-nuclear movement 
(centred on the demonstrations at Greenham 
Common United States air base) has become a 
central news feature. Only in France has the 
anti-nuclear campaign been muted. 
How is the peace movement organised interna-
tionally? 
65. The most authoritative document yet 
produced on this subject is " Soviet mani-
pulation of the European peace movement " by 
Dr. W. Joshua, published in the " Strategic 
Review" 1983. She quoted a former KGB 
officer saying : 
" The trick is to make people support 
Soviet policy unwittingly by convincing 
them they are supporting something 
else. Almost everybody wants peace and 
fears war. " 
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66. The most important " front " organisa-
tion is mentioned in paragraph 32 of our report 
in answer to a question by Mr. Atkinson and is 
the World Peace Council. As Dr. Joshua 
reminds us: 
" Based in Helsinki since 1968, it claims 
some 13 5 national chapters throughout 
the world. Most of its funding comes 
from Moscow. Its current president, the 
Indian communist Romesh Chandra, was 
apparently ' discovered ' in the 1960s by 
R.G. Bogdanov, a KGB colonel and now, 
appropriately, one of the deputies of the 
Institute for the Study of the United 
States and Canada. " 
67. Responsibility for the World Peace 
Council rests with Vitaly Shaposhnikov, a 
Deputy Chief of the International Depart-
ment. The latter is also a member of the 
Council's Presidential Committee. 
68. The World Peace Council and its affi-
liates have played an important role in organis-
ing demonstrations and conferences in both the 
anti-neutron bomb and anti-INF campaigns. 
For example, the Council sponsored an " inter-
national conference against the arms race " in 
June 1981 in Stockholm. The meeting drew 
representatives from thirty European countries, 
the United States and Canada. Not surpris-
ingly, it condemned the INF programme. 
The World Peace Council also staged an 
" international organisations meeting " in 
September 1981 in Prague to discuss ways to 
avert nuclear war. 
69. By organising anti-nuclear rallies and 
advocating Soviet-endorsed disarmament poli-
cies, the World Peace Council e:-.ploits fears of 
nuclear war. 
70. It is difficult exactly to trace Soviet finan-
cing for the peace movements, but the CIA esti-
mates that the activities of the World Peace 
Council, the Prague-based Christian Peace 
Council and other international front organisa-
tions are costing the Soviets about $63 million 
per year. Many of the peace organisations are 
openly or covertly supported by local commu-
nist parties who receive finance from Warsaw 
Pact countries - for instance, the West German 
Communist Party from the East German 
Government. 
71. At the present time in Europe, the peace 
movements seem to be flourishing most strongly 
in the Netherlands, in West Germany and 
to a lesser extent in Britain. In these largely 
protestant countries, churchmen have become 
particularly vulnerable to pacifist propaganda 
and this gives a spurious respectability to the 
movements. However, the Roman Catholic 
Church appears to retain a more aloof stance. 
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The counter-thrust 
72. As our report shows, there is a remark-
able solidarity among the governments of the 
WEU member countries for European defence 
strategy and this seems to be reflected in the 
majority view of the Assembly. Opposition to 
this strategy now appears to be gaining strength 
through organisations which exist outside par-
liaments rather than from inside. Thus, if we 
are not to lose the defence argument, it will be 
necessary for parliamentarians to take the argu-
ment right out to the public and fight the battle 
in the towns and villages rather than just in the 
debating chamber. 
73. For those who believe in defence and 
multilateral disarmament, it may now be neces-
sary to campaign actively in our countries to 
clarify the issues and counter Soviet misinfor-
mation. It would be dangerous for parliamen-
tarians to allow the pacifist arguments to go 
unanswered and it will be constantly necessary 
to remind the public, in the words of a famous 
churchman, that " It is futile for sheep to pass 
resolutions in favour of vegetarianism unless 
the wolves are prepared to do the same". 
IX. Point of view of Mr. Dejardin 
74. Analysis of action taken on the two 
Assembly recommendations concerned and of 
their effects in national parliaments brings two 
elements to light : 
(i) the insufficient response in member 
countries to the work of the WEU 
Assembly; 
(ii) the discrepancy between "official" 
government positions and those 
expressed among public opinion. 
75. Neither is likely to console the Assembly, 
either with regard to its functioning and effica-
city or to its ability to represent all points of 
view. 
A. EJ]icacity of tile Assembly 
76. The concern of the protagonists of the 
modified Brussels Treaty to avoid duplication 
of work between WEU and other international 
organisations on the one hand and, on the other 
hand, the decision expressed in the resolution 
of 20th December 1950 that it was no longer 
necessary to maintain the Western Union 
defence organisation in its present form (i.e. 
transfer of the exercise of the military activities 
of the Brussels Treaty Organisation to NATO), 
together with the creation of the North Atlantic 
Assembly and the development of its activities 
resulted in the audience and political efficacity 
of the Assembly being restricted. 
60 
77. Moreover, WEU and its Assembly suffer 
from underlying fundamental disagreement 
about the objective to be attained, a funda-
mental disagreement which was at the root of 
the failure of the EDC between the concept of 
Europe as a structure which would dominate 
relations between states and do away with their 
free will and the concept expressed among 
others by General de Gaulle that in building 
Europe use must be made of the free will of 
states and a European will created common to 
the states concerned. 
78. The first concept, promoted for instance 
by Mr. Schuman, Mr. Monnet and Mr. Spaak, 
is moreover the reason for the European Parlia-
ment's claim to handle defence and security 
matters, as emerges from the recent report by 
Mr. Ferguson. 
79. When debating the reports by Mr. Mom-
mersteeg and Mr. Lagorce, the WEU Assembly 
was able to tackle a " hot " topical sub-
ject. The debates were lively and meaningful 
but nevertheless the media showed very limited 
interest in them in spite of the efforts of the 
WEU press department. 
80. But the desire to revise the role of WEU 
shown by the French and Italian Governments 
and recognition by the governments of all 
member states of the exclusive nature of the 
responsibility of WEU and its Assembly for the 
military aspects of defence and security matters 
could lead to new dynamism and a new identi-
fication of essential collective defence in Eur-
ope, which is a factor of joint security and 
integration. 
81. Ever since it was set up, the Assembly 
has considered that Article IX of the treaty 
acknowledged its parliamentary role stemming 
from the application of the treaty and that it 
was entitled to exercise the same general 
responsibilities as the Council. It has a purely 
consultative role because it has no real powers. 
Its audience depends closely on the interest 
aroused by its activities and follow-up action in 
national parliaments through reports by its 
members there. 
82. Would it be impertinent to wonder 
about the real will of each one to assume this 
task to the full ? 
83. In spite of everything, human relations in 
politics as elsewhere are dominated by a 
balance of forces. 
84. All experts in defence or security ques-
tions and circles competent in such matters tes-
tify unanimously to the high standard of the 
Assembly's work. So that is not the problem. 
85. On the "technical" level, the balance is 
very positive but on the political level it is not, 
although the conclusions adopted by a majority 
of the Assembly largely coincide with the posi-
tions of governments and NATO bodies, parti-
cularly in the case of the two recommendations 
referred to in this report. 
B. Discrepancy with public opinion 
86. In his report to the Parliamentary Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe on East-West rela-
tions, Mr. Lied refers to various public opinion 
polls which clearly bring out a majority expres-
sion of hostility to the presence of nuclear wea-
pons in Europe. He also recalls that it is 
against war that a section of public opinion is 
militating and he considers this public opinion 
to have been earlier anaesthetised by faith in 
detente. 
87. It is certain that never before have initia-
tives in favour of peace through disarmament 
met with such a favourable response among the 
population. Not so long ago " anti-nuclear 
marches " and other similar demonstrations 
were mainly a matter for young people's orga-
nisations and marginal groups to the left of the 
political stage. Moreover, the fact that com-
munist parties were active in these initiatives 
and unconditionally espoused even the most 
undefendable positions of the Soviet Union too 
often and unfairly led to rejection by " traditio-
nal " political forces. 
88. Today the situation has changed. No 
doubt the fact that a number of former young 
activists of movements and initiatives for peace 
and against war (even cold) are now in respon-
sible political positions must be taken into 
consideration. However, this is not enough to 
explain the change, even if most of them are to 
be found in the ranks of the demonstra-
tors. Political parties with a government voca-
tion such as the socialists, social democrats and 
christian democrats openly adopt positions in 
favour of anti-nuclear objectives and disarma-
ment negotiations and, as Mr. Lied says, they 
meet what appear to be the aspirations of large 
sections of the population. 
89. It would be derisory as well as inaccurate 
to seek explanations for this trend of opinion in 
the effects of Soviet propaganda when circles 
favourable to NATO's decision of 12th Decem-
ber 1979 have at their disposal more extensive 
means of information and hence of mobilising 
public opinion. 
90. But until now the latter have not been 
able to gather together enough adepts to orga-
nise demonstrations, apart from a few sparsely-
attended academic meetings. 
91. Would it not be worthwhile to describe 
the origins of the present pacifist movements ? 
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92. They really started just before the first 
United Nations General Assembly special ses-
sion on disarmament. Their action is therefore 
fundamentally based on the principles laid 
down and the statements made during that 
session. 
93. Its importance became apparent in 
Europe following NATO's decision of 12th 
December 1979 and in the autumn 1981 
demonstrations. In the United States, it was 
seen on the occasion of the demonstration 
organised in New York on 12th June 1982 by 
the Freeze Now Movement during the second 
United Nations session on disarmament. 
94. These movements have a number of new 
characteristics : 
- their mass effect; 
- their instigators are either from the 
churches or from large co-ordinating 
committees bringing together most 
young people's organisations, pacifist 
groups, trade union organisations and 
political parties in which overt or 
covert communist influence is more 
often than not to be felt only among a 
minority; 
- their ability to assess the nuclear stakes 
(the Western European movements in 
fact now have their own independent 
experts, for instance in Belgium there is 
GRIP - group for research and infor-
mation on peace). 
95. The biggest mistake their opponents 
might make would be not to recognise their real 
independence of the military-political-industrial 
blocs for, in order to thwart them, they would 
have to bypass the democratic strategy of 
convincing by objective information and adopt 
an unacceptable strategy of violence which 
would be tantamount to repudiating the demo-
cracy to which all subscribe. 
96. To deny the independence of views and 
sincerity of the opponent soon leads to overt or 
covert violence. Particularly since opponents 
of the deployment of nuclear weapons in both 
East and West are as undeniably voluntaryist as 
unaligned in attaining their goals. 
97. The German and Nordic movements are 
more unilateralist, i.e. they call on each partner 
in negotiations to take the initiative of " inde-
pendent steps" towards disarmament, while 
movements in Latin areas concentrate more on 
bilateral, simultaneous steps. 
98. Nevertheless, a common will to prevent 
the installation of Euromissiles was again 
expressed last February at a Western European 
co-ordination meeting at Bradford (United 
Kingdom) which included France and Spain 
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and at Easter demonstrations in the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic. 
99. The Western European movement inspired 
the, United States Freeze Now Movement 
and is now encouraging similar action in 
Eastern Europe. In the German Democratic 
Republic there is the Protestant Church move-
ment and in Hungary the Independent Peace 
Movement. 
100. Views on the nature of pacifist organisa-
tions and demonstrations for peace and disar-
mament very often lead to heated discussion. 
101. In fact, for a long time the unilateralism 
of the world peace campaign made some people 
think that the movements fighting for peace and 
disarmament would be remote-controlled. How-
ever, a few recent events are likely to invali-
date such a view, for instance the incidents pro-
voked in Sofia in 1980 by western participants 
in an international demonstration for peace at 
which some of the latter publicly denounced 
the Manichaeism of pro-Soviet pacifism. Again, 
in East Berlin at the end of 1982 the 
Belgian delegates to the conference of eastern 
and western Christians condemned the arms 
race by the two superpowers. 
102. It is now the Soviets themselves who talk 
about incomprehension, particularly in letters 
from Mr. Yuri Jukov, Chairman of the Soviet 
Committee for the Defence of Peace and substi-
tute member of the Soviet Communist Party 
Central Committee, and from a Komsomol lea-
der to CNAPD (the Belgian committee which 
co-ordinates pacifist and young people's asso-
ciations and all action and demonstrations in 
Belgium against the arms race). In these 
letters, the two Soviet officials paternalistically 
warn western movements against the risks of 
anti-Sovietism, because in its directives 
CNAPD rejects unilateral declarations and 
challenges the deployment of all nuclear wea-
pons in Europe, in both East and West. 
103. Again, the support publicly expressed by 
western pacifists for " unofficial " pacifist initia-
tives in communist countries, including the 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania, is obviously little comfort 
for the authorities in those countries. 
104. Analysis of all these factors confirms the 
real independence of the peace movement of 
the eighties and its proximity to the social 
misgivings of the population, victims of the cri-
sis. In its ranks was born the slogan " Disarm 
to develop ", thus extending the objective to 
third world concerns. 
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105. The danger of social control inherent in 
speeding up the arms race just as much as a 
perilous orientation of economic growth are 
increasingly encouraging people to opt for the 
alternative chances of greater freedom and 
democracy and another form of economic deve-
lopment thanks to disarmament. 
106. In this connection, the rift between very 
large sections of the population, if not the 
majority (according to inquiries, polls and the 
undoubted success of demonstrations on a scale 
hitherto unprecedented), and the present 
governments of member states seems to be 
growing deeper. 
107. However, examination of ministers' 
replies to parliamentarians, government com-
muniques and positions publicly adopted by a 
large number of political leaders shows a steady 
inflection of the determination initially 
expressed at the end of 1979, not only among 
socialists and social democrats but also among 
christian democrats and others. 
108. Nor is it possible to gloss over the 
changed attitudes shown in new proposals by 
both East and West and the revival of the 
Geneva negotiations. 
109. There is no doubt that this is an effect of 
constant public pressure aroused by the now 
co-ordinated pacifist and anti-nuclear move-
ments which also have an influence in the East, 
although still inadequate. 
110. The governments of member states 
intend to respect the December 1979 com-
mitment; however, they can see the growing 
hostility of public opinion which is perhaps 
insufficiently informed but which is increa-
singly militant because it senses the danger 
involved in any lowering of the nuclear thres-
hold and the proliferation of arsenals of all sorts 
in both Eastern and Western Europe. 
Ill. What can come of such a situation ? In 
a democratic system, who should have the " last 
word " ? Military experts or the political will 
expressed by a majority of the people ? 
112. The Assembly is caught up in this 
dilemma and its member parliamentarians will 
certainly not find the road of wisdom through 
polemics, even if this is, rightly or wrongly, an 
intrinsic part of the political debate. 
113. To endeavour by hook or by crook to 
impose nuclear over-armament in Europe and 
to caricature the positions in this matter of all 
concerned would in the long run turn the 
people of Europe completely away from any 
collective defence system or military alliance 
and consequently would most certainly frustrate 
the ambitions of WEU and its Assembly. 
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APPENDIX 
Recommendations 383 and 388 and the replies of the Council 
RECOMMENDATION 383 1 
on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that 
the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-
range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced; 
(ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security 
policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war; 
(iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces; 
(iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis 
both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased 
by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option; 
(v) Regretting that SALT 11 remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by 
the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic 
arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further 
progress; 
(vl) Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions 
which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and 
comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those 
statements at the opening of the START negotiations; 
(vii) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks 
should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and 
welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end 
of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons; 
(viii) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations 
which must be conducted in the framework of START; 
(ix) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of 
ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons; 
(x) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Hel-
sinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides; 
(xi) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of 
deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of 
nuclear war; 
(xii) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements 
which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis 
of the facts in order to negotiate reductions; 
(xiii) Welcoming the publication of" NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which 
the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by govern-
ments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the 
basis of allied defence and arms control policies; 
(xiv) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to 
discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based, 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 16th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 918). 
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REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council, 
I. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an 
agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control; 
2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 
1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing 11 missiles less any reductions 
previously agreed in the INF talks; 
3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for !and-based missiles, 
and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclu-
sion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks; 
4. To welcome the resumption ofthe SALT process through the proposed opening of START in 
June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect 
of all SALT limits during the negotiations; 
5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verifi-
cation, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction; 
6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a 
joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by 
accident or miscalculation; 
7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO 
comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forth-
coming and objective in publishing force comparisons; 
B.l. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public 
opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied 
defence and arms control and reduction policies; 
B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic 
Council. 
64 
APPENDIX DOCUMENT 943 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 383 
1. The Council welcome the continued interest of the Assembly in the matter of intermediate 
nuclear forces (INF) and take careful note of the Assembly's views. The Council endorse many of 
the opinions expressed in the recommendation and its preamble, notably the need for arms control 
and defence measures to complement each other in a balanced security policy, and the importance of 
the 1979 double decision as the basis for redressing the imbalance in INF. 
2. The Council agree with the Assembly on the need to continue the current consultations 
amongst the allies on the subject of the INF negotiations. They welcome the addition of regular 
briefings of the North Atlantic Council, by the leaders of the United States Delegation to these INF 
negotiations, to the continued series of meetings of the Special Consultative Group for those member 
countries which participated in the dual decision of December 1979. 
3. The Council further agree with the Assembly on the importance to be attached to prepara-
tions for the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 11 missiles. NATO's 
resolve in implementing its 12th December 1979 decision was the key factor in persuading the Soviet 
Union to enter into arms control negotiations in Geneva and will continue to be crucial to achieving 
concrete results. Members of the Council who participated in the December 1979 decision will 
continue to do all within their power to promote early progress towards negotiated agreement on the 
basis of the so-called "zero option" or "zero-level outcome" for American and Soviet longer-range 
land-based INF missiles. They reconfirm that the negotiations should, as a priority, relate to these 
systems which constitute the greatest threat. They do not rule out the possibility that in the event of 
agreement, subsequent phases of the negotiations may relate to other INF systems. They believe that 
it would be premature to prejudge the forum in which any arms control agreement covering short-
range or battlefield nuclear systems might be considered. 
4. The Council are happy to repeat the welcome which has been given by member governments 
to the renewal of strategic arms control through the opening of the START talks and to the assur-
ances that what has been achieved through existing agreements will not be undercut pending the 
negotiation of a -S-T A.R T agreement, subject to reciprocity. The Council endorse the Assembly's 
concern to see effective verification measures in any arms control agreement. 
5. The Council doubt that the United States Government need outside encouragement to keep 
under review the existing measures to prevent any possibility of war by accident or miscalculation 
and in this respect have noted the initiatives outlined by President Reagan in his speech in Berlin in 
June 1982. 
6. The Council agree that the figures published on the forces of the integrated military structure 
of the alliance and of the Warsaw Pact, such as those in the NATO force comparisons paper pub-
lished in the spring of 1982 may need to be updated from time to time. They also accept that mem-
ber governments will need to continue their active information policies to ensure that public opinion 
is well informed about alliance security policy, and the threat faced by members of NATO. 
7. As regards a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlan-
tic Council, the European members of the alliance discuss the issues on the agenda of the North 
Atlantic Council with each other as well as with their North Atlantic allies, as part of normal consul-
tations. A number of these subjects are also discussed by the members of the European Community 
as a normal part of the Community's political co-operation procedures. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1982. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 388 1 
on the problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 2 
APPENDIX 
Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and 
throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, 
defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries; 
Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of 
strategic nuclear weapons; 
Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is 
encountering negative reactions from citizens of WEU member countries; 
Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations - including the part of the Geneva 
negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons - and the resumption or revival of other negotiations 
designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere; 
Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters would cause those negotiations to 
fail and would jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security and deploring the growing evidence of 
Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the 
West; 
Considering that pacifist movements are entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on 
disarmament; 
Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential 
for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets; 
Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its 
defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and 
strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements; 
Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires 
close co-ordination of national policies in these fields; 
Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament; 
Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent 
bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Demand that participating states strive to ensure the success of the various ongoing 
negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the 
world; 
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the 
United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the 
establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such 
weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained within 
the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
(9th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Docu-
ment 934). 
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3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of 
the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public; 
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and 
strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities; 
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards 
disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 388 
The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 388 on the problems for European 
security arising from pacifism and neutralism, which illustrates the importance attached by the WEU 
Assembly to the security aspirations voiced by public opinion in the member countries. 
1. The Council take this opportunity to reassert that for the maintenance of peace it is essential to 
establish a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They are wholeheartedly in favour of a 
successful conclusion to the current negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet 
Union on their respective nuclear forces. For their part, the member countries of WEU fully 
support the efforts made in this direction by the United States, whose so-called "zero-zero option" 
proposal relating to INF constitutes an important initiative, and whose global approach they fully 
endorse. They hope that the Soviet Union will also contribute to the achievement of speedy 
progress. 
The WEU member countries are also very concerned by the imbalance in favour of the USSR 
and the countries of the East which characterises the force relationship in conventional weapons. 
WEU member countries, who are all taking part in the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, are in 
favour of the speedy conclusion of this meeting with a balanced and substantial concluding document 
which includes a mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe, as proposed by France. 
Those of them who take part in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna are striving to achieve a more 
stable situation in Europe through the establishment of parity in the conventional forces in Central 
Europe in the form of a common and collective ceiling. 
2. The decision of 12th December 1979 providing for a limited modernisation of intermediate-
range nuclear forces, combined with a parallel offer of negotiations on American and Soviet weapons 
of this kind, was referred to clearly and fully in the communique issued after the last ministerial 
session of the North Atlantic Council (9th and lOth December 1982). The member countries of 
WEU wish to reaffirm their commitment to the terms of this communique of the Atlantic Alliance to 
which they all belong. '~> 
3. As the Council have repeatedly stated, they take the view that the security policy of the 
member countries - consisting of deterrence and defence as well as of arms control and disarma-
ment - enjoys the genuine support of the overwhelming majority of public opinion. The informa-
tion activity carried out within parliamentary bodies can also contribute to this support; this task 
requires that the fullest possible information be given on the alliance's position and on the threats 
facing its members. With this end in mind, the member states of WEU will continue to answer any 
questions on this topic which might be raised by public opinion in their countries. 
4. The policy of Western Europe on development aid is a natural component of its foreign policy; 
the member countries ofWEU are convinced that this policy secures international stability. 
This aid - already reflected in the considerable efforts made bilaterally by the countries repre-
sented on the Council - is also provided continuously and actively on a multilateral basis. This is 
evidenced by the Lome Conventions concluded by the European Communities and the many consul-
tations which have been held over the past year and which are continuing with the aim of achieving 
better co-ordination and consolidation of the measures taken by the international aid institutions. 
5. The member countries of WEU will continue to seek ways of strengthening their concerted 
action within various bodies and at various levels on matters of security and disarmament; in so 
doing they will affirm the specific nature of their common interest in the matter. Better co-operation 
between European states in the field of security and disarmament offers possibilities for strengthening 
the dialogue and co-operation with the United States. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th March 1983. 
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Political activities of the WEU Council 
Reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur 
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18th May 1983 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); 
Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile 
(Alternate: Caro), Bogaerts, Conti Persini, Gessner, Hardy 
(Alternate: Lord Hughes), Lagneau (Alternate: Steverlynck), 
Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Michel, Muller, Prouvost 
(Alternate: Baumel), Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Rosch 
(Alternate: Vohrer), van der Sanden, Thoss, Valiante, 
Vecchietti, van der Werff, Wilquin, Zito. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the WEU Council-
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(z) Reaffirming its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as 
possible with the many aspects of European security; 
(ii) Recalling that the exercise of its responsibilities calls for a meaningful dialogue with the 
Council; 
(iil) Convinced that this dialogue will be easier to develop if the Council plays a more active role in 
concerting European activities in areas within its competence; 
(iv) Welcoming the full-bodied report on European political co-operation submitted by the Council 
but noting that, in exercising its mandate, the Council does not yet seem to have taken account of the 
desire expressed by several of its members to strengthen their co-operation in various fields relating to 
their security; 
(v) Welcoming the transmission by the Council of the declassified version of the study by the 
Standing Armaments Committee on member countries' armaments industries and noting that in its 
reply to Recommendation 379 the Council confirmed the task given to the SAC: 
(vz) Recalling that the mandate instructing the SAC to promote European armaments co-operation 
implies that it take account of the latest decisions by NATO bodies in regard to defence plans, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Apply its competence in full by studying and tackling certain security problems which call for 
a concerted European approach; 
2. In that context instruct the SAC inter alia to complete its study without delay, with the addi-
tion of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the arma-
ments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly; 
3. Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of the 
decisions taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982. 
70 
DOCUMENT 944 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In his reply to the annual report of the 
Council for 1981, Mr. Vecchietti, Rapporteur 
of the General Affairs Committee, rightly 
underlined a degree of uncertainty among 
member governments with regard to WEU, and 
Recommendation 3 79 made a number of 
suggestions and called on the Council to give its 
views on them. It cannot be said that the 
reply to that recommendation, any more than 
the annual report for 1982, threw much light 
on the points raised last year. 
2. The reasons why the situation has not 
been clarified are probably not confined to 
WEU. Consideration by the European Parlia-
ment of two reports seeking to assert its own 
ability to examine matters which are WEU's 
responsibility has not been at all conclusive. It 
is encountering difficulties stressed for instance 
by Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, 
when he addressed the WEU Assembly on 30th 
November 1982: 
"The European Community, by virtue of 
the treaties on which it is founded, is not 
competent to deal with defence questions. 
Moreover, the presence of a neutral 
state makes any de facto extension of its 
authority in the realm of security prob-
lematical." 
J. Similarly, the proposal for a European 
act made by Mr. Genscher and Mr. Colombo 
has so far led to no firm commitment by 
governments. Nevertheless, if this Assembly 
wishes its views to continue to retain the 
attention of the governments, as the Council 
maintains that it does, it must relentlessly 
scrutinise the ways in which Europe should 
organise itself in order to handle its defence and 
security problems and also, as the Council 
urges it to do, "extend its debates to all the 
extremely varied themes which raise the pro-
blems relating to the security of European 
countries". This, in any case, is the course 
being followed by the General Affairs Com-
mittee. It is also the sense of the recent 
publication by five prominent leaders of foreign 
affairs institutes of five member countries 
entitled "The European Community: progress 
or decline?" which makes positive reference to 
the position of WEU in Europe. 
4. However, in the last year there have been 
signs that after ten years of apparent somno-
lence following the United Kingdom's accession 
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to the European Communities WEU is at last 
beginning to stir, although it is not yet possible 
to distinguish suggestion from proposal or 
encouragement from initiative. These signs 
may be listed as follows: 
5.(l) The French Government renewed its 
gestures of interest in the organisation at ·the 
last two sessions by sending its Minister for 
External Relations and then its Minister of 
Defence to address the Assembly in terms 
similar to the proposals made by Mr. Lemoine, 
Secretary of State for Defence, in November 
1981 and February 1982. Furthermore, 
Mr. Mauroy, Prime Minister, addressing mem-
bers of the Assembly on 29th November 1982, 
stressed and explained France's interest in 
WEU. All ministers from member countries 
who addressed the Assembly at the two part-
sessions in 1982 indicated that they approved 
these proposals. 
6.(ii) There were two changes at the top of the 
organisation at the end of 1982: Ambassador 
Diesel replaced Ambassador Schlaich as 
Deputy Secretary-General and Mr. Hintermann 
replaced Ambassador Plantey as Assistant 
Secretary-General, head of the international 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee. The latter was not a national civil servant 
but an expert in international questions who 
had been pursuing a political career. He is 
therefore well placed to give the SAC a 
political impetus which had perhaps been 
lacking hitherto. In any event, his appoint-
ment meets to some extent a concern expressed 
several times by the General Affairs Commit-
tee, particularly in Recommendation 103 in 
December 1963, for the secretariat-general to be 
led by a "political personality" which, accord-
ing to the Council's reply of 3rd April 1964, 
was "unnecessary at the moment". The 
Assembly is satisfied to note that, at least 
where the head of the international secretariat 
of the SAC is concerned, the Council believes 
that circumstances have since changed. 
7. Your Rapporteur wishes to take this 
opportunity of expressing the Assembly's 
thanks to Ambassador Schlaich and Ambassa-
dor Plantey who, in their respective capacities, 
served WEU with both competence and 
devotion. 
8.(iil) The reply to Recommendation 380 
announced that the Council had undertaken the 
study on "technical, military and political 
aspects" of problems raised by a possible 
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change in the list at Annex IV to Protocol 
No. Ill and the cancellation of paragraphs V 
and VI of Annex Ill to the same protocol, 
which should allow the control system of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments to be 
better adapted to "the evolution of the situation 
in Europe". This probably means that the 
seven governments now agree that the whole 
system of arms controls conducted by WEU 
should be reviewed and it is gratifying that 
instead of merely looking for ways to reduce the 
budget and possibly abolish posts they are 
facing up to the present situation in Europe and 
its implications for armaments control. 
9.(iv)- At the Franco-German summit meeting 
in October 1982, the two countries decided to 
extend the scope of their regular bilateral 
consultations to security and defence matters. 
In the absence of adequate information on 
action taken on this decision, it is not yet 
possible to assess its exact impact, but state-
ments by the French authorities hint at a desire 
for a concerted European approach to these 
matters, and the Federal Republic has always 
shown it was prepared to go as far in this 
direction as its French partners wished provided 
it was not detrimental to the role of NATO and 
relations between Europe and the United States, 
which remain the basis of the security of 
Europe and of the Federal Republic. 
10. Such consultations do not concern WEU 
directly. Nevertheless, they could possibly 
modify certain aspects of co-operation in the 
organisation, first because neither the Federal 
Republic nor probably France envisages keep-
ing within bilateral limits consultations bet-
ween the two countries on security questions 
which cannot stop at their frontiers but which 
necessarily concern the whole of Central Eur-
ope, and second because if these consultations 
progress favourably they might promote agree-
ment on matters over which divergences bet-
ween the European allies had blocked the 
activities of WEU. The Assembly would be 
most interested to receive any information 
about this which would allow it to complete its 
study of the situation. 
11. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
11. The foregoing remarks relate to the signs 
of movement and not the probable outcome of 
that movement. The Council's statements and 
even those of governments of countries most in 
favour of relaunching WEU's activities do not 
yet allow a very accurate idea to be obtained of 
the extent of the possible evolution. As 
Mr. Vecchietti pointed out in the explanatory 
memorandum to the General Affairs Commit-
tee's reply to the Council's annual report for 
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1981, France, by leaving the NATO integrated 
military organisation, created a new situation, 
the full consequences of which for Europe's 
security are yet to be seen. It is for France 
therefore to make proposals on the nature and 
extent of European defence co-operation as it 
sees it. 
12. The present French Government has 
clearly said what it expects of the WEU 
Assembly and the ideas it has expressed on the 
subject have been widely endorsed by the other 
governments. They have been effective, as 
shown by the agenda of recent Assembly 
sessions, because they corresponded very closely 
to the Assembly's own concept of its rOle. The 
Council fell short of the French proposals 
however where the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee is concerned. In November 1982, 
Mr. Hernu took up the remarks made by 
Mr. Lemoine the year before: 
"A year ago, Mr. Georges Lemoine, 
Secretary of State for Defence, speaking 
here, made a number of proposals aimed 
at giving more content to the work of 
your Assembly and of WEU as a whole, 
and making it more effective. He sug-
gested in particular that the Standing 
Armaments Committee should serve sys-
tematically as a 'design office' for the 
Assembly, to tackle directly certain fun-
damental political problems, the indepen-
dent in-depth treatment of which calls for 
a self-contained analysis and research 
service. The balance of Soviet-Ameri-
can conventional forces, an analysis of 
the pacifist movements, etc., would be 
among the possible subjects. These sug-
gestions are still on the table and it is up 
to the parliamentarians and the member 
states to implement them. For instance, 
what would there be against placing the 
Standing Armaments Committee at the 
service of the Assembly, provided the 
Assembly and Council of WEU agreed? 
We support such a reform which could 
be very useful even though some may feel 
it to be modest. I call upon them to 
show their good will, for it will be 
difficult for them to convince anyone that 
major projects in the sphere of defence 
policy in Europe can be implemented if 
there is no way of furthering realistic and 
reasonable proposals." 
13. In the end, the Council agreed to _this 
co-operation only on certain conditions, as 
stressed in its reply to Recommendation 379: 
"As regards the Standing Armaments 
Committee, which also was the subject of 
proposals by the State Secretary of the 
French Ministry of Defence, the Council 
recall that this body was set up on 7th 
May 1955 to promote co-operation in the 
matter of armaments. If in this respect 
the international secretariat of the SAC 
were occasionally to assist the Assembly 
in the study of clearly-defined themes, 
this could only be done under a proce-
dure involving a case-by-case examina-
tion by the Council, under whom the 
SAC is placed. It is clear that such work 
could not have the effect of relieving the 
SAC of its responsibilities nor could it 
affect its competence, these being the 
Council's exclusive responsibility." 
Here it met the concern expressed by the 
Assembly when it adopted the draft recommen-
dation submitted by the General Affairs 
Committee urging that the Council: 
"Ensure that the possible extension of 
tasks given to the SAC does not result in 
that body being relieved of its present 
responsibilities." 
14. There therefore seems to be wide agree-
ment between the Assembly and the Council 
that, while the SAC and its international secre-
tariat may be asked to assist the Assembly to a 
certain extent, they remain intergovernmental 
bodies and there is no need to modify their 
status, which corresponds to the reason for their 
existence. It is to be hoped that the pursuit of 
the assistance to be afforded by the SAC in the 
preparation of a report by the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-
tions will allow methods of work to be defined 
more clearly. 
15. It is understandable that the French 
Government should have considered turning 
the SAC and its international secretariat in this 
new direction, particularly as the Assembly 
itself had requested it. In some respects, it is 
the result of the conclusions drawn from the 
SAC's meagre achievements in its own specific 
field. It may be wondered whether, within the 
limits assigned to it by its terms of reference, 
the Council's decision of 7th May 1955 and the 
Council's constant concern to avoid duplication 
of work between the international institutions, 
the SAC has really fulfilled its assigned role. 
16. As it was only in May 1982 that the 
Assembly received an almost complete version 
of the study on European armaments industries, 
which had been prepared for it following 
requests first from the General Affairs Commit-
tee (Recommendations 293, 330, 335, 358 and 
374) and then by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, it has not until now 
had an opportunity of expressing its views on 
the document. Moreover, the General Affairs 
Committee is not required to give its views on 
armaments problems proper but only on the 
legal and economic aspects of the study, as it 
73 
DOCUMENT 944 
has already done at the Brussels symposium in 
1979 and in many of its replies to annual 
reports of the Council. Similarly, the Commit-
tee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions showed its interest in certain aspects 
of the study in Recommendation 381. 
17. The document sent to the Assembly is 
only a declassified version of a fuller text 
handed to the Council part by part, starting in 
1978, and which was not communicated to the 
Assembly. Possibly therefore some of the 
following remarks may not apply. Some clari-
fication was given however in the paper 
submitted by Ambassador Plantey, then Assis-
tant Secretary-General of WEU and head of the 
international secretariat of the SAC, to the 
General Affairs Committee at the symposium 
on a European armaments policy held in 
Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979 on the 
juridical conditions of defence procurement. 
18. The mandate given to the SAC on 31st 
May 1976 and 26th May 1977 to conduct a 
study on the armaments industry of member 
countries was but a first stage in implementing 
the proposal made by Mr. Van Elslande, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, and adopted 
by the WEU Council in London on 2nd May 
1975. When speaking about these proposals to 
the Assembly on 5th December 1974, Mr. Van 
Elslande described them as follows : 
"I think it is now urgent to try to do 
something and to begin to shape a 
common policy. A number of major 
equipment and re-equipment program-
mes have to be implemented in the 
comparatively near future. It is urgent 
for Europe to seize upon this opportu-
nity, which may be the last. 
The industrial problem, and that of 
exports which is closely bound up with 
it, are by far the most vast and most 
delicate. I believe that WEU could 
devote itself to the study of these ques-
tions, to which insufficient attention has 
hitherto been paid. WEU includes the 
chief European producers. The first step 
must be a thorough study of the structu-
res of the military sectors in the economy 
of each country. We must also ascertain 
what is their relative importance, what 
forms of specialisation are possible and 
what can be done about the pooling and 
financing of research activities. Finally, 
we must determine the best ways towards 
progressive integration, taking account of 
existing financial structures and of allian-
ces which may constitute an advantage 
or a disadvantage, depending on circum-
stances. 
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But transcending these studies, projects 
and cogitations, a common armaments 
policy soon comes to imply that decisions 
must be taken at the political level." 
19. A large part of the SAC's study was 
handed to the Council in May 1981, and it was 
approved in June. Even if it needs updating, 
the Council has had the text it requested since 
that date. There are no indications that in the 
meantime it has considered moving on to the 
second stage, in spite of the urgency stressed by 
Mr. Van Elslande of taking decisions at politi-
cal level. Yet from the abridged and declassi-
fied version of the SAC study submitted to the 
Assembly (document SAC (82) 1A-D27 of 
April 1982) it can be seen that certain facts 
noted in the study would require, as a logical 
follow-up to the 1976-77 mandate, that a fur-
ther mandate be given to the SAC to make 
suggestions and proposals to the Council. 
(i) Legal aspects 
20. (a) The remarks about the limited 
government calls for tender show restrictions on 
competition which must be removed if progress 
is to be made in European co-operation. 
21. (b) When private firms carry out research 
and development for defence production at the 
request of governments, the latter normally 
reimburse expenditure incurred plus a profit 
margin, but retain rights over the results 
obtained. For European co-operation to be 
developed, the principles governing industrial 
patent rights allowing governments to commu-
nicate these results to other firms should be 
defined jointly to provide a basis for specific 
agreements between governments and firms. 
22. (c) In the field of industrial patents, the 
procurement of armaments outside Western 
Europe should imply the simultaneous acquisi-
tion of the know how used. 
23. (d) Contrary to general principles of the 
Common Market, Article 223 of the Rome 
Treaty authorises states to make discriminatory 
arrangements for firms producing equipment 
for defence purposes. Specific proposals might 
be made for limiting this authorisation, particu-
larly in the case of conventional weapons. 
24. (e) Differences in legislation governing 
company law are being studied by the EEC with 
a view to harmonisation, although no major 
results have yet been achieved. Such harmoni-
sation would be of particular interest for arma-
ments co-operation and might be the subject of 
a special study for the industries concerned. 
25. (f) In order to facilitate transnational 
co-operation, reciprocal assistance agreements 
have been concluded by certain countries to 
allow development, tests and quality and price 
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controls by the local authorities on behalf of 
the foreign partner for whom the equipment is 
intended. Extension of such agreements to all 
WEU member countries might encourage trans-
national co-operation. 
26. (g) Application by certain countries of 
Article 223 of the Rome Treaty to exempt from 
customs duties armaments procured outside the 
Community and in principle subject to the joint 
EEC customs tariff unduly favours certain 
sellers outside the Community. A joint study 
of the implications of Article 231 with a view 
to its uniform application would be of real 
interest. 
(ii) Economic aspects 
27. (a) The SAC study notes that "the data 
collected are not always complete or homoge-
neous between one country and another" and 
in particular that it is not always possible "to 
dissociate armaments production from the ove-
rall production of military equipment and 
supplies, or from co-operative and compensa-
tory production", and finally that "certain 
countries have no statistics on their arma-
nents production". An attempt to make data 
homogeneous would be a logical follow-up to 
the SAC study. 
28. (b) The same is true of data relating to 
imports and exports of military equipment, in 
view of the fact that : 
- "for most of the countries, the data in 
question concern deliveries actually 
made, whereas for some others only 
export licences granted are taken into 
account"; 
- "no statistics on the export of military 
equipment are kept in certain coun-
tries"; 
- "direct exchanges between industries 
are not always listed"; 
- "transnational co-operation is not 
usually singled out in the statistics"; 
- "national statistics on foreign trade do 
not allow comparisons in the strict 
sense of the word. This quantified 
information is not always uniform on 
account of differences in the definitions 
and the ways of drawing up statistics ... 
They may or may not include figures 
on compensation and co-operation ... 
and it is impossible to determine to 
what extent they include armaments 
imports in the form of semi-finished 
products"; 
- "the available data on armaments 
imports and exports do not allow 
accurate conclusions to be made. Sta-
tistics do not single out, with any 
certainty, exchanges between WEU 
member countries, particularly where 
co-operative armaments production is 
concerned. Consequently, the foreign 
armaments trade of WEU, taken as a 
whole, cannot be estimated". 
29. (c) Data on research seem to suffer from 
the drawback reported in paragraph 14 of the 
study : "A fundamental aspect of this part of 
the study must be stressed : all the infor-
mation contained therein comes from available 
official sources". Indeed, as paragraph 18 
indicates, "it was not possible to obtain infor-
mation on the amounts spent by private firms 
from their own funds for military research and 
development. In certain countries these 
amounts could be considerable". This remark 
makes one wonder about the value of the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 381 of 
24th November 1982 in which it agreed to 
invite the international secretariat of the SAC 
to assist in preparing a report on the harmo-
nisation of research in civil and military high 
technology fields and to envisage drawing up a 
list of military research and development pro-
grammes which might be worthwhile matters 
for European or international co-operation. 
30. As the Assembly has often said, the 
maintenance of good relations between the two 
WEU bodies depends not just on whatever 
friendly gestures the Council may make towards 
it - and it must be recognised that from this 
point of view the Assembly can but welcome 
the Council's attitude towards it - but rather on 
the way in which the Council shoulders the 
tasks assigned to it by the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The principal difficulties stem from 
the Council's own field of activities, i.e. 
basically from the governments' will to apply 
the treaty in full with all that implies in the 
field of the joint production of armaments and 
political co-operation. 
(iii) Updating the study 
31. Parts of the SAC study have now been 
overtaken by events and it must be updated if it 
is to be followed up. In addition to bringing 
up to .date the statistical elements, the scope of 
the study might be broadened, for instance : 
(a) financial movements resulting from 
imports and exports are not included, 
which limits the scope of the study 
considerably; 
(b) the comment that national data are 
not homogeneous might be followed 
up by a critical examination of such 
data and the establishment of a 
reference system, as NATO has done 
in many areas; 
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(c) a list of bi- and multilateral agree-
ments might be drawn up, as well as 
of past, present or projected joint 
production programmes, which might 
be most useful for governments and 
potential importers, particularly if it 
were kept up to date, there being no 
indication of this in the declassified 
version of the SAC study; 
(d) the very notion of co-operation might 
be made clearer by including a list of 
co-operative bodies together with 
comments on their terms of reference, 
composition and origins as the 
Assembly already recommended to 
the Council in 1972 in Recommenda-
tion 222; 
(e) by evaluating results obtained by the 
two-way approach for the European 
economies. 
32. These are merely a few suggestions: not 
having the text of the study proper, the 
Assembly cannot expect to make proposals to 
the Council in the knowledge that they are 
well-founded. However, if the Council really 
wished to give the SAC a useful task, as Mr. 
Van Elslande proposed it should, it is now 
urgent for it to tackle the second stage referred 
to by the former Belgian Minister and that it 
prepare the way for " decisions... taken at the 
political level". 
33. Strictly from the point of view of rela-
tions between the Council and the Assembly, 
there is no doubt that communication of this 
study, even in a declassified version, is a gesture 
of good will and of dialogue on the part of the 
Council, which the Assembly appreciates. 
Ill. Political activities of the Council 
34. Although this chapter of the Council's 
annual report shows no substantial change in 
the Council's foreign policy activities, it never-
theless provides the Assembly with useful docu-
mentation insofar as, in response to a wish 
expressed by the General Affairs Committee, it 
has annexed the texts to which it refers, 
whether they emanate from the European 
Council or the North Atlantic Council. This 
is logical since the Council considers that 
decisions taken by these two bodies, in which 
all the WEU member countries are represented, 
are in fact decisions by the WEU Council when 
they relate to matters which are its respon-
sibility. 
35. It therefore becomes clearer that there 
was a real convergence of views between the 
governments and the Assembly on certain 
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matters, including the Polish crisis, Afghanistan 
and the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe held in Madrid in 1982 
and 1983. By linking neither disarmament nor 
the development of economic relations with the 
East with developments in the abovementioned 
two countries, but by underlining the violations 
of the Helsinki final act represented by Soviet 
intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign 
states and, a fortiori, the military invasion Of 
one of them, the Western European govern-
ments have shown their solidarity and their 
firm intention not "to develop a management 
of relations in general with the East" on any 
basis other than "better implementation of the 
final act of Helsinki", particularly in Poland. 
The Assembly welcomes the convergence of the 
positions described in Chapter 11 of the annual 
report on Poland, the Madrid conference, 
Afghanistan and the Middle East and those 
expressed by the Assembly, particularly in 
Recommendations 378, 384 and 386. 
36. The Council's paragraph on the 
Falklands crisis calls for a few remarks, how-
ever, insofar as there appears to be a contradic-
tion between the annual report and statements 
by certain members of the French Government 
when addressing the Assembly. The annual 
report states that : 
"In their declaration of lOth April the 
Ten stressed that they attached the 
greatest importance to the immediate and 
effective implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 502, namely an 
immediate cessation of hostilities, an 
immediate withdrawal of all Argentine 
forces from the Falkland Islands and a 
search for a diplomatic solution to their 
dispute by the Governments of Argentina 
and the United Kingdom. 
To these ends, and in a spirit of mutual 
solidarity, the governments of the Ten 
applied a complete embargo on the 
export of arms and military equipment to 
Argentina and, a few days later, they 
applied an embargo to imports of Argen-
tine origin, agreed in the context of the 
application of the Treaty of Rome." 
But Mr. Hernu, addressing the Assembly on 
30th November 1982, said that : 
"... it is interesting to note that, from 
the outset of the Argentinian aggression 
at Port Stanley, it was the seven member 
states of WEU that imposed the embargo 
on arms deliveries to Argentina. For 
while the embargo had the appearance of 
a Community decision, several EEC 
member states, not members of WEU, 
indicated that they would remain aloof 
from this decision. 
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It is therefore symptomatic that in a 
conflict opposing a member of WEU and 
an outside aggressor, the members of this 
organisation should have reacted in very 
similar fashion. And yet it involved 
something taking place very far from our 
Europe. 
This identity of view must, a fortiori, 
prevail in security and defence problems 
that concern the European continent..." 
3 7. It can be seen that the contradiction 
between the two views is not just a historical 
matter but raises the question of what true 
solidarity there is between the Ten. If the 
French Minister is to be believed, it is not the 
same as seven-power solidarity. The Assembly 
would therefore wish to be able to assess the 
true value of these two statements. 
38. Finally, on relations between Europe and 
the United States, the Council, quoting its reply 
to Recommendation 387, indicates that it : 
"acknowledged that divergent views may 
have arisen between western countries as 
regards their economic relations with the 
eastern countries. The Council recalled 
that since the beginning of 1982, the wes-
tern countries had met in various fora in 
order to reach a common approach 
remaining consistent with their political 
and security interests; the Council also 
stressed that a concerted, realistic and 
cautious approach towards the eastern 
countries was one of the major concerns 
of the WEU member countries." 
It is difficult for the Assembly to be satisfied 
with such an answer. Recommendation 387 
was clear enough. It was based on a well-
developed explanatory memorandum. The 
Assembly is therefore entitled to expect a far 
more detailed answer from the Council than it 
received which in fact amounts to a refusal of 
the recommendation, particularly with regard 
to disagreement between Europe and the Uni-
ted States about economic relations with the 
eastern countries. 
39. Finally, if, as the Council stresses in 
quoting its reply to Recommendation 3 79, it 
considers the Assembly should "extend its 
debates to all the extremely varied themes 
which raise the problems relating to the secu-
rity of European countries", it should draw the 
consequences of this wish for itself. As the 
Assembly has often recalled, WEU forms a 
whole and the Assembly cannot be expected to 
develop its activities if it is not accompanied by 
its only institutional partner, the Council. But 
it has to be noted that far from "extending" its 
consultations the Council for its part persists in 
clinging to a very restrictive concept of its role. 
The fact that the French Government wishes 
the range of the Assembly's work to be 
extended and the other member countries 
endorse this wish is excellent. But what is 
preventing the French Government from 
making parallel proposals to the Council ? It 
might then be hoped that the other countries 
would follow suit. Failing this, governmental 
statements in the framework of WEU will 
remain worthless and unavailing. 
IV. Conclusions 
40. In adopting Recommendation 379 pre-
sented by the General Affairs Committee on a 
report by Mr. Vecchietti in June 1982, the 
Assembly transmitted a series of detailed propo-
sals to the Council. It must be noted that the 
Council's reply to this recommendation was 
imprecise and vague if not simply evasive. In 
fact: 
41.(i) The recommendations adopted by the 
Assembly were addressed to the Council. The 
Council's replies essentially concern the Assem-
bly which for its part, as the Council recognises 
moreover, took the utmost account of the 
Council's suggestions. The wording of para-
graph I of the reply is very typical. The 
Council: 
"... note, first of all, that Western 
European Union is the only European 
organisation which by treaty has been 
given competence in matters of defence. 
Consequently, its Assembly is of special 
importance, being the only European 
parliamentary body empowered by sta-
tute to discuss defence questions, includ-
ing the control of armaments." 
42.(ii)Most of paragraph 11 is also devoted to 
the Assembly, whose debates, says the Council: 
"undoubtedly make an important contri-
bution to the Council's reflections. The 
Council, for their part, will not fail to 
follow with the greatest possible attention 
the movement of ideas among European 
public opinions and their impact." 
It would be most desirable to know what the 
Council's activities are in this latter connection. 
The annual report does not mention them. 
43.(iii) Paragraph Ill of the reply must prob-
ably be taken as a refusal of the paragraph of 
Recommendation 3 79 concerning terrorism 
since the Council : 
"note that discussion of this question 
takes place in other European fora." 
It should therefore be noted that this is a 
further relinquishment of activities by the 
Council which, until recently, had examined 
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certain aspects of terrorism; particularly the 
protection of diplomats. 
44.(iv)The Council denies the prolongation of 
its inactivity and says : 
"They will continue to exercise the 
responsibilities incumbent on them, and 
in so doing assert Europe's presence in 
consultations on security, armaments 
control and disarmament." 
Your Rapporteur finds little trace of these 
activities in the present annual report, nor in 
earlier ones, although the Council recognises 
that: 
"The fact that all the WEU member 
countries are members of the Atlantic 
Alliance and share the conviction that 
defence of the continent of Europe and 
global defence are inseparable, does not 
remove the justification for abiding by 
the mandates and for pursuing specific 
approaches." 
45.(v) The Assembly can but take note of the 
Council's refusal to follow up the paragraph in 
the recommendation concerning the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments. 
46.(vi)With regard to the SAC, on the contrary, 
the Council gives the Assembly the assurance it 
expected when it states that : 
"It was clear that such work could not 
have the effect of relieving the SAC of its 
responsibilities nor could it affect its 
competences, these being the Council's 
exclusive responsibility." 
It remains to be seen how the Council intends 
to use the SAC. The present explanatory 
memorandum includes a number of suggestions 
for action to be taken on the study on 
European armaments industries. But if the 
Council really intends the SAC to carry out the 
task given to it on 7th May 1955, i.e. to 
promote European armaments co-operation, it 
should be instructed to examine the implica-
tions for Europe of the decisions taken by the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee in 
December 1982 from the standpoint of arma-
ments production, failing which the SAC will 
remain out of touch with Europe's present and 
future armaments requirements. 
4 7. It can thus be seen that the General 
Affairs Committee has little reason to be 
satisfied with the Council's action on its reply 
to the annual report for 1981 and several of its 
recommendations will have to be repeated. 
They would probably carry more weight if the 
member governments wishing WEU, its Coun-
cil and ministerial organs to play their full role 
under the modified Brussels Treaty wasted less 
time before spelling out their proposals on these 
matters. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Political actirities of the WEU Council-
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Lagorce and others 
6th June 1983 
1. In paragraph ( Vl) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " the latest decisions 
by NATO bodies in regard to defence plans " and insert " all the latest technological developments in 
this field ". 
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the decisions taken by the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1982 " and insert " all the latest technological 
developments in the armaments field ". 
Signed: Lagorce, Pignion, Berrier, Bassinet, Fourre 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendments agreed to). 
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General Affairs Committee2 
by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur 
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18th May 1983 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Urwin (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. 
Ahrens, Mrs. Baarve/d-Schlaman, MM. Berrier, Bertile 
(Alternate: Caro), Bogaerts, Conti Persini, Gessner, Hardy 
(Alternate: Lord Hughes), Lagneau (Alternate: De Decker), 
Lagorce, Lord McNair, MM. Michel, Muller, Prouvost, 
Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Rosch (Alternate: ·vohrer), 
van der Sanden, Thoss, Valiante, Vecchietti, van der Werjf, 
Wilquin, Zito. 
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Introductory Note 
PrinciJHI] persons met by the committee or by the Rapporteur 
Your Rapporteur wishes to thank all the persons he met before, during or after the visit by the 
General Affairs Committee to the People's Republic of China from 7th to 22nd April 1983 and who 
received the committee or helped it to organise its visit and to obtain the information necessary for 
the preparation of this report. He regrets that he is not able to give a full list, the reasons being that 
certain persons wish to remain anonymous or, in some cases, he is not sure enough of their identity 
or duties. His gratitude is not therefore limited to those whose names are listed hereafter. However 
indebted he may be, he has refrained from quoting the sources of his information in the text of the 
report and assumes sole responsibility for the present document and the opinions expressed therein. 
In Beijing 
Zao Ziyang, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China; 
Hao Deqing, President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs; 
Xie Li, Secretary-General of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs; 
Jia Shi, Vice-Minister for Economic and Trade Relations with Foreign Countries; 
Wu Xiuquan, former Assistant Chief of General Staff and President of the Beijing Institute of 
Strategic Studies; 
Zhou Nan, Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Xing Yimin, Assistant Secretary-General of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress. 
In Shanghai 
Zhang An you, Assistant Director of the Municipal Foreign Affairs Bureau; 
Liu Funian, Delegate to the National People's Congress; Rector of the East China College of 
Higher Education; Professor; 
Fu Peibing, Delegate to the National People's Congress; Director of the Rui Jin Hospital; 
Professor; 
Zhou Xiaoyan, Member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee; Assistant 
Principal of the Shanghai Music Conservatory; Professor; 
Cao Miao, Assistant Director of the Shanghai Building Commission; 
Ding Chen, Vice-President of the Shanghai Municipal Federation of Industry and Trade; Econo-
mist; 
Jiang Li, Assistant Director of the Bureau of External Trade; 
Yu Baoling, Assistant Director of the General Administration of the Standing Committee of the 
Shanghai Municipal People's Congress; 
Zhao Andong, Head of the Education Division of the Shanghai Higher Education Bureau; 
Yuan Xin, Assistant Head of Division, Economic Research Centre. 
Throughout the visit to the People's Republic of China 
Members ofthe Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, including: 
Wang Chuliang, Deputy Secretary-General. 
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The institute's committees in Xian, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guilin, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the 
provincial and municipal authorities of those towns and the leaders of people's communes, produc-
tion groups and agricultural, industrial, tourist, trade and other sectors who received the General 
Affairs Committee in these towns. 
In Hong Kong 
Mr. Richard Margolis, Deputy Political Adviser to the Governor of Hong Kong. 
In Paris 
His Excellency the Ambassador and staff of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China; 
Wang Hsien Hua, Paris correspondent of the newspaper Guangming Ribao (Clarity). 
The committee also had the benefit of the assistance of their Excellencies the Ambassadors or 
Charges d'Affaires of the WEU member countries in Beijing, including His Excellency Mr. Roger 
Denorme, Ambassador of Belgium, the country ensuring the Chairmanship-in-Office of the WEU 
Council, to whom it expresses its particular gratitude, and the Consuls-General of these countries in 
Hong Kong. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on China and European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the priority given to internal development in the People's Republic of China 
is directing it on a lasting basis towards the search for international peace; 
(il) Considering that the People's Republic of China is an essential factor in the world balance and 
that the development of its economy should lead it to play an increasingly important role in 
international relations; 
(iil) Considering that in spite of differences in their political and social regimes the interests of 
Western Europe and of China converge in many fields; 
(iv) Considering that the development of trade and co-operation between Western Europe and 
China is in their joint interests; 
(v) Considering that the People's Re~ublic of China is now making proposals to European states 
and firms for co-operation of mutual interest; 
(vi) Reaffirming the commitments which closely link Western Europe with the United States, 
particularly for all aspects of defence and security, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I 
1. Ensure that the Western Europ~an countries start regular consultations with the Government of 
the People's Republic of China in the most appropriate frameworks on matters relating to the 
maintenance of peace in the world; I 
2. Carefully examine in the appropriate frameworks the possibility of increasing Western Europe's 
trade and economic co-operation with China; 
3. Remove as far as possible all current obstacles to the development of this trade and 
co-operation; 
4. Impress this point of view on the United States and on its partners in the OECD; 
5. Insist that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not allow the Soviet 
Union to deploy in Asia weapons withdrawn from Eastern Europe; 
6. Urge its members to pursue a concerted policy in order to lay th~-foundations for lasting peace 
in Eastern Asia and, inter alia, to endeavour to re-establish an independent state in Cambodia and to 
facilitate the search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When the General Affairs Committee 
adopted the report submitted by Sir Frederic 
Bennett on China and European security on 
16th May 1978, it drew its conclusions from 
the trend of Chinese policy which had taken 
China from being a privileged ally of the Soviet 
Union to its leading opponent. It proposed 
that in the interests of European security the 
countries of Western European Union co-
operate closely with the People's Republic of 
China on .the grounds that " the enemies of our 
enemies are our friends ", as the Rapporteur 
said in summary. 
2. There may be some reservations about 
these slightly provocative words since, whatever 
one might think about the policy of the Soviet 
Union and the dangers for international peace 
of its unbelievable accumulation of armaments 
of all kinds, it cannot be considered that it is 
inherently an enemy. Positive developments 
in its relations with the countries under its 
domination, renunciation of its policy of expan-
sion, liberalisation of its domestic regime and a 
reduction in its military strength would prob-
ably make Europeans revise radically their 
present attitude of deep distrust. 
3. But some have wondered to what extent 
the People's Republic of China still considers 
the Soviet threat as a real danger and since 
autumn 1982 there have been signs of detente 
in Sino-Soviet relations. One of the questions 
which your Rapporteur will try to answer is to 
what extent it is just detente which, in the long 
run, is desirable for all the partners in the inter-
national arena, including the Western European 
countries which have no interest in the worsen-
ing of conflicts in Asia, or whether the resump-
tion of " normal " relations between China and 
the Soviet Union is heralding a rapprochement 
between two powers which, all being told, 
claim to follow the same ideology and might 
consider joining forces again, as they did after 
1949, in order to dominate jointly the Asian 
continent or even a larger fra~tion of the planet. 
4. In conducting this study, the General 
Affairs Committee had a special advantage in 
having been invited to visit China in April 
1983. This visit was of exceptional interest 
because of the standing of the people the com-
mittee met, the time they were prepared to 
devote to in-depth talks and the frankness of 
their remarks. However, your Rapporteur has 
been careful not merely to record official spee-
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ches but to examine comparatively the informa-
tion given and to seek a broad cross-section of 
views so that the committee might study the 
essential and permanent bases of Chinese exter-
nal policy in full knowledge of the facts. 
Among these, the study of the Chinese eco-
nomy and its requirements, information the 
cqmmittee has obtained about China's means of 
ensuring its security, Chinese views on prob-
lems of national unity, its frontiers, the balance 
in Asia and throughout the world and the 
conclusions the committee has drawn about 
the stability of the political regime and the 
chances of its fundamental aims being main-
tained give very valuable pointers to the poss-
ible evolution ·of the People's Republic of 
China in future years and its relations with the 
Soviet Union, the West and the third world. 
5. There is little doubt that China's impor-
tance in the world will grow in future years in 
step with confirmation of the progress of its 
economy, the stability of its political and social 
system, the modernisation of its armed forces 
and its diplomatic activities. It is already an 
important factor in the balance of forces and its 
role in the world economy and in international 
politics is steadily gaining ground. Europe 
cannot neglect these considerations in tackling 
problems affecting its own security which can 
be ensured only by consolidating peace and 
developing the world economy. 
11. Economic problems 
A. The heritage of the past 
6. Considering that the Chinese Communist 
Party's assumption of power in 1949 marked 
the country's liberation from a long period of 
foreign occupation and the restoration of natio-
nal unity which had constantly been under-
mined by civil war for more than a century, it 
will surprise no one that great illusions were 
entertained, at least regarding the rate at 
which it would be possible to carry out the 
necessary transformations in a country whose 
infrastructure was out-dated, which had suffered 
considerable war damage and whose national 
unity had to be rebuilt. History has shown 
that these illusions led to economic and politi-
cal choices which were not always judicious. 
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(a) The population 
~· The first choice concerned the popula-
tiOn. For a long time, over-confidence in the 
ability of the communist regime to transform 
the basic economy prevented the Government 
of the People's Republic of China from paying 
due attention to the danger for the Chinese eco-
nomy ~f the population increasing too quickly. 
Only m the last ten years has a determined 
effort been made to reduce the birth rate, but 
the effects take a long time to be felt and China w~i~h i~ the ~fties had difficulty in feeding 500 
mllhon mhabttants, now has over 1 ,000 million 
in.habita~ts accord~ng to the latest figures, 
wtthout 1ts productiOn capacity having doubled 
in the last thirty years. Although measures 
taken to reduce the birth rate may seem severe 
they are obviously necessary. But it must b~ 
noted that for the moment they are still 
insufficient and that if they are too radical there 
is . a future risk of the population aging, thus 
bnngmg a very heavy burden for the active 
population. 
8. Available statistics show that the birth 
rate fell from 40 Ofoo in 19 53 to 18.4 Ofoo in 
1980, but over the same period the death rate 
fell from 19 °/oo to 6.29 °/oo. Consequently, the 
annual rate of increase- 22 °/oo in 1953- was 
stil! 12.1 °/oo in 1980 which, for a population 
whtch then reached the 1 ,000 million mark, 
would correspond to an increase of 12 million 
per year. Many observers believe the hope of 
reducing this annual increase to 5 °/oo in 1985 is 
too optimistic. 
9. It is quite clear that employment has not 
kept up with the birth rate in the countryside 
where 200 million agricultural workers can pro-
vide 800 days' work per cultivated hectare per 
year, which is obviously far too much, or in the 
towns where the effort made between 1977 and 
1980 to reduce unemployment apparently led 
to unduly large numbers of workers being 
employed in state firms and the administration. 
Conversely, there is a serious lack of quali-
fied workers in spite of all the efforts made to 
improve technical and professional training. 
Managerial staff, of whom there are too few, 
were the main victims of the purges before and 
after the Chinese Communist Party takeover 
and during the cultural revolution when the 
training of such staff was almost wholly 
interrupted. While there is abundant labour 
China nevertheless suffers from a serious short~ 
age of adequately trained technicians and 
managerial staff, which considerably cramps the 
possibilities of quickly increasing its agricultural 
and industrial productivity. This situation is 
~ecoming particularly critical since the genera-
tiOns now reaching positions of responsibility 
are those whose education suffered the most 
from the effects of the cultural revolution. It 
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should improve considerably in the next few 
years with the arrival of subsequent generations. 
10. Furthermore, there is a voluntaryist 
policy to halt migration from the country to 
the towns which has increased too quickly, pre-
senting urban administrations with almost insol-
uble problems. The aim is to decentralise 
industry towards rural communes, some aspects 
of which the committee was able to witness. 
However, the inadequate development of the 
communications and transport network limits 
the possibilities of a satisfactory relocation of 
industry in rural areas. 
(b) The economy 
11. Although in 1949 China was in many 
respects an economically underdeveloped coun-
try, the Chinese Communist Party intended, on 
coming to power, to make far-reaching econo-
mic changes and organise a socialist society. 
This ambitious programme encountered a num-
ber of obstacles from which stemmed a complex 
history marked by successive changes of course 
which obviously affected China's development. 
However, considered in the long term it can 
be seen that in the last thirty years the Chinese 
economy has even so made considerable pro-
gress and the country is now a great power. 
On the whole, conditions for the people have 
improved in spite of the over-rapid increase in 
the population and more definite progress is to 
be hoped for in future years (see table below). 
Growth of Chinese industrial and agricultural production 
1970-1980 
Year Industrial Agricultural production production 
1970 
··············· 
100 100 
1971 
··············· 
110.4 102.5 
1972 
··············· 
121.6 99.7 
1973 ............... 137.9 111.7 
1974 
··············· 
143.9 114.9 
1975 ............... 158.7 116.6 
1976 
··············· 
158.7 116.9 
1977 
··············· 
180 117.7 
1978 
··············· 
205 128.2 
1979 
··············· 
223 139.2 
1980 
··············· 
242 143 
12. As is natural, particularly in a country 
where the state has a tight control over the eco-
nomy, links between the struggle for power and 
the choice of economic courses have been many 
and close. Three major periods may be distin-
guished in the history of the People's Republic 
of China: 
13. (i) From 1949 to about 1960 there was 
widespread optimism about the possibilities 
( 
available to China for its internal development, 
its role in the world and, above all, the progress 
of world revolution. Property redistribution, 
the growth of farming co-operatives and the 
preparation of a plan with substantial Soviet 
financial and technical assistance led to a very 
high growth rate and a remarkable economic 
take-off. However, fascinated by the Soviet 
example, the new Chinese leaders do not 
seem to have taken sufficient account of the 
possibilities of a country where the rural 
element was still very largely dominant: when 
the first five-year plan (1953-57) was drawn up, 
89% of investment was earmarked for heavy 
industry, which was far too much. Moreover, 
the establishment of large industrial complexes 
under state control meant that many Soviet 
managerial staff had to be recruited, and the 
fact that farmers had to join one of the 700,000 
rural co-operatives, which were grouped in 
26,000 rural communes in 1958, seriously 
slowed down the development of agricultural 
production. The appeal for a collective effort 
to make without delay a "great leap forward", 
decreed at the beginning of 1958, led to 
the breakdown of a planning system which had 
over-equipped heavy industry with much 
wasted effort, the more so since the departure 
of Soviet technicians in 1960 increased the 
number of bottlenecks in the economic circuit. 
Agricultural production fell noticeably as from 
1959 without it being possible to maintain 
the rate of industrial growth, which had reached 
18% per year before 1958. 
14. (ii) From 1960 to 1975, economic options 
and the struggle for power were closely linked. 
A collegiate leadership took over at the end 
of 1959 with Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping. Without changing the main course 
followed during the previous period, they 
opened up the Chinese economy to more trade 
with the West, particularly with a view to more 
rational development of agricultural production 
and the diversification of industry. However, 
in 1966 the outbreak of the disturbances known 
as the cultural revolution, followed by the army 
taking over the country again in 1967-68, 
placed this policy in doubt by reducing China's 
external trade to virtually nothing. In cultural 
and commercial matters, only one's own forces 
counted. The economic consequences of this 
difficult period were not disastrous, however, 
since the Chinese market was sufficient to pro-
vide an outlet for agricultural production, 
which in 1970 had returned to its 19 58 level, at 
least where grain was concerned. Certain 
industrial sectors were also developed, includ-
ing oil production, which by 1975 amounted to 
approximately 100 million tons, which figure 
has hardly been exceeded since. 
15. (iii) Since 1975, a new course has been slowly 
worked out for the Chinese economy on the 
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basis of the " four modernisations " launched at 
that time by Zhou Enlai. However, the death 
of Zhou and Mao in 1976 followed by the diffe-
rences between the new leadership, led by Hua 
Guofeng, proponents of major reforms led by 
Deng Xiaoping and the most fundamentalist 
advocates of Mao Zedong's ideas, together 
known as the Gang of Four, delayed until 1977 
or even 1979 the application of the 197 5 pro-
gramme which was supposed to accomplish the 
full modernisation of agriculture, industry, 
science and technology before the end of the 
century so as to raise the Chinese economy to 
the highest world level, as Zhou Enlai said 
on 13th January 1975. The first years of 
application of this programme made China 
realise that it would have to procure much of 
the industrial equipment, means of transport 
and even armaments it needed in the West. It 
soon saw that, partly- because of the world 
crisis, its exports were not increasing sufficien-
tly to cover its programmes for imports and the 
acquisition of technical knowhow from the 
West. It therefore returned progressively, and 
the course was not smooth, to less ambitious 
development programmes, limiting its purcha-
ses abroad, and hence its debts, directing its 
programmes towards China's more essential 
requirements: feeding 1 ,000 million human 
beings, improving their standard of living and 
providing them with employment. More ambi-
tious projects, particularly in the military field, 
were postponed, not without good reason. 
B. Present economic aims 
16. It is obviously not for your Rapporteur to 
draw up a table of China's economic situation 
but merely, by using the most recent informa-
tion at his disposal, to examine the possible 
effects of economic aims on the country's 
external policy. Thus he will first try to 
examine the Chinese authorities' concepts for 
the country's economic future, for the next ten 
years at least, then study the implications of 
these concepts for China's external trade and 
finally examine the probable consequences of 
these concepts for future relations between 
China and the rest of the world. 
(a) China's economic development 
1 7. During the period of rapprochement 
between China and the West, marked by Pre-
sident Nixon's visit to China in 1972, it 
was hoped that the Chinese economy would 
develop quickly thanks to much broader pros-
pects for trade and very large-scale investment 
designed to develop the most modern sectors of 
activity. At the same time, the aim was to 
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abandon, or at least relegate to a secondary 
role, traditional doctrines whereby the develop-
ment of heavy industry was given absolute 
priority at the expense of agricultural produc-
tion, means of communication and industries 
producing consumer goods. The opening of 
the Chinese market was to be accompanied by 
a speedy increase in the standard of living of 
the Chinese people. 
18. However, this policy very soon ran up 
against obstacles impossible to overcome. First, 
in spite of firm measures to limit the birth rate, 
the Chinese population continued to increase 
too quickly. This steady increase has obvi-
ously slowed down the rise in the standard 
of living. 
19. Second, priority had to be given to 
developing the agricultural sector since China's 
external trade was weighed down by the need to 
feed the population. China is still a major 
importer of food products, particularly grain, 
and progress in the agricultural sector is 
inevitably slow (see table below). 
Structure of national income 
% 1952 1956 1972 1978 1979 
Industry ............ 18.0 26.4 43.0 46.9 45.7 
Agriculture .......... 59.2 48.1 38.8 35.3 38.8 
Building 
············ 
3.0 5.6 4.1 4.1 3.9 
Transport ........... 4.0 4.4 3.9 3.9 3.6 
Trade 
·············· 
15.8 15.5 10.2 9.8 8.0 
20. Third, the Chinese authorities resolved, 
no doubt very wisely, to place tight restrictions 
on China's external debt. However, as export 
capacity could not increase very quickly 
because of the time needed to implement the 
investment projects decided upon and the 
growing number of bottlenecks, such as inade-
quate port equipment, many investment pro-
'grammes had to be postponed or cancelled for 
lack of means to pay for them. The hoped-for 
technology transfers were therefore made only 
in part. 
21. Finally, these difficulties were discovered 
only gradually, thus leading to delays and 
incoherence in decisions governing the coun-
try's economy. Thus, the plan adopted in 
1978, whose effects should have lasted until 
1985, placed emphasis on the achievement of 
about 120 major industrial projects. But in 
July 1979 this plan had to be shelved and a 
two-year period of readjustment introduced in 
order to lay sounder foundations for a five-year 
plan. In September 1980, this plan in turn 
was abandoned before a start had been made on 
its implementation, and the rate of growth 
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planned for the coming years was limited to 
5.5 %. In December 1981, Zhao Ziyang, the 
Prime Minister, announced in the National 
People's Congress that the readjustment policy 
would be extended for at least five years and 
defined " ten economic principles " underlying 
the sixth five-year plan (1981-85). The aim of 
this plan is to lay the foundations for develop-
ment. Its main effect should be to improve the 
profitability of firms in the framework of an 
economy which is to remain directed but in 
which a wider margin of initiative is left to 
local bodies and to firms themselves. This 
policy already seems to have been productive in 
1982, in which year the rate of growth was 
7.3 % (7 % for agriculture and 7.8 % for 
industry), far more than forecast in the plan. 
This very favourable trend seems to have been 
confirmed in the first quarter of 1983, which 
gives credibility to the aim proclaimed at the 
twelfth Chinese Communist Party congress in 
1982 of quadrupling China's agricultural and 
industrial production before the end of the 
century. In 1985, agricultural and industrial 
production should be worth 871,000 million 
yuan, of which 605,000 million for industry 
and 266,000 million for agriculture, compared 
with a total of 715,000 million in 1980. 
22. These ''readjustments" did not affect the 
overall direction. Priority still went to develop-
ing agriculture, involving the establishment in 
northern China of vast state farms specialised in 
the production of grain. Large-scale develop-
ment of industries producing consumer goods, 
including textiles and food products, was to 
provide exports and at the same time ensure the 
well-being of the population. One can there-
fore well imagine the disappointment of the 
Chinese leaders at the quotas for Chinese 
textiles introduced by the United States and by 
the EEC too. Conversely, a 5% reduction in 
heavy industrial production was planned for 
1982. 
23. In the field of energy, hopes for the early 
development of oil were abandoned and plans. 
are now limited to the - apparently problem-
atical - maintenance of the level of little more 
than 100 million tons per year which has been 
the level for several years now. In these 
circumstances, oil being a· good item for export, 
China is now trying to reduce its consumption 
of oil which is only about 40 million tons per 
year through a policy of economy and greater 
use of coal, the production of which has been at 
630 million tons for the last three years and 
might gradually be increased by a careful 
investment policy, pending the fulfilment of the 
hopes placed in offshore oil research which 
requires technology not yet available in China. 
To overcome the handicap of China's late 
arrival in the oil business, several contracts on a 
mixed-economy basis associating China with 
foreign firms have already been concluded or 
are now being negotiated, particularly for t~e 
prospection and exploitation of offshore OI~. 
Finally, better use should be made of oil 
production through the development of refinery 
capacity and petrochemical industries. 
24. In spite of the ups and down~ of Chinese 
planning in recent years, it is possible to note a 
number of constant factors which have remai-
ned from one readjustment of the country's 
economic projects to another. First and fore-
most is the repeated wish to strengthen the 
country's capability by relying on its own 
means, i.e. by ensuring that economic develop-
ment does not make China dependent on any of 
its partners, be it through indebtedness or too 
great a deficit in the balance of trade, o~ undue 
reliance on foreign technology and particularly 
technicians or even trading or co-operating too 
exclusively' with certain countries. This means 
drawing full advantage from Ch~na's raw m~te­
rial resources and its large workmg populatiOn, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. Even if 
new changes are still possible, there is e~ery 
reason to think that these fundamental gUide-
lines will remain because they concord with the 
permanent facts of Chinese geography and 
China's permanent interests. 
(b) Trend of external trade 
25. For present Chinese leaders, as opposed 
to those who witnessed the breakdown of 
relations with the Soviet Union in 1960, the 
desire to rely on oneself no longer means 
economic isolation for China. On the contrary, 
the development of external trade is seen as 
a means of fostering the country's transforma-
tion even if trade has not increased at the rate fore~een in 1972 because of a series of obstacles 
which have impeded it : 
26. (i) Chinese currency is not co11:vertibl_e, 
which means China's purchases are paid for m 
western currency or based on clearing agree-
ments. Even trade with other countries whose 
currencies are not convertible such as the 
Soviet Union is governed by a currency of 
account, the Swiss franc, chosen no doubt 
because of its stability, or the United States 
dollar and is not the subject of financial settle~ents. If one of the countries is in 
deficit for a long period, it has to compensate 
for this deficit with a 2 % agio calculated in 
goods. This system limits the scale and speed 
of trade since it makes it subject to agreements 
between states which are renegotiated each year 
in the case of Sino-Soviet trade. 
27. (ii) Chinese goods on the intef!lat~o11:al 
market are of a limited nature and this hmits 
what China can buy. In spite of a considerable 
effort to develop its exports in the last five years 
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China has not yet managed to raise its external 
trade to a sufficiently high level. It is currently 
trying to develop exports of mining products, 
including oil and non-ferrous metals, and 
products manufactured from these meta~s, a_gri-
cultural products, handicrafts and certam hght 
industrial products : mechanical constructions, 
electrical equipment, furniture, textiles and 
processed food products. For . this reas~n 
short-term credits granted by foreign countnes 
have been concentrated on these industries, 
which can be set up or modernised promptly 
and produce for export fairly quick!Y· H_ow-
ever, these plans have been encountenng senous 
difficulties in the crisis conditions around the 
world since October 1973 because they concern 
products for which there is ~trong competition, 
especially between developmg countnes, and 
because protective measures have been adopted 
by the western countries which cannot allow 
their national industries to be completely 
ruined by competition from Chin~se goods. 
This is mainly the case for text~les whose 
import is everywhere on a quota basis. Where 
this is not yet the case, western producers call 
for it, e.g. at the present time French slipl?er 
manufacturers, who are unable to compete with 
China in present market conditions. It should 
be added that the requirements of western 
markets of the Soviet market and of the underde~eloped countries are very different in 
these fields, which makes it hard to offset the 
loss of one market by gaining another. 
28. (iii) After 1972, China placed . too much 
hope in the immediat~ future ?f Its expo~s, 
foreseeing a rate of mcrease m pr~uct10n 
which was subsequently reached only m part. 
A case in point was its commitments to 
Japan for the sale of oil: deliveries are marking 
time at just over 8 million . tons per _y~ar, 
whereas it had planned to dehver 9.5 mtlhon 
tons in 1981 and 15 million tons in 1985. It 
has had to cancel a number of contracts which 
it could not fulfil, and this has had serious 
repercussions on its imports and, c~nsequently, 
its equipment and output. There IS no doubt 
that the Chinese leaders will henceforth be 
determined to be more circumspect in their 
forecasts and commitments. In 1982, 17 % of 
China's exports were agricultural, 39 % light 
industrial and 43.4% heavy industrial products. 
29. Regarding imports, one of the mai~ aims 
of China's economic policy is to avmd any 
imports which are not essential fo~ th~ coun-
try's economic advancement. Th1s mcludes 
imports of grain which the developmen~ of 
agricultural production should redu~ consider-
ably, while the purchase of ~qmp!llent ~or 
mines transport and processmg mdustnes 
should, by about 1990, free China from t~e 
need to import semi-finished goods. To th1s 
end, any long-term loans obtained by China 
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should be used for infrastructure work, particu-
larly in the energy, transport and communica-
tions fields. Imports of technology and equip-
ment should be confined to what is not yet 
available in China, the aim being less to acquire 
complete equipment, as was the case in earlier 
years, than to make the most of the country's 
present potential. In 1982, 39 % of China's 
imports were raw materials, 35% durable 
goods, 7% agricultural products and 10% other 
consumer goods. There seems no reason to 
expect any great change in this breakdown in 
the near future. 
30. In 1982, the overall value of China's 
external trade amounted to 74,300 million 
yuan. The trade balance had a surplus of 
4,600 million thanks to an 8.6% increase in 
exports, while imports remained at the same 
level as in 1981. The sixth plan forecasts an 
annual increase of 8.7% which would bring 
trade up to 85,500 million in 1985, exports to 
40,200 million and imports to 45,300 million, 
which would imply even greater growth than 
for exports, which is favourable for the equip-
ping and development of the country. 
31. The Chinese Government's resolve to 
develop its trade relations on an almost wholly 
reciprocal basis inevitably led it to deal with 
the largest possible number of partners. At 
present, China trades with 174 countries or 
regions and has co-operation agreements with 
89 countries. Its trade with the western coun-
tries is far greater than with the eastern 
countries, including the Soviet Union. In 
1980, 1.2 % of Chinese exports went to the 
Soviet Union, representing only 0.3% of the 
latter's imports, while 1.5 % of Chinese imports 
came from the Soviet Union, representing 0.3 % 
of its imports, thus making the Soviet Union 
the seventeenth customer and eleventh supplier 
of China, China being the thirty-third customer 
and thirty-eighth supplier of the Soviet Union. 
In 1981, trade between the two countries 
picked up slightly and improved again in 
1982. It must be noted that in view of the 
close proximity of the two countries, their 
population and their size, these figures are 
abnormally low and might rise significantly 
without the West taking offence (see tables 
below). 
Growth of Chinese external trade from 1970 to 1980 (1970 = 100) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Exports 
-value .................. 100 116 146 234 308 332 335 374 467 635 891 
-volume ................ 100 115 134 158 148 163 181 183 229 278 ... 
- price .................. 100 101 109 148 208 204 185 204 204 228 ... 
Imports 
-value .................. 100 103 127 233 331 329 268 316 498 692 913 
-volume ................ 100 106 130 194 184 180 156 165 253 306 ... 
- price .................. 100 97 98 120 180 183 172 191 197 226 ... 
Trend in the composition of Chinese imports 
Percentages 1955 1959 1962 1966 1970 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 $ million between brackets 
Total ($ million) .......... (1,065) (2,060) (1,150) (2,035) (2,245) (5,225) (7,385) (6,010) (7,100) (10,305) (14,345 
Food products (%) ........ 2.1 1.0 40.0 25.0 17.6 20.7 12.2 9.3 15.7 12.9 12.3 
Grain(%) ................ - - ... 19.7 12.4 17.0 9.1 5.4 10.5 9.4 10.0 
Raw materials and fuel(%) 14.8 21.7 25.8 16.7 16.5 20.0 14.1 14.9 20.3 17.3 16.1 
Textile fibres (%) ......... 8.0 5.6 9.5 7.4 5.1 8.0 4.8 5.1 7.0 8.4 8.0 
of which artificial(%) ..... ... ... ... . .. 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.0 
Chemical products(%) .... 9.6 7.5 7.0 2.3 14.7 9.0 11.1 10.0 12.5 10,5 9.7 
Fertilisers (%) ............ 3.7 3.4 3.5 7.6 10.6 4.0 5.5 3.8 4.9 4.2 4.3 
Machines and equipment 
(%) ...................... 22.8 47.6 10.4 22.4 16.7 17.0 30.0 30.4 17.3 19.3 26.7 
Other manufactured pro-
ducts(%) ................ . .. 10.4 . .. 22.4 35.2 33.0 32.3 34.0 32.8 39.6 34.4 
Iron and steel(%) ......... { 8.9 ... { 7.4 11.1 18.0 19.0 21.0 24.0 22.1 27.9 23.0 Non-ferrous metals(%) .... ... 3.0 9.7 8.0 6.1 4.3 3.7 4.0 3.4 
Other(%) ................ ... 12 . .. 3.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.4 0.4 0.8 
88 
32. These facts may cause surprise if it is 
recalled that much Chinese equipment, particu-
larly in industry and transport (lorries and 
aircraft), was purchased from the Soviet Union 
between 1950 and 1960, since it was between 
1960 and 1970 that trade between the two 
countries declined most sharply : Sino-Soviet 
trade in 1970, expressed in roubles, was less 
than 5 % of the 19 50 figure, and the rise in the 
following decade only brought it back to 20 % 
of the 1960 figure, in spite of the depreciation 
of the rouble. Yet China was still obliged to 
purchase spare parts from the Soviet Union as 
these were essential for running its industry, 
and this left little room for other items, one of 
which is important : sawn timber. Soviet pur-
chases from China were mainly non-ferrous 
ores, meat and textiles. 
33. It might be considered that political 
decisions thus interrupted trade which might 
otherwise have developed quite differently. 
However, this is not so for, if the main items 
imported and exported by China are conside-
red, it can be seen that they are almost identical 
with those of the Soviet Union. The two 
countries compete for exports of oil products, 
for which the western countries and Japan are 
the main customers, and both are importers of 
large quantities of grain and the western 
countries are best prepared to supply them with 
the equipment and technology which are 
lacking both in the Soviet Union and in 
China. It would even be difficult to imagine 
China switching its imports of cotton from the 
underdeveloped countries to the Soviet Union. 
34. Admittedly, the geographical proximity 
which might be enhanced by building in the 
present decade the Baikal-Amur railway with 
several branch lines to China is a factor favour-
able to the development of Sino-Soviet trade. 
The lack of strong currencies can but encourage 
the two countries to develop bilateral trade 
based on the clearing system and it is not at 
all surprising that the desire to normalise 
their relations should encourage them to try to 
increase their trade considerably. But it 
cannot be claimed that economic burdens are 
drawing them closer together. 
35. On the contrary, it seems quite clear that 
both China and the Soviet Union consider the 
West a better partner because its economy is a 
better complement of theirs. However this 
may be, if the West wishes to develop trade 
relations with China and maintain or even 
strengthen links with that country it will have 
to grant favourable credit terms, the right to 
import the equipment China needs and freer 
access to western markets for China's exports. 
One has only to listen to Chinese grievances 
about the United States to be convinced of the 
harm caused to Sino-American relations in the 
last decade by the protective measures adopted 
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by the United States in recent years. Europe 
has enough products and technology to offer 
China for it to be able to open its frontiers to 
Chinese goods without fearing the development 
of reciprocal trade. It can urge the United 
States to avoid undue protectionism, as it has 
already done in fields affecting its direct 
interests, and open its own frontiers as widely 
as possible to Chinese products within the 
limits which allow its own industries to survive, 
as the EEC has done for a number of other 
developing countries. 
36. There is every indication that China now 
finds the development of its economic and trade 
relations with Western Europe desirable 
because Europe has too small a share in its 
foreign trade, it is afraid of becoming over-
dependent on the privileged partner that Japan 
is gradually becoming, and Europe is well 
placed to purchase Chinese products and to 
supply China with equipment items it needs. 
Receiving the General Affairs Committee on 
9th April 1983, Zhao Ziyang, Prime Minister, 
emphasised that : 
"We must realise that in spite of 
differences in our social systems our 
needs are complementary. I hope that, 
thanks to efforts on both sides, China and 
WEU will be able to make breakthroughs 
in the field of economic co-operation. " 
3 7. All the views expressed to the committee 
in China concorded to attach great importance 
to the development of economic and trade 
relations between China and Western Europe 
on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, 
principles of reciprocal advantage and equality 
of the partners. Such principles are obviously 
endorsed by the European countries. 
38. In fact, trade between Western Europe 
and China has developed steadily in recent 
years without running up against fundamental 
difficulties. In 1982, trade between China and 
Western Europe amounted to $5,400 million, 
i.e. 13.97% of China's external trade. Chinese 
exports amounted to $2,560 million, i.e. 
11.76% of the total, and its imports to $2,870 
million, i.e. 16.78% of the total, which left 
China with a deficit of $300 million, largely 
offset by its trade surplus with other regions. 
39. Overall Chinese imports of finished pro-
ducts declined sharply but China wishes to 
acquire more parts essential for the equipment 
of industries which it will produce itself and 
more technology which it will be able to 
apply. However, the committee heard com-
plaints in China about Western Europe's falling 
imports of Chinese products in 1981 and 1982, 
although this trend has not been confirmed in 
the first months of 1983. 
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40. Again, the Chinese authorities drew the 
committee's special attention to the importance 
they attach to industrial co-operation between 
European and Chinese firms, particularly 
through mixed-economy firms capable of 
attracting western capital to China and helping 
to train Chinese technicians and executives. 
They have already done much to facilitate the 
formation of such firms, particularly in special 
economic zones such as Shenzhen on the Hong' 
Kong frontier which the committee was able to 
visit in detail. To that end, many of the 
principles of state control applied in the rest of 
China have been relaxed and the greatest 
flexibility is allowed in order to encourage 
foreign investors to play a larger part in the 
industrialisation of China. It is to be regretted 
that Europeans are rather slow in responding to 
these invitations, particularly as Asian competi-
tors seem to be showing greater alacrity. In 
any event, the Prime Minister confirmed 
China's good will when telling the committee 
that: 
" We are prepared to take your interests 
into consideration by opening up the 
Chinese market to products of mixed-
economy firms... In the future, China 
and Western Europe will be able to make 
progress with the gradual transfer of 
technology through mixed-economy 
firms." 
41. Furthermore, particularly during the visit 
by Mr. Tindemans, Chairman-in-Office of the 
EEC Council, last March, China has shown its 
desire to co-operate more closely with the 
European Community and one of its most 
authoritative representatives told the committee 
that this country 'hoped to be accepted into the 
category of countries to which the EEC grants 
generalised preferences. 
(c) Prospects of change 
42. The true shape of the new course adop-
ted by China since the end of the cultural revo-
lution became clear only in about 1978. It is 
yet too soon and insufficient information is 
available to assess the full impact, particularly 
as there have been several readjustments. 
The most recent available information comes 
from 1 the presentation of the sixth five-year 
plan, covering the period 1981-85, by Zhao 
Ziyang, Prime Minister, at the beginning of 
December 1982. On this occasion, he confir-
med the lines already known, referring to the 
good results in 1982 but warning that such 
results might not always be so encouraging. 
Thus, the plan proposed an annual global 
growth rate of 4 o/o to 5% for the five-year 
period as a whole, i.e. moderate progress, 
account being taken of outside and inside con-
straints, which should allow the government to 
retain control over the economic system. 
43. These good results were obtained by a 
policy which systematically generalised encou-
ragement to shoulder responsibility, particularly 
in the agricultural sector where the peasants' 
share in production profits was developed 
through such means as the farming contract 
which in fact decollectivised land exploitation. 
The new constitution, adopted in December 
1982, at the same time reduced the role of the 
rural communes, depriving them of their admin-
istrative duties and making them economic 
units. These measures were subsequently com-
pleted by the freeing of many prices already 
begun in 1982, and by increases in an'd reorga-
nisation of wages and decentralisation of econo-
mic powers to the benefit of the municipalities. 
But apparently the government, anxious to 
avoid disturbances, deciqed to introduce these 
various reforms progressively and perhaps at ' 
different rates according to the regions concer-
ned. 
44. Furthermore, concentration of invest-
ments, 40 o/o of which are earmarked for energy 
and transport, should increase coal production 
by 13 % and electricity production by 20 o/o 
between now and 1985. In 1982, a first 
offshore oil drilling and exploitation contract 
was signed with an American firm and negotia-
tions for other areas are being conducted with 
French and Japanese firms. Expected conse-
quences are: in spite of a reduction in state sub-
sidies for production, amounting to 30 o/o of 
public expenditure in 1982, the budgetary defi-
cit, which was 2,500 million yuan in 1982, 
should increase to 3,000 million in 1983. 
Co-operation with western firms should be 
more widespread. The 0 trade balance, which 
was in surplus in 1982, thus allowing China to 
build up a foreign currency reserve of about 
$10,000 million, will probably become a deficit 
because of increased purchases of modem 
equipment and technology, mainly from the 
West and Japan. Finally, the traditional policy 
of refusing to contract debts abroad might be 
, seriously circumvented. 
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45. The above remarks and conclusions are 
obviously significant only insofar as the evolu-
tion on which they are based is confirmed and 
lasts. With regard to the present trend in 
China, the Soviet new economic policy comes 
to mind in which Lenin, in 1921, restarted the 
machinery of free enterprise, while retaining 
very strict state control over the whole econo-
mic system, which allowed the Stalinist plan-
ning system to be introduced even before Stalin 
came to power. The new economic policy was 
a tactical expedient to relaunch the economy 
after the civil war and in no way committed the 
Soviet Union to a liberal economic course. 
But the first Chinese reforms only started in 
1976 and it was only in 1981 or 1982 that they 
gathered enough speed to offer some prospect of 
a far-reaching change in the facts of the Chinese 
economy. As to whether it is possible and 
probable that the trend might be reversed is a 
question worth raising but obviously no firm 
answer can yet be given. 
46. However, there are many indications that 
the refgrms undertaken will be continued and 
that, whoever China's future leaders may be, 
they will not be able to revert to the previous 
economic system. Indeed, everything points 
towards the present trends being maintained 
and strengthened. 
4 7. (i) The average standard of living of the 
Chinese is still very low. Admittedly, figures 
which can be quoted vary somewhat ($256 per 
capita GNP in 1976 according to the World 
Bank and $315 per capita in 1982 according to 
Chinese economists), which places China 
among the underdeveloped countries. Even if 
the 1981 and 1982 high growth rates are con-
firmed in the coming years and the growth in 
the population is contained, which is not yet 
the case, it will be many years before the whole 
Chinese population attains a significantly 
higher standard of living. 
48. (ii)The failure of the great leap forward in 
1958 produced a shock which has not been 
forgotten. It resulted in reduced production 
and famine with millions of victims and largely 
explains the excesses of the cultural revolution 
which also left bitter memories. All this is a 
warning against undue voluntaryism in the eco-
nomic field and against the belief that planning 
can overcome all constraints. 
49. (iii)Chinese society, with all its adversities 
and various traditions firmly anchored in a col-
lective mentality, is a brake on initiatives from 
above. This makes it necessary to decentralise 
economic decisions and every attempt to avoid 
this has so far failed. 
50. (iv) Conversely, the first steps towards decen-
tralising economic decisions and diversifying 
investment conditions and management firm by 
firm and region by region have produced 
worthwhile results and probably to a large 
extent explain the recent progress of the Chi-
nese economy. 
I 
51. (v)Similarly, the development of the free 
market, the return to a certain degree of inde-
pendence and family initiative in production 
groups or people's communes, a greater degree 
of profit-sharing for the workers, the responsibi-
lities assigned to workers' collectivities in the 
sq>cial security field, the wider independent 
margin of decision and above all the possibility 
of using part of the profits made by firms for 
· -self-financing admittedly seem to have given 
rise to difficulties and problem~ but they have 
also changed ways of thinking, btfought younger 
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elements to posts of responsibility and pro-
duced promising results. 
52. (vi) Although in many areas such as housing 
there is little relationship between prices and 
costs, the recent development of the free market 
seems to have helped to bring these two ele-
ments closer together in other sectors with the 
result that there is an increased sense of econo-
mic responsibility among those responsible for 
production at every level, which is also a factor 
of reorganisation and progress. 
53. (vii)Even if China no longer considers that 
there are models of socialism in other countries 
to which it can conform, particularly in view of 
the absolutely unique nature of its situation, it 
can nevertheless be noted that the Eastern 
European countries which, like Hungary or 
even the Soviet Union in certain sectors, have 
started to allow a degree of economic pragma-
tism and decentralisation of decisions have not 
lost in the process. Rigid planning is no longer 
so attractive as it seemed. 
54. (viii)Finally, in 1982 China, for the first 
time for more than twenty years, published a 
statistical yearbook (for 1981) and the number 
of economic information reviews has increased 
in recent years, which means that the public 
now has the facts allowing it to assess and 
form an opinion on the results of the govern-
ment's economic policy. 
55. These various considerations admittedly 
give us no clear indication of what the future 
will be. History never follows expectations. 
However, factors recorded by the committee 
during its visit to China compared with 
the most recent western publications have 
convinced it that the course followed since 
1976, and particularly in 1981-82, is not, in 
the opinion of the present Chinese leaders, a 
provisional expedient but commits the country 
for a long time to come. Results already 
obtained hold promise of ~uccess on the 
ecom~mic and social level and, consequently, 
will be welcomed by a nation that has suffered 
too much from past uncertainties not to be 
ready for the benefits to be gained from 
espousing a certain degree of pragmatism 
and liberalisation. 
(d) Economy and foreign policy 
56. From the point of view of foreign policy, 
the first consequence of the economic options 
adopted by China, if they are pursued, should 
be to induce the Chinese Government to give 
priority to the country's internal development 
rather than to external activities and hence 
limit as far as possible expenditure on defence 
and all extern::tl commitments. This implies 
that: 
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57. (i) The indispensable modernisation of Chi-
nese armed forces will be slow and China will 
have tp pay far greater attention than in the 
past to achieving effective results in the disar-
mament field. 
58. (ii) China will be extremely cautious in its 
external initiatives and will be ever more hesi-
tant about embarking upon ventures as in 
Korea in 1950, India in 1962, the Sino-Soviet 
frontiers in 1969 or Vietnam in 1979. 
59. (iiz) Even if China continues to claim to be a 
third world country it is not in a position to 
replace the western countries at short notice in 
its trade with the third world. This trade has 
so far been mediocre for a number of reasons: 
(a) China's exports, particularly to Japan, 
can be increased only at the expense 
of those of other developing coun-
tries, such as Indonesia for oil and 
raw materials, and many countries for 
textiles; 
(b) the priority China gives to its econo-
mic development imposes a burden 
on it which will greatly reduce its 
already limited ability to grant third 
world countries long-term loans at 
favourable rates; 
(c) the internal economic guidelines 
recently adopted by China, if suc-
cessful, can still allow it to be a model 
for countries faced with similar prob-
lems, but it can hardly claim to be 
the guiding star of world revolution 
which to some extent it was in earlier 
years. 
60. (iv) Inevitably, the West and Japan will be 
China's economic partners because they alone 
can supply it with the technology, equipment 
and credits it needs and at the same time offer 
it outlets for its exports provided they agree not 
to protect their domestic markets against pro-
ducts from the People's Republic. 
61. ( v) Apart from political considerations, the 
Soviet Union, whose economy is not comple-
mentary to that of China, cannot be a leading 
economic partner for China for any length of 
time. For economic as well as political rea-
sons, therefore, the normalisation of relations 
between the two countries cannot lead to a 
return to the situation in 19 50, at least on a 
lasting basis. 
62. In short, China needs an extended period 
of peace and trade development, particularly 
with the West and Japan, for deep-rooted and 
permanent reasons, and everything shows that 
it now fully realises this. It may be deduced 
that it should pursue the policy of peace and 
economic opening to the rest of the world 
which it has been following for several years 
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now and which conforms perfectly with Eur-
ope's interests. It might even accentuate this 
policy, or at least this is the impression your 
Rapporteur gained during the committee's visit 
to China. 
Ill. Political options 
A. The committee's inquiry 
63. The purpose of the study undertaken by 
the General Affairs Committee is not to express 
an opinion on the institutions of the People's 
Republic of China and even less to interfere in 
that country's internal affairs. But insofar as 
domestic policy has an influence on relations 
with the outside world it cannot disregard these 
matters entirely and, to be specific, it has 
examined the nature of the relationship 
between the party and state bodies and some-
times local institutions or firms. Depending on 
which of them tips the balance, vast differences 
are possible in the way the economy may be 
run and political decisions taken, maintained or 
carried out. Consequently, very different 
conclusions may be drawn about the future of 
relations between China and the rest of the 
world. 
64. It should be said straight away that this is 
a point on which your Rapporteur does not feel 
able to express unassailable views following the 
committee's visit to China. A few remarks 
may be made however: 
65. (i) All the questions put by committee mem-
bers about the recruitment of business execu-
tives received the answer that ability was the 
sole criterion, thus confirming the priority 
given to economic profitability at every level. 
66. (il) Behind overall approval of government 
policy, no attempt was made to conceal reser-
vations about certain aspects of its application, 
but feelings regarding the importance of local 
responsibilities were expressed strongly. 
6 7. ( iii) Inadequate consideration given to certain 
working conditions, particularly security, 
showed a great weakness in the trade union 
organisation in face of the requirements of 
profitability. 
68. (iv) Ideological imperatives were never in 
conflict with economic considerations in describ-
ing the economy of the country, regions, 
towns or firms. 
69. (v)ln views expressed to the committee on 
foreign policy, defence, China's economic rela-
tions with the rest of the world or the country's 
domestic problems, whatever they might be, 
although " different ideological bases " were 
mentioned for relations with the rest of the 
world, at the same time it was specified that 
, 
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such differences were not an obstacle to de 
facto convergences. Similarly, when mention 
was made of " building socialism " in domes-
tic affairs, it was specified that this in no way 
precluded analysis of the facts, whether it be a 
matter of nationality, economic imperatives, 
weaknesses in the structure of the country or 
the weight of traditional ways of thinking. 
70. In short, your Rapporteur realised that 
any consideration of the situation in China 
which stopped when it came to ideological 
obstacles between China and Western Europe 
would be inadequate and pointless. Similarly, 
any projection which failed to take account of 
China's past and its evolution since 1949 would 
produce a partial and unsound judgment. 
Conversely, when analysed objectively and his-
torically, China is seen to be following a slow 
and sometimes bumpy road from the semi-
colonial position it occupied before 1949 
towards an improvement in the living condi-
tions of the people, economic development, 
greater freedom and an opening towards the rest 
of the world. 
B. The political heritage 
71. In the economic field, the situation 
inherited by the two successive Chinese Govern-
ments which have been in power since 1976 
was difficult to handle in spite of the remark-
able start obtained in 1949 because of the 
choices made in the early years of the new 
regime and the influence then exercised by the 
Soviet Union followed by the isolation to which 
China was reduced after breaking off relations 
in 1960. The same was almost true for the 
political situation in which Mao Zedong left his 
country, without stable institutions, close to 
anarchy, but where the revolution had produ-
ced apparently lasting unity in a country which 
had been divided for more than a century at the 
risk of being permanently split. The fact that 
Taiwan has remained outside the People's 
Republic of China and the Chinese Govern-
ment's setbacks in some of its attempts to recu-
perate China's former frontiers are of little 
account compared with the major fact that the 
mainland of China is reunited under the guid-
ance of a government which, in spite of dicta-
torial aspects and adhering to an ideology not 
wholly suited to the real requirements of the 
Chinese people, quickly managed to gain 
recognition as the legitimate government and 
impose its authority on a country emerging 
from a long period of division and anarchy. 
72. However, the economic difficulties stem-
ming from the failure of the great leap forward 
in 1958 led Mao Zedong to withdraw progres-
sively from his political responsibilities. He 
was replaced as President of China in 1959 by 
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Liu Shaoqi, which started a long period of 
struggle for power marked by the cultural 
revolution which started in 1966, abandonment 
of the application of the 19 54 constitution, the 
reconquest of power between 1967 and 1969 by 
the Red Guards on behalf of Mao Zedong, once 
again Chairman of the Chinese Communist 
Party in 1968, the progressive setting up of 
revolutionary committees in the provinces and 
the disappearance in often obscure circumstan-
ces of the principal leaders of the country and 
of the Communist Party. A radical purge of 
so-called counter-revolutionaries was continued 
until 1973. 
73. As from that date, new institutions were 
set up under the 197 5 constitution which consi-
derably strengthened the powers devolving on 
the party and a new government was formed, 
the principal leaders being Deng Xiaoping, who 
became Vice-Chairman of the Party, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Chief of Staff in 1975, and 
Hua Guofeng, who became Prime Minister 
after the death of Zhou Enlai in 1976. How-
ever, the struggle for leadership continued after 
the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 
with the arrest and trial of some of his suppor-
ters such as the Gang of Four, convicted in 
1980, and the rehabilitation of their victims. 
In fact, it was in 1977 that a new team of 
leaders took over. This was confirmed by the 
eleventh congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party, which appointed Hua Guofeng Chairman 
of the Party and adopted a third constitution 
for the People's Republic of China. The 
further change in leadership of the country and 
party which took place in 1981-82 and brought 
Hu Yaobang to the head of the CCP and made 
Zhao Ziyang Prime Minister on the contrary 
took place without apparent clashes but led to 
further major transformations in China's politi-
cal and economic course. 
74. These struggles for power did not entirely 
paralyse China, however. In the economic 
field, national production grew significantly 
during the cultural revolution. In external 
policy, the break with the Soviet Union came 
in 1960, the first fighting on the Ussuri in 1969, 
but only in 1979 did China denounce the 1950 
Sino-Soviet treaty, at the same time as it tried a 
first series of talks on the " normalisation " of 
these relations. The first signs of rapproche-
ment with the United States and Japan were in 
1971. The decision to bring China out of its 
diplomatic and economic isolation therefore 
antedates the death of Mao Zedong and has 
been constantly pursued ever since. 
75. It may be deduced from these facts that 
the main guidelines of China's foreign policy 
were not dictated by domestic events alone but 
that they were motivated by more than the pre-
vailing economic situation, as Sir Frederic Ben-
nett underlined in his report. However, the 
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way these guidelines have been followed up 
since 1977 has changed considerably and this is 
certainly attributable to the new leadership. 
76. China has not had a President since the 
death of Mao Zedong but it is governed by a 
State Council on which several tendencies are 
represented. The 3,500 delegates to the Natio-
nal People's Congress are appointed so as to be 
truly representative of the country. In spring 
1983, a new Congress was elected. Economic 
and political options have been debated openly 
and it has been possible to voice opposition. 
There has been growing moderation in the 
repression of former leaders. The strict mea-
sures applied to aliens have been greatly 
relaxed, if not abandoned. The former demo-
cratic parties were able to meet again and hold 
congresses at the beginning of 1979. 
77. At the same time, mention of threats or 
the use of force to attain foreign policy aims 
disappeared from official speeches where they 
were prominent in the days of Mao. Further-
more, the declared wish to make China a great 
economic power without delay and the first 
country with a truly communist regime gave 
way to an increasingly realistic assessment of a 
situation which dictated far more modest ambi-
tions. It is now evident that the condemnation 
of Maoist excesses expressed more and more 
clearly in the last fifteen years are not only part 
of the political struggle but above all recogni-
tion of the failures of an extreme policy of 
voluntaryism and a sign of the firm intention to 
adapt Chinese policy to the limits imposed on 
it by a situation beyond its control. 
C. New political options 
78. The Chinese constitutional system was 
modified quite recently, since the new statutes 
of the Chinese Communist Party were adopted 
at the twelfth party congress in September 1982 
and a constitution by the National People's 
Congress in November 1982. In order to 
throw light on these texts, your Rapporteur 
thought it would be useful to draw from the 
very remarkable report presented by Hu Yao-
bang at the twelfth party congress a number of 
pointers to the Chinese Government's inten-
tions. 
19. It should be recalled that the constitution 
in force until 1982 dated from the beginning of 
1978 and was th!e drawn up immediately after 
the death of Mao Zedong, at a time when the 
new team of leaders was not yet firmly estab-
lished and had not yet defined the new course 
it wished the Chinese economy to follow, which 
it did later in 1978. Referring to the period 
1978-82, Hu Yaobang wrote that the arduous 
task of ending confusion about guidelines had 
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been accomplished and a great historical turn-
ing point reached by re-establishing the nor-
mal course of things. 
80. The signs of this turning-point, as he pre-
sented them, may be summed up as follows: 
(i) we have resolutely broken the 
fetters of dogmatism and the person-
ality cult which existed for a long 
time, and have reaffirmed the Marx-
Ist ideological line of seeking truth 
from facts; 
(ii) we have put an end to years of 
social turbulence and brought about 
a political situation characterised by 
stability, unity and liveliness; 
(iii) sociallst democracy and the socialist 
legal system are being gradually 
perfected; 
(iv) equality and unity among all our 
nationalities have been strengthened 
anew; 
(v) the patriotic united front has expan-
ded further [i.e. the number of poli-
tical groups outside the Communist 
Party has increased]; 
(vi} we have resolutely shifted the focus 
of work of the party and the state to 
economic construc,tion [i.e. the eco-
noll!Y is no longer subordinated to 
purely political considerations]; 
(vii) relations between the party and the 
intellectuals have improved enorm-
ously; 
(viii) we have made tremendous efforts to 
build a modern regular revolution-
ary army. 
81. Your Rapporteur considers that these 
eight points show most explicitly how the 
policy of the new team of leaders has broken 
with the legacy of the past whose shortcomings 
in the eyes of the present leaders may be 
guessed from the references '>to "truth from 
facts ", social unrest, legality, nationalities, 
intellectuals and building up the economy. 
They also suggest how these leaders intend to 
run the country in the coming years. The new , 
party statutes are above all designed to promote, J 
within that organisation, greater representativity 
of the various elements of Chinese society and 
greater freedom of expression. It is clear that 
the new constitution meets the same concerns 
and reflects the same trend. This is what Hu 
Y aobang already announced when he said that 
"the draft constitution, soon to be submitted to 
the National People's Congress for adoption, 
contains many new and very important stipula-
tions formulated in the light of the achieve-
ments scored and the principles worked out in 
developing socialist democracy since the third 
plenary session of the Eleventh Central Com-
mittee. The adoption of this constitution will 
mark a new stage in the development of 
China's socialist democracy and legal system". 
82. The text of the 1982 constitution can be 
interpreted only in the light of a constitutional 
trend marked by five fundamental texts. A 
comparison of these texts shows a significant 
trend. For instance, the new constitution gives 
far less prominence than earlier constitutions to 
the leading role of the party but, on the 
contrary, places greater emphasis on the auto-
nomy of various organs, particularly judicial 
organs (Section VII) and on respect for a 
number of freedoms, including religious free-
dom (Article 36), not to speak of personal free-
doms (Articles 3 7, 39 and 40). 
83. Information obtained by your Rapporteur 
from other sources makes him think that libera-
lisation has already been very real in recent 
years, thus leading to considerable detente in 
relations between alien populations, particu-
larly Buddhist Tibetans, and the central state, 
and also between religious minorities (Moslems, 
Buddhists, Christians, etc.) and the communist 
regime. Associated with the re-emergence of a 
private market, detente has put an end to the 
clashes which, in the days of Mao Zedong, 
seem to have been quite serious. Greater auto-
nomy for towns and provinces, the reality of 
which the committee was able to see, particu-
larly in Shanghai, the creation of special admi-
nistrative regions such as that of Shenzhen 
which the committee visited in detail, whose 
statute is determined " in the light of the speci-
fic conditions " (Article 31) - some Chinese 
speakers told the committee that Taiwan, 
Macao and Hong Kong might one day be inclu-
ded - also show a desire to liberalise, decentra-
lise (Sections V and VI) and allow more room 
for the expression of various opinions and res-
pect for the populations. The preamble to 
the constitution even specifies that " in the 
struggle to safeguard the unity of the nation-
alities, it is necessary to combat big-nation 
chauvinism, mainly Han -chauvinism, and also 
necessary to combat local-national chauvinism". 
D. Implications of the internal situation for foreign policy 
84. Xhe only too brief analysis your Rappor-
teur has been able to make of the present trend 
of Chinese internal policy allows a few indica-
tions to be deduced concerning foreign policy 
on the basis, inter alia, of Hu Yadbang's 
report. The resolve that China's action should 
be based on analysis of facts leads the Chinese 
Government to consider that "China's foreign 
policy... proceeds from the fundamental inte-
rests of the people of China and the rest of the 
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world ", which implies that while it is still 
convinced " that communism will ultimately be 
realised throughout the world ... revolution can-
not be exported but can occur only by the 
choice of the people of the country concerned". 
The five principles of: 
- mutual respect for sovereignty and ter-
ritoral integrity; 
- mutual non-aggression; 
- non-interference in each other's inter-
nal affairs; 
- equality and mutual benefit; and 
- peaceful coexistence 
have consistently guided China in its effort to 
develop relations with other countries. These 
principles are set out in the preamble to the 
constitution of 4th December 1982. 
85. An attentive reader cannot overlook the 
fact that each of these principles is in clear 
contradiction with the policy pursued by the 
Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the 
countries it occupies or controls. Hu Yaobang 
emphasised moreover that if Sino-Soviet rela-
tions had deteriorated it was because " the 
Soviet Union has pursued a hegemonist pol-
icy", a feature of which was the continue sta-
tioning of "massive armed forces along the 
Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders", sup-
port of Vietnamese expansionism, " constant 
provocations along China's border" and the 
occupation of Afghanistan. While the Soviet 
Union had expressed a desire to improve rela-
tions with China, " deeds, rather than words, 
are important ", i.e. abandonment of hege-
mony. "With the friendly socialist countries 
of Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia we main-
tain close co-operation. " 
86. The hegemony of which the Soviet 
Union is accused is not just the aggressive 
policy it pursues in Asia but also and perhaps 
mainly its claim to be a model socialist regime 
to which all communist countries and parties 
should conform. By emphasising its desire to 
" rely on its own forces " China intends to 
remain fully responsible for deciding how to 
organise its economy, society, political system 
~nd external relations. 
8 7. Where peace and disarmament were 
concerned, Hu Yaobang said that: " The most 
important task for the people of the world 
today is to oppose hegemonism and safeguard 
world peace. Due to the rivalry between the 
superpowers, the danger of a world war is 
growing ever greater. However, experience 
shows that the people of the world, by persever-
ing in their struggle, can upset the strategic 
plans of the superpowers. World peace can be 
safeguarded, provided the people truly unite 
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and fight resolutely against all expressions of 
hegemonism and expansion. We have always 
firmly opposed the arms race between the 
superpowers, stood for the prohibition of the 
use of nuclear weapons and for their complete 
destruction and demanded that the superpowers 
be the first to cut their nuclear and conventio-
nal arsenals drastically. " 
88. With regard to Japan, the writer said that 
if " the development of relations of peace and 
friendship, equality and mutual benefit, and 
prolonged stability between China and Japan 
is in accord with the long-term interests of 
the two peoples and conducive to the peace and 
stability of the Asian-Pacific region", it was 
primarily because " Japan is China's neigh-
bour". As for the United States, "a cloud has 
all along hung over the relations between the 
two countries. This is because the United Sta-
tes, despite having recognised that the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China is 
China's sole legal government and that there is 
only one China and Taiwan is part of China, 
has passed the Taiwan Relations Act which 
contravenes the principles embodied in the 
joint communique on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, and it has continued to 
sell arms to Taiwan, treating Taiwan as an 
independent political entity". 
89. Again, "socialist China belongs to the 
third world " and is quite prepared to co-
operate with those countries, both in the econo-
mic field and " in the struggle... against impe-
rialism, hegemonism and colonialism ". 
90. Finally, relations with Western Europe 
were mentioned in the following terms: 
" Many western countries have social sys-
tems different from China's, yet we share 
a common desire to safeguard world 
peace and a common interest in develop-
ing our economic and cultural co-opera-
tion, for which the potentials are great, 
and we have maintained good relations 
over the years. The past few years 
have also seen some development in our 
relations with East European countries. " 
91. It therefore seems quite clear that " set-
ting right our practical work on all fronts " on 
the sound, permanent foundations laid by the 
1982 constitutional reforms is leading China to 
adopt an external policy which conforms to the 
underlying aspirations of the Chinese people 
and to develop its economy and introduce more 
democratic political and social conditions 
through internal order and external peace. 
Defining itself as a third world country, 
announcing the precedence of economic consi-
derations over political considerations and 
launching liberal reforms in many fields neces-
sarily means renouncing a foreign policy which 
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is adventurous or dominated by ideological 
concerns. For these reasons it would appear 
that undue importance should not be attached 
to Sino-American tension or the Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement of recent months and it should 
be noted that China and Western Europe have 
a fairly parallel approach to international 
questions because, although they respect very 
different ideologies, they are based on the 
same facts of life. 
IV. Foreign policy 
A. China and East- West rellltions 
92. The external policy of the People's 
Republic of China has passed through several 
very characteristic stages. 
93. (i) From 1949 to 1959, China thought 
that through close co-operation with the Soviet 
Union and confrontation with the capitalist 
countries it could find the normal security 
policy of a communist country. The assistance 
the United States gave the Kuomintang in the 
last years of the civil war and the guarantees 
extended to the refugee government in Taiwan 
which continued to claim to represent the 
whole Chinese people, its refusal to recognise 
the regime in Beijing and allow it a seat in the 
United Nations left the People's Republic of 
China little choice in its alliance and in 
February 19 50 it signed a treaty of alliance with 
the Soviet Union. In 19 57, an agreement 
extended military co-operation between the two 
countries to the field of advanced military tech-
nology, including nuclear weapons. 
94. (ii) However, this co-operation immediately 
ran into difficulties since China refused Soviet 
control over any nuclear weapons that might be 
delivered to it, and in July 1959 the Soviet 
Union denounced the 1957 agreement. In July 
1960, it also cut off all co-operation with China 
in every field, including that of defence, thus 
reducing the People's Republic of China to 
almost total isolation. 
95. It was during this period of isolation that 
China developed an independent nuclear wea-
pons policy which allowed it to explode its 
first nuclear bomb in October 1964 and its first 
thermonuclear bomb in June 1967. At the 
same time, it strongly criticised the Soviet 
Union for its attempts to reach agreement with 
the Americans on limiting nuclear weapons, 
calling it revisionist and taking the risk of an at 
least indirect clash with the United States over 
the islands of Quemoy and Mazu which were 
under the authority of the Taiwan Government. 
96. However, Sino-Soviet relations continued 
to deteriorate, particularly because of the fron-
tier problems which Sir Frederic Bennett descri-
bed in his report in 1978. Already, when in 
1962 China was seizing territories which it 
considered did not belong to India, the Soviet 
Union was drawing closer to that country and a 
treaty of alliance was signed with it in 
1971. But above all, in 1969, there was violent 
fighting in the Far East and Mongolia between 
Soviet and Chinese armed forces. Information 
on this subject indicates that China is believed 
to have been seriously defeated in Mongolia, 
while forces engaged along the Ussuri River 
apparently resisted more successfully. 
97. If to these facts is added the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in spring 
1968, one can understand why China increas-
ingly saw the Soviet Union as an imperialist 
power dangerous for its security. Its military 
setbacks in Mongolia brought out its military 
inferiority in the conventional field and the fact 
that the number of forces it was capable of 
mobilising was not enough to ensure its security 
in face of the much better equipped Soviet 
army. Soviet diplomatic activity in Asia, its 
protectorate in Mongolia, its support for the 
new People's Republic of Vietnam and for 
India, particularly during the 1965 war between 
India and Pakistan, the growth of its influence 
in Afghanistan and then the invasion of that 
country in December 1979 were so many sub-
jects of concern for China which encouraged it 
to emerge from isolation to ensure its security. 
98. (iii) During the same period, American 
power was beginning to seem less dangerous for 
China. In 1969, President Nixon announced 
his intention to end the war in Vietnam. Some 
of the United States' European allies had 
re-established diplomatic relations with the 
People's Republic of China and in October 
1971 it was admitted to the United Nations 
where it took the permanent seat occupied until 
then by the Taiwan Government. In February 
1972, President Nixon paid an official visit to 
the People's Republic marking a rapproche-
ment between the two countries. 
99. Since then, relations between the People's 
Republic of China and the western countries 
and Japan have developed apace, particularly 
in the economic field and even, for certain 
European countries such as France and the 
United Kingdom, in the armaments field. But 
this rapprochement has also affected the poli-
tical field. 
100. (iv) However, since 1980 China's external 
policy seems to have taken a new turn. One 
reason is probably because it has found it 
materially impossible to follow up a number of 
economic co-operation projects with the west-
em countries or Japan, which led to disap-
pointment on all sides. 
101. Further, assistance granted by the United 
States under Mr. R~agan's Presidency to the 
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Taiwan reg1.me, which still considers itself to 
be the _legal Chinese Government, while the 
government in Beijing considers Taiwan to be 
part of Chinese national territory of which it is 
the legitimate government, has led to serious 
tension between China and the United States 
since 1981. On 17th August 1982, Sino-
American talks led to the publication of a joint 
communique which the Chinese Government 
consider committed the United States to a 
progressive limitation of its deliveries of arma-
ments to Taiwan. The conclusion of a new 
contract between the United States and Taiwan 
at the end of the same year was considered in 
Beijing to be a breach of this commitment. 
I 02. Moreover, the introduction of quotas for 
imports of Chinese textiles to the United States, 
the maintenance of certain modem equipment 
on the lists of products whose export to China 
is forbidden by Cocom, the refusal to deliver 
certain weapons and an advanced computer to 
China and finally the March 1983 decision to 
grant asylum to a young Chinese tennis player 
further contributed to the deterioration in 
relations which seemed promising at the time of 
President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. Mr. 
Shultz's talks in Beijing in February 1983 were 
apparently not enough to dispel all the clouds 
which had gathered over Sino-American rela-
tions, in spite of the significant and steady 
development of trade relations between the two 
countries. When denouncing the " two hege-
monies " China admittedly does not place the 
Soviet Union, which it considers to be "a 
threat", on the same footing as the United 
States, which " makes many mistakes ", but 
there is no doubt that Sino-American relations 
are at present at a difficult juncture. 
103. Concerned above all about its economic 
development since 1977, China has laid stress 
on the progress of agriculture, light industry 
and consumption which is at present the 
essential consideration. These economic options 
did not allow Chinese military strength to be 
developed rapidly but required durable interna-
tional peace, in Asia at least. Thus, after 
signing a treaty of friendship and co-operation 
with Japan in 1978, China began a dialogue 
with Moscow in 1979, just at the time 
it denounced the 1950 treaty of friendship. It 
broke it off on 19th January 1980 after the 
invasion of Afghanistan. However, on 3rd 
October 1982 Mr. Ilyichev, Soviet Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Beijing for 
three weeks to hold explanatory talks with his 
Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, which seems 
to indicate that both sides are ready to resume 
the dialogue. 
I 04. The death of Leonid Brezhnev and his 
replacement by Mr. Andropov do not seem to 
have interrupted this process since on the 
occasion of Mr. Brezhnev's funeral on 
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16th November Huang Hua, Chinese Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, met Mr. Gromyko and at 
the close of their talks the latter declared in 
Pravda that the Soviet leaders attached great 
importance to the normalisation of relations 
with China and that they intended placing such 
relations on a good neighbourly footing. 
Finally, both parties agreed that the dialogue 
should be pursued. Huang Hua for his part 
told the Xin Hua Agency that peace and 
friendship between China and the Soviet Union 
corresponded fully not only to the interests of 
the two countries and two peoples but also to 
the interests of peace in Asia and the world. 
He praised the desire Mr. Brezhnev had shown 
to improve Sino-Soviet relations and hoped for 
new Soviet efforts in this sense. However, the 
fact that Huang Hua had to leave his post on 
19th November, i.e. three days after this decla-
ration, leaves a question mark over the Chinese 
Government's endorsement of this text. A 
further meeting was held in Moscow in 
March 1983 and does not seem to have clarified 
the situation entirely. 
105. The Chinese authorities made three 
requests to the Soviet Union in autumn 1982: 
evacuation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambo-
dia and a reduction in the number of Soviet 
forces deployed along the Chinese frontiers. 
These requests correspond exactly to China's 
known fears of the Soviet Union, but they seem 
to have produced no results. 
106. There is no reason to think that with the 
resumption of its talks with the Soviet Union 
China is envisaging a return to the same kind of 
relations as it had with it prior to 1960. On 
the one hand, they have left it with nothing but 
unhappy memories, particularly domination 
hardly disguised by references to socialist frater-
nity. On the other hand, the problems oppos-
ing it to the Soviet Union, including territorial 
problems, are still there. But most probably 
China has no intention of pursuing a confronta-
tion from which it can gain nothing or of 
making itself over-dependent on its western 
partners, including the United States, or Japan. 
In its desire to ensure a period of peace 
which is essential for its economic develop-
ment, to maintain its independence by avoiding 
an accumulation of debts and increasing the 
number of its partners and to play the interna-
tional role commensurate with a country whose 
population represents almost a fifth of man-
kind, it has to oppose any form of hegemony. 
In this respect, it readily considers Europe, 
and probably also Japan, as the best partners 
because it is now difficult to suspect them of 
imperialist aims, they do not have the where-
withal to exercise hegemony, they are inherent-
ly attached to the maintenance of peace and the 
development of international trade and in the 
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main both Europe and Japan share China's 
views and interests. 
107. However, this moderate, realistic and 
reasonable course which seems to have been 
chosen by the People's Republic of China has 
probably not secured the approval of all the 
Chinese leaders. The recent dismissal of 
Huang Hua is probably an indication of 
differences over the country's foreign policy and 
the question is whether the generation now 
coming to power whose most prominent repre-
sentatives were at least partly trainetl in 
Moscow between 1949 and 1960 is not more 
marked than the previous generation and the 
next one by Soviet influence. This would 
imply that in the next few years Sino-westem 
relations might run into certain difficulties 
which might then be overcome if Europe 
manages to meet China's true requirements and 
prove its interest in maintaining peace and 
retaining its independence with the means to 
do so. While it may seem to a Chinese obser-
ver that Europe and China at present form the 
two pillars of peace, this in no way means that 
one or other should allow its means of defence 
to be weakened but, on the contrary, that both 
must acquire the wherewithal to remain inde-
pendent of any hegemonic power. A compa-
rison between what is known about the Chinese 
people's desire for independence and, on the 
other hand, the hesitation among many Euro-
peans about the requirements of a credible 
defence policy make one wonder whether a 
political and military weakening is not more to 
be feared on the European side than on the 
Chinese side in future years. This seems to be 
the meaning of the message conveyed to Mr. 
Carstens, President of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, when he visited Beijing in October 
1982, particularly when Peng Zhen, member of 
the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist 
Party, apparently referred to the Soviet Union 
as a " hungry tiger ". 
108. It therefore seems quite clear that the 
Sino-Soviet rapprochement in 1982 did not 
herald any wish by the Chinese authorities to 
revert to the pre-1960 situation, at least as long 
as there is no great change in Soviet policy ; it 
was merely a sign of realism on the part of a 
government anxious to avoid pointless and 
dangerous clashes. It may of course be felt 
that China has less interest in detente in Europe 
and that it would not be sorry if the Soviet 
Union transferred some of its redoubtable 
military forces from Asia to its western 
frontiers. Probably the Chinese leaders well 
know that a war involving the two great 
powers, or even strong tension between them, 
would probably not spare China. Just as the 
Soviet Union is not likely to disturb the 
situation in the East without peace in the West, 
nor would it risk a serious confrontation in the 
West while China remained at full strength 
since it considers China to be a threat to its 
immense Asian territories, separated from 
China by a 7,400 km frontier, several areas of 
which are contested by China, not without 
sound reason. 
109. The Beijing Government therefore views 
with some concern the Soviet counter-proposals 
submitted on several occasions for opening 
negotiations with the Americans on medium-
range nuclear weapons. Indeed, while the zero 
option offered by President Reagan called for 
the destruction of SS-20 missiles deployed in 
Europe, the Soviet counter-proposals referred 
merely to their transfer further east, i.e. the 
transfer of a considerable nuclear force to the 
Sino-Soviet frontiers. Most probably the 
Chinese authorities strongly encouraged Mr. 
Shultz, United States Secretary of State, when 
he visited Beijing on 2nd February, to be very 
firm about maintaining the zero option as 
defined so far by President Reagan. Here too 
China's interests are close to those of Western 
Europe, which cannot believe that its security 
would be enhanced by the transfer of SS-20s to 
the East in view of the mobility of these 
missiles. 
B. Defence policy 
110. In the military field, a comparison 
between the Military Balance for 1982-83 and 
publications for earlier years shows that many 
plans to equip the Chinese army with material 
imported from western countries were not 
carried into effect and that, taking account of its 
large numbers, this army is under-equipped and 
mainly with Soviet equipment procured before 
1960 and consequently obsolete. This means 
that the Chinese army is not in a position to 
measure up to Soviet forces of which forty-
seven divisions, including six armoured divi-
sions, are deployed along the Sino-Soviet 
frontier. There is every indication that in 
conventional weapons China, far from catching 
up with the Soviet Union, has lagged still 
further behind in the past decade. This is 
probably not so for nuclear weapons, which are 
developed enough to give the Soviets second 
thoughts, but perhaps not truly deterrent in 
view of the superiority of the Soviet Union 
which has just reinforced its frontier with China 
by deploying some hundred SS-20s according to 
available sources. 
111. The Chinese with whom the General 
Affairs Committee spoke stressed that while 
Chinese defence, like that of the West, was 
based on deterrence, its means were not modem 
or nuclear weapons but the very size of China, 
the number of inhabitants and the duration of 
any hostilities in which Chinese territory would 
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be occupied by foreign forces. These are 
certainly meaningful deterrents and no power 
can rationally envisage occupying the whole of 
China. But this strategy is not enough to 
shield China from aggression, particularly in 
sparsely-populated Central Asia. The Chinese 
authorities are well aware of this and have 
plans for means of defence other than "revolu-
tionary warfare ". 
112. Results obtained in conventional wea-
pons are disappointing because of the cost of 
procurement abroad and the poor level of 
Chinese production. In recent months the 
Chinese Government seems to have hesitated in 
face of the cost of certain weapons to be 
procured from European countries. Some ob-
servers have wondered whether China was not 
considering buying small quantities of sophisti-
cated weapons which it would then reproduce 
in China itself, but at the same time they had 
doubts about the Chinese industry's ability to 
do this. Even if purchases increased signi-
ficantly in the next few years, there is little 
likelihood of the Chinese forces being ready to 
stand up to the Soviet army for a long time to 
come. 
113. It is in this context that the nuclear 
weapons China is developing should be consi-
dered. At the present juncture, they are not a 
total deterrent but designed to deter an aggres-
sor from using nuclear weapons against China 
or its forces. This means that unlike the 
Western European countries, for which nuclear 
weapons are the basis of deterrence, China is 
able to express its willingness not to be the first 
to use its nuclear weapons. But one may 
wonder whether this doctrine will not evolve in 
step with the development of the Chinese 
nuclear force. 
114. Most recent information available indi-
cates that the People's Republic of China does 
not yet have tactical nuclear weapons but is 
preparing to develop them. Conversely, it 
fired several intercontinental ballistic missiles in 
1982 and for the first time successfully laun-
ched a missile with· a nuclear capability from a 
submarine in October 1982. This means that 
China now has nuclear strength which must be 
reckoned with and this is probably one reason 
why the Soviet Union considered it worthwhile 
to re-establish normal relations with China. 
This may have advantages for both sides, but 
not in the same cases. For the Soviet Union, it 
may be a means of bringing pressure to bear on 
the West to welcome its proposals on the limi-
tation of nuclear weapons, while for China it is 
probably destined to delay the conclusion of the 
Geneva negotiations which might strengthen 
the twofold hegemony which it fears. 
115. The parallel between the position of 
China and of Europe obviously cannot be taken 
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further. Fully committed to its alliance with 
the United States, Western Europe has no claim 
to non-alignment, which is an aspect of Chinese 
policy, nor can China consider that the adhe-
sion of Europe to its positions on disarmament 
and non-alignment would help to promote a 
balance likely to ensure peace, any more than 
Europe can believe that its security would be 
strengthened by a change in China's economic 
and social policy. 
C. Asitul problems 
116. It is over truly Asian matters that dif-
ferences have emerged between Europe and 
China. Admittedly, the Sino-Japanese reconci-
liation, sealed by a treaty of alliance and 
friendship in 1978, the year of the normalisa-
tion of Sino-American relations, is now a most 
important factor of peace and stability. Japan 
has now become the People's Republic's num-
ber one supplier and trade partner and its 
number two customer, which is particularly 
reassuring for the maintenance of peace in the 
Far East. There is no longer any real dispute 
between the two countries, but their solidarity 
and mutual respect for each other's territory 
seem to be a major guarantee of joint security. 
117. In 1982, Japan bowed to Chinese wishes 
by agreeing to withdraw from circulation the 
history books which the Chinese Government 
accused of glossing over Japan's actions against 
China during the war. The Chinese too have 
shown their desire to reach lasting agreement 
with Japan in recent years. The development 
of the Japanese economy is proof of the Far 
East's ability to occupy a leading place in the 
progress of modem industry and technology. 
Insofar as Japan, whose investments in the 
defence field have been very limited, seems to 
have no wish to undermine China's claim to 
play a world role, its technological development 
makes it a privileged partner in both trade and 
industrial co-operation. Some western obser-
vers already consider there is a de facto 
community between China and Japan, but this 
is probably premature. Indeed, while China 
endorses the Japanese point of view on certain 
matters, particularly the boundaries of Soviet-
Japanese territories, when receiving the special 
envoy of the new Japanese Government, Yasu-
hiro Nakasone, in February 1983, it again 
spelled out its position : although China finds it 
natural for Japan to acquire the armaments it 
needs for its security it has no wish for them to 
exceed certain limits. 
118. The same is obviously not true of other 
territories which are still disputed with other 
powers. Admittedly, it is not the case of Hong 
Kong, part of whose territory was leased to the 
United Kingdom in 1898 for a period of 
ninety-nine years which is due to expire in 
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1997. This lease recognises China's sovereign 
right and hence does not involve questions of 
principle. But the island of Hong Kong itself 
was ceded to the United Kingdom on a perma-
nent basis by the 1842 Nanking Treaty. This 
was one of the unequal treaties whose validity 
the government in Beijing does not -recognise. 
The narrow limits of that part of Hong 
Kong's territory would not allow it to survive 
without the good will of the People's Republic 
of China, and the United Kingdom has said 
that it is prepared to negotiate the regime of the 
whole territory. The negotiations started in 
September 1982 between the United Kingdom 
and China in this connection should not there-
fore encounter insuperable difficulties, but little 
progress seems to have been made so far. 
119. It is clear that China, on the one hand, is 
anxious to maintain the extensive trade with 
the West which the statute of Hong Kong 
allows it (40% of China's trade with the outside 
world passes through Hong Kong) but, on the 
other hand, wishes at all costs to avoid putting 
a seal on the unequal treaties of the nineteenth 
century, which would undercut its claims to a 
large part of central and eastern Asia ceded to 
Russia. Moreover, an agreement between the 
United Kingdom and China granting special 
status acceptable to the 5.5 million inhabitants 
of the territory whose standard of living is far 
higher than that of the Chinese of the interior 
and whose industrial, commercial and banking 
activities are considerable, and protecting a 
broad range of economic interests for many 
countries might encourage the Taiwan authori-
ties also to seek similar status. The fact that, 
thanks to capital transiting through Hong Kong 
and the agreement on a special statute for the 
Shenzhen area by the government in Beijing, 
investments have been made on both the 
Chinese and the British sides of the frontier for 
periods extending far beyond 1997 indicates 
that both sides are determined to find an 
acceptable solution. The statute of Macao, 
recognised in 1976 after four centuries of 
Portuguese sovereignty as being "Chinese terri-
tory administered by the Portuguese ", shows 
that success is possible. 
120. The case of Taiwan is entirely different 
since the Chinese Nationalist Government 
which took refuge on the island in 1949 has 
never given up its claim to represent China as a 
whole, any more than the Beijing Government 
can give up its claims to the territory of 
Taiwan. The two governments at least agree 
not to accept the principle of a permanent 
division of China into two states. During 
periods of great tension between the People's 
Republic of China and the West, there were 
many incidents between the two governments 
claiming to represent China. Recognition of 
the right of the People's Republic to occupy 
China's permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council by most western countries, 
generally accompanied by a break between 
these countries and the Kuomintang Govern-
ment, largely contributed to making the 
situation clearer. Incidents have stopped and 
in recent years there has been a marked 
increase in trade between Taiwan and mainland 
China. At present, the Beijing Government 
says it is prepared to show the utmost flexibility 
in its relations with Taiwan, i.e. to agree to 
wide-ranging concessions to bring about the 
reunification of China, including meaningful 
guarantees for the interests of the government 
and population of Taiwan, even going so far, 
according to a message by Marshal Y eh 
Chienying to the " fellow-citizens of Taiwan " 
on 30th September 1981, as to make it a 
" special administrative region " in which its 
different economic and social regimes, adminis-
trative autonomy, police force and even its own 
army would be maintained. Finally, the idea 
of making the Taiwan head of state Vice-
President of the People's Republic of China was 
mentioned. 
121. In these circumstances, can the sale of 
modern weapons by the United States to the 
Taiwan Government in 1982 really be in the 
West's interest? First, China apparently 
thought the American decision was dictated by 
a concept directed against Chinese communist 
ideology and placing China on the same footing 
as the Soviet Union by supporting against it a 
regime whose principal merit was anti-commu-
nism. Viewed from the People's Republic it 
seems like a reversion to the theory of two 
Chinas which the United States renounced after 
recognising the People's Republic. Moreover, 
the military strengthening of that regime might 
well make it more uncompromising or even 
detract it from reaching agreement with the 
People's Republic of China, although this 
would be in the interests of all. In any event, 
this American policy has led to a deterioration 
in Sino-American relations which, since 1970, 
had developed favourably and is probably a 
reason for the tentative Sino-Soviet rapproche-
ment, but in any case it helps Chinese 
advocates of rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union. As underlined in Mr. Brezhnev's 
speech at Tashkent in March 1982, the Soviet 
Union rejected the theory of two Chinas but 
recognised the sovereignty of the People's 
Republic of China over the island of Taiwan. 
Your Rapporteur believes that Europe is 
entitled to exercise a positive influence on 
United States policy since, having elected to 
recognise the Beijing Government as being that 
of the whole of China, it should draw the 
consequences and encourage reunification by 
agreement between Beijing and Taiwan. 
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122. The growing strength of the People's 
Republic of Vietnam, its expansion in Laos and 
Cambodia and the threat it represents for other 
states of the Indo-Chinese peninsula, are also a 
source of serious concern for China, particu-
larly in view of Moscow's support for the 
Hanoi Government. Even before the reunifi-
cation of Vietnam in 1975, there were many 
conflicts between China and North Vietnam 
over disputed frontiers, ideological differences 
and the fate of the large Chinese population in 
Vietnam. These conflicts have never stopped 
and frontier incidents have increased : Beijing 
reported 1,100 in 1970. But when Vietnamese 
forces invaded Cambodia on 7th January 1979 
China reacted vigorously and a real war was 
waged between 17th February and 16th March 
along the frontiers between the two countries. 
According to certain sources, there were more 
than 100,000 victims, without the Chinese 
diversion preventing the occupation of Cambo-
dia. Since then, the Beijing Government has 
been supporting movements of resistance to the 
government set up by the Vietnamese in 
Phnom Penh and has offered asylum to the 
former leaders of Cambodia. It is urging its 
partners to demonstrate clearly their opposition 
to the continued presence of Vietnamese forces 
in Cambodia. 
123. European opinion certainly did not react 
very strongly to Vietnam's occupation of Cam-
bodia in view of the atrocities committed by the 
Khmer Rouge to impose a radical revolution at 
the cost of millions of victims. No tears were 
shed for the Pol Pot Government and in 1979 
the Vietnamese may have been seen as libera-
tors. The situation however has since changed 
radically because the Vietnamese army stayed 
in Cambodia and set up a government of its 
own leaning which resulted in the emergence of 
several movements which are by no means all 
followers of the Khmer Rouge. A further wave 
of emigrants left Cambodia, often in atrocious 
conditions, to escape the war and the repression 
of both the Vietnamese and the Phnom Penh 
Government. China for its part welcomed 
representatives of the various movements oppo-
sed to this foreign domination and endeavoured 
to reunify them round a coalition government 
in which the former Cambodian sovereign, 
Norodom Sihanouk, who could hardly be 
suspected of conniving with Pol Pot, played a 
leading role. 
124. Throughout the Cambodian affair, China 
took great care not to act without the agree-
ment of the other countries interested in peace 
in the Indo-Chinese peninsula, particularly 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaya and Indonesia, 
grouped in the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations. In autumn 1980, the various move-
ments opposed to the Phnom Penh Govern-
ment formed an anti-Vietnamese front in Kuala 
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Lumpur with the backing of these five coun-
tries, their aim being to " free Cambodia from 
the Vietnamese aggressors". Free elections 
under United Nations supervision were then to 
allow the Cambodians to choose their govern-
ment. Prince Norodom Sihanouk became Presi-
dent of that coalition and on 27th October 
1982 the United Nations General Assembly 
negatived the Vietnamese amendment refusing 
to recognise the credentials of the delegation of 
the opposition coalition. Most western coun-
tries were at the side of China and countries of 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
among the ninety countries which refused to 
recognise the government imposed by Viet-
nam. The others abstained. 
125. Now, the fact that Chinese assistance 
goes mainly to the Khmer Rouge group, which 
is totally discredited by the extortions of the Pol 
Pot Government, makes several western coun-
tries very cautious. Conversely, the fact that 
China preferred to be associated with other 
countries interested in protecting the Indo-
Chinese peninsula from Vietnamese domination 
by supporting a coalition, in which the Khmer 
Rouge is only one of the four components, is 
more reassuring. China has approved the 
coalition's declared objective: the re-establish-
ment of a neutral and non-aligned Cambodian 
state. In this respect, its position has drawn 
closer to that of the western powers, which 
could not accept the government set up in 
Phnom Penh by Vietnam as being representa-
tive but could not readily support the Pol Pot 
Government. Some of them regret that the 
Khmer Rouge element still seems to have some 
support in China, whereas they would prefer to 
place greater emphasis on the neutral and non-
aligned nature of the coalition, as President 
Mitterrand emphasised on behalf of France in 
Beijing on 3rd May. 
126. The third tension area in Asia is Afghan-
istan where, as soon as it was invaded by the 
Soviet Union in December 1979, the People's 
Republic of China adopted a far firmer attitude 
than the West towards the Soviet Union since it 
interrupted for two years a dialogue aimed at 
normalising relations between Moscow and 
Beijing. It is impossible to know to what 
extent China assists the Afghan resistance 
movements but efforts by the Soviet army to 
control the sole mountain road, inaccessible for 
half the year, which connects Afghanistan with 
China show that the Soviet Union is intent on 
isolating Afghanistan from China. The Peo-
ple's Republic of China for its part is believed 
to have made the evacuation of Afghanistan 
one of the three conditions laid down in 1982 
for the normalisation of its relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
127. On the other hand, it may be noted that 
Sino-Soviet frontier problems, both in Mongo-
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lia and in the Far East, and matters relating to 
the Sino-Indian frontiers were not raised by the 
Chinese on that occasion. In his 1978 report, 
Sir Frederic Bennett made a careful study of 
these problems and there is no sign of any great 
change since then. China has therefore set 
them on one side deliberately in recent years. 
This does not mean that it has given up its 
positions of principle in this respect but 
probably that it felt it was not desirable to bring 
them to the fore, knowing that it lacked 
leverage to advance its cause and had nothing 
to gain by provoking Soviet reactions on these 
matters. This attitude is very close to that 
adopted by the EEC countries with regard to 
both Afghanistan and Poland. 
D. The third world 
128. It is clear that the positions adopted by· 
the People's Republic of China, particularly 
with regard to Cambodia, helped to draw it 
closer to many third world countries, especially 
the ASEAN countries. The calming down of 
hostilities with India, its support for the 
Afghans and the liberalisation of its policy 
towards national minorities also helped, and the 
Chinese Government's determination to be 
included among the developing countries has 
revived solidarities which had declined during 
China's isolation. 
129. Finally, it should be added that Zhao 
Ziyang, Chinese Prime Minister, paid a long 
visit to Africa at the end of 1982. It would be 
interesting to know what China expects of the 
African continent and what kind of relations it 
intends to establish there, or re-establish after a 
few years during which its interest in that part 
of the world had been more discreet. Does it 
wish to demonstrate its solidarity with third 
world countries in order to strengthen the 
weight of its diplomacy ? In view of the trend 
of Chinese economic policy, this seems more 
probable than the search for economic or ideo-
logical influence in Africa. Attempts in this 
sense in earlier decades had only a limited 
impact and China hardly has the means needed 
to pursue a policy far from home whose 
economic effects could but be to arouse possible 
competition for it on western markets and 
whose results would in any event be limited. 
But solidarity with the third world may present 
certain advantages for Chinese diplomacy, for 
instance in the United Nations for an affair 
such as that of Cambodia. In any case, China 
certainly has a hand in important modernisa-
tion programmes in several African countries. 
130. In any event it is clear that China is not 
considering bringing third world countries into 
opposition with Western Europe and the Chi-
nese leaders whom the committee met, particu-
larly the Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, spoke of 
more active and more concerted co-operation 
between China and Western Europe for a world 
development policy. 
E. The bases of Chillll's external policy 
131. From these considerations, your Rappor-
teur believes a number of principles emerge 
which seem to guide the foreign policy of the 
People's Republic of China : 
132. (i) China fully realises that it does not 
have sufficient conventional or nuclear forces to 
ensure its security in face of the only power 
which constitutes a permanent threat, the 
Soviet Union. This has dictated its attitude of 
caution, avoiding useless clashes and seeking 
normalisation of its relations with the Soviet 
Union without thereby allowing its relations 
with the western countries to deteriorate, even 
with the United States which helps to exercise a 
deterrent role which is essential for the mainte-
nance of peace for the benefit of both China 
and Europe. 
133. (ii) While improving its armaments, parti-
cularly in the nuclear field, China is now giving 
priority to its economic development and even 
to increasing consumption rather than to its 
armaments policy, which means that its caution 
will continue for a long time and that it is fun-
damentally attached to peace. 
134. (iii) However, China is not at all prepared 
to allow the Soviet Union to impose its domi-
nation in Asia and is prepared to assist any 
Asian peoples wishing to defend their inde-
pendence, particularly in face of Soviet impe-
rialism. 
135. (iv) Considering itself as a country divided 
because of the rivalry between the two great 
powers, it upholds the principle of the right of 
peoples to re-establish national unity every-
where in the world, particularly in Korea, but 
also in Germany. 
136. (v) It defends with equal energy the right 
of peoples to self-determination, be they Cam-
bodians, Afghans or Poles. 
137. (vi) However, these aims are secondary 
compared with the main objective, i.e. the 
maintenance of international peace. China has 
principles, but it is not prepared to risk war for 
their early promotion. 
138. Generally speaking, these priorities and 
principles correspond to those defended by 
Western Europe. This is obviously one of the 
reasons why, together with Japan, Europe is 
now a particularly privileged partner for China 
since the measures taken by President Reagan's 
administration in connection with the Taiwan 
problem run counter to Chinese aims. They 
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seriously undermined Sino-American relations 
although, to the best of your Rapporteur's 
knowledge, not to the extent that improved 
Sino-Soviet relations allowed a true rapproche-
ment between those two countries. 
139. Western Europe must not waste the capi-
tal of good will revealed by the Chinese autho-
rities or restrict benefit to the advancement of 
trade relations, however desirable this may 
be. It is also and above all for political 
reasons, principally the maintenance of peace 
and the defence of the freedom of peoples and 
their rights, that Western Europe and China 
must be able to agree on a permanent basis in 
striving to promote the principles which draw 
them together for the furtherance of the inter-
national peace they both need so much. 
140. The Prime Minister., Zhao Ziyang, refer-
red to his country's co-operation with Western 
Europe in the following words when he spoke 
to the General Affairs Committee on 9th April 
1983: 
" There are many points of convergence 
between China's position and that of the 
WEU countries. The starting points 
may be different but our positions can 
coincide. I should like China and WEU 
to exchange views more often so as to 
take more effective action on internatio-
nal problems. There are no serious 
divergences between China and Western 
Europe. More frequent consultations 
would allow action to be better co-
ordinated. " 
141. These remarks must certainly be compa-
red with the talks between the Chinese leaders 
and Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for Exter-
nal Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the 
EEC Council, during his visit to Beijing in 
March 1983. Mr. Tindemans reported to his 
colleagues in Luxembourg on 26th April in the 
framework of ten-power political co-operation. 
There is every reason to hope that this offer 
will be followed up as it seems to meet the inte-
rests of both Europe and China. 
V. Conclusions 
142. At the close of this explanatory memo-
randum, your Rapporteur wishes to underline 
the very great convergence of the information 
and impressions obtained by the committee in 
China itself with indications received from 
non-Chinese sources before the visit. 
143. In conclusion, he wishes to recall some of 
the reasons which he considers militate in 
favour of pursuing a European policy which is 
more concerted and more alive than hitherto to 
the realities of the People's Republic of China. 
DOCUMENT 945 
144. (i) The first obviousl:y stems from the 
nature of the world balance, which Europe 
wishes to be neither dominated by a continental 
hegemony nor defined solely in te~s of p~e­
sent bipolarity, i.e. the state of Amencan-Soviet 
relations. The development of an independent 
power in Asia can but help to give weight. to 
Europe provided the latter manages to combme 
forces sufficiently to define a policy. 
145. (ii) For China, whose fundamental prob-
lem is the transformation of its economy, as 
well as for Europe, which fully realises that any 
war between the United States and the Soviet 
Union would devastate its territory, the aim of 
a rational policy can but be to strengthen 
peace. This means that srstematic c~ticism ~f 
China for the ideology It pursues IS not m 
Europe's interest; but it has every interest in 
helping China to find its way in the modem 
world, particularly since China seems to have 
given up ideological expansionism. 
146. (iii) From an economic standpoint, Europe 
must bear in mind the advantages of develop-
ing a potential market of more than a thou-
sand million persons. It did so in the second 
half of the nineteenth century but used ques-
tionable means whose effect was to share out 
but not really develop this market. Develop-
ment depends on the economic transformation 
of China. Even if China were to become a 
serious competitor for Western Europe in a 
number of years' time, the modernisation of its 
economy should lead to a consider~ble expan-
sion of international trade from which Europe 
could derive the utmost benefit if it managed to 
adapt itself to the specific conditions of ~he 
Chinese market. China is at present makmg 
proposals for co-operation which are well worth 
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close examination and it is to be hoped that 
they will be followed up. 
147. (iv) From a political standpoint, the search 
for reasonable and moderate solutions to inter-
national problems, particularly Asian proble~s, 
and recourse to bodies such as the Umted 
Nations for this purpose clearly seem to be in 
everyone's interest. Europe must respond 
favourably to China's proposals for regular 
mutual consultations. 
148. (v) In security and defence matters, the 
search for methods of disarmament which do 
not increase the threat to peace or the over-
whelming influence of the two great . powers 
seems to be in the interests of both Chma and 
Europe. 
149. (vi) In the cultural field, converging inte-
rests should lead to exchanges from which 
Europe too might benefit. It is undoubtedly in 
China's interest to import from Europe not 
only technology but also ways of thinking 
developed in recent centuries le~ding to . an 
understanding of natural, economic, techmcal 
and human factors thanks to the progress of 
modem sciences. But Europe cannot remain 
indifferent to the establishment of a Chinese 
way in the economic field because, if successful, 
it might well become a model for the develop-
ment of the third world. But, in order to see 
China as it really is, Europe must make the 
same effort as China has made in order to 
improve its understanding of the West. 
150. (vii) Finally, the reality of China can but 
remind Europe of the need for greater unity of 
means and efforts to face up to a contemporary 
world in which each individual European coun-
try is but a tiny entity. 
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Amendment 1 
China and European security 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Fourre 
1. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
6th June 1983 
" and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the eastern 
countries ". 
Signed: Fourre 
l. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
China and European security 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Vogt 
2. Leave out paragraph ( vz} of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
6th June 1983 
3. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows: 
" Appeal to the People's Republic of China to stop the tests of atomic weapons and delivery 
vehicles, especially in the Pacific, in order to comply with the deep concerns of the Pacific 
peoples about such activities of the atomic powers, thereby setting a good example in the 
interest of the survival of mankind ; ". 
Signed: Vogt 
1. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendments negatived). 
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Amendment 4 
China and European security 
AMENDMENT 4 t 
tabled by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourre 
4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
6th June 1983 
"and refrain from any position which might prevent the return of Taiwan to China;". 
Signed: Bassinet, Fourre 
I. See 2nd sitting, 7th June 1983 (amendment withdrawn). 
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The la.w of the sea. 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological a.nd Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Lenz.er, Rapporteur 
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18th May 1983 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Val/eix (Chairman); 
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Adriaensens, Amadei, Antoni, Barthe (Alternate : Lagorce), 
Fiandrotti, Forma, Fortier (Alternate : Bassinet), Fourre, 
Garrett (Alternate: Lord Northfield), Sir Paul Hawkins, 
MM. McGuire, Manning, Prussen, Spies von Biil/esheim, 
Mrs. Stae/s-Dompas, MM. Topmann, Worrell (Alternate: 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
011 till kw of till Sill 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 377 on implications of the law of the sea 
conference that the aim pursued by the governments of member states was to reach a universally-
accepted international convention on the law of the sea, which would constitute an important factor 
in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states, especially between western industria-
lised countries and developing countries in the third world; 
(ii) In agreement with the Council's opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-
seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for industrialised 
Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials; 
(iii) Conscious of the third world's claims to a share of deep-sea mineral resources ; 
(iv) Aware of the shortcomings of the proposed seabed mining regime but regretting the policy split 
among the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO on whether the conven-
tion should be signed; 
(v) Considering that this split may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world; 
(vi) Aware of the danger of losing what has been gained in some fourteen years of negotiations and 
the benefits to be derived from the convention for the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of 
the signatory countries, including those of the Soviet bloc, may derive far-reaching advantages with 
the backing of international law, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Examine the strategic and tactical disadvantages of the present situation and seek to eliminate 
the differences in the policies of member countries towards the draft law of the sea convention ; 
2. Request the Governments of France and the Netherlands to devote their efforts in the 
preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining 
regime in an equitable manner with less state control and protectionism than proposed by the Soviet 
bloc and many third world countries ; 
3. Request the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom to adopt policies with a view to making full use of Europe's political and 
industrial influence in the preparatory commission to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions 
to problems relating to the seabed mining regime; 
4. Pursue its efforts to convince the United States Government of the negative consequences of its 
policy and of the advantages of a duly-signed unambiguous convention on the law of the sea and, 
consequently, the rule of law of the world oceans, as opposed to a mere customary law situation 
which cannot be enforced. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
I. In Recommendation 3 77, adopted by the 
Assembly on 3rd December I98I, on the impli-
cations of the law of the sea conference and 
attached to its first report, your committee had 
indicated that the results achieved, especially in 
seabed mining arrangements, leant strongly 
towards dirigism and protectionism. Neverthe-
less, member countries of WEU were of the 
opinion that a new international convention 
might establish the rule of law on the world 
oceans which might in the future forestall many 
difficulties and would constitute a factor in 
maintaining peaceful and friendly relations 
between states. They were also aware of the 
importance of such a convention between 
western industrialised countries and developing 
countries of the third world. 
2. The Council, in its reply of 20th April 
I982, stated further as its opinion that a satis-
factory international regulation of deep-seabed 
mining was strategically and economically of 
great importance, especially for the indus-
trialised Western European countries which 
were highly dependent on imports of raw mate-
rials to be extracted from the deep seabed. 
WEU member governments were therefore pre-
pared to take part in a constructive manner in 
the forthcoming consultations and negotiations 
to arrive at a system which would take into 
account the interests of all concerned. 
3. On 30th April 1982, the last day of the 
third United Nations conference on the law 
of the sea, the United States Ambassador, 
Mr. Malone, called for a vote by the delegates 
of the participating countries on the draft 
convention, all efforts to reach a consensus on 
the convention having been exhausted. The 
convention was approved by 130 votes to 4, 
with I7 abstentions. Israel, Turkey, the Uni-
ted States and Venezuela voted against. The 
Soviet Union and countries of the communist 
bloc, and Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom abstained. France and Japan voted 
in favour of the convention. Turkey and 
Venezuela voted against as they objected to 
provisions on the delimitation of marine and 
submarine areas between states with opposite or 
adjacent coasts. Israel objected because the 
text gave recognition to the PLO. Albania and 
Ecuador did not participate in the voting. 
4. The Soviet Union and the eastern bloc 
countries abstained on 1Oth April 1982 because 
they did not agree to pioneer investors (Amer-
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icans and Western Europeans) having an advan-
tage and thought the establishment of an 
equitable economic order, taking into account 
the interests of all countries, was not assured. 
5. The full conference then met twice more 
in 1982: in New York from 22nd to 24th Sep-
tember to act on the recommendations of the 
drafting committee and for the last time in 
Kingston, Jamaica, from 6th to I Oth December 
for government representatives to sign the draft 
convention. 
6. After the convention is signed, its ratifi-
cation by sixty states will bring it into force 
twelve months after ratification by the sixtieth 
state. 
7. On I Oth December I982 in Kingston, the 
United States and several WEU member coun-
tries did not sign the convention mainly 
because it contained a deep-seabed mining 
regime which they could not support. They 
agreed that the convention on the law of the sea 
contained many positive provisions consistent 
with their interests and in the interests of all 
those who are maritime powers and use the 
seas. 
(a) United States policy 
8. The United States Government gave the 
following reasons for not supporting the deep-
seabed mining regime as set out in the 
convention : 
(z) It would deter development of deep-
sea mineral resources as it would 
limit the availability of minerals 
for global consumption; in addition, 
there would be a limit on the num-
ber of mining operations that could 
be conducted by any one country. 
(iz) The draft convention would create a 
system of privileges operating against 
private mining companies; the supra-
national enterprise which would be 
the seabed mining agency to be 
established by the convention could 
gain a monopoly. 
(iiz) The decision-making machinery of 
the seabed authority would not effec-
tively protect the political and eco-
nomic interests and reflect the finan-
cial contributions of participating 
states; for example, the convention 
would make American access to 
seabed resources dependent on the 
voting power of competitors and on 
those countries that do not wish to 
see the resources exploited. 
(iv) Amendments to the convention 
could come into force through a 
review process that would not require 
the approval of all participating 
states and therefore of the advice and 
consent of the United States Senate. 
(v) In addition to practical problems 
raised by the provisions setting up 
official production limits and a man-
datory transfer of proprietary techno-
logy to competitors of United States 
companies, these provisions would 
also create undesirable precedents for 
future international negotiations. 
9. On 9th December 1982 the United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Jean 
Kirkpatrick, declared that the seabed regime 
would set up a big bureaucracy that would have 
the authority to determine which countries 
could and which could not have free access to 
deep-sea minerals. There was an enormous 
gap between bearing the cost of deep-seabed 
mining and nations making decisions. She 
emphasised that the United States would carry 
out its own seabed mining subject to a reason-
able regard for the interests of other states and 
would not be affected by the law of the sea 
agreement. 
10. United States companies and companies 
of other countries would be able to mine under 
an alternative regime for which initial steps 
have already been taken, as mentioned in your 
Rapporteur's first report. They call for volun-
tary procedures to resolve conflicts over seabed 
mining. 
11. It was indicated by the United States that 
initially this interim agreement would concern 
only countries that already have an interest in 
mining and a near-term capability. 
12. The interim arrangement would accept 
private initiative and private investment and 
take account of the fact that private companies 
simply would not risk their capital on a new 
venture unless they knew they would be able to 
profit if the venture ultimately succeeded. 
13. During the law of the sea conference 
negotiations too many developing countries lost 
sight, according to the United States Delega-
tion, of the practical economic realities that 
govern any new industry. These negotiations 
failed to produce seabed mining provisions 
compatible with this basic principle 
14. As a consequence of the United States 
position, the government announced on 30th 
December 1982 its determination to withhold 
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funds from the United Nations because of the 
General Assembly's decision to fund the law of 
the sea preparatory commission from the gen-
eral United Nations budget. The resolution 
was voted on 3rd December 1982 and was 
opposed by the United States Government 
which would therefore not pay its share of 
some $500,000 to $700,000. The preparatory 
commission which was to develop rules and 
regulations for the seabed mining regime should, 
according to United States delegates, be paid 
for by those countries which had accepted the 
law of the sea convention. 
15. On lOth March 1983 President Reagan 
proclaimed officially an exclusive economic 
zone extending 200 nautical miles from the 
coast of the United States. He confirmed that 
the United States would not sign the United 
Nations law of the sea convention although it 
contained provisions with respect to traditional 
uses of the oceans confirming existing maritime 
law and practices and fairly balancing the 
interests of all states. He announced three 
decisions, first that the United States was 
prepared to act and accept the traditional uses 
of the oceans such as navigation and overflight 
on a reciprocal basis. Second, that the United 
States would exercise and assert its navigation 
and overflight rights and freedoms on a world-
wide basis but would not accept unilateral acts 
of other states designed to restrict the rights and 
freedoms of the international community in 
navigation and overflight and other related 
high-sea uses. Third, he proclaimed an exclu-
sive economic zone in which the United States 
would exercise sovereign rights over living and 
non-living resources within 200 nautical miles 
of its coast. There would thus be United 
States jurisdiction over mineral resources out to 
200 nautical miles not necessarily on the conti-
nental shelf. Recently-discovered deposits in 
those areas could be an important future source 
of strategic minerals. 
16. The President did not claim a right of 
jurisdiction over marine scientific research 
within such a zone. 
17. The proclamation included, in particular, 
new rights over all minerals in the exclusive 
economic zone which are not on the continen-
tal shelf but are within the 200 nautical miles. 
Deposits of cobalt, manganese and other mine-
rals in these areas have been discovered 
recently and, although many years away from 
being commercially recoverable, could become 
a major future source of strategic and other 
minerals important to the United States eco-
nomy and security. The President's statement 
made clear that the proclamation did not 
change existing policies with respect to the 
outer continental shelf and fisheries within the 
United States zone. 
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18. The Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, Mr. James Malone, declared 
that the exclusive economic zone was an 
important component in a new United States 
oceans policy. He declared the concept of the 
economic zone as lawful under customary inter-
national law. This was recognised by the 
International Court of Justice and the American 
Law Institute. He thought that international 
consensus supported the proclamation. The 
exclusive international zone was a lawful claim 
of sovereign rights and jurisdiction under 
customary international law and brought within 
United States jurisdiction and control those 
natural resources which were rightfully theirs 
while simultaneously preserving to the maxi-
mum extent the traditional high-seas freedoms 
of navigation and overflight. 
19. The proclamation was also valid for the 
commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the northern 
Mariana Islands and United States overseas 
territories and possessions. The total area was 
estimated to exceed two million square nautical 
miles. 
(b) Policies of WEU member countries 
20. Belgium has not so far signed the conven-
tion although it well realises that the European 
Community can sign it only when six countries 
of the Community have signed. Belgium's 
signature would therefore involve the European 
Community in the work of the preparatory 
commission. On 21st December 1982 the 
Belgian Foreign Minister declared in the Cham-
ber of Representatives in Brussels that, on 1Oth 
December 1982, Belgium had signed the final 
act of the law of the sea conference but not the 
convention. This was mainly because of the 
articles on deep-seabed mining. Belgium has 
developed a world reputation for the transfor-
mation of non-ferrous metals and the refining 
of special metals. It was therefore directly 
concerned with the future consequences of the 
approval of the convention and the related 
deep-sea mining. Further consultation was 
therefore needed with the Belgian industries 
concerned, the European Economic Commun-
ity and its member countries. Time was still 
available as the preparatory commission was 
not to meet before the middle of March 1983. 
21. The French Government has signed both 
the final act and the convention since the 
convention has satisfied French expectations in 
many fields, such as the regime for territorial 
waters, the economic zone, the continental 
shelf, the right of transit in straits and through 
archipelagoes. The articles on pollution were 
also satisfactory. The preparatory commission 
should correct some anomalies, however, on 
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deep-sea mmmg. France will have a seat on 
the preparatory commission along with other 
states which have signed the convention. It is 
to start its work two or three months after fifty 
signatures have been obtained. 
22. The Federal Republic of Germany has 
not signed the convention and is to take a 
decision before the preparatory commission 
convenes. Of great importance, of course, will 
be the position of the member countries of the 
EEC and NATO. In order to take a weighted 
decision, the following considerations are 
important: 
(a) participation in the preparatory com-
mission; 
(b) improvement of the deep-seabed 
mining regime; 
(c) participation in an alternative regime 
proposed by the United States for 
deep-seabed mining; 
(d) signature of the law of the sea 
convention by the EEC and the need 
for a common approach by the EEC 
member countries; 
(e) maintaining law and order through 
the general law of the sea convention, 
the delimitation of territorial seas, 
economic zones, freedom of naviga-
tion, scientific research and sea pollu-
tion; 
(j) keeping open the option for estab-
lishing the sea tribunal in Hamburg; 
(g) balancing North-South interests; 
(h) applying the law over seas and 
oceans; 
(z) keeping open the possibility of rati-
fying the convention. 
23. The Italian Government has followed the 
same line of reasoning as Belgium and might 
decide to sign the convention later. Luxem-
bourg has likewise not yet signed. 
24. The Netherlands Government has signed 
the convention mainly because of its involve-
ment in improving North-South relations and 
the importance of the convention in allowing 
the have-not states to share in the proceeds of 
the world's last great untapped reserves. 
25. The United Kingdom Government is not 
planning to sign before it has obtained satisfac-
tory improvements in the deep-sea mining 
regime. Here it is inclined to follow the same 
attitude as the United States Government, but a 
definite decision has not _yet been taken. 
(c) The position of other states 
26. Half of the NATO countries - Canada, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, the Nether-
lands, Norway and Portugal - have signed the 
convention. Half of the EEC countries 
- Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and the 
Netherlands - have also signed the convention. 
27. All the Warsaw Pact countries have 
signed the convention, mainly out of solidarity 
with the third world but also because of the 
rules on freedom of navigation and of transit in 
straits. Moreover, they hope, through the 
international seabed authority, to keep in touch 
with deep-seabed mining technology. 
28. Of the 141 countries present at the 
signing ceremony at Kingston, Jamaica, on I Oth 
December 1982, 117 have signed the conven-
tion, 23 states have signed only the final act 
and 27 states were not represented. The large 
number of signatures was unexpected as some 
important western industrialised states had 
adopted a negative attitudt:. 
29. A large majority of the so-called group of 
77 (in fact 120 countries) has signed the 
convention and those who did not sign had 
particular reasons, such as Argentina with the 
problem of the Falkland Islands, Libya because 
of the refusal to consider the Gulf of Sirte as an 
inland sea, Venezuela because of delimitation 
problems with Columbia, Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia because of the entrance of the Gulf of 
Aqaba and Zaire because of insufficient protec-
tion for land-based producers of important 
metals such as manganese, etc. 
30. Arab states such as Lebanon, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar and Syria have adopted a wait-
and-see attitude. Several Latin American 
countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Peru and El Salvador wanted time for reflec-
tion and insofar as they are coastal countries, 
they will probably have to change their laws 
governing the coastal economic zones. Several, 
like Brazil, insisted on their prior consent in 
case of naval exercises by foreign navies and 
have special legislation on the construction of 
artificial islands in that zone. Several, like 
Peru, have declared the economic zone a terri-
torial zone which does not, of course, concord 
with the convention. 
31. All Western European countries outside 
the Communities have signed the convention 
with the exception of Spain which is not in 
agreement with the rules on passage through 
the Straits of Gibraltar which it considers too 
liberal; for the same reason Morocco did not 
sign. Switzerland did not want to sign before 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
States and several other industrialised countries 
had signed; Turkey did not sign because of the 
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delimitation rules of the marine coastal areas. 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well 
as Japan have signed. 
32. Although the Soviet Union and the other 
communist countries abstained on 30th April 
1982, they nevertheless signed on lOth Decem-
ber. They still declared then that they were 
not in agreement with the articles on advan-
tages for pioneer deep-sea mining investments 
but they wished to adopt the same attitude as 
the underdeveloped countries. 
33. The Chairman of the conference, the 
Singapore Ambassador, Mr. Koh, invited the 
preparatory commission on deep-sea mining 
arrangements which is to meet in Jamaica in 
March to be practical and objective and show 
an " operational " spirit, which were essential 
conditions for the accession of present non-
signatories and without which fourteen years' 
work would have served no purpose'. 
34. He paid tribute to the success, unprece-
dented in the annals of the United Nations, of 
117 countries representing all parts of the world 
having signed such an important treaty. 
35. Drawing conclusions from the 121 
speeches made, he picked out the following 
four themes: 
- the provisions of the convention were 
an indissociable whole involving both 
rights and corresponding obligations; 
- the convention introduced a new law 
which was not merely a codification of 
existing customary law. Among the 
new provisions based on the conven-
tion, he quoted the right of free transit 
through international straits and move-
ment in archipelagic channels and the 
new definition of the continental shelf; 
- the traditional concept of freedom of 
the high seas was no longer a legal juri-
dical basis for authorising exploitation 
of the resources of the ocean floor 
outside the convention. In the opi-
nion of many countries, mankind's 
common heritage had become part of 
customary law on the same basis as 
freedom of navigation; 
- finally, he noted that a unanimous 
appeal had been made to the United 
States to change its position so that its 
attitude would correspond more closely 
to its history, its special interests in the 
law of the sea and the key role it had 
played in the conference by negotiating 
1. Period covering the work of the Seabed Committee set 
up at the end of 1967 and transformed into a standing 
committee by the United Nations General Assembly at the 
end of 1968. 
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the many compromises which had 
allowed the convention to see the light 
of day. 
36. There is, of course, uncertainty as to 
whether those who have signed will also ratify; 
for several, such as France and the Netherlands, 
this will depend on improvements in the deep-
sea mining regime. 
11. Some basic provisions of the convention 
37. In his report on the implications of the 
law of the sea conference of 29th October 
19821, your Rapporteur underlined some of the 
security aspects of the law of the sea con-
vention. The acid test is to what extent it 
would be an instrument to avoid conflicts, and 
could bring law and order to the world's seas 
and oceans. It should guarantee freedom of 
navigation and, in particular, the right of transit 
in straits; freedom to lay submarine cables and 
pipelines should be preserved. 
38. The right of innocent passage through 
territorial seas is recognised in Article 17 and 
in Article 38 the right of transit through straits 
used for international navigation. The passage 
of warships through territorial seas was a 
controversial subject and after long discussions 
the innocent passage of such ships was agreed 
to and no specific provisions on prior authori-
sation or notification were laid down. 
39. Article 39 of the convention allowed 
ships and aircraft of all countries transit passage 
through straits. Vessels of all states enjoy 
similar rights of innocent passage through 
archipelagic waters (Article 49). The sea lanes 
are to be designated by the archipelagic state 
with sovereignty over these waters. 
40. Freedom of -the high seas, including the 
various traditional freedoms, is reaffirmed for 
all states. Article 87 governs freedom of navi-
gation, overflight, laying submarine cables and 
pipelines, fishing and scientific research. 
41. A uniform 12-mile territorial sea limit 
has been established where the coastal states 
have sovereignty over the seabed, the waters 
and the air space above the territorial sea. A 
contiguous zone of 24 miles from the coast 
allows the coastal state to apply its customs, 
fiscal, emigration and sanitary regulations. 
42. From the 134 coastal states, 76 have 
accepted the 12-mile limit, 26 more than 
12 miles and, of these, 14 up to 200 miles. 
Only 32 states, including the Federal Republic 
I. Document 890. 
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of Germany, have kept the 3-mile sea limit and 
in some cases this has been 4 or 6 miles'. 
43. Some 20 coastal states declared that they 
wanted prior notification of the passage of 
warships. Whether this can be enforced after 
signature will eventually be a question to be 
put before the international sea tribunal. 
44. Transit passage is assured through 100 
important straits. However, certain important 
straits, such as the Baltic Sea and its entrances, 
the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, will remain 
governed by existing treaties, such as the 
Copenhagen and Montreux conventions. With 
regard to the Strait of Malacca, the declaration 
made by the neighbouring countries - Malay-
sia, Indonesia and Singapore - and by the user 
countries- Australia, France, Germany, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States -
remains in force. 
45. The convention recognises seven archi-
pelagoes, mainly in the Pacific, which by 
drawing limits round certain outer islands can 
declare the seas within these limits inland seas; 
their sovereignty over these inland seas is, 
however, restricted as they must allow peaceful 
transit passage and other high-sea rights. 
46. In the exclusive economic zone, the 
coastal state - while enjoying sovereign rights 
for the exploration, exploitation and manage-
ment of all living and non-living resources, the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures - has jurisdiction 
but may not influence the freedom of navig-
ation and overflight and freedom to lay sub-
marine cables and pipelines. The same applies 
to the continental shelf in the high seas where, 
in exercising its right on the continental shelf, 
the coastal state must not influence the freedom 
of other states. In certain cases, the conti-
nental shelf may extend as far as 350 miles 
from the coast if certain conditions set out in 
the convention are met. 
47. The exclusive economic zones with res-
tricted sovereign rights for the coastal states 
are of the greatest importance as in these zones 
can be found 95% of all oil and gas resources, 
85 % of all fish and possibly many other future 
renewable energy resources. The majority of 
artificial islands and constructions are to be 
found in these zones which are also the most 
important areas for the protection of the 
environment. Exclusive economic zones repre-
sent about 40 % of the surface of the world's 
seas. 
48. The convention regulations with regard 
to exclusive economic zones are of great 
importance for western industrialised states as 
well as for fast-developing countries like Brazil, 
I. See Appendix I. 
Argentina and India. Eighty states have al-
ready indicated their wish to make declarations 
on exclusive economic zones. 
49. For the Federal Republic of Germany, 
although preferring the old rules, this meant 
that it had to declare its own fishery zones in 
the Baltic Sea, in June 1978, and in the North 
Sea in January 1977 together with the EEC 
member countries. 
50. The treaty provides for procedures for 
settling disputes through conciliation, the law of 
the sea tribunal and arbitration. In addition, 
countries may always turn to the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague. Such proce-
dures for the settlement of disputes are of consi-
derable importance but they do not preclude 
the risk of political conflict or confrontation 
since the convention offers no effective means 
of resolving disputes between states. Most 
probably there will be many conflicts regarding 
sovereignty over numerous rocks and islands, 
the possession of which grants great power over 
vast expanses of sea and the attendant natural 
resources. The delimitation of territorial seas, 
exclusive economic zones and the continental 
shelf of neighbouring states might lead to many 
difficulties with controversies over fishing, 
transfrontier gas and oil deposits, environ-
mental pollution and freedom of movement on 
the seas and in the air. Your Rapporteur 
might refer here to the report by Mr. Bassinet1 
on the maritime frontier between Norway and 
the USSR. 
51. The convention favours coastal states but 
not other countries which are at a geographical 
disadavantage with only a small coastline or 
which are landlocked. The latter have a right 
to fish - only when surpluses exist - in 
neighbouring economic zones and the encour-
agement offered to them to take part in the 
exploitation of marine deposits is small conso-
lation. These arrangements might also give 
rise to many conflicts. 
52. A further cause of conflict is the recogni-
tion of exclusive economic zones, which in fact 
means that international waters are severely 
reduced. According to Article 140, activities 
in the area, defined in 1970 as "the common 
heritage of mankind ", are to be organised and 
carried out by the international seabed author-
ity for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In 
fact, the only raw materials now economically 
accessible in the area are manganese nodules. 
53. There is also a source of dispute between 
countries which have signed the convention and 
countries such as the United States, probably 
the largest future consumer of manganese 
nodules, which do not wish to sign the 
l. Document 930. 
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convention. Moreover, there is a provision 
that all seabed activities must be carried out by 
the seabed authority and its organs, or by 
private and state entities in association with the 
authority. 
Ill. Deep-sea mining aspects 
54. In the first part of his report' your 
Rapporteur discussed several aspects of deep-
sea mining problems. Here he wishes to 
mention the interesting points raised by 
Admiral Labrousse before the committee on 
15th February 1983. He stated: 
" Where seabed technology is concerned, 
the United States is of course in the lead 
either through private American groups 
or through multinational groups set up 
with European countries, Japan and 
Canada2• At the United States Senate I 
attended a hearing on this subject which 
brought together most of the large private 
American firms with international seabed 
programmes. The heads of the firms 
questioned by Senate committees answered 
that they had the technology and had spent 
$1 ,000 million on research. It was private 
money and the Amem.:an state had not 
invested one dollar. The technology was 
theirs, it was their trade secret, it was their 
future. They would make it available to 
the United States if necessary but there 
could be no question of transferring this 
technology in any form whatsoever to an 
international organisation or a foreign coun-
try. If the United States Government for-
ced them to do so, they would attack it in 
the United States Supreme Court. 
In the convention, it is first stipulated 
that the international authority's enterprise 
must be made viable. It must be capable 
of exploiting certain seabeds itself under its 
own authority. If the United States wishes 
to have permission to exploit the internatio-
nal seabed it must contact the international 
authority and, at the same time as the 
permission is requested, afford the authority 
rights of equivalent value which it will keep 
in reserve. This will be its capital. But 
the permission placed in reserve must be 
exploited. And how can this be done 
without the necessary technology? Provi-
sion had been made for a system of 
technological transfers by industrialised 
states to the enterprise since the poorer, 
underdeveloped countries will in fact never 
work the international seabed. They will 
I. Document 890, paragraphs 29-33. 
2. See Appendix 11. 
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exploit only their own wealth, the wealth in 
the 200 nautical miles of economic zone. 
On the continental shelf there are no 
nodules; these are found at depths of 
about 4,000 or 5,000 metres or more. 
There is a kind of barrier at a depth 
of about 3,000 metres between oil and 
nodules. 
A nodule field must allow four million 
tons to be extracted each year. To work a 
licence represents an investment of 
$10,000 million. These are current esti-
mates provided all the technology is avail-
able. It is certain that if the United States, 
the industrialised countries or multinational 
firms do not come to the assistance of the 
authority it will never work. 
The United States and certain other 
industrialised countries have not signed 
[the convention], not because they are 
against the very idea of the 'common 
heritage of mankind' and of the interna-
tional seabed authority but because it will 
never be possible for the theoretical and 
utopian system provided for in the 
convention to work. This is the main 
criticism which most industrialised coun-
tries which have not signed have to make 
of the draft convention. 
The. Russians have signed. I asked them 
why. Their answer was surprising. They 
said : 'But why not sign since the system 
will not work?' That was Soviet reason-
ing. We industrialised countries do not 
see things in at all the same way. 
A preparatory comrrusston has been set 
up to implement this enormous project. 
In my view, it has at least ten years' 
work before it. Only in ten years' time 
will we have a more or less accurate idea 
of the future of this world government of 
the seabed. 
Of course, the group of 77 conststmg of 
most of the third world countries and at 
present supplying the industrialised coun-
tries with most of their mineral resources 
is not in favour of the exploitation of the 
international seabed since this would 
compete seriously with their own resources. 
Countries of this group are afraid they 
will have no control over these resources 
and that the industrialised countries, with 
their technology, money and manpower, 
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may be the first to exploit them and the first 
to gather the fantastic wealth from the 
seabed. The gap between the developing 
countries and the industrialised countries 
would grow even wider and impossible to 
bridge. 
One of the main arguments of the United 
States Delegation during the ten years of 
the law of the sea conference was that the 
wealth exists. It is fabulous. No one 
has the right to prevent mankind from 
enjoying it. Progress demands that it be 
exploited. The conference does not have 
the right to leave such wealth untapped. 
It is possible for a multinational firm 
with the ships, technology and scientific 
means of investigation to act on behalf of 
the enterprise and extract nodules for 
payment. This is one solution - and 
probably the only one. " 
IV. Defence aspects 
55. In preparation for the report, the com-
mittee invited Admiral Labrousse to brief the 
committee on the defence aspects of the law of 
the sea conference. He pointed out that all the 
economic zones in the world, including North 
and South America, Asia and Africa, covered 
an area of 1 00 million square kilometres of 
which 25 million square kilometres belonged to 
Western Europe. Western European countries 
therefore had sovereign rights over one-quarter 
of the world economic zones. 
56. With existing modern technology, coastal 
countries are able to install detection and control 
instruments in their territorial waters which give 
far greater security than was possible under the old 
3-mile system. The 1958 convention was unable 
to fix the limits of the territorial seas but now the 
12-mile limit and contiguous zone of another 
12-miles have been fixed. 
57. Peaceful passage in the territorial sea is 
more precisely defined than in the 1958 
convention. Peaceful passage excludes threat or 
use of force with regard to the coastal state. 
No exercises or manoeuvres with the use of 
weapons are allowed, or information gathering, 
propaganda broadcasts, the embarkation of 
military engines or commercial embarkations. 
Peaceful passage also means the possibility of 
being able to stop and act in cases of navi-
gational incidents. Submarines have to show 
the flag and therefore pass on the surface. 
58. For Western European countries which 
are used to peaceful passage in their territorial 
waters there are therefore no great changes. 
For the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc 
countries which so far have refused the peaceful 
passage of warships in their territorial waters, it 
will mean changing their respective laws. 
59. All coastal states can, however, adopt 
laws and regulations with regard to safety of 
navigation, the protection of navigational aids 
and of cables and pipelines. However, the coastal 
state must give due publicity to all such laws and 
regulations. It has the right to require merchant 
ships to comply but has no power with regard to 
warships which it can only ask to leave the 
territorial waters. For archipelagoes, the right of 
innocent passage is established; the state can 
designate sea lanes and air routes for the 
continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships 
and aircraft and submarines can pass through such 
lanes submerged. Islands belonging to continental 
states cannot benefit from the regime accorded to 
archipelagoes. 
60. The exclusive economic zone gives the 
coastal state sovereign rights but not sovereignty 
over the whole of the economic zone. Free-
dom of navigation for ships and aircraft is 
therefore guaranteed, submarines can pass sub-
merged and all ships have the possibility of 
laying submarine cables and pipelines. The 
exclusive economic zone has therefore the same 
regime as the high seas with the exception of 
reserved rights for coastal states; the coastal 
state has sovereign rights over natural resources, 
living and non-living, jurisdiction over artificial 
islands and installations and can control marine 
scientific research and the marine environment. 
In principle, therefore, the exclusive economic 
zone has no direct influence on the navigation 
of warships. On the other hand, warships of 
coastal states are able to control more effect-
ively the maritime approaches. With regard to 
scientitic vessels which may have suspect inten-
tions, the control can be more stringent. 
61. With regard to the continental shelf which is 
limited to 350 miles from the coastal state, the 
regime is the same as for the economic zone. 
62. Rules for transit through straits were of 
course the main concern of the maritime powers 
when the law of the sea conference opened. 
63. Extenstion of territorial waters to 12 sea 
miles in fact led to the closure of almost 140 
straits. 
64. Rules for innocent passage through conti-
guous territorial waters of coastal states would 
have led to considerable inconvenience for private 
ships and aircraft and particularly for naval forces 
65. Submarines would have had to navigate 
on the surface and aircraft request authorisation 
to overfly the straits. Another solution thus 
had to be found. 
66. The convention therefore provided that 
in straits used for navigation between two parts 
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of the high seas or of the exclusive and consti-
tuted economic zones of the territorial waters of 
coastal states ships and aircraft would benefit 
from the " right of unimpeded transit ·: This 
right means: 
- freedom of navigation and overflight 
for the sole purpose of continuous and 
expeditious transit in accordance with 
their normal means of navigation, thus 
allowing submarines to remain sub-
merged; 
- the right for aircraft to overfly straits. 
67. Ships and aircraft must refrain from the 
threat or use of force against coastal states, 
abstain from any activity other than passage 
and respect international safety regulations relating 
to maritime and air navigation. 
68. Ships must respect international regula-
tions designed to avert, reduce and control 
pollution. To this end, coastal states may 
designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes 
which ships must respect. Ships may conduct 
survey work only with the authorisation of the 
coastal states. 
69. But rules for transit passage do not apply 
in the case of: 
- straits which are formed by the main-
land territory of a state and an island 
belonging to that state if there exists, 
off that island, a route through the high 
seas or through an economic zone of 
similar convenience (e.g. Straits of 
Messina); 
- straits used for navigation between the 
high seas or economic zone and a 
state's territorial waters (e.g. Strait of 
Tiran). 
In both these cases rules for innocent passage 
will apply. 
- finally, straits governed by longstanding 
international conventions which are still 
in force continue to be governed by these 
conventions (Turkish and Baltic straits). 
70. In fact, there are now five possible cases: 
- straits governed by a special conven-
tion; 
- straits where there is a route through 
the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone (freedom of the high seas); 
- straits consisting of territorial waters used 
for navigation between two parts of the 
high seas or economic zones (unimpeded 
transit); 
- the same, but constituted by an island 
and a mainland territory belonging to 
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the same state if it is possible to use a 
high sea route off the island of similar 
convenience (innocent passage); 
- straits formed of territorial waters and 
used for navigation between the high 
seas or an exclusive economic zone and 
a territorial sea (innocent passage). 
V. Conclusions 
71. The classic principles of the law of the 
sea were laid down in 1609 by Hugo Grotius 
who founded the doctrine of freedom of the 
seas. This doctrine was first challenged in 1945 
by the then American President, Mr. Harry 
Truman, who proclaimed United States jurisdic-
tion over the seabed resources of its continental 
shelf. Three years later Chile, Peru and Ecuador 
proclaimed a 200-mile maritime zone and started 
a fishing war with the United States, seizing its 
tuna boats. 
72. In 1958, the United Nations convened 
the law of the sea conference in order to find 
common rules and accommodation between the 
newly-proclaimed coastal jurisdictions and the 
traditional freedom of the seas. In December 
1982 this resulted in the broadest international 
convention ever submitted for signature. 
73. Territorial claims were reduced to a limit 
of 12 miles. The convention stated that the 
right to free and unimpeded passage would be 
guaranteed, especially through straits narrower 
than 24 miles. Free passage would apply to 
all ships whether military or civilian, on the 
surface or submerged. The exclusive 200-mile 
economic zone for coastal states was recognised, 
but the convention does not allow them to 
restrict the passage of ships or overtlights of 
planes of other nations. 
74. The significance of what has been agreed 
should not be underestimated and, especially 
for western countries, conflicts over rights of 
passage can now be avoided in most cases. 
The convention also greatly reduces the num-
ber of issues liable to provoke clashes between 
third world countries and industrialised powers. 
As conflicts over rights of passage are now 
unlikely, major bases in distant oceans of the 
world are unnecessary and this in turn can 
therefore lead to the avoidance of conflicts 
between the superpowers. 
75. In return for the concession on free transit, 
the smaller, poorer and sometimes landlocked 
nations of the third world have demanded a right 
of access to the vast mineral deposits that lie on 
the floor of the ocean outside the 200-mile 
economic zones. The problem was how to devise 
a system that balanced the needs of the large 
western mining companies against the desire of the 
third world countries to have a share in the 
deep-sea minerals. After much negotiating, the 
conference conceived the idea of an international 
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seabed authority which would supervise the 
mining of the ocean floor. Part of the ocean 
would be mined by an international body under 
United Nations authority and operating on behalf 
of the developing nations and part would be mined 
by · private mining companies. The preparatory 
commission to be formed in Jamaica should define 
the relationship between private mining companies 
and the international body called the enterprise. 
To resolve the points still being disputed will not 
be an easy task, but the acceptance and ratification 
of the convention by many industrialised countries 
will depend on solutions being found. 
76. The United States position is based on 
the argument that the advantages the conven-
tion granted the maritime powers were already 
customary law and that all states might there-
fore benefit from them whether parties to the 
convention or not. 
77. Thus, from a military point of view the 
new rules for transit through international straits, 
allowing aircraft to overfly them without authorisa-
tion and submarines to pass through submerged, 
the legal regulations applying to economic zones, 
provisions relating to marine scientific research and 
rules on pollution would be matters of customary 
law merely because they were brought up by the 
conference. 
78. Certain legal experts are unconvinced of · 
the value of this argument and others object 
that the advantages obtained by the maritime 
powers with regard to freedom of navigation are 
naturally offset by those granted to the third 
world under the international seabed regime. 
79. The problem is in fact fundamental, for if 
the United States argument is correct, it is not 
essential, from a military standpoint, to sign 
and to ratify the convention. Conversely, if it 
is questionable, the risk of losing the remark-
able gains of some ten years of negotiations 
and reverting to the outdated 1958 law would 
be intolerable for the western naval powers 
which would be denied the benefits of the 
convention over the greater part of the globe, 
whereas the navies of' the signatory countries, 
including the Soviet Union, would derive the 
maximum advantage with the backing of inter-
national law. 
80. Hence, our long-term industrial interests 
must be weighed against our long- and medium-
term defence interests. 
81. The political interest of such a decision 
cannot be left unmentioned, particularly in view of 
its important repercussions on policy towards the 
third world. 
82. The presence of certain WEU countries 
may bring in their wake other countries of ten-
power Europe, thus allowing the EEC to take 
part in the preparatory commission which thus 
would not be dominated solely by the Soviet 
Union. 
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Territorial sea and other maritime claims1 
Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's 
Government whether they will now list those 
states which have established territorial seas of 
less than 12 miles (specifying their extent), of 
12 miles, and of more than 12 miles (speci-
fying their extent); fishery zones of 200 miles 
and of less than 200 miles (specifying their 
extent); pollution control zones (specifying their 
extent); seabed jurisdictions (specifying their 
extent); and other zones of partial or complete 
national jurisdiction not universally recognised. 
The Minister of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (Lord Belstead): The 
following lists show claims by states to a terri-
torial sea, fishery limits and exclusive economic 
zone of the extent indicated. A claim to an 
exclusive economic zone includes rights with 
respect to the resources of the seabed and sub-
soil of the zone and other resources, and may 
also include some degree of pollution 
control. States also have jurisdiction under 
international law over their continental shelf, 
the extent of which varies. 
TERRITORIAL SEA: 
(a) Less than 12 miles 
Australia 
Belgium 
Belize 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Finland 
FRG 
GDR 
Greece 
Irish Republic 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kiribati 
(b) 12 miles 
Algeria 
Antigua 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Bulgaria 
Burma 
Cambodia 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
3 
3 
3 
3 
6 
4 
3 
3 
6 
3 
6 
3 
3 
Lebanon 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Nicaragua 
Qatar 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Singapore 
Turkey (Aegean) 
Tuvalu 
UK 
USA 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
France 
Fujairah (UAE) 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Italy 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Kenya 
I. House of Lords, Official Report, 21st March 1983. 
6 
3 
4 
3 
3 
6 
3 
6 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
119 
Republic of Korea 
Kuwait 
Libya 
\1alaysia 
\1aldives 
\1alta 
\1auritius 
\1exico 
\1onaco 
\1orocco 
\ttozambique 
:"Jauru 
:-Jew Zealand 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Saudi Arabia 
Seychelles 
Sharjah (UAE) 
Solomon Islands 
More than 12 miles 
Albania 
Angola 
Argentina 
Ben in 
Brazil 
Cameroon 
Chile* 
Congo 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
*3 miles in Civil Code 
FISHERY LiMITS: 
(a) Less than 200 miles 
Albania 
Algeria 
Anguilla 
Belize 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Egypt 
Finland 
Gabon 
Greece 
Iran 
Israel 
Italy 
Jordan 
(b) 200 miles 
Angola 
Antigua 
Argentina 
Australia 
Bahamas 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belgium 
15 
20 
200 
200 
200 
50 
200 
200 
200 
200 
100 
200 
200 
200 
15 
12 
3 
3 
12 
12 
12 
12 
150 
6 
50 
6 
12 
3 
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South Afnca 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Surinam 
Sweden 
Thailand 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tabago 
Tunisia 
Turkey (Black Sea and 
Mediterranean outside 
Aegean 
USSR 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Western Samoa 
Yemen Arab Republic 
Yemen People's Democratic 
Republic 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Liberia 200 
Madagascar 50 
Mauritania 70 
Nigeria 30 
Panama 200 
Peru 200 
Senegal 150 
Sierra Leone 200 
Somalia 200 
Syria 35 
Tanzania 50 
Togo 30 
Uruguay 200 
Republic of Korea 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malta 
Monaco 
Poland 
Tanzania 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
20-200 
6 
20 
150 
25 
12 
12 
50 
12 
12 
Turkey 
UAE 
Yugoslavia 
12 
up to 73 
12 
Benin 
Brazil 
Burma 
Cambodia 
Canada 
Cape V erde Islands 
Chile 
Colombia 
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Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
FRG 
France (except in 
Mediterranean) 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Irish Republic 
Ivory Coast 
Japan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Liberia 
Malaysia 
Mal dives 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nauru 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Peru 
Portugal 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Surinam 
Sweden 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
UK 
Uruguay 
USA 
USSR 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen People's Democratic 
Republic 
Zaire 
States understood to have declared an EEZ of 200 miles: 
Antigua 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Burma 
Cambodia 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic 
Fiji 
France 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Iceland 
India 
Ivory Coast 
Kenya 
Malaysia 
Mal dives 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nauru 
New Zealand 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Seychelles 
Solomon Islands 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Tonga 
UAE 
USA 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Western Samoa 
Yemen People's Democratic 
Republic 
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Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's 
Government which offshore national jurisdic-
tions they recognise (a) de jure and (b) de facto. 
Lord Belstead: Her Majesty's Govern-
ment consider that the following zones of off-
shore national jurisdiction beyond a coastal 
state's internal and territorial waters are permit-
ted by international law: contiguous zone, 
fishery zone, exclusive economic zone. In 
each case, the limits of the zone and the extent 
of the jurisdiction claimed within it must 
conform with the rules of international law. 
In addition, coastal states exercise sove-
reign rights over the continental shelf in accord-
ance with international law. 
Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's 
Government which states now recognise no 
more than a three-mile territorial sea. 
Lord Belstead: At present, in addition to 
the United Kingdom and dependent territories, 
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany, German Democratic Republic, 
Irish Republic, Jordan, Kiribati, Netherlands, 
Nicaragua, Qatar, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Singa-
pore, Tuvalu and the USA claim no more than 
a three-mile territorial sea. But Her Majesty's 
Government are not aware whether these states 
recognise the claims of other states to wider 
territorial seas. 
Lord Kennet asked Her Majesty's 
Government what are the advantages to the 
United Kingdom of maintaining a three-mile 
territorial sea. 
Lord Belstead: As I explained in my 
written answer to the noble Lord on 7th 
February, we are now examining the question 
of the extension of the United Kingdom's terri-
torial sea in the context of the outcome of the 
United Nations law of the sea conference. 
While we maintain a three-mile territorial 
sea we can object on that ground to wider 
claims by other states which may purport to 
curtail rights of navigation, particularly in 
international straits. 
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up: 
APPENDIX 11 
Deep-sea mining consortia 
Six international consortia have been set 
(a) the Kennecott Copper Corporation 
consortium (KCC), established in 
1964 and now controlled by British 
Petroleum, with Consolidated Gold 
Fields (United Kingdom), Noranda 
(Canada), Mitsubishi (Japan), British 
Petroleum Minerals and Rio Tinto 
(United Kingdom) each holding 10% 
and the Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion holding 50 % ; 
(b) the Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) 
consortium, the main members of 
which are ESSEX Minerals (a subsi-
diary of the largest American steel 
company, US Steel), Union Seas (a 
subsidiary of l'Union Miniere Beige), 
the Sun Company (United States) and 
Samin, a subsidiary of the Italian 
state company ENI ; 
(c) the Ocean Mining Company (OMCO) 
consortium, comprising Lockheed 
Missiles and Space Company, AMO-
CO Minerals and the Shell subsidiary 
Billiton and Bos Kalis (Netherlands); 
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(d) Ocean Management Incorporated 
(OMI), consisting of INCO (Interna-
tional Nickel Company of Canada), a 
German group consisting of Preussag, 
Metallgesellschaft and Salzgitter, the 
American SEDCO group and a num-
ber of Japanese firms combined under 
the acronym DEMES; 
(e) a recently established purely Japanese 
consortium; 
(f) the French Association for the Study 
and Research of Polymetallic Nodules 
(AFERNOD) of which the main par-
ticipants are CNEXO (National Cen-
tre for Ocean Mining), the Commissa-
riat a l'energie atomique et Le Nickel 
company. 
For Western Europe, cobalt and manga-
nese are the most important minerals. Several 
of the abovementioned states may not be par-
ties to the convention, in which event national 
laws and partial agreements are likely to 
multiply. In fact, because of developments in 
the law of the sea concept, the nature of the 
problem has changed and the convention will 
not be universally accepted. This change 
might force a long delay between the signature 
and the entry into force of the convention. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
The law of the sea 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim 
7th June 1983 
1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "seabed mining regime " 
leave out "but" and insert "and". 
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert a new text as follows: 
"4. Pursue its efforts to seek co-operation with the United States with a view to estab-
lishing a universally-acceptable system of the rule of law for the world oceans. ". 
Signed: Spies von Biillesheim 
I. See 4th sitting, 8th June 1983 (amend1ent I agreed to ; amendment 2 negatived). 
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Amendments 3, 4 and 5 
The law of the sea 
AMENDMENTS 3, 4 and 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Fourre 
7th June 1983 
3. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "the policy 
split " to the end of the paragraph and insert " the individual and divergent positions which the 
member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO have taken up as to whether the 
convention should be signed;". 
4. At the end of paragraph ( v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add " more parti-
cularly in relation to the developing countries;". 
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to adopt policies" and insert 
"to sign the convention on the law of the sea". 
Signed: Fourre 
1. See 4th sitting, 8th June 1983 (amendments 3 and 4 agreed to; amendment 5 negatived). 
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Burden-sharing in the alliance 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
7th April1983- SHAPE, Casteau 
Major General Tabary, Belgian Army, ACOS Logistics; 
Mr. Jonathan Stoddart, Minister, Special Assistant for International Affairs; 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR; 
Lieutenant General Cacciola, DCOS Logistics; 
Colonel Fox, USAF, DCOS Intelligence; 
Mr. Pozzi, Italian civilian, strategic analyst; 
Air Vice· Marshal J. Gilbert, RAF, ACOS Policy. 
8th April 1983 - NATO, Brussels 
General Lewis Melner, United States Army, Deputy Chairman, Military Committee; 
H.E. Mr. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative; Mr. Savage; 
Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary-General; 
H.E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative; Mr. Colin Bal-
mer; Admiral Sir Anthony Morton, United Kingdom Military Representative; 
H.E. Dr. H. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many; Dr. A. Bocker, Minister; 
H.E. Mr. Jean-Marie Merillon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France. 
11th April1983- Bonn 
Ministry of Defence: 
Mr. Manfred Womer, Minister of Defence; 
Mr. Lothar Riihl, Minister of State for Defence; 
General Tandecki, Fiihrungsstab Ill; Colonel Rode; Colonel Weige; Colonel Wieland; Colonel 
Flasse; Colonel Ertmann; Colonel Siebert; Colonel Lingan; Colonel Vorwerck. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
Dr. W. Hofmann, Director of Atlantic Alliance and Defence Affairs. 
12th April1983- Ministry of Defence, London 
Mr. David Fisher, DSI; 
Mr. David Wilson, DS 12. 
19th April1983- Headquarters CINCHAN and COMEASTLANT, Northwood 
Rear Admiral Propper, Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of Staff; 
Captain Morin, Belgian Navy. 
The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on Monday, 14th February 
1983, when it discussed a draft outline of the present report. 
It met subsequently in the United States from 21st to 30th March where, in the United Nations, 
New York, it was briefed by Mr. Jan Martenson, United Nations Under-Secretary General. Depart-
ment for Disarmament; Mr. Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Political 
Affairs; Mr. Charles Lichtenstein, United States Deputy Representative to the Security Council. In 
Washington it met with Mr. Gerard Smith, former Director of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and Chief Negotiator for SALT I; Mr. George Kennan, former United States 
Ambassador to Moscow; Mr. Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defence. In the State Depart-
ment it was briefed by Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Director for Politico-Military 
Affairs; Mr. Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs; in the Department of 
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Defence it was briefed by Dr. William E. Hoehn Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for International Security Policy; Mr. Franklin C. Miller, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 
Director for Strategic Policy; Mr. Abram Shulsky, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for 
Strategic Arms Control Policy; Mr. George W. Heiser, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Theatre 
Nuclear Policy; Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, Joint Chiefs of Staff, International 
Negotiations: Major General Earl G. Peck, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Policy), Director for 
Intelligence and Space Policy; Colonel Kent Montavon, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Inter-
national Security Policy), Director for NATO Affairs; Colonel James L. Gould, Office of the 
Secretary of Defence (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), Director for Mobilisation Plans and 
Operations; Mr. James W. Morrison, Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security 
Policy), Director for European Policy. 
The committee then met with Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee; and with Mr. Joseph Addabbo, Chairman of the Defence Sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, and the following members of the subcommittee: 
Mr. Les AuCoin; Mr. Norman D. Dicks; Mr. W.G. Hefner; Mr. John P. Mu'rtha; Mr. J. Kenneth 
Robinson. 
In the White House Executive Building the committee was briefed by Mr. Sven Kraemer and 
Colonel Mayer of the National Security Staff. The committee then visited the Patuxent Naval Air 
Test Centre, where it was briefed by the Commander, Rear Admiral E.J. Hogan, and saw the AV-8, 
F/A-18, SH-60B, E2 and P3 aircraft. The committee then visited the Lockheed-California Com-
pany, Los Angeles, where it was briefed by Mr. Ed Cortright, President, and Mr. Ben Rich, in par-
ticular on the TR-1 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. It visited Hughes Aircraft Company and was 
briefed by Mr. George E. Todd, Senior Vice-President, International; Mr. David M. Snyder, Asso-
ciate Director, Middle East and Africa; Mr. Paul H. Kennard, Vice-President and Manager, Advan-
ced Projects Division; Mr. Louis E. Greenbaum, Manager, Communications Systems Division, 
Ground Systems Group; Mr. Leonard Gross, Vice-President, Electro-Optical and Data Systems 
Group; and Mr. Robert L. Roderick, Vice-President, Missile Systems Group, on various aspects of 
the company's activities; visited the Douglas Aircraft Company where it was briefed by Mr. E. Cur-
tis, Senior Vice-President, Fiscal Management; Colonel John Patterson, United States Air Force Plant 
Representative; Mr. L.J. Colapietro, Manager, Government Customer Relations; Mr. E.A. Chambers, 
Manager, Government Marketing, and Mr. D.C. Caldwell, Programme Manager, T -45TS Pro-
gramme, in particular on the VTXTS, C-17 and KC-10. 
At the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, the committee was received by the 
Superintendant, Major General Robert E. Kelley, and Captain Crowley, USAF. The committee 
then visited NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, where it was received by Lieutenenant General 
Kenneth Thorneycroft, Canadian Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and briefed by Major Bob 
Tracy, Major Don Read, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Farkas, and Captain Rick Kniseley. 
The committee then met in the Sala del Consiglio, Pisa, on 3rd May where it discussed a draft of 
the present report, and also visited the Italian Parachute Training School where it was received by 
Colonel Valdimiro Rossi, Commandant. On 4th May it visited the Oto Melara works in La Spezia, 
where it was received by Mr. Fiaccavento, Mr. Ricci, and Mr. Ferrari, and then visited the NATO 
SACLANT ASW Research Centre where it was briefed by the Director Dr. Rolf Goodman and staff. 
The committee met finally in Brussels on 17th May for a joint meeting with the Council under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, and on 18th May when 
it discussed and adopted the present report. 
The committee· and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of Congress, 
officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and 
replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on burden-sharing in the alliance 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear deterrent and world role the United 
States spends a considerably higher proportion of its national wealth on defence than its European 
allies; 
(ii) Appreciating the special contribution to overall deterrence made by the independent nuclear 
forces of France and the United Kingdom; 
(iil) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the 
differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the 
Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the 
allied defence effort; 
(iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European allies on 
strategic policies and defence issues; 
(v) Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members 
and the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to 
the security of Western Europe in the fullest sense; 
(vi) Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western secu-
rity unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and 
Congress of the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless 
European public opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United 
States contribution to allied defence; 
(viz) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence 
on allied contributions to the common defence, and statements by Eurogroup which identify the size 
of the European contribution; 
(viii) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding that the 
European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share 
which has increased from 24 % to 38 % in the last twenty-five years, and increased most significantly 
in the decade of the 1970s during which the United States effort declined, but believing that certain 
specific improvements in defence efforts are required; 
(ix) Believing that allied defence plans must take account of the possible consequences of develop-
ments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly 
recognise as threatening the vital interests of the alliance, the ready assistance of all allies must be 
forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area, and in the case 
of certain allies, to participate in such deployments; 
(x) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national 
defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic, political and monetary relations 
between the United States and the European allies, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A. Urge member governments concerned within the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts: 
(a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of a real increase in defence expenditure in 
real terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the annual 
force goals set by SACEUR; 
(b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty 
days' stocks of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capa-
city of reserve forces; 
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(c) by maximismg conventional firepower and ralSlng the nuclear threshold through the 
progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly 
developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis; 
(d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention 
forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in 
Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States 
reinforcements destined for Europe; 
2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area which the allies jointly recognise as affect-
ing their vital interests: 
(a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any 
NATO country beyond the area; 
(b) in the case of those allies with appropriate military capability to participate in such 
deployments; 
3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure 
satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms controls agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of 
both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to 
proceed with the deployment of GLCM and Pershing 11 missiles in accordance with the decision of 
12th December 1979; 
4. (a) To improve informal European defence consultation within WEU and the Eurogroup and 
arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in the United States, especially to 
Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort co-ordinated by the Washington 
embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat and Chairman-in-Office; 
(b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the 
European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence; 
B. Consider, and report to the Assembly on: 
I. The desirability of expanding the defence activities of the Council, last defined in 1957, to 
include European aspects of allied defence policy; 
2. The desirability of inviting all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European 
pillar of the western alliance. 
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Draft Resolution 
on burden-sharing in the alliance 
The Assembly, 
Reaffirming its role as the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to 
discuss defence matters; 
Stressing the need for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened through 
agreement between all European allies on the basic principles of alliance defence policy and strategy; 
Recalling its Resolution 15, 
CALLS on the parliaments of Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey to appoint 
observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation 
of its forthcoming report on the state of European security; 
DECIDES that such observers shall have the right to speak. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Under the terms of reference this report 
is to examine European and American contri-
butions to common defence in the alliance and 
the fair sharing of the burden. 
1.2. A collective security system including 
Western European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance must be founded upon the principle of 
equitable participation in a common defence. 
Since an attack upon one member is, under the 
terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, to be 
regarded as an attack upon all the members of 
the alliance, the interdependence of the signa-
tories is not in doubt. The national defence 
provisions of the Brussels Treaty are even more 
binding and the commitment of the WEU 
nations to each other's defence lies at the heart 
of Western Europe's security. 
1.3. Every national contribution, whether poli-
tical, financial, military, industrial, in man-
power or materiel, contributes towards a shar-
ing of the joint burden of defence in the west-
ern alliance. However, certain fundamental 
concepts should underlie the efforts that are 
made: 
(a) alliance nations must pursue an 
agreed strategy - in the case of 
NATO of forward defence and flex-
ible response underpinned by the 
availability of nuclear weapons to 
assure deterrence; 
(b) the burden of the military and econo-
mic efforts to implement this strategy 
must be distributed in a manner 
which all members of the alliance can 
accept as fair. 
1.4. Implementing these concepts is not 
easy. A free association of independent states 
has few sanctions it can realistically apply on 
those members whom the majority of the alli-
ance believe to be in default of a reasonable 
and realistically attainable contribution to their 
common defence. A too intense debate over 
the criteria to be applied to achieve a fair 
assessment of national obligations can all too 
easily prejudice political willingness to pursue 
national security objectives in an alliance 
context. 
member countries are not to be dangerously 
aroused. Such factors should include: 
(a) what outlays are required to meet 
multilaterally-recognised force goals; 
(b) the contributions of each nation both 
in input (expenditure and manpower) 
and in output (forces and equipment) 
terms; 
(c) what a fair share of the effort required 
for every individual country actually 
is on a consensus basis; 
(d) how the burdens can be redistributed 
to match national circumstances and 
capabilities and the strategic impera-
tives recognised by the alliance as a 
whole. 
1.6. Coalition defence between wholly sove-
reign states has inherent stresses and inner ten-
sions which can only by surmounted through a 
recognition that the interests of the alliance as 
a whole transcend those of its individual mem-
bers. This is particularly so when, as in the 
case of NATO, there is great geostrategic, topo-
graphical, economic, historical and political 
diversity within it. A constant effort of poli-
tical magnanimity, imagination and goodwill is 
required to overcome those potentially fissi-
parous qualities within the alliance. 
1. 7. The NATO collective security system 
evolved in the aftermath of World War 11 out of 
an evident necessity to harness preponderant 
American power to redress a military imbalance 
in Europe. A relationship of virtual American 
protectorate, perhaps symbolised by the NATO 
military . doctrine of the conventional force 
tripwire guaranteed by the strategy of massive 
United States nuclear retaliation which charac-
terised the 1950s, has evolved to the point 
today where diminishing nuclear advantage at a 
strategic level and unfavourable nuclear and 
conventional balance at a theatre level call in 
question the ultimate American security gua-
rantee which Western Europeans have con-
veniently taken for granted for so long. 
1.8. At the same time, this relationship of 
strategic dependency upon the United States, 
1.5. An objective assessment, therefore, of which the European members of the alliance 
burden-sharing must be very comprehensive still assume, does not any longer correspond to 
and take into account as wide a range of factors the economic relationship between the United 
as possible if the political susceptibilities of States and Western Europe, or to the respective 
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parties' physical involvement in and economic 
dependence upon strategic developments in the 
wide areas of the world outside the area of res-
ponsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation. The institutional and consultative 
mechanism must evolve so that the Europeans 
assert collectively their growing political autho-
rity within the alliance more effectively. 
1.9. In short, there is a temptation on the part 
of the Europeans in NATO to continue to dis-
play the military dispositions of client states 
while adopting the independent-minded poli-
tical postures commensurate with their new-
found economic power. Understandably, pub-
lic opinion in the United States, with the pers-
pective of a people with global responsibilities, 
does not understand why certain West European 
countries, where the standard of living is cer-
tainly higher than in America, should spend 
little more than half the proportion of the 
national product expended by the United 
States, much of whose military budget goes to 
defending the more affiuent Europeans. The 
argument can all too easily become simplistic 
and dangerously emotive unless it is clearly 
borne in mind that some of the deepest dis-
agreements between members of the western 
alliance have very fundamental causes. One of 
the most obvious is a difference of view about 
the military threat and hence what is militarily 
required to meet it. 
1.10. Geography, history and economic cir-
cumstances all play their part in influencing 
perceptions of the threat. Concern to preserve 
the unique relationship with fellow Germans in 
the German Democratic Republic and to 
maintain West Germany's traditional trade with 
Central Europe must influence the Federal 
Republic's perception of the threat and modify 
the Bonn Government's formulation of security 
policy in the widest sense. Likewise, the Nor-
dic balance concept of Norway and Denmark is 
evolved in response to the neutralist foreign 
policy of Sweden and Finland and not just to 
the Soviet threat to the north flank of NATO. 
1.11. Following the collapse of the .European 
Defence Community in 1954 and notwithstand-
ing the political consultation within WEU; the 
Eurogroup; and the process of European poli-
tical consultation among the Ten, there are 
bound to be variations in foreign policy, threat 
analysis and diplomacy between the individual 
European members of the alliance let alone bet-
ween the West Europeans and the United Sta-
tes. Issues such as East-West relations, trade 
with the Soviet bloc, linkage with human rights 
questions, financial credits, food aid and tech-
nology transfers to Eastern Europe, arms 
control and the implementation of the Helsinki 
final act often receive markedly different treat-
ment by governments within the western 
alliance. 
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1.12. This foreign policy diversity explains 
why the greatest care must be exercised before 
reaching definitive conclusions about burden-
sharing. Not only are political assumptions 
often misleading, but a universally acceptable 
statistical basis of comparison is almost impos-
sible to attain. In the words of a NATO 
Financial and Economic Board report written 
as long ago as 19 51: 
" A final decision as to what constitutes 
an equitable distribution can never be 
derived from the mechanical use of any 
purely statistical formula. Even if the 
statistics available to the board were 
wholly comparable, no mechanical for-
mula could be devised or take account of 
the varying circumstances and peculiar 
problems of each country. Differences 
in size, population, economic structure 
and stage of development of the various 
countries make simple comparisons 
impossible. " 
1.13. Since then, to quote from the United 
States Secretary of Defence's report to the Uni-
ted States Congress on allied contributions to 
the common defence, March 1962: " despite 
many efforts and agreement that there is a need 
for burden-sharing, NATO has been unable to 
agree on an acceptable definition of the burden 
or how to measure it ". 
1.14. An objective definition of the guidelines 
for fairer burden-sharing within NATO is easier 
to achieve than a consensus among the indivi-
dual nations within the alliance as to whether 
their own contributions are equitable. Coun-
tries with low living standards or economic prob-
lems argue that a sound economy is a pre-
requisite for an effective defence. Countries with 
strong peace movements or a strong ethical 
tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs will 
stress the importance of carrying public support 
for national defence policy. Countries with a 
weak balance of payments may be reluctant to 
incur the foreign exchange costs of stationing 
forces overseas or of purchasing defence equip-
ment abroad. 
1.15. As recorded in the introductory note this 
report draws on information derived from the 
visit of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments to the United States in March 
1983 and particularly from the briefings and 
discussions at the State Department, Pentagon, 
National Security Council, on Capitol Hill and 
from industry and the United States air force. 
In Europe information was derived at SHAPE, 
NATO, CINCHAN and from national defence 
ministries. 
11. The concept of allied defence 
2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first 
collective security agreement after World War 
11 which was directed against the growing 
Soviet threat. Its provisions as modified by the 
Paris Protocols of 1954 form the basis of 
Western European Union and bind the signa-
tories to mutual assistance in the event of 
external attack in Europe 1• There is no 
geographic limitation to the applicability of 
the treaty for consultation purposes 2 and its 
unambiguous nature ensures that regardless of 
political developments among NATO countries 
in either Northern or Southern Europe and 
regardless of political developments in North 
America, there will be a Western European 
inner security zone among the seven nations of 
WEU. 
2.2. Although by contrast there is a stricter 
geographic limitation to the applicability of 
mutual defence under the North Atlantic 
Treaty, this should not inhibit alliance consul-
tation and co-operation in response to threats 
to the interests of member countries outside the 
NATO area. Even so, following the collapse 
of the southern and eastern tiers of Foster Dul-
les' alliance system created to contain commu-
nist expansion (CENTO and SEA TO), the 
NATO nations did very little to concert their 
security policies to protect their joint interests 
in the Middle East, Arab/Iranian Gulf, South-
West and South-East Asia and Indian Ocean. 
Indeed, the Government of the United King-
dom compounded western problems by closing 
military bases east of Suez even when in 1971 
the rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms still wanted 
the British to stay. 
2.3. Soviet support for the Marxist regimes in 
Ethiopia and South Yemen and Vietnam at 
each extremity of the large area of instability 
along the southern edge of the Eurasian land-
mass together with the Iranian revolution and 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the heart of 
the highly volatile region bordering on the oil-
rich Arab/Iranian Gulf convinced the Govern-
ment of the United States that it must be pre-
pared militarily to fill an alarming power 
vacuum in an area of huge oil reserves and 
great strategic importance to the West. 
2.4. The United States has now created a new 
South-West Asian Command autonomous of 
SACEUR and has earmarked a rapid deploy-
ment force of up to six divisions to be assigned 
I. Article VI: " If any of the High Contracting Parties 
should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the 
other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the 
party so attacked all the military and other aid and assis-
tance in their power". 
2. Article VIII.3: "At the request of any of the High 
Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately con-
vened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any 
situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic 
stability". 
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to it. Base facilities at Diego Garcia, Mashi-
rah Island and elsewhere around the littoral 
of the Indian Ocean have been built up. The 
United States navy was already overstretched in 
view of the Soviet naval challenge worldwide, 
and with the redeployment of assets from the 
Mediterranean fleet and elsewhere to the Indian 
Ocean is almost a four-fleet navy. 
2.5. The determination of the United States 
Administration not to afford to the Soviet 
Union a monopoly in underpinning the global 
competition for political influence and econo-
mic advantage by military means was heigh-
tened by the two shocks towards the end of Mr. 
Carter's presidency of Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan and the failure of the United States 
mission to rescue the American hostages from 
the United States Embassy in Iran. 
2.6. The European members of the alliance 
may or may not agree with the new military 
role which the United States has assumed in 
South-West Asia but an urgent accommodation 
on their part with the practical consequences to 
them of growing American commitments 
beyond the NATO area is required. Open dis-
agreement with the Americans over their mili-
tary strategy in South-West Asia would deepen 
the misunderstanding that already exists within 
the alliance. Quiet emphasis on the merits of 
a grand strategy involving diplomacy, aid, poli-
tical and economic support to complement 
military preparedness and deployment would 
be a valuable contribution in terms of Euro-
pean expertise in ensuring the formulation of 
an effective alliance security policy for a noto-
riously unstable region where geography affords 
to the Soviet Union great advantages in any 
power struggle which might arise. 
2.7. Mutual defence arrangements under the 
North Atlantic Treaty are of course limited to 
the Atlantic Treaty area defined in Article 6, 
but the treaty imposes no geographical limit-
ation on consultation under Article 4 when-
ever the security of any party is threatened. 
Nevertheless, discussion of out-of-area defence 
matters has evolved only slowly in NATO, the 
most recent statement of the position being in 
the texts adopted by the sixteen members at the 
Bonn NATO summit on lOth June 1982: 
" All of us have an interest in peace and 
security in other regions of the world. 
We will consult together as appropriate 
on events in these regions which may 
have implications for our security, taking 
into account our commonly-identified 
objectives. Those of us who are in a posi-
tion to do so will endeavour to respond 
to requests for assistance from sovereign 
states whose security and independence is 
threatened. " 
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The document on integrated defence adopted 
by representatives of the countries cont~buting 
to the integrated military structure contams the 
following paragraph : 
" Noting that developments beyond the 
NATO area may threaten our vital inte-
rests, we reaffirm the need to consult 
with a view to sharing assessments and 
identifying common objectives, taking 
full account of the effect on NATO secu-
rity and defence capability, as well as of 
the national interests of member coun-
tries. Recognising that the policies 
which nations adopt in this field are a 
matter for national decision, we agree to 
examine collectively in the appropriate 
NATO bodies the requirements which 
may arise for the defence of the NATO 
area as a result of deployments by indi-
vidual member states outside that 
area. Steps which may be taken by indi-
vidual allies in the light of such consul-
tations to facilitate possible military 
deployments beyond the NATO area can 
represent an important contribution to 
western security." 
It is considered in NATO that " developments 
beyond the NATO area " which " m~y thr~aten 
our vital interests " are only events mvolvmg a 
risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its 
allies. 
2.8. There are two responses which the Euro-
pean members of the alliance must make in the 
event of United States out-of-area deploy-
ments. First, they have to be prepared to com-
pensate from their own resources not only for 
any United States redeployments from the 
NATO theatre to South-West Asia but also to 
make contingency plans for a situation where, 
in the event of a simultaneous military threat in 
Europe, United States reinforcements currently 
scheduled for rapid deployment to Europe were 
diverted instead to South-West Asia. Not-
withstanding American as~urances. that ~he 
defence of Europe will remam the htghest pno-
rity of the United States, the danger of. a 
confrontation on two fronts, and of a Sovtet 
feint or diversionary move to tie down United 
States forces in the Middle East or South-West 
Asia must be recognised. It can be met prima-
rily by the provision of some additional forces 
by the Europeans themselves, although. the 
intervention forces of some European nattons, 
notably France and the United Kingdom, are 
by no means negligible and can have a valuable 
role to play out of the NATO area as their res-
pective deployments in recent years to Chad, 
Zaire, Zimbabwe and the Falkland Islands have 
shown. 
2.9. Secondly, where under the Bonn arrange-
ments quoted above NATO collectively recog-
134 
nises that some specific " development beyond 
the NATO area" does indeed "threaten our 
vital interests ", the European allies must be 
prepared to facilitate by action within the 
NATO area movements of United States forces, 
or indeed the forces of any other NATO coun-
try, passing through the. NATO area. ~y~r­
flying staging and refuellmg and port facthttes 
of ali sorts may be involved. The United 
States on the other hand cannot expect to 
secure as it appears to be requesting, open 
ended' agreements from its European allies to 
facilitate any future United States troop move-
ments for whatever purpose they may be under-
taken. 
2.1 0. There is a third response which only cer-
tain European allies are in a position to offer. 
Often the early despatch of a very highly 
trained experienced force early in a crisis can 
prevent its developme.nt into a full-~cale ~mer­
gency. For thi.s certam Europ~an am~obtle or 
amphibious umts, such as Bnttsh mannes, and 
French paratroops, would be particularly 
appropriate. Certainly an exercised and pre-
planned determination by some European 
countries to bear if only a small part of Ame-
rican out-of-area burdens would greatly 
enhance mutual understanding in the alliance. 
So would improved host-nation support, logis-
tic infrastructure, refuelling, docking and main-
tenance facilities in Europe, not just for 
United States forces assigned to NATO but also 
for United States forces en route to South-West 
Asia. 
2.11. Within the NATO area there is un-
doubtedly potential for increased role speciali-
sation but this is politically a highly sensitive 
issue since defence impinges upon national sus-
ceptibilities on sovereignty in a direct way. 
Few countries are prepared for example totally 
to assign to other nations the protection of their 
air space or the defence of their territory. 
However the United Kingdom could rationally specialis~ more in naval, air and intervention 
forces but this could only be at the expense of 
its Brussels Treaty commitment on the conti-
nent in Germany which would be politically 
unwelcome to its allies. The Netherlands 
could logically concentrate its naval forces 
more in the North Sea and Channel, but that 
country understandably sets great store by its 
blue water anti-submarine role in the North 
Atlantic. The Federal Republic could at a cost 
increase still further its land and air forces in 
Central Europe although for demographic rea-
sons it would be difficult and would have 
implications for inner-German relations. .France 
in its latest defence plans has already dectded to 
modernise the whole spectrum of its nuclear 
capability and Italy with its deployments to the 
peacekeeping forces in Sinai and Lebanon has 
demonstrated its intervention capability and 
concern for security within the Mediterranean 
basin as a whole. 
2.12. In short, geography, history, manpower, 
industrial and economic potential already dic-
tate a substantial degree of national speciali-
sation. Only France and the United Kingdom 
in Europe maintain independent nuclear deter-
rents. Likewise, only Britain and France main-
tain balanced forces in all three services 
together with a substantial overseas intervention 
capability. The Federal Repuplic of Germany 
is the dominant European nation on the central 
front. The Netherlands concentrates on the 
larger naval vessels which appertain to an ocea-
nic role at sea. The maritime role of Belgium 
is primarily coastal. In air defence there is a 
worrying tendency for Belgium to downgrade its 
air defence commitments, particularly as 
regards its contribution to modernising its sec-
tion of the Hawk SAM belt. Denmark and 
Norway have evolved the concept of total 
defence and have large home guards. Italy 
plays a key role in all three services on the 
southern flank. 
2.13. There is little prospect therefore of any 
dramatic initiative to achieve either a more 
equitable sharing of the burdens or ~ mo~e c_ost 
effective defence by means of a rat10nahsatton 
of national roles and responsibilities. Modest 
progress can always be achieved but bold radi-
cal changes would be politically fraught with 
danger. It has to be borne in mind that for an 
alliance committed to deterrence its cohesion 
and unity in peacetime is no less important 
than its combat capability in war. Of course it 
would be logical for the British to do more at 
sea and to concentrate more on intervention 
forces than on the central front, but with the 
German armed forces . already fully stretched 
and in view of the alliance strategy of a forward 
defence reliant upon substantial in-place allied 
force contributions, there is no immediate pros-
pect of such a change in allied roles. Never-
theless for the defence of Central Europe there 
are good military and economic reasons why 
the seven WEU nations at least should better 
co-ordinate their defence policies. Franco-
German military co-operation is valuable for 
European security as is the integration of 
French air defence forces with the NATO early 
warning system. The security of the United 
Kingdom Air Defence Region and East~rn 
Atlantic and Channel Command areas are vttal 
for the reinforcement of Europe. It would, 
therefore, be better if national initiatives like 
the United Kingdom defence review of 1981 
and the French defence review of 1983 were the 
subject of prior consultation within at least the 
WEU Council and preferably the Eurogroup 
Council to facilitate appropriate readjustments 
within the alliance. 
2.14. Although the preponderance of the 
Warsaw Pact in both armour and manpower on 
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the central front puts a premium on the value 
of mobility, manoeuvre and concentrating 
defence firepower at the decisive point, there is 
such a narrow defence depth available in West 
Germany that the Federal Republic's total com-
mitment to forward defence has been inevitably 
espoused by the alliance as a whole. 
2.15. SACEUR's proposals for the use of emer-
ging technology to develop new land/air tactical 
doctrines to interdict the battlefield more effec-
tively and to prevent the follow-through of 
second echelon Warsaw Pact formations are 
promising but they are no panacea. They will 
be costly and should be regarded as part of the 
evolutionary process of improving the combat 
effectiveness of NATO as and when new 
weapons systems become available. Certainly 
they should increase the confidence of western 
public opinion as these doctrines would apl?re-
ciably raise the nuclear threshold. But to sattsfy 
Western European public opinion the procure-
ment of the new intelligent weaponry and 
precision munitions essential to enhance 
NATO's air/land capability to offset Warsaw 
Pact armoured preponderance on the central 
front must be achieved on an equitable basis, 
and it should not distort further in the United 
States' favour the alliance defence equipment 
market. 
Ill. Measuring and comparing the defence 
effort 
(a) General 
3.1. Measuring a country's "defence effort" 
as a general concept is not a simple task; defini-
tions are needed before measurements can be 
made. It is still more difficult to compare the 
defence effort of one NATO country with that 
of another because of different national views of 
the requirements of defence resulting partly 
from social, economic and geographical diffe-
rences, and partly from different political atti-
tudes to defence. Furthermore, financial com-
parisons involving currency conversion may be 
distorted when exchange rates do not closely 
reflect purchasing power. But as least the 
NATO countries can be compared in terms of a 
market economy; comparisons between NATO 
countries and the Warsaw Pact countries with 
their centrally-directed communist economies 
are more conjectural, not only because of the 
incomplete disclosure of defence expenditure in 
the official Soviet defence budget, but also 
because of the difficulty of assigning com-
parable prices to articles in a communist 
economy. 
(b) Defence expenditure 
3.2. Defence effort is usually assessed in terms 
of defence expenditure and in terms of man-
power in the armed services - the so-called 
defence inputs. It is more difficult to assess the 
defence capacity which can be produced from 
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those resources. Countries differ in the items 
which they include in their defence budgets, 
and one of the earliest tasks undertaken by the 
NATO international staff, in the framework of 
the annual review, was to draw up a common 
definition of " defence expenditure " for NATO 
purposes. This (unpublished) definition adop-
ted in 1952 is known to include government 
payments to service pension funds, and costs of 
internal security forces that would serve under 
military command in war. In general, defence 
budgets to NATO definition tend to be slightly 
higher than national defence budgets submitted 
to parliament, largely because it was easier to 
agree on a common NATO definition by includ-
ing items already included in the defence bud-
get of at least one NATO country, rather than 
by excluding items not included in the national 
definitions of a majority of countries. Still 
excluded from the NATO definition, however, 
are items which certain NATO countries would 
consider defence-related. These include actual 
payments of service pensions, war damage, civil 
defence, strategic stockpiling of industrial war 
materials, and, in the case of Germany, major 
host-country support costs, economic assistance 
to Berlin and Turkey. Figures of defence expen-
diture at Appendix I are given to NATO defini-
tion and have been published regularly in com-
mittee reports each year for more than twenty 
years. The European c;ountries today provide 
about 38 % of total NATO defence expenditure 
compared with 24% in 1958 when the com-
mittee first published these statistics. 
3.3. It should be noted that defence effort 
measured in this way is the total defence effort 
of every NATO country, irrespective of the 
tasks to which particular elements of the armed 
forces may be assigned. Not all defence tasks 
assumed by certain NATO countries would be 
recognised by a majority of the allies as being 
" NA TO-related " defence tasks. In fact no 
attempt has been made to assess defence effort 
in terms of " NA TO-related " defence, partly 
because of the flexibility of defence forces 
which, for example, recently permitted the Uni-
ted Kingdom to repossess the Falkland Islands 
in an operation which most NATO countries 
would not regard as "NATO-related ", whereas 
the bulk of the forces concerned normally ope-
rate within the NATO area where they are allo-
cated very much to NA TO-related tasks. 
Similar examples can be cited in the case of 
military operations conducted in recent years 
by several NATO countries 
(c) Manpower contribution 
3.4. Appendix LB. compares the present man-
power contribution of the NATO countries to 
the armed forces. The European countries col-
lectively provide 60 % of total NATO military 
manpower. As the European countries except 
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Luxembourg and the United Kingdom rely on 
conscription, whereas the United States has 
purely regular forces, there are further hidden 
defence advantages and economic costs of lost 
opportunity in the European contribution. The 
defence advantage is the large pool of trained 
reserve manpower which conscription automa-
tically leaves in the population at large after 
completion of compulsory service. This can 
be particularly impressive and important as in 
the case of the Federal Republic of Germany 
which can mobilise its Landwehr rapidly, and 
in the case of Denmark and Norway which 
have large home guards and a concept of " total 
defence". 
3.5. The hidden opportunity costs of con-
scripting manpower can be assessed in various 
ways. " If allied manpower costs for 1979 are 
computed at United States pay rates, the value 
of non-United States NATO total defence 
would increase relatively to the United States 
by approximately 20 % reaching a total 
approximately equal to that of the United Sta-
tes. As a result, several countries such as 
Canada, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
whose average pay and allowances are higher 
than in the United States, would have their 
defence expenditures adjusted downwards; 
others, notably Turkey, Italy, Portugal and 
France, would see theirs increased. " 1 
(d) Ability to contribute and comparison between 
NATO countries 
3.6. Defence expenditure statistics published 
by NATO (Appendix I) include some measures 
of ability to contribute - gross domestic pro-
duct; population; and gross domestic product 
per capita - and derive from these comparative 
statistics of national contributions to allied 
defence. The most widely quoted are defence 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and armed 
forces as a percentage of the active population 
because international comparison between these 
figures is not distorted by conversion of natio-
nal currencies. Defence expenditure itself, and 
defence expenditure per capita can only be 
compared when converted to a single currency 
with the reservations noted above. 
3.7. There are, however, limitations in mea-
suring defence expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP. Not all countries can be expected to 
devote the same percentage of their domestic 
product to defence - countries with the lowest 
per capita domestic product will be expected to 
make a prior claim on it to provide basic living 
standards for the population before making any 
significant contribution to allied defence 
l. United States Secretary of Defence report to Congress 
on allied contributions to the common defence, March 
1982. 
beyond a local domestic defence effort. The 
" wealthier " countries in terms of GDP per 
capita can be expected to have a larger " avail-
able" GDP after basic living standards have 
been met, part of which can then reasonably be 
devoted to allied defence. The graph at 
Appendix 11, therefore, shows defence expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP plotted against 
GDP per capita. Surprisingly, this graph 
shows a very significant defence effort on the 
part of the three poorest countries of the 
alliance - Turkey, Portugal and Greece - and a 
below average defence effort among some of the 
wealthier countries - Norway, Canada, Den-
mark and Luxembourg. 
3.8. The comparative prosperity of countries 
as measured by GDP per capita, converted to 
dollars at current exchange rates, shows a rela-
tive decline in the position of the United States 
compared with the other allies over the last 
decade. At $11 ,348 per head for 1980, the 
United States came only seventh among NATO 
countries, among which Norway led with 
$13,766. This perception of ability to contri-
bute has bedevilled the transatlantic argument 
on burden-sharing which is discussed in the fol-
lowing section. It has, however, been pointed 
out that the exchange rates used in this calcula-
tion, and inflation rates assumed for constant 
price comparisons over a period of years, do 
not accurately reflect the purchasing power of 
national currencies. When conversions are 
carried out using purchasing power parity 
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instead of fluctuating exchange rates, the 
United States remains a significantly wealthier 
country measured by GDP per capita ($11 ,348 
in 1980) than any other member of the alliance. 
Luxembourg, the second in this table, had only 
$9,430 1• 
3.9. Since March 1981, in response to the 
amendment introduced by Senator Levin to the 
fiscal year 1981 Defenqe Authorisation Act, the 
Secretary of Defence has submitted an annual 
report to Congress on allied commitments to 
defence spending (1981) and allied contribu-
tions to the common defence (1982). This 
report goes into burden-sharing in considerable 
statistical detail. In particular it has inves-
tigated other possible measures of ability to 
contribute than those mentioned above. The 
most original feature is a " prosperity index " 
which is derived for each country first by multi-
plying that country's percentage share of the 
total allied GDP by its per capita GDP expres-
sed as a percentage of the highest per capita 
GDP of any NATO country (Denmark). The 
resultant product is totalled for all NATO 
countries and an individual country " prospe-
rity index " is expressed as its percentage share 
of the allied total (" allied " is taken in the 
Secretary of Defence's report as the total for 
NATO plus Japan). Other indicators of ability 
I. Sharing the defence burden, Rainer W. Rupp, Econo-
mic Directorate of the NATO International Staff in NATO 
Review, December 1982. 
NATO countries' gross domestic product per head 
in 1980, in US$ 
Based on exchange rates Based on purchasing power parity 
Country Index Index 
US$ NATO= Rank US$ NATO= Rank 
100.0 100.0 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Germany 13,306 137.1 1 9,411 106.3 3 
Denmark 12,957 133.5 2 9,094 102.7 4 
France 12,136 125.0 3 9,046 102.2 5 
Belgium 12,084 124.5 4 8,924 100.8 6 
Luxembourg 12,059 124.2 5 9,430 106.5 2 
Netherlands 11,851 122.1 6 8,599 97.1 7 
United States 11,348 116.9 7 11,348 128.2 1 
United Kingdom 9,344 96.3 8 7,622 86.1 8 
Italy 6,906 71.1 9 7,205 81.4 9 
Spain 5,648 58.2 10 5,843 66.0 10 
Greece 4,236 43.6 11 4,713 53.2 11 
Portugal 2,423 25.0 12 3,675 41.5 12 
Other NATO 
countries (8) 5,082 52.3 X 5,508 62.2 X 
TOTAL NATO 9,708 100.0 X 8,852 100.0 X 
(•) Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey. 
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to contribute contained in the report are : per-
centage share of total allied GDP; percentage 
share of total allied population; per capita GDP 
as a percent of the highest nation. 
3.10. The same report lists seven selected indi-
cators of defence contribution : defence spend-
ing as a share of total allied expenditure; 
defence spending as a percentage increase since 
1971; percentage share of total allied defence 
manpower; percentage increase in defence man-
power since 1971; total active and reserve 
defence manpower share of the allied total; 
ground forces as a percentage share of total 
allied ground forces (expressed in armoured 
division equivalents); and tactical combat air-
craft as a percentage share of the allied total. 
Selected indicators from this report, comparing 
contribution with ability to contribute, are 
reproduced at Appendix Ill. 
(e) Trends of defence expenditure 
3.11. Figures for defence expenditure for a 
single year are less informative than the trend 
of defence expenditure over a number of years, 
partly because with some countries expenditure 
in a single year may be distorted through the 
costs of some equipment procurement pro-
gramme falling particularly heavily in one 
year. Also in 1977 NATO defence ministers 
agreed to increase defence spending " in the 
region of 3 % per annum in real terms " over 
the planning period 1979 to 1984, reaffirmed in 
1980 for the period up to 1986. The extent to 
which countries have fulfilled this commitment 
can be seen from the table of annual defence 
expenditure, if expressed in constant prices (to 
allow for inflation). NATO, however, has not 
yet been able to reach agreement on the defla-
tors to be applied to defence expenditure in the 
different countries in order to produce a fair 
statement of expenditure at constant prices. 
As a consequence of this, the official NATO 
defence expenditure statistics published each 
December do not include a series of country 
expenditures at constant prices. Curiously, 
however, for the last few years these statistics 
have included figures of defence expenditure 
per capita for six successive years expressed at 
constant prices. These can only have been 
produced through the use of some provisional 
deflator by the NATO staff, and by multiplying 
by the populations concerned it is possible to 
deduce from these figures a table of total 
defence expenditure at constant prices. This 
is shown at Appendix IV. Annual percentage 
increases in real terms actually achieved by 
member countries from 1978 to 1982 have 
fluctuated widely between one year and 
another, and between different countries, 
Greece showing a decrease of 8.8 % between 
1979 and 1980, while Luxembourg recorded the 
largest increase of 16.3 % from 1979 to 1980. 
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(f) NATO- Warsaw Pact comparisons 
3.12. It is instructive to extend the foregoing 
methodology for international comparison of 
defence inputs to a comparison of the defence 
efforts of the NATO and Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. Most publicity is attracted to East-West 
comparisons of defence output - assessments of 
the defence capability the inputs produce. As 
pointed out in paragraph 3.1, however, to make 
input comparisons an attempt has to be made 
to assign values to the Soviet defence effort in 
terms of western market economies. It is of 
course widely accepted that the officially 
published Soviet defence budget records only 
part of defence expenditure, and is known to 
exclude the large amount spent on research and 
development. 
3.13. For the past fourteen years, the United 
States Government has published annually esti-
mates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact defence 
expenditure in the ACDA series "World Mili-
tary Expenditures and Arms Transfers". Figu-
res for defence expenditure in dollars given in 
this publication are calculated by the CIA on 
the " building block " method whereby separate 
estimates are made of the value of research and 
development (nearly a quarter of the total); 
procurement of equipment and construction 
(about one-half); and operating costs (a little 
over one-quarter, of which 60 % is personnel 
costs). These official United States estimates 
for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the United States 
and the Soviet Union are shown at Appendix 
V. The March 1981 version of World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, quoting 
constant 1977 prices, shows NATO as a whole 
to have outspent the Warsaw Pact in defence 
spending in every year from 1970 to 1978 - the 
last covered in the publication. The March 
1982 version, however, using constant 1978 
prices, shows total Warsaw Pact expenditure 
slightly exceeding that of NATO for the years 
1976 to 1978 inclusive, while NATO again 
overtook the Warsaw Pact in 1979. What, of 
course, is more disturbing for the United States 
authorities was the trend of Soviet defence 
expenditure in these calculations which from 
being less than that of the United States up to 
1970, significantly overtook it in the years 1971 
to 1979 - the last quoted in the 1982 edition. 
Press reports on 7th April of the 1983 edition 
referred to an estimate for Soviet expenditure of 
$188 billion in 1980 compared with United 
States expenditure of $131 billion. However, 
the press one month earlier 1 reported that the 
CIA estimates on which the WMEA T figures 
were based had been revised for the year 1981 
to show Soviet expenditure of $160 billion 
compared with United States $154 billion. 
I. International Herald Tribune, Guardian, 4th March 
1983. 
The basis of the reduction was CIA intelligence 
analysis that the Soviet Union had produced 
less military equipment than predicted, leading 
the CIA to revise downwards its estimate of 
annual increase in Soviet defence expenditure 
from 3 or 4 % to 2 %. Accepted by the State 
Department, the CIA findings had been dispu-
ted by the United States Defence Intelligence 
Agency which had suggested that original esti-
mates of expenditure were correct, but that 
higher costs had led to less equipment being 
produced. 
3.14. Independent academic comparisons of 
Soviet and United States, and of Warsaw Pact 
and NATO expenditure claim that the CIA 
dollar estimates of the components of the Soviet 
defence effort, particularly the research and 
development and manpower costs, are over-
stated. The following bar chart shows two offi-
cial and three independent academic compari-
sons for 1978 which show an excess of NATO 
over Warsaw Pact expenditure ranging from 
about 40% to 5 % (excluding of course the 
Warsaw Pact estimate). 
Military expenditures of the major 
alliances, 1978- five views 
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Source: World Military and Social Expenditures 
1981. Ruth Leger Sivard. Publisher World Priorities Inc. 
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3.15. Estimates of numbers in the armed forces 
are not subject to the uncertainties involved in 
cost comparisons between the unlike economies 
of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The 
United States ACDA WMEA T reports referred 
to above show total NATO armed forces for 
1979 (the latest year available in that publi-
cation) of 5.29 million compared with 6.16 mil-
lion for the Warsaw Pact. The IISS Military 
Balance estimate for that year is 4.88 million 
for NATO compared with 4.76 million for the 
Warsaw Pact; the difference is unexplained. 
The latest IISS estimates for 1982 are NATO 
5.35 million; Warsaw Pact 4.82 million. 
IV. The transatlantic debate 
4.1. The burden-sharing debate at the present 
time has arisen largely through United States, 
especially Congressional, perceptions of sup-
posed shortcomings on the part of the European 
allies. These include inadequate European 
contributions to what the United States believes 
the allied defence effort should be, or failure of 
the European allies to follow United States 
policy in economic and political relations with 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. 
Typical of some attitudes in Congress, seeking 
reductions in public spending yet believing that 
United States superiority in naval and air 
power was its chief guarantee of protection 
from the Soviet Union, was the enactment by 
the Senate last autumn requiring the level of 
United States troops stationed ashore in Europe 
by the end of fiscal year 1983 (30th September) 
not to exceed their real levels at September 
1982 (315,600). The move led by Senator Ste-
vens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had 
originally sought a freeze at the lower level of 
March 1980. 
4.2. The United States Administration itself 
has to face both ways - at times assuring 
Congress that the European allies make a large 
proportionate contribution to the total allied 
defence effort, at others exhorting the Euro-
peans to make a bigger effort, or to align them-
selves more closely with United States policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
4.3. Typical of the first is evidence given by 
Mr. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26th 
March 1982 on " the critical importance of 
maintaining the United States military presence 
in Europe". Noting that over the thirty years 
since the creation of NATO " the United 
States-Soviet balance has moved from United 
States superiority to, at best, a precarious 
balance, with powerful adverse trends ", he 
asserted that " we are now running hard to 
make up for nearly a generation of neglect in 
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our military programmes. The allies in 
contrast, have turned in a remarkably steady 
performance. Roughly speaking they have sus-
tained an increase of between 2 and 3 % for 
more than a decade. " 
4.4. The Secretary of Defence's annual 
reports to Congress referred to above 1, submit-
ted in accordance with the Levin amendment to 
the 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, provide a 
systematic, objective, and on the whole opti-
mistic assessment of the European contribu-
tion. In the words of the 1981 report : 
"There is no question that the United 
States and its allies can provide the forces 
necessary to meet the Soviet threat and to 
execute agreed NATO strategy. Collec-
tively we have more than adequate 
resources - human, industrial, technolo-
gical and financial - to provide a reason-
able margin of security ... 
The NATO allies maintain on active 
duty about three million men and women 
compared with about two million for the 
United States and 250,000 for Japan. If 
we include reserves ... the allied total is 
over six million compared with about 
three million for the United States. If 
we add civilian defence manpower... the 
totals come to just under eight million for 
the allies and just over four million for 
the United States. The GDP of all the 
non-United States NATO nations combi-
ned represents around 45 % of the NATO 
and Japan total. Our NATO allies 
account for over 60 % of total NATO 
and Japan ground combat capability, 
around 55 % of the tactical air force com-
bat aircraft and around 50 % of the total 
tonnage of naval surface combatants and 
submarines. " 
4.5. "... We have devised for the purposes 
of this report a number of indices of 
burden-sharing and have developed an 
overall assessment. We believe this 
approach - while imperfect and certainly 
not agreed by the allies - can give a 
better perspective of burden-sharing than 
any one individual indicator. Using this 
formulation, the aggregated NATO allies 
appear to be shouldering their fair share 
of the total NATO and Japan defence 
burden." 
4.6. The 1982 report follows similar lines, 
pointing out that " collectively [the NATO 
allies and Japan] have 80% greater population, 
four times the GDP and more than double the 
per capita GDP of the Warsaw Pact". Curi-
1. On allied commitments to defence spending, March 
1981; and on allied contributions to the common defence, 
March 1982. 
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ously it then reduces significantly the assess-
ment of allied contribution : " Our NATO 
allies account for over 55 % of total NATO and 
Japanese ground combat capability, around 
50 % of the tactical air force combat aircraft 
and around 35% of the total tonnage of naval 
surface combatants ... ". The reductions of 
these percentages from 60 %, 55 %, and 50% 
respectively the previous year are obviously far 
greater than any real changes in the force bal-
ance in the intervening twelve months. In 
conclusion the report is more critical of its 
allies: "In the final analysis the United States 
appears to be doing somewhat more than its 
fair share of the NATO and Japanese total 
based on quantifiable measures examined for 
this report. " 
4. 7. The informal meeting of defence minis-
ters of all European NATO countries, except 
France but now including Spain, known as 
Eurogroup regularly publishes its assessment of 
the European contribution to defence within 
the alliance. The last communique of 29th 
November 1982 noted a more favourable Euro-
pean share than did the foregoing reports : 
"4. Within the NATO partnership, Euro-
group countries participating in NA TO's 
integrated military structure make a sub-
stantial and significant contribution to 
the alliance's military forces. Their act-
ive armed forces total some two-and-a-
half million and they provide approxima-
tely 75% of NATO's readily available 
ground forces in Europe, 7 5 % of the 
tanks, 65 % of the air forces and 60 % of 
the warships ... " 
A list of new military equipment being intro-
duced by the Eurogroup countries was appen-
ded. The percentages would of course be 
increased if account were taken of French 
forces. 
4.8. In the light of the foregoing authoritative 
assessments, and the Rapporteur's extensive dis-
cussions in NATO, SHAPE, and Bonn, the 
committee concludes that on the whole the 
European countries are providing a very rea-
sonable share of the allied defence burden. 
Required improvements in the European effort 
call for a long-term commitment to steady 
enhancement, particularly in " sustainability " 
of the conventional forces - the ability to offer 
sustained resistance beyond the first few days of 
any possible attack. This requires an improve-
ment in the ammunition stockpiles of many 
countries and in rapidly available reserves to 
relieve the combat fatigue of forward troops, 
although there is more insistence in some 
quarters on the need to be able to " re-establish 
deterrence " if the forward defences were in 
danger of being overrun. Certainly a 4 % 
increase in real terms in defence budgets called 
l 
for by SACEUR to provide new generations of 
conventional equipment and weapons to permit 
detailed reconnaissance, target acquisition and 
selective attack on the second echelon of Soviet 
forces will not be forthcoming; the need is 
rather for steady investment in new weapons 
technology as proven weapon systems become 
available. Mr. Weinberger's emerging techno-
logy on which he has reported to NATO can be 
incorporated only progressively into the NATO 
armoury. 
4.9. With the present United States Admin-
istration there have been significant failures of 
allied consultation. President Reagan's address 
to the National Association of Evangelicals on 
8th March 1983- dubbed the" Darth Vaders" 
speech by the Washington establishment -
portraying the Soviet Union as an implacably 
hostile power reveals an outlook not shared by 
European, governments. His proposal for 
research on new ABM systems in his television 
address of 23rd March - dubbed the "Star 
Wars " speech - was not conveyed by 
Mr. Weinberger attending the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group of NATO defence ministers in 
Portugal a few hours earlier the same day. 
Mr. Weinberger was either hilJ)self unaware 
that the proposal would be made, or still 
hoping that President Reagan would heed the 
advice of Department of Defence advisers not 
to make the proposal. It is a lesser failure of 
communication that the otherwise valuable 
briefings given to the committee in the Pen-
tagon only a few hours before the Presidential 
speech should have contained no inkling of the 
ABM proposal. 
4.10. Differences between the present United 
States Administration and European govern-
ments in general policy issues related to defence 
are frankly recognised in the Secretary of State's 
1982 report on allied contributions to the com-
mon defence already quoted in the burden-
sharing context above : 
"Emphasising social and economic viabi-
lity as their first priority, many Euro-
peans continue to view the Soviet threat 
less seriously than the United States. 
Moreover, United States and European 
views of how best to counter the Soviet 
threat remain divergent, in spite of major 
United States efforts over the past year to 
portray the threat graphically for Euro-
pean elites and publics... Europeans 
believe Soviet policy can be moderated 
through traditional forms of social, eco-
nomic and political contact. They are 
less enthusiastic than the United States 
about the build-up of military force as a 
counter to the Soviet challenge. " 
Referring to foregone economic benefits of 
defence contributions, the report continues : 
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" Occasionally however the common 
interest is overridden. An especially 
painful example occurred during 1981 
and early 1982 when several allies opted 
in favour of economic expediency rather 
than defence interests in agreeing to the 
West Siberian pipeline despite strong 
opposition by the United States. In this 
case some NATO countries chose to 
place the interests of their domestic 
industry ahead of national security consi-
derations. This occurred even though it 
was far from clear that the cost of deli-
vered natural gas would be economical, 
given the hidden charges in the long-
term bargain struck with the Soviet 
Union. In addition, despite the projec-
ted massive dependency on Soviet gas of 
western areas such as Bavaria, no safe-
guards have been planned by the allies to 
offset the danger of a gas cut-ofT. This 
is a very critical development in the 
alliance and it may have serious conse-
quences in the future. " 
4.11. The tendency of the present United 
States Administration to assume that its 
approach to East-West relations is the correct 
one for the alliance as a whole has led to an 
increase in consultation on defence and security 
issues among the European countries indepen-
dently of the United States, and for calls for 
further improvement in such arrangements -
discussed in the next chapter. 
V. The European pillar 
(a) General 
5.1. There is a growing feeling today among 
European members of NATO, reflected strongly 
among members of the committee, that the 
European members of the alliance must concert 
their views on the main principles of allied 
defence policy and strategy as they affect Euro-
peans. The European pillar of the alliance 
must be strengthened. That observation has 
been made many times before. The question 
on which there is less agreement is on what 
topics and to what extent should the Europeans 
consult independently, and in what institutional 
framework ? Several are available and are 
considered separately below. 
(b) Western European Union 
5.2. Western European Union is primarily a 
defence organisation as Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty makes clear. After signa-
ture of the treaty by the original five members 
in 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as 
WEU was then known, created its own Western 
Union Defence Organisation and established 
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the first post-war allied headquarters at Fon-
tainebleau. But even in the eyes of the five 
signatories WUDO was a stop-gap, awaiting the 
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty which 
took place the following year. Once the 
NATO integrated military structure was in 
place the BTO dissolved its own defence orga-
nisation as superfluous and transferred its exis-
ting military headquarters and infrastructure 
programme to NATO. The relevant resolution 
of the Council of 20th September 19 50 is worth 
quoting: 
" Resolution by the Consultative Council 
of the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 
20th December 1950 on the future of 
the organisation of western defence in 
the light of the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation military 
structure 1 
1. The Consultative Council have consi-
dered the suggestion of the North 
Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty 
powers should review the status of the 
Western Union Defence Organisation in 
the light of the establishment of an 
overall North Atlantic Treaty Command 
Organisation. 
2. The Consultative Council have 
noted: 
(i) that it has been decided to 
dissolve the existing European 
Regional Planning Groups with 
their Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and 
principal Staff Officers Commit-
tees; 
(ii) the view of the North Atlantic 
Council that, when the new 
NATO Command Organisation 
is established, it will be unneces-
sary and undesirable to have a 
parallel Western Union Com-
mand and that the new Head-
quarters suggested for Western 
Europe should be directly under 
SHAPE and should not be res-
ponsible to the Western Union 
Defence Committee. 
3. The Council agree that, in the light 
of this re-organisation, the continued 
existence of the Western Union Defence 
Organisation in its present form is no 
longer necessary. They accordingly 
instruct the Permanent Commission to 
consider in consultation with the Western 
Union Military Committee, acting on the 
instructions of the Defence Ministers, 
I. Reproduced previously in Document 29, 3rd October 
1956, and Document 557, 16th November 197-1. 
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how the proposed re-organisation can 
best be effected and what military machi-
nery, if any, needs to be retained under 
the Brussels Treaty. 
4. The Council affirm that these new 
arrangements will in no way affect the 
obligations assumed towards each other 
by the signatory powers under the Brus-
sels Treaty. In particular, the Consult-
ative Council established under Arti-
cle VII, including the non-military 
organs set up under the Council, will 
continue to function, and the reorganisa-
tion of the military machinery shall not 
affect the right of the Western Union 
Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to 
meet as they please to consider matters of 
mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty 
powers." 
It will be noted in particular that under para-
graph 4 of the resolution the new arrangements 
"shall not affect the right of the Western Union 
defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as 
they please to consider matters of mutual 
concern to the Brussels Treaty powers". 
5.3. However, since that date defence min-
isters and chiefs-of-staff have not met in the 
Brussels Treaty framework, and when the treaty 
was modified in 1954 to create the seven 
member WEU the 19 50 resolution was in effect 
confirmed in the new Article IV of the modi-
fied treaty which expressly provides that NATO 
military bodies will not be duplicated : 
"In the execution of the treaty, the high 
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall 
work in close co-operation with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO 
for information and advice on military 
matters." 
In fact, under the terms of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty the military provisions concerning 
levels of forces and control of armaments incor-
porated in Protocols Nos. 11, Ill and IV, are 
inextricably linked to the integrated military 
structure of NATO which is made responsible 
in part for implementation of some of the WEU 
treaty obligations. 
5.4. While the Council recognises that its 
defence responsibilities - notably under Art-
icles V and VIII of the treaty - are not dimi-
nished by post-1950 arrangements, the desirable 
extent of the Council's defence activities has 
been the subject of debate between the Council 
and the Assembly ever since the latter was estab-
lished under the same 19 54 modifications. 
As a consequence of this debate the Council 
was led in 1957 to define formally the scope of 
its residual defence and related activities. The 
seven governments considered that the activities 
of the Council in the field of defence questions 
and armaments should relate only to : 
" (a) matters which the contracting par-
ties wish to raise, especially under 
Article VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member states; 
(c) the maintenance of certain United 
Kingdom forces on the continent; 
(d) the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments; 
(e) the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee." 1 
Since then it is understood that no government 
has in fact raised any matter under Article VIII 
of the treaty, so that Council defence activities 
have been limited to discussion of force level 
limitations, arms control and Standing Arma-
ments Committee matters discussed in another 
report by the committee 2• As the committee 
points out in that report, on the basis of exten-
sive quotations from ministers of member coun-
tries who have addressed the Assembly, 
although member governments today are unani-
mous in stressing the importance of the Assem-
bly's functions as a contribution to public 
debate on defence issues, no WEU government 
has proposed that the defence activities of the 
WEU Council should be increased; indeed, 
Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations 
of France, reporting to the French National 
Assembly on 6th June 1982 on his earlier 
address to the WEU Assembly, commented 
specifically on the lack of any great future for 
the executive of WEU : 
" The other day, on behalf of the French 
Government, I addressed the Assembly of 
WEU, not because the executive of WEU 
seems to have a very great future but 
because the Assembly is an elected one ... 
competent to handle these [defence] mat-
ters, which must be discussed among 
members of parliament... " 
5.5. The fact that despite intermittent urging 
by the Assembly over the last twenty-five years 
the Council since 1950 has chosen not to dis-
cuss allied defence planning, is not in itself a 
reason why it should not do so at the present 
time. Several members of the committee 
believe that without seeking to replace the 
I. Second annual report of the Council, Document 3 7, 
25th February 1957. 
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 948. 
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organs of NATO concerned with detailed allied 
defence planning, and taking full account of 
member states' obligations to NATO, the 
Council of WEU should today assume respon-
sibility for discussing the main lines of a 
defence strategy common to the WEU coun-
tries. The advantages of reviving Brussels 
Treaty defence activities in this way are 
obvious : the seven member countries collect-
ively provide the great bulk of the European 
defence contribution to NATO; their forces 
man the vital central front; they include all the 
most important defence production industries 
in Europe; they include all the countries on 
whose territory it is proposed to deploy a new 
generation of intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles if the INF talks fail. Most important, 
France, which has withdrawn its forces from 
the integrated military structure of NATO, 
remains a full member of WEU as does the 
only other European nuclear power, the United 
Kingdom. 
5.6. There is, however, a serious political 
disadvantage in discussing collective defence 
policy among only an inner nucleus of Euro-
pean allies. Your Rapporteur was made very 
much aware of it during his extensive discus-
sions in preparing the present report, and it has 
obviously inhibited member governements in 
making any such use of WEU since 
1950. Any proposal for a "causus" meeting 
of European countries within NATO is a 
delicate matter because of the obvious exclusion 
of the United States and Canada from such 
discussions. Any inner caucus meeting of 
seven countries within the fourteen European 
allies will be particularly resented by the 
remaining seven just as much as suggestions for 
defence meetings of a " big three " or " big 
four " - put forward occasionally in the past 
have been bitterly resented by other members 
of WEU. As it happens the peripheral Euro-
pean members of NATO, although the defence 
efforts of some of them may appear smaller 
than the average contribution of European 
countries, all make a vital contribution to allied 
defence through the strategic location of their 
mainland and island territories which almost 
completely block sea and air access of Soviet 
forces to the open oceans, or provide important 
naval bases, maritime patrol bases and sub-
marine listening posts. Norway and Turkey 
alone among NATO countries have common 
frontiers with the Soviet Union itself. 
5.7. For the foregoing reasons many members 
of the committee feel that in any attempt to 
agree on a European approach to the main 
principles of allied defence strategy it is essen-
tial to ensure the participation of all European 
members of NATO. On a number of occa-
sions in the past the Assembly has recommen-
ded that other European NATO countries 
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should be invited to JOID WEU 1; the Council 
has never agreed to extend such invitations 
knowing that they would not be taken up as 
was once made clear by one of the countries 
concerned 2• The political obstacles to acces-
sion to the modified Brussels Treaty by other 
European allies are several: first the treaty 
embodies many outdated restrictions on force 
ceilings and internal arms control; secondly 
accession at the present late stage could be seen 
as a vote of no-confidence in NATO and in the 
United States commitment which is particularly 
important to the countries of the periphery. 
Lastly, some European allies may not wish to 
subscribe to the terms of the mutual defence 
obligations in Article V of the Brussels Treaty 
which are more constraining than the corres-
ponding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
5.8. For all these reasons the draft recommen-
dation proposes in paragraph B.l that the 
Council should consider and report to the 
Assembly on the desirability of expanding its 
defence activities. The defence activities of the 
WEU Assembly remain uncontroversial. The 
draft resolution included in this report recalls 
the earlier Resolution 15 of the Assembly 
adopted on 18th June 1959, on a report from 
the Presidential Committee 3 whereby the 
Assembly considered the interests " of member 
states of NATO which are not members of 
WEU " and decided that the committee could 
invite observers from any NATO country to 
attend its meetings with the right to speak. In 
implementation of that resolution, the commit-
tee did in fact invite parliamentary observers 
from Denmark and Norway, some of whom 
duly attended meetings at that time, but the 
practice appears to have fallen into abeyance. 
The draft resolution now proposed would 
specifically invite parliamentary observers from 
all European NATO countries not members of 
WEU to participate with the right to speak in 
meetings of the committee which will be 
concerned with the preparation of the forth-
coming report on the state of European 
security. In paragraph 4 (b) of the draft recom-
mendation the committee also proposes that the 
Assembly should assist governments in explain-
ing to the European public and parliaments 
the contribution which the United States makes 
to allied defence. 
(c) Eurogroup 
5.9. Eurogroup describes itself as "an infor-
mal association of defence ministers of Euro-
pean member governments within the frame-
I. Recommendation 41 of 3rd December 1959; Recom-
mendation 372 of 1st December 1981. 
2. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 41. 
3. Text at Appendix IX. 
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work of NATO ... " open to all European mem-
bers of the alliance. It was founded in 1968 at 
the suggestion of Mr. Denis Healey (the then 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence) 
" as a means of responding to a widespread 
desire for closer European co-operation within 
the alliance " 1• In particular, the Eurogroup 
" provides an informal forum for an exchange 
of views by defence ministers on major poli-
tical/strategic questions affecting the common 
defence". 
5.10. Originally an informal dinner of defence 
ministers in 1968, discussion among partici-
pants today continues between the Permanent 
Representatives to NATO of the participating 
countries and their staffs. Participation in 
Eurogroup has extended progressively and now 
includes all European members of NATO with 
the exception of France. Significantly Spain, 
which does not yet participate in the integrated 
military structure of NATO, took part in 
the ministerial Eurogroup meeting on 29th 
November 1982. Eurogroup has no interna-
tional staff, or formal structure. Secretarial 
services are provided by the staffs of the various 
participating delegations. Meetings are held in 
the NATO headquarters. Eurogroup also aims 
at co-ordinating more closely the defence efforts 
of participating countries and for this purpose 
has established some nine subgroups which 
have had varying degrees of success. 
5.11. It is as an informal forum for discussion 
of political and strategic questions affecting 
common defence that Eurogroup activity 
appears to have increased during the last two 
years, as the European NATO countries have 
increasingly felt the need to co-ordinate the 
European attitude to the United States within 
NATO. Such " caucussing " within the 
NATO framework is of course a politically sen-
sitive matter, but Eurogroup provides a flexible 
and discreet framework because meetings bet-
ween officials within the NATO headquarters 
need not attract publicity. 
5.12. France does not participate in the Euro-
group; the then French Minister of Defence, 
Mr. Debre, took some weeks to consider the 
invitation to attend the first Eurogroup dinner 
of defence ministers in 1968. One factor at 
that time was that the British initiative was 
suspected of being a " back door " to British 
membership of the European Community then 
being negotiated. The other factor undoub-
tedly was the link with NATO. 
5.13. The first of these obstacles to French par-
ticipation in Eurogroup disappeared in 1973 
with British accession to the European Commu-
nity. As for the second, it can be said that 
1. Quotations from " The Eurogroup " pamphlet pub-
lished by Eurogroup, issued by NATO information service. 
Eurogroup as such has no closer links to 
NATO than France which, despite the 1966 
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
ture, has always remained a fuller part;cipant in 
NATO as a whole than is generally recognised. 
France, of course, is a full participant in the 
North Atlantic Council, as it is now in such 
NATO bodies as the new Air Defence Commit-
tee, in the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors, as well as in the three NATO mili-
tary agencies based in France. Some French 
nationals remain in the NATO International 
Staff, chiefly in the economic and political sec-
tions; French military missions are of course 
appointed to the NATO Military Committee 
and to all military headquarters. On balance it 
would seem that the political obstacles in the 
way of French participation in Eurogroup are 
fewer than those in the way of the accession of 
six or seven European NATO countries to 
WEU. It was noted at the time of the NATO 
summit meeting in Bonn in June 1982 that the 
attendance of President Mitterrand at the 
concluding formal dinner was a precedent. It 
could not be a greater precedent for a French 
Defence Minister to attend the next Eurogroup 
dinner of defence ministers - it is understood 
that an invitation was extended on one recent 
occasion. 
5.14. The committee suggests in paragraph B.2 
of the draft recommendation that the Council 
consider and report to the Assembly on the 
desirability of inviting all members of WEU to 
contribute to strengthening the European pillar 
of the western alliance. Many members 
believe that Eurogroup, where all European 
members of NATO except France are already 
present, remains the most flexible and appro-
priate method of concerting European positions 
on NA TO-related defence issues, without 
having a disruptive effect on allied defence 
planning. There is a case for strengthening the 
ability of Eurogroup to make its position better 
known in the United States, particularly to 
members of Congress. This can be co-ordi-
nated through the United Kingdom Embassy in 
Washington, as that country provides the 
permanent secretariat to Eurogroup, and addi-
tionally through the Washington Embassy of 
the country which for the time being is 
chairman-in-office of the Eurogroup as happe-
ned during a recent tour by Eurogroup officials 
and senior officers to the United States as a 
public relations exercise. 
(d) European political co-operation 
5.15. European political co-operation among 
the ten countries of the Community has been 
increasingly successful on a number of issues 
including Middle East policy. It is now agreed 
among the ten foreign ministers that " secu-
rity " policy can be discussed in that frame-
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work. The Falklands is a recent example of 
very rapid decision-making by the Ten in this 
framework in a resolution condemning the 
Argentine invasion. Other " security " matters 
discussed by the Ten include the European 
position in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and aspects of disarma-
ment usually considered in the United Nations 
framework. 
5.16. European political co-operation is a 
largely informal arrangement although the func-
tions of the " presidency " have developed 
around the three ministers comprising the 
foreign minister who is chairman-in-office for 
six months, associated with his immediate pre-
decessor and successor. In the foreign ministry 
of the chairman-in-office room is provided for 
one official from each of the two other coun-
tries associated with the "presidency" for the 
time being. However, European political co-
operation remains outside the framework of the 
European Community treaties themselves, and 
two or three member countries at least have 
reservations about extending the defence func-
tions of this institution at the present time. 
The neutral position of Ireland remains a pro-
blem. 
(e) Independent European Programme Group 
5.17. The IEPG is yet another informal group-
ing, without treaty or international staff, in 
which all European NATO countries parti-
cipate. Concerned with European armaments 
production, and co-ordination with the NATO 
Conference of National Armaments Directors 
in pursuance of a two-way street in defence 
equipment between Europe and the United 
States, this is not a body which is likely to 
become involved in discussing more general 
aspects of European defence policy. 
VI. Defence production 
6.1. In measuring progress on the concept of a 
two-way street in defence equipment between 
the United States and its European allies, 
a concept formally adopted by the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee in May 1975, it is 
useful to compare the attitudes of the Carter 
and Reagan administrations. 
(a) The Carter administration 
6.2. A few days before Ronald Reagan arrived 
at the White House on 20th January 1981, 
a report on rationalisation/standardisation 
within NATO (report to the United States 
Congress, January 1981) by Mr. Harold Brown 
of the Carter administration, outgoing Secretary 
of Defence, was published. According to this 
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report, the United States expects each NATO 
nation to do its fair share in support of the col-
lective defence of the West, but joint European 
defence production is considered to be the best 
means of improving the two-way street. The 
3 % formula goes hand in hand with a recom-
mendation that Europeans place their industries 
on a " united and collective basis ". Yet 
Europe and North America are the two richest, 
most technologically advanced industrial econo-
mies in the world. Together we have a combi-
ned GNP more than twice that of the Warsaw 
Pact. If we were to pool our resources and 
efforts and pull together, we could produce a 
credible and capable coalition defence, without 
economic strain. In his address to the NATO 
summit in London in May 1977, President 
Carter emphasised that: 
" A common European defence produc-
tion effort would help to achieve econo-
mies of a scale beyond the reach of 
national programmes. A strengthened 
defence production base in Europe would 
enlarge the opportunities for two-way 
transatlantic traffic in defence equipment, 
while adding to the overall capabilities of 
the alliance. 
The Europeans have sought the econo-
mic benefits Gobs and technological pride 
and progress) of developing, producing 
and selling weapons to the United States 
in order to earn the foreign exchange 
needed to buy weapons from the United 
States. But here we confront a structural 
problem within Europe itself that com-
pounds the problems already mentioned. 
Only Britain and France (and in some 
areas, Germany) can produce weapons 
to a continental scale. No country in 
Europe can produce to an interconti-
nental scale. Thus the economies of 
scale in the alliance needs - and the 
benefits the Europeans seek - cannot 
be fully realised until (in the words of the 
Culver-Nunn Legislation) the European 
nations organise their defence procure-
ment on 'a united and collective basis'. 
Europe's fragmented defence industrial 
base also makes it difficult for its indus-
tries to develop and produce weapons 
competitive in quality, quantity and 
price with those produced in the United 
States. " 
6.3. The attitude towards the IEPG is not 
negative either: 
" As a result of the Eurogroup initiatives, 
the European members of the alliance 
established the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) in February 
1976 with France as a full member. The 
Congress, in the Culver-Nunn Legislation 
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of July 1975, encouraged the European 
governments to accelerate their efforts to 
achieve European armaments collabora-
tion. President Carter at the London 
NATO summit in June 1977 also encou-
raged these collective European defence 
industrial efforts, and pledged to work 
with the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group as it gathered strength 
and cohesion. The United States has 
participated in a transatlantic dialogue 
with the IEPG in a series of meetings 
sponsored by the alliance as a whole. 
However, the IEPG has not developed 
into a strong device for co-ordinating 
European contributions to alliance arma-
ments development. " 
6.4. According to Mr. Brown's report, stan-
dardisation and interoperability are essential: 
" The challenges to standardisation and 
interoperability are many. In meeting 
them, we have had a number of impor-
tant successes in the past year. In our 
triad of rationalisation, standardisation 
and interoperability (RSI) initiatives, we 
signed the first memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) for a family of weapons, 
culminating two years of negotiations. 
We also made substantial progress 
towards a second family. We signed two 
more bilateral general reciprocal procure-
ment MOUs. Dual production of many 
major systems continues and is planned 
for others. The periodic armaments 
planning system (PAPS) and the NATO 
armaments planning review (NAPR) pro-
grammes have started, marking a major 
step toward an integrated and unified 
NATO arms planning system. The 
NATO airborne early warning and 
control programme is moving from plan-
ning to operational status. The alliance 
Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) has become increas-
ingly active and effective in its support of 
arms co-operation programmes. The 
European national armaments directors 
and defence ministers strongly expressed 
their sense of progress and commitment 
to NATO co-operative programmes at 
their fall 1980 meetings. We also conti-
nue to revise DoD directives so that the 
principles of standardisation and inter-
operability are reflected in our internal 
standard operating procedures. More-
over, we are undertaking two major new 
initiatives: (1) reviewing the feasibility of 
establishing a second source in Europe 
for selected systems and (2) examining 
our foreign ownership, control or influ-
ence regulations and procedures and how 
they affect cross-national investment in 
arms industries. 
Meeting challenges to standardisation/ 
interoperability 
To meet the challenges we have outlined, 
the United States has continued to take 
three primary approaches for increasing 
defence co-operation with allies: (1) reci-
procal procurement agreements, (2) dual 
production of weapons systems which 
have already been developed, and (3) 
sharing development of next-generation 
families of weapons. In addition, we are 
pursuing efforts at developing a NATO-
wide acquisition process, have continued 
to work on the NATO AEW &C pro-
gramme, and are working toward produc-
tion of a multiple-launch rocket system. 
We have also begun a programme by 
which DoD evaluates weapons and tech-
nologies of our allies in terms of potential 
utilisation in the United States in order 
to save research and development funds. 
Finally, the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors (CNAD) has been 
extremely active in the past year. We 
continued to make substantial progress in 
all of these areas. " 
6.5. Mr. Brown considers results achieved in 
1980 to be satisfactory: 
" The past year has been one of great 
success in NATO standardisation and 
interoperability. The momentum that 
has been building for several years has 
resulted in a rapid movement forward. 
Under the triad of initiatives, we have 
signed our first family of weapons MOU 
and have almost completed all of the 
reciprocal general procurement MOUs. 
Dual production of systems has proven 
most valuable. The CNAD has been 
extremely active with PAPS and NAPR 
now activated. The NATO AEW &C 
programme is nearing operational status 
and other new initiatives are under way. 
Congress has provided important support 
for United States and alliance efforts at 
standardisation and interoperability. In 
sum, 1980 was a year in which many of 
our efforts came to fruition and others 
are being refined and/or are nearing ful-
filment." 
6.6. Where armaments co-operation is concer-
ned, Mr. Brown's analysis lays greater emphasis 
on progress accomplished than on the imba-
lance of trade between the United States and 
Europe: 
" The alliance has made significant pro-
gress toward greater co-operation in ar-
maments. The Conference of National 
Armaments Directors has become a 
much stronger organisation which is now 
147 
DOCUMENT 94 7 
working on major co-operative program-
mes for the future. Under its auspices, 
the family of weapons concept promises a 
more efficient division of effort in the 
field of weapons development. The first 
family of weapons agreement signed in 
August 1980 covers air-to-air missiles 
and provides for the Europeans to deve-
lop an advanced short-range missile while 
the United States develops an advanced 
medium-range missile. Thus, the family 
of weapons has moved from concept to 
reality within four years. Also, the 
United States has negotiated bilateral 
MOUs for reciprocal procurement of 
defence equipment with individual allies 
(eleven have been signed, and one is 
pending). These agreements are designed 
to improve open competition in systems 
acquisition by waiving buy-national and 
other restrictive provisions. Ongoing or 
pending co-operative programmes include: 
(A) Dual production in the United 
States: Roland air defence system, 
MAG-58 armour machine gun, 120 mm 
tank gun, CFM engine (KC-135 re-engin-
ing), squad automatic weapon. 
(B) Dual production in Europe: F-16, 
MOD Flir, M483, improved conventional 
munition; Stinger man-portable air defence 
system, AIM-9L improved short-range 
air-to-air missile, Patriot. 
(C) Co-operative programmes: NATO 
AWACS, multiple-launch rocket systems 
(MLRS), rolling air frame missile (RAM), 
NATO small arms ammunition. 
6.7. Mr. Brown therefore asks for the support 
of Congress: 
" The Department of Defence appreciates 
the support Congress has given NATO 
rationalisation I standardisation I inter-
operability. Our efforts in this regard 
continue to be bolstered by the Congres-
sional affirmation in the FY 77 Defence 
Appropriation Act that it is United States 
policy for equipment procured by the 
United States for use in NATO to be 
standardised or at least interoperable with 
that of our allies and that progress toward 
realisation of standardisationlinteropera-
bility objectives would be enhanced by 
expanded inter-allied procurement of 
arms and equipment within NATO and 
greater reliance on licensing and copro-
duction." 
(b) The Reagan administration 
6.8. With the Reagan administration the Uni-
ted States seems not only to be keeping up 
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the transatlantic dialogue but also wishing to 
strengthen it, recognising its political import-
ance for the Atlantic Alliance. This was affir-
med by Mr. Richard DeLauer, United States 
Under-Secretary of Defence, at the CNAD 
meeting in Brussels on 5th May 1981. The 
Reagan administration strongly supports United 
States and NATO arms co-operation program-
mes but apparently, unlike the Carter adminis-
tration, lays greater stress on the fact that 
industry must play a more active role in the 
process of armaments co-operation than on the 
need for widespread intra-European co-opera-
tion so that Europe may become a real 
competitor for the United States. 
6.9. The programme of the symposium on 
industrial co-operation with NATO, held in 
Brussels in April 1983, also offers a number of 
ideas, for instance: 
"(a) review of mandatory DoD contract 
clauses and subcontract flow-down 
provisions to delete those which are 
inapplicable or unnecessary for 
contractors/subcontractors located 
outside the United States; 
(b) negotiation of ' contract adminis-
tration' and 'pricing/auditing' an-
nexes to general MOUs to pro-
vide for reciprocal exchange of 
government services 
- audit agreements exist for France 
and United Kingdom 
- first contract administration an-
nex signed with the Netherlands 
in April 1982 ; 
(c) strong emphasis on 'industry-to-
industry' seminars to explore mu-
tual business opportunities ; 
(d) defence acqulSltiOn circular 
no. 76-25, issued on 31st October 
1980 
- first major change to section VI 
' Foreign acquisitions ' in over 
20 years 
- includes all NATO general 
MO Us 
- creates new part 14 ' Purchases 
from NATO participating sour-
ces' 
- waives ' Buy American Act '; cus-
toms duties etc. 
- stresses open subcontracting with 
NATO sources. " 
6.10. Mr. Weinberger, United States Secretary 
of Defence, in his report on the allied contribu-
tion to the common defence (Department of 
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Defence, March 1982) considers that NATO 
has developed major programmes for improving 
the alliance's defence capability: 
" These are the coproduction, dual pro-
duction and families of weapons pro-
grammes. These programmes provide 
for the sharing of development and pro-
duction costs and can produce substantial 
savings in R&D expenditures. Such 
savings can improve the industrial base 
in the United States, Canada and Europe 
and assist technology transfer within the 
alliance. These transfers take place in 
both directions - from Europe to the 
United States and from the United States 
to Europe. " 
Major examples quoted by Mr. Weinberger are 
United States procurement of the MAG-58 
machine gun and the 120 mm smooth bore 
tank gun. He underlines that Europeans have 
derived benefits from coproduction in the 
framework of the F -16 aircraft programme: 
" Both sides may benefit from future air-
to-air missile weapons families. Dual 
production, coproduction and the family 
of weapons programmes enable industry 
to distribute large R&D costs, to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale and to 
share in advanced technology. " 
6.11. Unlike Mr. Brown, he also stresses the 
problem caused by the imbalance in the equip-
ment trade between the United States and its 
partners: 
" In 1980, eight major NATO trading 
partners (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway 
and the United Kingdom) accepted Uni-
ted States manufactured defence equip-
ment deliveries amounting to $1.85b. In 
contrast, the United States accepted deli-
veries on only $0.20b from those same 
NATO countries - a ratio of 9.4: 1 
favouring the United States. The com-
parable ratio was 5.3:1 in 1977 and has 
been increasing consistently since then in 
favour of the United States." 
6.12. In the report standardisation of equip-
ment within NATO (report to the United States 
Congress, January 1983), Mr. Weinberger com-
ments on the efforts of the Department of 
Defence and NATO allies to standardise, or at 
least make interoperable, equipment (including 
weapons systems, ammunition and fuel) of 
allied forces committed to NATO. Mr. Wein-
berger considers progress has been made in the 
effort to strengthen alliance conventional forces 
and to adapt the alliance defence posture to the 
changing needs of the 1980s: 
" Improvements in NATO planning pro-
cedures are contributing to the process of 
improving standardisation and interoper-
ability within NATO. NATO has 
agreed to explore urgently ways to 
improve its conventional defence by 
taking advantage of emerging technolo-
gies. " 
6.13. Mr. Weinberger considers it necessary to: 
" ... improve NA TO's efforts to allocate 
development of related weapon types to 
specific allies under the family of wea-
pons concept. Artificial barriers to trade 
in defence equipment must be removed 
under the reciprocal memoranda of 
understanding that we have with our 
allies. 
Coproduction may be selectively 
employed to provide industrial parti-
cipation to allies who agree to adopt 
standardised systems. 
Finally, the two-way street/armaments 
co-operation must be made a reality 
through increased trade in defence equip-
ment in both directions across the Atlan-
tic resulting in benefits to NATO as a 
whole." 
6.14. Another difference between Mr. Wein-
berger's approach (see abovementioned text) 
and that of Mr. Brown is the emphasis he 
places on the need for a major leadership role 
for industry (in this process) and his desire to 
see a reduction in obstacles to direct industry-
to-industry agreements. 
6.15. In the United States, it has been decided 
that the determination of allied governments is 
not enough. It is also necessary to obtain Uni-
ted States Congress backing and ensure a will 
on the part of American industry to carry out 
European projects jointly. Anxiety about 
unemployment also carries great weight in this 
analysis. Mr. Weinberger concludes the intro-
duction to the abovementioned report with 
remarks about Congress's attitude: 
"We welcome the positive statement of 
the Congress for greater co-operation 
with our allies as expressed in the FY 
1983 Defence Authorisation Act. 
We will intensify consultations to meet 
these objectives. At the same time we 
solicit the assistance of Congress in elimi-
nation of obstacles to co-operation, e.g. 
specialty metals legislation which is 
seriously undermining NA TO's arms co-
operation efforts. " 
6.16. Nevertheless the rhetoric exceeds tenfold 
the practical progress made towards achieving 
an equitable two-way street. True there are 
notable examples of European equipment's 
being accepted for the United States armed for-
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ces but primarily where the European produce 
was outstanding such as the Harrier for the 
United States Marine Corps, the Hawk for the 
United States navy and the CF-56 powerplant 
for the KC-135 tankers of Strategic Air Com-
mand. 
6.17. Surprisingly, amendments in favour of 
NATO industrial co-operation like the Roth-
Glenn-Nunn Amendment (Appendix VI) can 
be passed by the Senate and yet amendments 
like the Speciality Metals Amendments and the 
Defence Appropriations Bill are carried which 
do immense damage to the prospects of the 
procurement of European equipment by the 
United States armed forces and to transatlantic 
relations. 
6.18. The Europeans do not help their own 
cause by their slow progress towards interopera-
bility, standardisation, and joint development 
and procurement. The IEPG has had great 
difficulty, inevitably, in harmonising national 
operational requirements and procurement 
time-scales. Some promising examples exist of 
greater co-operation such as the Tornado pro-
gramme or the new generation of collaborative 
anti-tank guided weapons. Others such as the 
tortoise-like progress towards a new European 
combat aircraft for the Italian air force, Luft-
waffe and Royal Air Force show how hard 
it is even for the Europeans to concert their 
procurement among themselves let alone with 
the United States. 
(c) Conclusions 
6.19. Both the democratic and republican 
administrations placed and are placing empha-
sis on the need for standardisation and/or at 
least interoperability of allied equipment. Both 
show interest in the principle of the two-way 
street, considered to be essential for enhancing 
the defence capability of the alliance itself. 
6.20. However, there are differences of tone or 
rather of emphasis in the two approaches. 
Mr. Carter's administration underlined the idea 
that large-scale intra-European co-operation 
could have been a means of making Europe a 
true competitor for the United States. The 3% 
formula goes hand in hand with this idea. The 
Reagan administration makes more direct refer-
ence to the imbalance of trade between the 
United States and Europe but in its strong 
desire to pursue cross-Atlantic industrial team-
ing does not mention the expediency of 
intra-European co-operation (at least in the 
reports examined by your Rapporteur) and, 
although on the one hand it proposes to repeal 
the Buy American Act, on the other hand it 
vigorously asserts the need for a " major lea-
dership role for industry " and a reduction in 
" obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agree-
ments". 
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VII. Forces of WEU countries 
(a) General 
7 .1. This section briefly summarises the forces 
which the WEU countries make available for 
allied defence. There are of course other 
important forces in Europe: those of the United 
States and of the other European NATO coun-
tries - Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Turkey. 
(b) Belgium 
7.2. The Belgian forces, which include con-
scripts, are mostly NA TO-assigned in pea~e­
time. A significant element of the Be~gtan 
corps is stationed in the Federal Repubhc of 
Germany in peacetime and comes under the 
command of the NATO Northern Army 
Group but there is some doubt about con-
tinued' Belgian participation in the vita~ Haw.k 
SAM screen in Germany. The Belgian au 
force is largely under command <?f the 2n~ 
Tactical Air Force of NATO. BelgiUm contn-
butes a parachute battalion group to th~ ACE 
Mobile Force and transports them m the 
C-130s of its air force. The small but modem 
naval force usually contributes a frigate to the 
peacetime Standing Force Atlantic and mine-
sweepers to the Standing Force Channel. ~~e­
ther with the Netherlands they form a JOmt 
minesweeping force for their coastal wa.ters. In 
developing situations, reserve fof!Dat10ns are 
formed to reinforce the NA TO-assigned forces, 
or to provide a force under national con~rol for 
internal defence, and for the protectiOn of 
national lines of communication. In wartime 
all naval ships will operate under NATO 
control. 
(c) France 
some twenty-eight conventional submarines, the 
navy possesses two conventional aircra~-car­
riers and some forty-four destroyers, fngates 
and ' corvettes. The naval air arm has a 
total of some 200 aircraft, some that are car-
rier-borne and others that are engaged in 
maritime surveillance. The French air force is 
based in France, although there is normally a 
detachment at Djibouti. The French air force 
consists of some 700 combat aircraft and there 
are about 300 aircraft in the transport or 
liaison role. The French army has already des-
patched a contingent to join the United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon. It alwa~s. has 
units at readiness to meet requests for mihtary 
aid at typically brigade group strengt~ with the 
necessary air force support for countnes such. as 
Chad who have a military aid agreement wtth 
France. French forces at battalion strength are 
stationed in Guyana, at Kourou, and in 
Mururoa Oceania, and are mainly employed in 
the engi~eer role. French overseas territo~es, 
which are administered as part of metropohtan 
France have their own local defence forces in 
which iocal conscript soldiers serve. 
(d) Federal Republic of Germany 
7 .4. Almost without exception, the armed for-
ces of the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
include conscripts, are based in the Federal 
Republic. The army, howev~r, has. a training 
facility in Canada and the .Umted Kini?idom for 
tank formations and the au force, until recen-
tly, has maintained an F-104 pilo~ train~ng 
facility in the United States of Amenca which 
will be closed due to the establishment of a new 
facility in the United Kingdom for t~aining 
Tornado pilots at RAF Cottesmore for aircrews 
of the Luftwaffe, German naval air arm, Italian 
air force and RAF. 
7 .5. For the defence of the Federal Republic's 
eastern frontier, the land forces place an army 
corps size formation under Northern Army 
7.3. France, although a member of the NATO Group and two army corps under the command 
alliance does not assign forces to NATO and of the Central Army Group. A further forma-
does ndt participate in the integrated military tion operates in the Jutland area under the 
structure although elements of these forces par- command of Allied Forces Northern Europe. 
ticipate from time-to-time on a bilateral basis Reserve formations are assembled during deve-
in military exercises outside. the NA.T<? ar~a loping situations to reinforce NATO and to 
with allied nations. There IS conscnpt10n m protect lines of communication. The 1?-aval 
France. France maintains an army corps in forces consist of some twenty-four conventional 
Germany, consisting of three divisions, and a submarines, twenty frigates and destrorers~ an.d 
garrison in Berlin at battalion strength. Some some fifty light fast-patrol craft. Theu role Is 
corps troops are stationed in north-east to maintain naval superiority of the Baltic Sea 
France. Two army corps headquarters and and the Kattegat and to operate in the North 
some eleven other divisions are located in Sea; they contribute unit~ to the Standing For?e 
France and their army is tasked to defend Atlantic and the Standmg Force Channel m 
French territory in war. The French navy will peacetime. 
eventually have six nuclear missile submarines 
for deterrence; Jaguar aircraft squadrons, and of 7.6. The navy is supported by some twenty 
course the ballistic missiles at the Plateau d'Al- maritime patrol aircraft and has some 100 
bion installation, and nuclear-capable Mirage-IV shore-based 1 04-G fighters w~ich are being gra-
aircraft also serve this purpose. Besides having dually replaced by Tornado aucraft. 
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7. 7. The air force possesses some 600 combat 
aircraft, most of which are assigned to NATO 
and serve in the 2nd and the 4th Tactical Air 
Forces. There is a detachment of the Luft-
waffe with an air-sea rescue capability at 
the NATO training base at Decimomannu 
Sardinia. ' 
(e) Luxembourg 
7.8. Luxembourg provides a regimental com-
bat team, which includes conscripts, which is 
normally assigned to the ACE Mobile Force 
but is transported by the air forces of other 
NATO countries. 
(/) Italy 
7.9. Italy confines its forces almost entirely to 
the defence of its territory and its immediate 
coastal waters. It is fair to say that the three 
services of the Italian forces, which include 
co~scripts, are to all intents and purposes 
assigned to NATO. They comprise an army 
corps based in the north of Italy, and twenty-
five squadrons of aircraft, totalling some 
300 combat machines, some of which have a 
maritime role. Italy possesses a fleet of 
twenty-seven warships and a number of fast 
attack craft. There remains about three 
brigades under national command for internal 
defence in wartime. The Italians, at the 
moment, are contributing to the United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon and they 
provide contingents for the ACE Mobile Force 
which they airlift in their own aircraft. 
(g) Netherlands 
7 .I 0. The Netherlands armed forces, which 
include conscripts, are mainly based in that 
country, although a naval picket ship is 
normally on station in the Netherlands Antilles 
with a detachment of marines, and one or two 
maritime aircraft for air-sea rescue and coastal 
suryeillance tasks are based there. The army 
ass1gns an army corps to NATO, consisting of 
an armoured division and two infantry divi-
sions. The navy contributes units to the Stand-
ing Force Atlantic and Standing Force Channel. 
Their minesweeping effort works jointly with 
that of Belgium. The fleet of some fifteen des-
tr~yers and frigates, supported by fleet supply 
sh1ps and six submarines, is also assigned to 
NATO. Two squadrons of maritime patrol 
aircraft are available. The air force has some 
200 combat aircraft and is almost completely 
under NATO command. 
(h) United Kingdom 
7.11. The United Kingdom considers that the 
support of NATO is the principal role of its 
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regular armed forces. On the European conti-
nent a corps, comprising three divisions and an 
artillery division, is assigned to NATO. The 
logistical support of these formations remains 
under national control. This British effort is 
called the British Army of the Rhine, and in 
1982 was at an average peacetime strength of 
~ome 58,600 !fie~. 1 The Brussels Treaty 
1mposes an obhgatlon upon the United King-
dom to station an army of the equivalent 
of four divisions and a tactical air force on the 
continent. The Royal Air Force maintains a 
number of air bases in Germany on which some 
160 combat aircraft are stationed in peacetime. 
These are assigned to the 2nd Tactical Air 
Force of NATO. Reforming in the United 
Kingdom at this moment is the 2nd Infantry 
Division, comprising regular and reserve briga-
des and of course their supporting arms. 
This formation is to reinforce BAOR when 
required. The United Kingdom has its own 
air defence capability which operates under 
NATO. The United Kingdom maintains a 
brigade in Berlin and a strong presence of all 
three arms of service in the Falklands at 
brigade strength. A battalion-sized garrison is 
kept in Gibraltar together with naval elements 
to support fleet operations in the Mediterranean 
if required. A battalion group, with a detach-
ment of Harrier aircraft and a naval picket ship 
is based on Belize in Central America. Th~ 
United Kingdom is able to provide a contribu-
tion to the ACE Mobile Force - usually Royal 
Marines - for deployment on the flanks of 
NATO and able to engage in Arctic warfare if 
required. 
7.12. Naval elements are provided to the 
Standing Force Atlantic and the Standing Force 
Channel. Contributions are made to the Uni-
ted Nations peacekeeping forces in Cyprus and 
Lebanol!, the United Kingdom base in Cyprus 
supportmg this force. The British forces are 
required to provide training support for certain 
former colonies and the Gulf states. Certain 
units of the forces assigned to NATO are 
detached for duty in Northern Ireland in order 
to maintain law and order in a paramilitary 
role. 
7.13. Maritime aircraft, operating from United 
Kingdom shores, are able to maintain surveil-
lance over a wide sea area, particularly the 
Faroes gap and the Denmark Strait and are able 
to engage hostile naval submarine and surface 
units. Airborne early warning aircraft extend 
the United Kingdom surveillance capability. 
The United Kingdom possesses its own nuclear 
deterrent in the form of four nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines which each carry 
sixteen Polaris missiles, which is to be modem-
1. Twenty-eighth annual 
Document 942, page 11. 
report of the Council, 
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ised towards the end of this decade through 
the construction of four new nuclear-powered 
ballistic-missile submarines and the procure-
ment of a complement of Trident 05 missiles 
for them. 
(i) ACE Mobile Force 
7.14. The committee has frequently drawn 
attention in the past to the political importance 
of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force 
(AMF) which, when activated, draws on spe-
cially trained and equipped units supplied by 
all WEU countries (except France), the United 
States and Canada. In a crisis it can be rapidly 
deployed by air to either NATO flank to pro-
vide a military demonstration of the political 
solidarity of the alliance. The force comprises 
a land component of brigade group size drawn 
from infantry battalions and support units sup-
plied by Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and an air component of some 
four squadrons one of which is provided by the 
Netherlands. AMF is a tangible demonstration 
of burden-sharing in a joint allied force and it is 
essential that participating countries meet their 
commitments. At present the land component 
needs more local air defence, and the Luxem-
bourg infantry battalion - the only military unit 
which Luxembourg contributes to NATO - is 
at less than half strength. 
VIII. Nuclear weapons 
8 .1. The committee is to prepare a separate 
report on all aspects of nuclear weapons for the 
second part of the session in November; it last 
reported in detail in May 1982 1• The present 
chapter merely records the present levels of 
nuclear weapons, the status of modernisa-
tion and improvement programmes and the 
relevant arms control negotiations. 
(a) Cu"ent lenls of nuclear weapons 
8.2. Current information on levels of nuclear 
weapons by categories is given at Appendix 
VIII - estimates for autumn 1982 with some 
updating. 
(b) INF debate 
8.3. The INF debate goes back at least to the 
late 1950s when the Soviet Union began 
deployment of some 600 SS-4 and SS-5 
medium-range missiles while NATO deployed 
comparable Thor missiles in the United King-
dom and Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey, 
and had primitive cruise missiles of the day -
1. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Docu-
ment 918, 19th May 1982. 
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Matador and later Mace - deployed in Ger-
many. With the entry into service of ICBMs, 
however, these NATO weapons systems were 
rapidly considered obsolescent and were phased 
out by 1963, reliance being placed both on the 
United States ICBM and SLBM force and on 
aircraft including the forward-based F-111 in 
the United Kingdom, the FB-lllA in the Uni-
ted States, and carrier-home aircraft. 
8.4. NATO began a re-examination of the 
theatre nuclear force (as it was then called) 
position in the light of the appearance of the 
Soviet Backfire bomber from 1974 and SS-20 
missile from 1977. A high level group under 
United States chairmanship was established in 
NATO and considered NATO force improve-
ment proposals ranging from 200 to 600 mis-
siles. In April 1979, NATO established a 
similar special group to examine the arms 
control aspects of theatre nuclear forces. At 
the conclusion of these deliberations a special 
meeting of NATO foreign and defence minis-
ters announced the " dual track " decision on 
12th December 1979 whereby NATO decided 
on the deployment in Europe of 572 United 
States nuclear missiles distributed as follows : 
Country 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
TOTAL 
GLCM 
48 
48 
96 
112 
160 
464 
Pershing 11 
108 
108 
8.5. The communique said : 
Total 
48 
48 
204 
112 
160 
572 
" As an integral part of TNF moderni-
sation, 1,000 United States nuclear war-
heads will be withdrawn from Europe 
as soon as feasible... The 572 LR TNF 
warheads should be accommodated 
within that reduced level. " 
8.6. The communique stressed the importance 
of arms control and supported the United States 
decision to negotiate LRTNF limitations with 
the Soviet Union along the following lines: 
" A. Any future limitations on United 
States systems principally designed for 
theatre missions should be accompanied 
by appropriate limitations on Soviet thea-
tre systems. 
B. Limitation on United States and 
Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems 
should be negotiated bilaterally in the 
SALT Ill framework in a step-by-step 
approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these 
negotiations should be the establishment 
of agreed limitations on United States 
and Soviet land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear missile systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these sys-
tems must be consistent with the prin-
ciple of equality between the sides. 
Therefore, the limitations should take the 
form of de jure equality in ceilings and in 
rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be ade-
quately verifiable. " 
8.7. The communique concluded: 
" 11. The ministers have decided to 
pursue these two parallel and comple-
mentary approaches in order to avert an 
arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet 
TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability 
of NA TO's strategy of deterrence and 
defence and thus maintain the security of 
its member states. 
A. A modernisation decision, including a 
commitment to deployments is necessary 
to meet NA TO's deterrence and defence 
needs, to provide a credible response to 
unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and 
to provide the foundation for the pursuit 
of serious negotiations on TNF. 
B. Success of arms control in constrain-
ing the Soviet build-up can enhance 
alliance security, modify the scale of 
NA TO's TNF requirements, and pro-
mote stability and detente in Europe in 
consonance with NA TO's basic policy 
of deterrence, defence and detente as 
enunciated in the Harmel report. 
NA TO's TNF requirements will be exa-
mined in the light of concrete results 
reached through negotiations. " 
8.8. Deployment of the United States missiles 
is to begin at the end of 1983 and site construc-
tion is in progress in the United Kingdom and 
Italy. There have been conflicting reports of 
progress in development of Pershing 11 and the 
Tomahawk GLCM in the United States. Bel-
gium and the Netherlands have reserved a final 
decision on deployment in their countries pend-
ing an assessment of progress in the INF 
negotiations. 
8.9. The bilateral INF talks opened in 
Geneva towards the end of 1980, under the 
Carter administration, and were then adjourned 
for a year until 30th November 1981 while the 
Reagan administration considered its negotia-
ting position. On 21st October 1981 the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group formulated 
NA TO's zero option position : " On the basis 
of reciprocity the zero level remains a possible 
option under ideal circumstances ... ". Presi-
dent Reagan defined the zero option in more 
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detail in a speech on 18th November 1981: 
"The United States is prepared to cancel its 
deployment of Pershing 11 and ground-launched 
cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their 
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. " 
8.10. The SS-20 missile has been deployed 
both in European Soviet Union and around the 
U rals, from both of which sites it is within 
range of Europe, and about one-third out of 
range of Europe near Mongolia. The United 
States has made it clear that the zero option 
would require the Soviet U niQn to dismantle all 
SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles whether in range 
of Europe or of China and Japan, particularly 
stressing that some of these missiles are a threat 
to Japan and other Asian countries. 
8.11. On 30th March 1983, President Reagan, 
apparently responding to urgings from most 
European allies, announced that the United 
States had informed the Soviet Union in the 
INF talks in Geneva that the United States was 
" prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in 
which the United States would substantially 
reduce its planned deployment of Pershing 11 
and GLCM provided the Soviet Union reduce 
the number of its warheads on longer-range 
INF missiles to an equal level on a global 
basis ", and had proposed that the talks, which 
had adjourned for Easter, resume on 17th May. 
The zero option remained on the table. 
Press reports had earlier suggested the proposals 
would imply an interim level of 300 INF war-
heads on each side, but the statement made no 
reference to numbers, nor did it link an interim 
agreement to Soviet acceptance of zero levels as 
the ultimate aim. By referring to " a global 
basis", the statement included all Soviet INF 
systems in the Far East as well as Europe. 
8.12. The public position of the Soviet Union 
on the INF talks had been Mr. Andropov's ear-
lier statement of 21st December 1982, key 
excerpts from which are: 
" .. . We have suggested an agreement 
renouncing all types of nuclear weapons 
- both medium-range and tactical -
designed to strike targets in Europe ... 
We have also suggested another variant : 
that the USSR and the NATO countries 
reduce their medium-range weaponry by 
more than two-thirds. So far the United 
States will not have it... It has submitted 
a proposal which, as if in mockery, is 
called a zero option. It envisages elimi-
nation of all Soviet medium-range mis-
siles not only in the European, but also 
in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, 
while NA TO's arsenal of nuclear missiles 
in Europe is to remain intact and may 
even be increased... We ... will conti-
nue to work for an agreement on a basis 
that is fair to both sides. We are prepa-
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red, among other things, to agree that the 
Soviet Union should retain in Europe 
only as many missiles as are kept there 
by Britain and France - and not a single 
one more. This means that the Soviet 
Union would cut down by hundreds of 
missiles, including dozens of the latest 
missiles, known in the West as 
SS-20... If later the number of British 
and French missiles were scaled down, 
the number of Soviet ones would be addi-
tionally reduced by just as many. Along 
with this there must also be an accord 
on reducing to equal levels on both sides 
the number of medium-range nuclear-
delivery aircraft stationed in this region 
by both the USSR and the NATO coun-
tries. " 
8.13. At a rare televised Moscow press confer-
ence on 2nd April, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, rejected President Reagan's 
proposals of 30th March, stressing that it 
would give NATO a 2.5 to 1 superiority over 
the Warsaw Pact in warheads on all INF 
systems. He reiterated the demand for British 
and French nuclear forces, and United States 
forward based systems, to be taken into 
account. He rejected the " global " basis of the 
United States proposal to cover Soviet systems 
in Asia, pointing out that the Soviet Union was 
surrounded " by a ring of United States bases " 
where United States "medium-range nuclear 
weapons are deployed ". The latest public 
statement of the Soviet position was contained 
in Mr. Andropov's speech at a dinner in 
Moscow for the East German leader, 
Mr. Honecker, on 3rd May 1983, in which he 
offered to count warheads, as well as missiles, 
but still insisted on British and French nuclear 
forces being taken into account, and on limiting 
the scope of an agreement to Soviet weapons 
" in the European part of the Soviet 
Union". The real Soviet negotiating position 
will be explored only when the bilateral talks 
resume in Geneva on 17th May. 
8.14. United States press reports of 16th and 
20th January 1983 said Mr. Nitze, the United 
States JNF negotiator, had discussed an infor-
mal agreement with his Soviet counterpart, 
Mr. Kvitsinsky, in July 1982 whereby the 
United States would forego all planned INF 
missile deployments in Europe if the Soviet 
Union reduced its INF missiles in range of 
Europe from 500 to 50, and froze those in 
range of China and Japan at the present level of 
100. The proposal was said to have been 
rejected by the Soviet Union and not subse-
quently endorsed by the United States author-
ities. 
8.15. Opposition circles in the United States 
and some European countries have regarded 
the " zero-zero '' option as unrealistic on 
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the grounds that the Soviet Union has had 
600 intermediate-range missiles deployed since 
the early 1960s and cannot be expected to 
reduce these weapons to zero in exchange for 
the non-deployment by NATO of weapons that 
do not yet exist. Mr. Paul Warnke, the 
former Director of United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, and negotiator of 
SALT 11, has proposed that : 
" 1. all intermediate-range missiles be 
taken into account, regardless of nationa-
lity or whether launched from the land or 
sea; and 
2. the United States would cancel the 
Pershing 11 and GLCM deployment if the 
Soviets reduced an equivalent number of 
warheads. " 1 
This would involve the dismantling by the 
Soviet Union of all 280 remaining obsolete 
SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and about 100 of the 
SS-20 missiles. " The result would be equili-
brium between the Soviet land-based force of 
SS-20 missiles and the western (British, French 
and American) sea-based missiles of interme-
diate range. The Soviets would have 215 
SS-20 missiles (100 of which would remain 
targeted only on China or Japan) carrying 645 
warheads, and the West would have 184 mis-
siles carrying 544 warheads. (There are also 
eighteen land-based French IRBMs and 
approximately thirty Soviet SS-N-5 
SLBMs.)" Mr. Denis Healey, in his address to 
the WEU Assembly Socialist Group in Decem-
ber 1982, specifically endorsed Mr. Warnke's 
proposals. 
8.16. Reports of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on a number of 
occasions have endorsed both aspects of the 
NATO dual track decision of December 1979, 
but have stressed that any attempt to measure 
''nuclear balance" between East and West can 
only be done globally, taking account of all 
categories of nuclear weapons on both sides, 
because of the great complexity of defining 
categories of nuclear weapon which should be 
deemed " of interest " to the European thea-
tre. Reports have similarly stressed that for 
deterrent purposes reliance must be placed on 
the whole range of nuclear weapons available to 
the West, so as to avoid any risk of" decoup-
ling" the United States strategic deterrent 
through mistaken reliance on a supposed sepa-
rate nuclear balance within Europe. Any 
agreement on the reduction of weapons on the 
other hand would almost certainly have to be 
limited to narrow categories of weapons sys-
tems. Reports have stressed that although 
there can be no question of France or the Uni-
I. Source : Committee for National Security - statement 
released on 16th September 1982. 
ted Kingdom accepting reductions in the pre-
sent relatively small levels of their nuclear wea-
pons, while levels of Soviet and United States 
weapons remain very large, nevertheless exist-
ing numbers of British and French weapons are 
inevitably taken into account by the Soviet 
Union in its own assessment of the balance. 
(c) Strategic nuclear weapons 
8.17. As part of the United States strategic 
force modernisation programme the air-laun-
ched cruise missile became operational for the 
first time on 16th December 1982 when a 
squadron of fourteen specially marked B-52s 
were fitted with twelve ALCM each, the first of 
20 I B-52s earmarked to carry ALCM of which 
4,348 have been ordered 1• The special mark-
ing of the B-52s in accordance with SALT 11 
is to permit external verification. Plans for 
deployment of the controversial MX ICBM are 
still in abeyance pending further decisions on 
the basing mode. A bi-partisan Presidential 
Commission on Strategic Forces appointed by 
President Reagan, under the chairmanship of 
retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, 
reported on 12th April that the Soviet ability to 
destroy United States land-based missiles (as 
claimed by the Reagan administration) was 
theoretical only, because of" problems of ope-
ration accuracies " and " planning uncertain-
ties". The commission recognised that rea-
sonable survivability of ICBMs " may not out-
last this century ", that the MX could not be 
invulnerable, but that I 00 should be deployed 
in Minuteman silos, and that a new small 
mobile ICBM with only one warhead should be 
developed. On 17th December 1982 the forty-
eight British Vulcan bombers were withdrawn 
from service. 
8.18. The SALT 11 Treaty negotiated during 
the successive presidencies of Nixon, Ford and 
Carter, signed by the last on 18th June 1979, 
has not been ratified. The Reagan adminis-
tration has found it " fatally flawed " but decla-
red that it will not " undercut " it provided the 
Soviet Union does not do so either. SALT 11 
was signed on the assumption that negotiations 
on a SALT Ill, to include restrictions on thea-
tre or forward-based nuclear systems, would 
have started at once, and the attitude of the 
United States Administration to the protocol to 
SALT 11 is not clear. The protocol would 
have expired on the last day of 1981 and for-
bids : (i) the deployment or testing of mobile 
ICBMs; (ii) the deployment of GLCMs or 
SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km; or 
l. Press reports have suggested the existing ALCM will 
shortly become vulnerable to Soviet AWACS and improved 
defences; it will be replaced by a new model with small 
radar image. 
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the testing of such missiles with MIRV s; 
(iii) the testing or deployment of air-to-surface 
ballistic missiles. 
8.19. United States proposals for reductions of 
strategic nuclear weapons in the START talks, 
proceeding parallel to the INF talks in Geneva, 
were announced by President Reagan on 9th 
May 1982 in general terms, concentrating 
on a reduction in ICBMs, the category in which 
the Soviet Union is superior to the United 
States. Officials at that time said the proposal 
was for a common ceiling of 850 ballistic mis-
siles (SLBMs plus ICBMs) with a total of not 
more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 
warheads could be on ICBMs. This was said 
to involve a reduction of I ,500 Soviet missiles 
and I ,300 warheads compared with a reduction 
of 850 United States missiles and 2,200 war-
heads, the reductions to be carried out over ten 
years. 
8.20. Mr. Andropov, in his speech of 21st 
December 1982, proposed a 25 % reduction in 
all strategic weapons of both sides, restrictions 
on improvements to nuclear weapons, and a 
freeze at present levels while negotiations were 
in progress. Comments in Pravda of 2nd 
January 1983 pointed out that this proposal 
amounted to a 25% reduction in the ceilings of 
SALT 11 to leave each side with a combined 
total of I ,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers by 1990. The Soviet Union has 
proposed a total ban on all new types of 
strategic weapon including ALCM, GLCM and 
SLCM. 
IX. Conclusions 
9.1. The present burden-sharing problem 
arises chiefly because of differences in the way 
that the European allies on the one hand and 
the present United States administration on the 
other approach relations with the Soviet Union, 
differences which lead to differing views as to 
the necessary size of the total allied defence 
effort. 
9.2. Because of these difficulties the com-
mittee fully recognises that there is a greater 
need for defence consultation between Euro-
pean allies and for a more equal political rela-
tionship between the European members and 
the United States. The relative merits of WEU 
and the Eurogroup as a forum for discussion 
among European allies are examined in Chap-
ter V above and the committee's conclu-
sions are presented in paragraphs A.4 and B of 
the draft recommendation and in the draft reso-
lution. There is a need for the European posi-
tion to be expounded clearly in the United 
States, especially to Congress committees and 
staffs, through a public relations effort co-
ordinated by the Washington embassies of the 
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countries which provide the Eurogroup secre-
tariat and chairman-in-office. Reciprocally 
there is a need for European public opinion and 
parliaments to show greater appreciation of all 
aspects of the United States contribution to 
allied defence; WEU, especially the Assembly, 
has an important role to play in this connec-
tion. 
9.3. International comparisons between the 
defence efforts of different countries are difficult 
to make, both because of problems of metho-
dology discussed in Chapter Ill above, and 
because of differences in military manpower 
policy, geography, economic and industrial 
capacity, logistic infrastructure, political prior-
ities and perceptions of the threat. The com-
mittee concludes however that the European 
allies for the most part now carry a very 
reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share 
which has increased from 24 % to 38 o/o in the 
last twenty-five years, and has increased most 
significantly in the first eight years of the last 
decade during which the United States effort 
declined. 
9 .4. It is important to maintain the collective 
commitment to an annual increase in de-
fence expenditure in real terms as long as the 
Soviet military build-up continues, and to meet 
the NATO biennial force goals as approved by 
nations on proposals from the supreme com-
manders. Certain specific improvements listed 
in paragraphs 1 (b), (c) and (d) of the draft 
recommendation are also required. 
9.5. Unilateral decisions by any allied country 
to opt out of a specific defence role which 
forms a part of collective allied defence plans 
can be particularly damaging. Despite its 
theoretical attraction the committee has not 
identified specific role-sharing opportunities 
that would permit any greater specialisation by 
member countries in specific military roles than 
exists at present. 
9.6. In the case of developments beyond the 
NATO area which the allies jointly recognise as 
threatening the vital interests of the alliance 
(discussed in paragraph 2.7 above), the ready 
assistance of all allies must be forthcoming 
within the area to facilitate deployments by the 
United States, or by any NATO country, 
beyond the area. Certain allies, such as France 
and the United Kingdom, should be ready to 
participate in such deployments. 
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9.7. The British and French independent 
nuclear forces constituting an additional centre 
of strategic decision and national riposte to 
potential Soviet aggression afford an extra 
dimension to overall western deterrence and 
must not be bargained away in any accommo-
dation between the Soviet Union and United 
States over the balance of intermediate-range 
nuclear forces between them. 
9.8. The United States and its allies should 
seek to balance although not necessarily to 
match at every level the growing nuclear capa-
bilities of the Soviet Union. However, the 
deployment since the end of 1977 of some 350 
SS-20 ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union has 
had a seriously adverse effect upon the theatre 
nuclear balance in Europe, and unless this 
deployment is substantially reduced or coun-
tered it could have a gravely intimidating 
impact upon the Soviet Union's neighbours 
around the Eurasian landmass. The first 
objective therefore of the " twin track " decision 
of 12th December 1979 remains a priority. If 
it cannot be met in verifiable manner there 
must be no departure from the agreed national 
commitments to deploy GLCMs or Pershing 11 
ballistic missiles. It is to be hoped that the 
deployment process would induce the Soviet 
Union to reach an accommodation with the 
United States over INF on a mutually-accep-
table basis of balance as a first step to reduc-
tions on both sides. 
9.9. Every effort should be made at all levels 
both politically, diplomatically and militarily to 
maintain trust and mutual confidence between 
the European and American components of the 
alliance. This can only be achieved in the 
long term if the Europeans show an under-
standing of America's concern over its world-
wide peacekeeping role in view of the emerging 
Soviet global threat and if the Europeans make 
a financial and military contribution to the 
alliance commensurate with their economic 
potential. 
X. Opinion of the minority 
10.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 
14 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions. The minor-
ity of the committee which voted against was 
opposed to the terms of paragraph 3 of the 
draft recommendation calling for the deploy-
ment of cruise missiles failing agreement in the 
INF negotiations. 
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Country National currency unit 
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United Kingdom ........... Million £ Sterling 
TOTAL WEU ········· 
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10,476 11,296 11,932 4,228 5,038 5,269 4,527 4,577 137,291 157,501 168,929 140,486 141,745 13,942 14,038 14,150 14,246 14,280 3.1 3.2 
11,510 12,154 14,186 14,619 19,155 26,775 24,647 25,726 315,713 407,140 523,373 497,079 484,886 55,902 55,946 56,010 56,021 56,032 4.6 4.7 
---- -
68;596 83,098 98,749 88,247 89,401 1,929,964 2,337,155 2,679,697 2,341,464 2,333,628 249,447 250,043 250,833 251,427 251,941 3.6 3.6 
----= 
5,499 6,289 7,415 4,087 4,119 4,703 5,245 6,044 205,596 228,483 253,348 279,950 297,052 23,493 23,701 23,959 24,213 24,564 2.0 1.8 
9,061 10,230 .. 1,315 1,519 1,608 1,436 .. 56,464 65,047 66,594 57,579 58,883 5,104 5,117 5,125 5,120 5,118 2.3 2.3 
96,975 142,865 171,968 2,125 2,420 2,276 2,578 2,745 31,690 38,519 40,138 36,707 39,912 9,360 9,450 9,599 9,707 9,775 6.7 6.3 
8,242 9,468 10,844 1,307 1,454 1,669 1,650 1,803 40,647 47,130 57,400 57,143 59,179 4,060 4,073 4,087 4,100 4,107 3.2 3.1 
43,440 51,917 61,859 623 702 868 844 871 17,758 20,326 24,076 23,485 25,533 9,820 9,863 9,905 10,005 10,106 3.5 3.5 
185,656 313,067 447,790 2,728 3,001 2,442 2,815 3,031 52,499 69,371 56,886 57,560 57,355 42,926 43,821 44,737 45,672 46,718 5.2 4.3 
143,974 170,033 198,509 109,247 122,279 143,974 170,033 198,509 2,131,801 2,376,828 2,587,100 2,881,512 3,008,587 222,585 225,055 227,627 229,805 231,988 5.1 5.1 
---- -
121,432 135,494 157,540 184,601 . . 2,536,455 2,845,704 3,085,542 3,393,936 },546,501 317,348 321,080 325,039 328,622 332,376 4.8 4.8 
--= 
190,028 218,592 256,289 272,848 .. 4,466,419 5,182,859 5,765,239 5,735,400 5,880,129 566,795 571,123 515,812 580,049 584,317 4.3 4.2 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30)' 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not in 
conversion. 
For the period 1978-1982 the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US$ per unit Units per US$ 
Belgium and Luxembourg Franc 
- 1978 0.03184 31.41000 
- 1979 0.03411 29.31860 
- 1980 0.03420 29.24260 
- 1981 0.02693 37.13101 
- 1982 0.02312 43.24500 
i:anada Canadian Dollar 
- 1978 0.87664 1.14073 
- 1979 0.85371 1.17136 
- 1980 0.85523 1.16928 
- 1981 0.83409 1.19891 
- 1982 0.81518 1.22672 
Denmark D. Krone 
- 1978 0.18134 5.51462 
- 1979 0.19008 5.26097 
- 1980 0.17743 5.63593 
- 1981 0.14038 7.12337 
- 1982 0.12594 7.94010 
France Franc 
- 1978 0.22159 4.51276 
-1979 0.23505 4.25445 
- 1980 0.23663 4.22604 
- 1981 0.18401 5.43458 
- 1982 0.16294 6.13738 
Fed. Rep. of Germany Deutschmark 
- 1978 0.49785 2.00863 
- 1979 0.54559 1.83288 
- 1980 0.55016 1.81767 
- 1981 0.44248 2.26000 
- 1982 0.42338 2.36195 
Greece Drachma 
- 1978 0.02729 36.64843 
- 1979 0.02696 37.09694 
- 1980 0.02347 42.61666 
- 1981 0.01805 55.40842 
- 1982 0.01596 62.63780 
Ncte b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross domel'tic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Country 
Italy 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
- 1982 
Netherlands 
-1978 
-- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
- 1982 
Norway 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
- 1982 
Portugal 
- 1978 
-1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
- 1982 
Turkey 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
- 1982 
United Kingdom 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
- 1981 
- 1982 
Unit 
1,000 Lire 
Guilder 
N. Krone 
Escudo 
T. Lira 
£ 
US$ per unit 
1.17832 
1.20357 
1.16761 
0.87969 
0 77484 
0.46224 
0.49849 
0.50299 
0.40077 
0.38361 
0.19076 
0.19747 
0.20246 
0.17423 
0.16627 
0.02276 
0.02044 
0.01998 
0.01625 
0.01407 
0.04118 
0.03218 
0.01315 
0.00899 
0.00677 
1.91951 
2.12155 
2.32628 
2.02791 
1.81350 
Prior to 1978, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of oth4 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP an 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only. 
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(82)24. 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT- 1982 
Period of compulsory 1 
military service 
(months) 
Army Navy Air force 
Belgium 103 10 3 103 
France 12 4 12 4 12 4 
Germany 15 5 15 5 15 5 
Italy 12 18 12 
Luxembourg voluntary 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 
United Kingdom voluntary 
TOTAL WEU 
Canada voluntary 
Denmark 9 9 9 
Greece 22 26 24 
Norway 12 15 15 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 
Turkey 20 20 20 
United States voluntary 
ToTALNON-WEU 
TOTAL NATO 
Sources: 
l. IISS, Military Balance, 1982-83. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (82) 24, 1st December 1982. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. Eighteen months for overseas. 
5. To be eighteen months. 
e = estimate. 
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Total in armed forces 2 
military personnel 
(thousands) 
(e) 
109 
578 
495 
517 
1 
106 
335 
2,141 
81 
31 
186 
40 
91 
769 
2,189 
3,387 
5,528 
APPENDIX I 
Total armed forces 2 
(military and civilian) 
as percentage 
of active population 
(e) 
2.8 
3.1 
2.5 
2.4 
0.8 
2.6 
2.2 
2.6 
1.0 
1.6 
5.9 
2.5 
2.3 
4.4 
2.9 
3.0 
2.8 
-VI 
\0 
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...,-ence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita- 1981 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Selected indicators comparing defence contribution with ability to contribute 
Ratio defence Ratio defence Ratio active defence 
spending share/ spending share/ Manpower share/ 
Country GDP share prosperity index share population share 
1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 
Belgium 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.77 0.77 0.94 1.29 1.11 1.11 
France 1.08 1.05 1.03 0.99 0.93 1.05 1.24 1.25 1.23 
Germany 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.71 0.68 0.81 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Italy 0.67 0.63 0.61 1.16 0.98 1.07 0.89 0.91 0.92 
Luxembourg 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.33 
Netherlands 0.92 0.81 0.79 1.11 0.74 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.88 
United Kingdom . 1.38 1.33 1.31 1.90 1.52 1.59 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Canada 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Denmark 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.43 0.53 0.59 0.85 0.80 0.80 
Greece 1.50 1.45 1.73 3.60 3.63 4.93 2.07 2.09 2.05 
Norway 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.58 0.55 1.17 1.15 1.13 
Portugal 1.00 0.92 0.88 4.29 4.13 4.06 0.87 0.94 0.93 
Turkey 1.18 1.21 1.29 7.65 10.20 11.02 1.61 1.62 1.63 
United States 1.37 1.39 1.38 1.27 1.31 1.19 1.28 1.26 1.27 
Japan 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 
NATO less 
United States 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.91 1.02 1.09 1.09 1.09 
NATO plus 
Japan less 
United States 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.87 
Total NATO 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.12 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.16 1.16 
Total NATO 
plus Japan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: Years are date of Secretary of Defence report. 
"Share" means "share of total for NATO plus Japan". 
Source: Successive reports to United States Congress by the Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common 
defence. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Defence expenditure at constant 1980 prices 1 
$million 
Country 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (e) 
Belgium 3,799 3,881 3,963 3,999 3,727 
France 24,880 24,974 26,427' 27,467 27,387 
Germany 25,724 26,100 26,671 30,419 27,530 
Italy 8,904 9,106 9,588 9,552 9,816 
Luxembourg 43 45 53 55 57 
Netherlands 5,145 5,363 5,264 5,442 5,555 
United Kingdom 25,491 26,015 22,773 27,226 28,016 
TOTAL WEU 93,986 95,484 94,739 104,160 105,815 
Canada 4,581 4,551 4,696 4,867 5,011 
Denmark 1,592 1,~97 1,609 1,613 1,662 
Greece 2,555 2,485 2,275 2,796 2,766 
Norway 1,608 1,641 1,667 1,714 1,754 
Portugal 766 789 872 880 859 
Turkey 2,361 2,410 2,461 2,466 2,523 
United States 132,438 137,509 143,860 151,212 163,784 
TOTAL NON-WEU 145,901 150,982 157,440 165,548 178,359 
TOTAL NATO 239,887 246,466 252,179 269,708 284,174 
1. Calculated from NATO figures for per capita expenditure. 
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1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
APPENDIX V 
United States ACDA official world military expenditures and arms transfers 
(Military expenditure, constant prices) 
March 1981 edition- March 1982 edition - 1978 prices 1977 prices 
NATO Warsaw United NATO Warsaw Soviet Pact States Pact Union 
174.7 129.4 128.8 192.4 150.0 127.8 
166.9 133.0 117.9 184.2 153.4 130.2 
169.3 138.0 117.4 187.1 158.9 134.4 
165.2 144.3 112.1 183.3 165.8 140.5 
167.8 150.1 112.3 185.8 173.1 147.2 
164.9 154.6 108.5 183.3 178.1 151.4 
161.5 161.2 103.3 179.8 185.4 158.2 
167.5 161.7 108.0 186.3 187.2 159.9 
169.1 165.1 108.4 188.8 189.0 161.6 
- - 112.3 195.2 193.6 166.7 
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APPENDIX VI 
Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment 1 
The full text of the Roth-Glenn-Nunn 
Amendment on NATO Defence Industrial Co-
operation follows : 
Sec. 1122. (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the United States remains firmly commit-
ted to co-operating closely with its North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as NATO) allies in protect-
ing liberty and maintaining world peace; 
(2) the financial burden of providing for the 
defence of Western Europe and for the protec-
tion of the interests of NATO member coun-
tries in areas outside the NATO treaty area has 
reached such proportions that new co-operative 
approaches among the United States and its 
NATO allies are required to achieve and main-
tain an adequate collective defence at accept-
able costs; 
(3) the need for a credible conventional 
deterrent in Western Europe has long been 
recognised in theory but has never been fully 
addressed in practice; 
(4) a more equitable sharing by NATO 
member countries of both the burdens and the 
technological and economic benefits of the 
common defence would do much to reinvigo-
rate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
alliance with a restored sense of unity and 
common purpose; 
(5) a decision to co-ordinate more effectively 
the enormous technological, industrial, and eco-
nomic resources of NATO member countries 
I. Approved by the United States Senate by 87 votes to I 
on 13th May 1982. 
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will not only increase the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of NATO military expenditures but 
also provide inducement for the Soviet Union 
to enter a meaningful arms reduction agreement 
so that both Warsaw Pact countries and NATO 
member countries can devote more of their 
energies and resources to peaceful and econo-
mically more beneficial pursuits. 
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the 
President should propose to the heads of 
government of the NATO member countries 
that the NATO allies of the United States join 
the United States in agreeing-
(1) to co-ordinate more effectively their 
defence efforts and resources to create, at 
acceptable costs, a credible, collective, conven-
tional force for the defence of the North 
Atlantic Treaty area; 
(2) to establish a co-operative defence-indus-
trial effort within Western Europe and between 
Western Europe and North America that would 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
NATO expenditures by providing a larger pro-
duction base while eliminating unnecessary 
duplication of defence-industrial efforts; 
(3) to share more equitably and efficiently 
the financial burdens, as well as the economic 
benefits (including jobs, technology, and trade) 
of NATO defence; and 
(4) to intensify consultations promptly for 
the early achievement of the objectives descri-
bed in clauses (1) through (3). 
DOCUMENT 94 7 
APPENDIX VII 
Major United States equipment procured by European 
countries and vice-versa 
A. European equipment being procured by the United States 
- MAN truck for weapon systems in Europe (Germany) 
- MAG-58 armour machine gun 1 (Belgium) 
- 120 mm tank gun 1 (Germany) 
- 5.56 mm squad automatic weapon 1 (Belgium) 
- Muzzle bore sight (training) (United Kingdom) 
B. European equipment being evaluated by the United States 
- Anti-tank weapons : 
LAW-80 
M72-750 
M72A3 
Jupiter 
Panzerfaust Ill 
Armbrust 
Apilas 
Strim 
- Plessey groundsat rebroadcast radio 
- 90 mm Cockerill Mk Ill gun 
- Large-calibre bore brushes 
- Underground field shelter, MK-2 
- MH-842 (Markhandler rough terrain forklift truck) 
- 7.62 mm machine gun mount 
- Chemical agent monitoring system 
- Conventional generic mine devices (training mines) 
- HC smoke pots 
- Cartridge, 5.56 mm, ball, practice, Xm 858 
- 4.2 inch mortar sub-calibre training system 
- Cartridge, 50 calibre, ball and tracer, plastic training ammunition 
- DM 82 (hand grenade fuse) 
- FH-380 (personal dosimetry system) 
- Lightweight decontamination system (SANA TOR) 
- Inflatable decoy system for United States Hawk air defence system 
- 150 kW low noise generator 
- Aerial radiac system 
- 105 mm kinetic energy practice ammunition 
- Kinetic energy recovery rope 
- Penguin missile 
- PAP-104 mine neutralisation system 
- Minesweeper hunter (MSH-1) procurement 
- Searchwater radar 
- Versatile exercise mine (VEM) 
C. United States equipment being procured by European countries 
- M113 APC 
APPENDIX VII 
- AN/TSQ-73 missile Minder (a part of the fire duection centre of the improved Hawk 
battery) 
- 1-Hawk (air defence system) 
· - 66 mm M72 Law (a squad-level anti-tank weapon) 
- Projectile 155 mm M483A1 (anti-personnel round delivered by the 155 mm Howitzer) 
l. Produced in the United States. 
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- 2.75 inch rocket (air-delivered anti-personnel round) 
-MOD Flir 
- Tow W/helicopter roof-mounted sight 
- M I 09 A3 SP Howitzer 
- Stinger missile (man-portable infrared-homing air defence missile system) 
- Harpoon anti-surface ship missile 
- Submarine-launched Harpoon 
- MK-46 light-light anti-submarine torpedo 
- Sparrow advanced monopulse missile (AMM) AIM/RIM-7M 
- AIM-9L infrared air-to-air missile (The AIM-9L will be employed on the F-14, AV-8, F-16, 
F-15, F/A-18 and the MRCA Tornado. This Sidewinder missile differs from its predeces-
sors principally in having an all-aspect attack capability.) 
- High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) 
- Fl A-18 naval strike fighter aircraft 
- P-3 patrol aircraft Orion 
- Super rapid-blooming oflboard chaff (SRBOC) 
- E2-C early warning aircraft 
- F-16 multinational fighter programme 1 
- Airborne early warning and control (AEW &C) programme 
- Navstar global positioning system (GPS) 1 
- Joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) (system adopted for the NATO 
AEW &C programme) 
- Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile 1 
- KC-135 (tanker fleet) re-engining (CFM-56) 1 
- Electronic countermeasure simulator 
- Peace Green communications equipment 
- ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods 
- ALQ-1 0 1 electronic countermeasure pods 
l. European coproduction. 
Source: Standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress by Mr. Weinberger, January 
1983). 
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Type 
ICBMs 
Titan 11 
Minuteman 11 
Minuteman Ill 
Sub-total 
SLBMs 
Poseidon C-3 
Trident C-4 
Sub-total 
BM total 
Aircraft B-52 
TOTAL 
APPENDIX VIII 
Levels of nuclear weapons 
A. Total warheads all systems 
Numbers of nuclear warheads mid-1982 
(Figures rounded to nearest hundred) 
United States Soviet Union 
ICBM 2,100 5,200 
SLBM 4,800 1,800 
Strategic bomber 2,300 300 
Total strategic 1 9,200 7,300 
All other 2 14,700 8,700 
Grand total 3 24,000 16,000 
Sources : 1. As in following table. 
2. Deduced by difference. 
3. Hearings United States Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, 13th November 1981. 
B. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons 
(covered by SALT) 
United States strategic systems (covered by SALT) 
Medium-range Number Number of independent (km) 
warheads each 
15,000 52 1 
11,300 450 1 
{ 250 (160 kt) } 13,000 300 (353 kt- 3 Mk 12A) 
1,052 
4,600 304 10-14 
7,400 216 
520 
1,572 
16,000 312 2 up to 10 or 
12 ALCM 
1,884 
1. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
APPENDIX VIII 
Assumed total 
number of warheads 
52 
450 
1,650 I 
2,152 
3,040 
4,768 
6,920 
2,280 
9,200 
2. 570 reported in SALT 11 data base includes 220 in "deep storage". United States figures for March 1983 show a 
further 75 B-520 withdrawn from service. 
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Soviet strategic systems (covered by SALT) 
Maximum-range Number Assumed total Type Number of independent (km) 
warheads each number of warheads 
ICBMs 
SS-11 10,500 570 1 570 
SS-13 10,000 60 1 60 
SS-17 10,000 150 1 or 4 600 I 
SS-18 9-10,500 308 1 or 8 2,464 I 
SS-19 11,000 310 6 or 1 1,500 
Sub-total 1,398 5,200 
SLBMs 
SSN-5 1,120 57 1 57 
SSN-6 2,400-3,000 400 1 400 
SSN-8 8,000 292 1 300 
SSN-17 5,000 12 1 12 
SSN-18 8,000 208 3 1,040 
Sub-total 969 1,800 
BM total 2,367 7,000 
Aircraft Combat radius 
(km) 
Bear Tu-95 5-6,000 105 2-4 210 
Bison Mya-4 4-6,000 45 1-2 90 
Sub-total 150 300 
TOTAL 2,498 7,300 
I. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
Note: Forces loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred). 
United States forces estimated at mid-1982. 
Source: 
- IISS, Military Balance 1982-83. 
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983. 
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, September 1981. 
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982. 
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C. Le11els of intermediate-range nuclear we11p0ns of interest to Europe 
Maximum range Assumed Western estimates
1 
or combat warheads Weapons Total In range of Soviet claims
3 
radius (km) per system inventory Europe2 
USSR: 
5,000 3 SS-20 351 234l 2,000 1 SS-4 210 ( 170 "land-based" 4,000 1 SS-5 15 496 
1,000 1 SS-12 70 70 
1,000 1 SS-22 100 100 
1,120 1 SS-N-5 57 57 "sea-based" 18 
4,000 3 or 4 Backfire 100 40 
2,800 2 Badger 310 124 J 
3,100 2 Blind er 125 50 "air-based" 
1,600 2 Fencer 550 110 461 
720 1 Flogger D 550 220 
600 1 Fitter CID (a) 688 138 
TOTAL 3,126 1 ~313 975 
NATO inc. France: 
1,900 2 F-111 156 78 
2,000+ 4 or 6 FB-111A 60 60 
750 1 F-4 424 127 
800 1 F-104 290 87 723 
F-16 68 20 
1,000 2 A-6/A-7 68 34 
950 2 Buccaneer 50 25 
720 1 Jaguar 117 58 I 
1,600 1 Mirage IV-A 34 34 46 
560 2 Super-Etendard 16 8 
720 1 Pershing I 180 180 
4,600 1 Polaris 64 64 64 
3,000 1 M-20 80 80 80 
3,000 10 or 14 Poseidon (b) 40 40 
TOTAL 1,647 895 913 4 
I. IISS Military Balance 1982-83 and NATO NPG communique of23rd March 1983. 
2. Military Balance estimate of numbers available in nuclear role in Europe. 
3. Lev Semeiko in Moscow News, 17th January 1982. 
4. Omitting 55 Vulcan bombers phased out in February 1983. 
(a) The Military Balance 1982-83 also lists 265 Fitter A and lOO Fishbed J-N aircraft under long- and medium-range systems 
for the European theatre but their combat radius of 400 km has excluded them from this table. 
(b) 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are also included in strategic table B. 
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D. Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-10 missiles 
Total Total Total Total 
Year ofSS-4 SS-20 Total Total yield equivalent warheads Notes 
missiles warheeds 1 in range of 
and SS-5 MP megatons 3 Europe 4 
1962 200 - 200 200 200 200 200 Period of 
SS-4 and 
SS-5 
· build-up 
1963-1971 700 - 700 700 700 700 525 
1972-1976 600 - 600 600 600 600 450 
1977 600 (20) 620 660 609 617 440 
1978 590 100 690 890 635 675 642 Start of 
SS-20 de-
ployment 
1979 590 120 710 950 644 692 682 
1980 440 160 600 920 512 576 650 
1981 380 230 610 1,070 483 575 745 
19825 230 324 554 1,200 376 504 820 
Source : Successive editions of IISS Military Balance. 
1. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads. 
2. Assuming 1 MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads. 
3. Total of Y} where Y is yield of each warhead in MT. 
4. Assuming ~SS-4, 5 and ~SS-20 in range of Europe. 
4 3 
5. Figures from NATO NPG communique of 30th November 1982. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX IX 
RESOLUTION 15 • 
on the participation of observers in certain meetings 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
APPENDIX IX 
Considering the interests of member states of NATO which are not members ofWEU, 
DECIDES 
1. That the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observers to attend its 
meetings from member states of NATO which are not members ofWEU; 
2. That such observers shall have the right to speak. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the first part of the fifth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Document 130 
and Addendum). 
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Amendment 1 
Burden-sharing in the alliance 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Reddemann 
1. Leave out paragraph 3 (a) of the draft recommendation proper. 
l. See 3rd sitting, 7th June 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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6th June 1983 
Signed: Ahrens, Reddemann 
Document 947 
Amendments 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
Burden-sharing in the alliance 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 1 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
7th June 1983 
2. In paragraph (z) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "and world role" and 
insert " due in particular to a worldwide concept of its role ". 
3. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "and in the 
case " to the end of the paragraph. 
4. Leave out paragraph A.l(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
" (a) by maintaining and improving if necessary the quality of their conventional defence 
potential while advocating a possible reappraisal of the tasks and force goals set by 
SACEUR in order to meet the social, economic and budgetary constraints of member 
states;". 
5. In paragraph A.l(c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" Atlantic-wide" and insert 
"European". 
6. In paragraph A.l(d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "both to improve" to 
the end of the paragraph. 
7. Leave out paragraph A.2(b) of the draft recommendation proper. 
8. Leave out paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"To take account of the anxiety of public opinion regarding the arms race and to exert all 
necessary pressure on the superpowers in order to avert the deployment of intermediate-range 
missiles on European territory;". 
9. In paragraph A.4(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the United States" and 
insert "each and everyone". 
l. See 3rd sitting, 7th June 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendments 10 and 11 
Burden-sharing in the alliance 
AMENDMENTS 10 and 11 1 
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson 
7th June 1983 
10. In the first line of section A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "concerned within 
the North Atlantic Council". 
11. In paragraph A.1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "annual force goals set by 
SACEUR" and insert "NATO biennial force goals approved by the nations". 
l. See 3rd sitting, 7th June 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the 
proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ; 
(ii) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons 
in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the 
Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls ; 
(iii) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified 
Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no 
longer appropriate to apply them ; 
(iv) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within 
their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in 
the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter 
connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331; 
(v) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed on 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for the Control of 
Armaments has co-operated from time to time ; 
(vi) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report, in response to Recommendations 331 
and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, 
and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included ; 
(vU) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various 
other items the Assembly has requested, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNciL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel 
paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, 
military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, in application of 
Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the 
possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ; 
3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification 
and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the 
latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake ; 
4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments 
industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which 
would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied 
countries; 
5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its 
competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to 
extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information ; 
6. To include in future annual reports: 
(a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and 
of the French forces in Germany ; 
(b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of 
armaments in member countries ; 
(c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to 
control. 
175 
DOCUMENT 948 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
0.1. At its meeting on 2nd December 1982 
the Presidential Committee followed usage by 
r~ferring to the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments the following chapters of 
the a~nual report of the Council : Chapter I : 
Relations between the Council and the Assem-
bly (to the extent of the committee's compe-
tence, whic~ . ~overs defence questions) ; Chap-
ter 11 : ActlVlties of the Council - B. Defence 
questions ; Chapter Ill : Agency for the Control 
of Armaments ; Chapter IV : Standing Arma-
ments Committee. 
0.2. The committee notes that Recommenda-
tion 380 1, adopted by the Assembly on 15th 
June 1982 on the committee's previous report 2, 
was largely accepted by the Council and several 
ministers of member countries have commented 
favourably on the report in question. As the 
basic situation has not evolved, the principal 
ideas in the present report follow those of last 
year's report : 
- The fundamental provisions relating to 
security in the modified Brussels 
Treaty (Articles IV, V and VIII (3)) are 
still as valid today as when they were 
signed. Public demonstration of their 
credibility is to be found in the dia-
logue between the Assembly and the 
Council. · 
- The WEU Assembly provides the best 
forum for public debate between Euro-
pean members of parliament on 
defence, security and armaments control 
matters, a debate which is essential in 
order to keep public opinion informed, 
and to support the defence effort for 
our countries' security. 
- For the rest, and particularly as regards 
the control of levels of forces and 
armaments provided for in Protocols 
Nos. 11, Ill and IV to the treaty, WEU 
must as far as possible be adapted to 
the political circumstances of the 
eighties. 
- Allied defence plans proper continue to 
be the preserve of the NATO bodies in 
accordance with Article IV of the 
Brussels Treaty. 
l. Text of Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply 
at Appendix I. 
2. Document 908, adopted on 20th April 1982. 
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0.3. As the committee recognises in another 
report 1, European intergovernmental consulta-
tions on defence questions are necessary. These 
consultations are at present held in the flexible 
framework of the Eurogroup, and more general 
" security " questions in the framework of 
European political co-operation. The commit-
tee notes that since the Brussels Treaty was 
modified in 1954, no member government has 
asked that the WEU Council be convened as 
provided for in Article VIII (3) of the treaty, to 
allow the seven governments " to consult with 
regard to any situation which may constitute a 
threat to peace ... ". This problem is discussed 
in the committee's other report 1• 
I. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
1.1. Relations between the Assembly and the 
Council in 1982 were very good, as shown by 
the detailed replies given to the various recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly on the 
basis of the committee's reports. With regard 
in particular to Recommendation 380 of the 
Assembly on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty, adopted by the Assembly in June 1982, 
the approving words of the various ministers 
who in turn addressed the Assembly should be 
quoted. 
1.2. Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External 
Relations of Belgium and then Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, addressing the Assembly 
on 14th June 1982 once again underlined the 
importance of the treaty and indicated that the 
Council was prepared, where the control of 
armaments was concerned, to take account of 
the evolution of the situation in Europe : 
" By way of conclusion to this part of my 
statement, may I reaffirm WEU member 
countries' adherence to the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols and 
their determination to fulfil the obliga-
tions they have entered into. They stress 
once again the importance they attach to 
the commitment to collective self-defence 
contained in Article V of the treaty, 
which is one of the cornerstones of the 
European security system. 
I. Burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 94 7, 
Rapporteur : Mr. Wilkinson. 
In the matter of armaments control, the 
Council has repeatedly indicated its wish 
to take account of the changing situation 
in Europe ... " 
1.3. It was then the turn of Mr. Leister, 
Minister of State for Defence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, to describe on 16th June 
the broad lines of his country's defence policy, 
stressing the importance of NATO and express-
ing his government's agreement with the 
Assembly's proposals for adapting WEU to the 
needs of the day and deleting those treaty 
provisions which seem obsolete : 
" There is no doubt that when speaking 
of collective security policy for Europe 
we have to think above all of NATO and 
the NATO security system which inclu-
des our North American partners. How-
ever, against the background of the pre-
sent global - and not exclusively military 
- threat to our free way of life, it appears 
increasingly necessary to direct our deli-
berations to the possibilities arising from 
European co-operation in the various 
existing forums. 
In this connection the WEU Assembly is 
of particular importance as a forum for 
the discussion of European security pol-
icy. Not only is WEU the sole European 
parliamentary forum dealing with matters 
of security and defence policy, but by 
pledging military assistance in the form 
of a treaty it also contributes decisively to 
deterrence and, consequently, to the safe-
guarding of peace. 
The Federal Government is following 
with interest and attention the Assem-
bly's endeavours to adapt the WEU treaty 
to present requirements. We were there-
fore pleased to note that the Assembly 
passed, by a large majority, a proposal to 
cancel some provisions of the treaty 
which seem outdated. Let me stress, 
however, that the Federal Government's 
commitment to its WEU treaty obliga-
tions will remain as unreserved as in the 
past. " 
1.4. Addressing the Assembly on 15th June 
1982, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External 
Relations of France, laid particular emphasis on 
the need for a public debate on peace, the 
balance of forces, security and disarmament and 
the importance of the WEU Assembly in this 
context: 
" ... Let me ask you this : how many years 
is it since our national parliaments last 
had any real debates on peace, the 
balance of forces, security and disar-
mament? 
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You are an elected Assembly, the only 
one in our European countries at present 
to have the competence, the qualifica-
tions and the interest to discuss these 
matters. You must help the govern-
ments, you must help those responsible 
by enabling this debate to take place. 
Furthermore, you are the elected repre-
sentatives of our European countries, and 
in this debate the European countries 
have an interest, an approach and ideas 
of a specific and particular nature. 
Do not misunderstand me. There is no 
question of dividing the defence of 
Europe from that of the other countries 
of the alliance. With the present imbal-
ance of forces on the continent of 
Europe itself that would be a fatal risk ... 
So there must be absolutely no doubt that 
defence on the continent of Europe and 
global defence go hand in hand. No-
thing could be more dangerous than to 
doubt this, until there is something like a 
balance of forces on the continent itself, a 
balance of forces and weapons capable of 
reaching the continent and sited there. 
But while nothing must be done which 
might separate the defence of Europe 
from that of the alliance as a whole, it is 
nevertheless extremely useful for us to be 
able to express our own ideas. They do 
exist, and in some variety, too. 
... So it is a good thing, when public 
attention is at last involved and a genuine 
debate on these defence problems begins, 
that the opinions and constraints peculiar 
to the people of these countries should be 
expressed. 
Mr. President, this is the French Govern-
ment's appeal to this Assembly. It must 
become the main forum in which our 
peoples can discuss, through their elected 
representatives and with the necessary 
feedback, all the problems connected 
with our security ... " 
1.5. Reporting to the National Assembly on 
6th July 1982 on his address to the WEU 
Assembly, Mr. Cheysson again underlined the 
latter's importance : 
" The other day, on behalf of the French 
Government, I addressed the Assembly 
of Western European Union, not because 
the executive of WEU seems to have a 
very great future but because the Assem-
bly is an elected one, elected in the 
second degree. This elected Assembly is 
competent to handle these matters, which 
must be discussed among members of 
parliament. .. " 
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Perhaps to a greater extent than his prede-
cessors, Mr. Cheysson in fact stresses the 
importance of the NATO integrated command 
for the security of non-nuclear European coun-
tries which cannot be protected by the French 
nuclear force. This is what he affirmed in his 
article in the Wall Street Journal of 
25th February 1983 : 
" Adequate to guarantee our vital inter-
ests, our nuclear arms are not now inten-
ded - nor will they be in the future - to 
insure the protection of the entire Euro-
pean zone of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor 
may they be used to this end, since we 
retain exclusive control over them. The 
guarantee of European territories that do 
not have nuclear weapons therefore can 
come only from the integrated command 
of NATO, that is to say, in fact, the 
United States. For this reason, maintai-
ning the American nuclear deterrent and 
continually modernising it insofar as this 
is necessary are in our view essential. " 
1.6. Most recently, on 1st December 1982, 
Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, 
particularly showed his government's agreement 
with the Assembly's views as expressed in the 
last two recommendations on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty: 365, adopted on the report 
by the Defence Committee (Rapporteur : Mr. 
Tanghe) in June 1981, and 380, already 
mentioned, adopted in 1982 : 
"Also this [WEU] is the only European 
parliamentary forum empowered by sta-
tute to address defence matters. This is 
of great importance and will continue to 
be so. But it is also important to be 
realistic about the aims we pursue here. 
Recommendation 365 was right to 
acknowledge that ' for greater effective-
ness the material organisation of collec-
tive defence is undertaken in the wider 
framework of the North Atlantic Council 
and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group'. We cannot consider 
collective defence adequately without 
giving full weight to the contribution of 
the United States. 
If I have understood correctly the views 
expressed · in the Assembly in recent 
years, the Assembly now believes that, 
twenty-eight years after the Brussels 
Treaty was modified, the time has come 
for some adaptation. The message 
which emerges from Recommendations 
365 and 380 is that the political situation 
has evolved since 1954 and the Assembly 
therefore questions, for example, the need 
to defray so many of WEU's limited 
resources on checking on member 
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governments' armaments... Checks on 
armaments data lie at the heart of arms 
control negotiations with the Warsaw 
Pact, but the records of the member 
states of WEU are not closed books and I 
am sure that it is right that the Council 
should be giving careful thought to 
Recommendation 380. 
In the preamble to Recommendation 
380, the Assembly urged that WEU 
should be adapted to the needs of the 
1980s. With this the Government of the 
United Kingdom agree. However, I do 
not mean to imply support for complete 
revision. For one thing, the United 
Kingdom Government, along with our 
European partners, regard the mutual 
defence commitment in Article V of the 
Brussels Treaty as of fundamental impor-
tance. It is a commitment that uniquely 
expresses our support to each other as 
Europeans. " 
1. 7. The committee finds it particularly 
encouraging that its recommendations, ratified 
by the Assembly, should be listened to so care-
fully by the governments. 
1.8. In its reply to Recommendation 380, the 
Council lastly undertook to endeavour to 
communicate its annual report to the Assembly 
by the end of February. As the last chapter 
reached the Office of the Clerk in mid-March 
this year, committee members had time to 
examine it before discussing the draft of the 
present report. 
II.B. Activities of the Council -
defence questions 
1. Level of forces of member states 
2.1. Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty, completed by the Council's resolution 
of 15th September 1956 and the agreement of 
14th December 1957, imposes limits on mem-
ber countries' armed forces and provides that 
changes in the level of these forces must 
receive the approval of member countries 
expressed either in the WEU Council or by the 
representatives of the seven member countries 
on the North Atlantic Council. With regard to 
the land and air forces which the six mainland 
countries place under the command of 
SACEUR in peacetime, these are subject to 
upper limits laid down in a special (unpub-
lished) agreement appended to the stillborn 
European Defence Community treaty. When 
NATO defence plans make provision for 
increases in the levels of forces assigned by 
these countries, any increase must receive the 
unanimous approval of the seven member 
countries, which may be expressed in NATO. 
2.2. The annual report for 1982 informs us 
that: 
" The Council, at their meeting of 
24th February, noted that the level of 
forces of the member states of WEU, as 
set out in the NATO force plan, fell 
within the limits specified in Articles I 
and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as in force at 
that time. They also took note of a 
declaration on French forces made by the 
representative of France. 
On 15th October, the Council examined 
the report of a further meeting of the 
same six permanent representatives to the 
North Atlantic Council, and approved 
the acceptance by one member state of 
the increase in its force level recommen-
ded by SACEUR." 
This is believed to refer to an increase in the 
number of helicopters which Germany assigns 
to NATO. This cumbersome procedure for 
approving the levels of various categories of 
member countries' forces provided for in Proto-
col No. 11 and related documents, like the 
control of armaments provided for in the treaty, 
has clearly been overtaken by events. How-
ever, the treaty provisions do not allow the pro-
cedure to be modified unless the treaty itself is 
modified. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed 
on the continent of Europe 
2.3. Under Article VI of Protocol No. 11, the 
United Kingdom initially undertook •• to main-
tain on the mainland of Europe ... the effective 
strength of the United Kingdom forces which 
are now assigned to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe, that is to say four 
divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or 
such other forces as the Supreme Allied 
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Commander, Europe, regards as having equiva-
lent fighting capacity ... not to withdraw these 
forces against the wishes of the majority of the 
high contracting parties ... ". Following succes-
sive decisions of the Council, the level of this 
commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus 
the Second Tactical Air Force. 
2.4. The committee notes with satisfaction 
that the information concerning this commit-
ment given in the Council's annual report for 
1982 again fully meets its wishes as expressed 
inter alia in the Assembly's Recommendations 
331 and 348. The report states in fact that the 
average number of British land forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe in 1982 in accor-
dance with Article VI of Protocol No. II was 
59,567. However, it continues: 
•• ... The continued need for the presence 
of troops in Northern Ireland made it 
necessary for units of the British Army 
of the Rhine to be redeployed for short 
tours of duty there. In 1982 there were 
on average 909 men in Northern Ire-
land. As has been previously stated 
these units would be speedily returned to 
their duty station in an emergency affect-
ing NATO." 
It may be deduced that the average number of 
British troops stationed in Germany was 58,658 
men, whereas the commitment is for 
55,000. In the previous year, 58,885 were 
declared for Germany .and 1 ,899 for Northern 
Ireland, making an average of 56,986 actually 
on the spot. 
2.5. Like last year, the annual report gives the 
following details on the strength of the United 
Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force: 
•• Furthermore, in accordance with the 
Council's reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 348 the Government of the United 
Kingdom have informed the Council that 
the strength of the United Kingdom's 
contribution to the Second Allied Tacti-
cal Air Force in 1982 was : 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Buccaneers 2 
Jaguars 4 
Offensive support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguars 1 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles 1 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 4 
Air transport Puma 
Ground defence RAF regiment 1" 
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These figures have not changed since last year 
but the report ~oes not indicate whether, as was 
supposed, Rapier units were sent to the 
Falklands in 1982. 
2.6. Although the foregoing statements on 
United Kingdom force levels on the continent 
show that the United Kingdom has more than 
met the current Brussels Treaty commitment of 
55,000 men plus the second TAF in 1981 and 
1982, the June 1981 White Paper " The way 
forward" announced that "(17) BAOR's man-
power which had been planned to continue to 
increase beyond the 55,000 level, will be held 
at that level". Planned reorganisation of 
BAOR over the period 1983 to April 1984 
involves both some strengthening of units in 
Germany with armoured regiments and Rapier 
missile units, but also net reductions of about 
2,000 men with one divisional headquarters and 
an infantry battalion being withdrawn to the 
United Kingdom. The committee will wish to 
be assured in future years that the level of 
55,000 men is met, irrespective of any tempo-
rary deployments to Northern Ireland or 
elsewhere. 
2.7. Last year, in its report on the application 
of the Brussels Treaty, the committee proposed 
the tacit extension to the other member 
countries of the commitment to maintain 
adequate forces under allied command. In 
fact, under the Brussels Treaty only the United 
Kingdom (which escapes most controls on 
armaments) has to maintain a minimum num-
ber of forces on the mainland of Europe 
assigned to SACEUR. In its reply to Recom-
mendation 380, the Council rejected the 
Assembly's proposal to invite the other member 
countries taking part in the NATO integrated 
system to make unilateral declarations 
concerning the level of forces which they 
undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe. Nor did the Council 
agree to include in its annual reports a declara-
tion on the level of such forces, similar to the 
one already made with regard to United 
Kingdom forces. 
2.8. The committee recalls that publication in 
the Council's annual reports of the level of 
British forces assigned under Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11 is in no way a requirement 
imposed by the treaty. The United Kingdom 
agreed to include these figures in the annual 
report only in response to Assembly Recom-
mendations 331 and 348, and only after 
repeated requests by the Assembly in several 
consecutive years. The committee sees no 
reason why the other six member countries 
should not agree to include in the annual report 
similar declarations concerning the forces which 
they assign to NATO command or, in the case 
of France, the forces which it maintains in 
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Germany and which, according to the Council's 
annual report, are treated by the Council, as far 
as approval of their levels is concerned, in the 
same way as forces under NATO command. 
The committee therefore repeats this proposal 
in the draft recommendation. 
3. Control of armaments 
2.9. In the context of its proposals for 
adapting WEU to the needs of the eighties, the 
committee has for several years been pointing 
out that the provisions relating to the control of 
armaments contained in the Brussels Treaty 
and its protocols have completely lost their 
point in the circumstances now prevailing in 
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. The 
committee proposed that the control system be 
reduced to the minimum which could be 
achieved by using the procedure for amendment 
contained in the treaty itself and its protocols, 
but without having recourse to international 
negotiations which would be required to modify 
the treaty texts themselves. 
2.10. Two lists of armaments subject to control 
can be amended by the procedure laid down 
in the treaty : 
(z) the list of certain conventional 
weapons which Germany undertook 
not to manufacture on its territory 
(Protocol No. Ill, Annex Ill) ; 
(ii) the list of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons and certain 
conventional weapons subject to 
quantitative controls on the mainland 
of Europe (Protocol No. Ill, Annex 
IV). 
2.11. With regard to the first list, which 
concerns Germany, this may be amended or 
cancelled " in accordance with the needs of the 
armed forces " if a recommendation to this 
effect is made by the competent supreme 
commander of NATO, if the German Govern-
ment submits a request accordingly, and if the 
WEU Council approves the proposals by a 
two-thirds majority. Since it was signed, this 
list has been reduced on several occasions, most 
recently on the Assembly's recommendation, 
and now includes only strategic bomber aircraft 
(paragraph VI) and long-range surface-to-surface 
missiles (paragraph IV). Last year, in Recom-
mendation 380, the Assembly recommended 
that the .Council cancel these last two items. 
In its reply, the Council recalled that in 
applying the controls provided for in the treaty 
" account should be taken, to the fullest extent 
possible, of the evolution of the situation in 
Europe... The Council have received with 
great interest and are considering the Assem-
bly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs 
IV ... and VI... ". 
2.12. Last year's proposal is taken up again by 
the committee in the draft recommendation. It 
is suggested that Germany take the initiative (as 
provided for in the treaty) of asking for this 
cancellation not because it intends to manufac-
ture such weapons in the immediate future but 
in order to put an end to an obsolete situation. 
2.13. With regard to the second list, which 
applies to all member countries on the main-
land of Europe, Article V of Protocol No. Ill to 
the treaty provides quite simply that " the 
Council of Western European Union may vary 
the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision ". 
Last year, in Recommendation 380, the Assem-
bly asked that the Council " vary by reducing 
the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill". In 
its reply, the Council informed the Assembly 
that " the Council are considering the technical, 
military and political aspects of this problem". 
Now this three-page list has not been amended 
since the treaty was modified in 1954. The 
Council is at present examining the proposal 
made by the Director of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments on the amendment of 
this list. The committee for its part considers 
that the Council should report to the Assembly 
on the result of its consideration of the 
problem, and should consider deleting the 
list except for atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons. 
2.14. It might have been thought that for poli-
tical reasons it was wise to retain controls on 
the atomic, biological and chemical weapons 
which head this list. In reality the Council has 
never allowed the controls provided for in the 
treaty to be applied to atomic or biological 
weapons, and the committee considers in 
present circumstances that it would no longer 
be sensible to apply them. Quantitative 
controls are not applied to chemical weapons 
because no country has declared that it has 
stocks of such weapons. But by retaining 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons on the 
list of weapons subject to quantitative controls 
by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, a 
certain degree of reciprocity of commitments 
will be maintained with Germany, which has 
renounced the right to manufacture these 
weapons. 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.1. Chapter Ill of the Council's annual 
report of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments follows, with one slight difference (refer-
red to in paragraph 3.9 below), the one for the 
previous year. The committee therefore consi-
ders it worthwhile to repeat in the present 
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report the same explanations as it gave last year 
on current practice relating to the application 
of controls. 
3.2. The extent of the Brussels Treaty 
controls is not widely understood, nor is the 
fact that the Council failed to apply many of 
the control provisions from the outset. The 
control provisions of the treaty may be summa-
rised as follows: 
(z) Germany undertook not to manufac-
ture atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons on its territory; 
(ii) Germany also undertook not to 
manufacture certain conventional 
weapons, the list of which may be 
amended or cancelled in accordance 
with a special procedure, the Coun-
cil deciding by a two-thirds majority; 
(iiz) the Council determines the level of 
stocks of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons which countries 
manufacturing them may hold on 
the mainland of Europe1; 
(iv) levels of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons and certain 
conventional weapons held by mem-
ber countries on the mainland of 
Europe1 are subject to verification 
by the WEU Agency for the Control 
of Armaments. The list of these 
ABC and conventional weapons may 
be modified by a unanimous deci-
sion of the Council; 
(v) the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments verifies that the above 
provisions are respected, except for 
the weapons of forces assigned to 
NATO, which are verified by the 
latter. 
(a) Non-application of controls 
3.3. In the earlier days when the controls 
could be held to serve some purpose, the Com-
mittee had frequent occasion to draw attention 
to the major shortcomings in their application 
by the Council. The twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council indicated no change in 
this situation. 
3.4. Like earlier reports, the Council's present 
report refers to fields where the Agency does 
not exercise its activities: 
"Atomic, chemical and biological 
weapons 
1. The expression " on the mainland of Europe " excludes 
British weapons on British metropolitan territory. 
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The position described in the last annual 
report of the Council has remained 
unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency cover nei-
ther nuclear nor biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
two categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only 
non-production controls take place; no 
quantitative controls are made since the 
member states have always declared they 
possessed no such armaments. " 
Previous reports have included a statement to 
the effect that: 
" The non-nuclear components of such 
[nuclear] weapons (namely the missiles 
themselves and other specially designed 
equipment) are subject to control except 
as regards the weapons qualified as 
' strategic ' by one member state. Further-
more, as this state has declared that its 
nuclear capability as a whole is directed 
to one and the same objective of deter-
rence, its missiles with nuclear capability 
and tracked launchers are no longer sub-
ject to control. "I 
The Committee has noted2 that the state in 
question was France and that Pluton tactical 
nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from 
Agency control as from 1979. 
3.5. The Council's report goes on to say: 
" As the convention for the due process 
of law3 has not yet entered into force, 
the control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 1981, 
as in previous years, to take the form of 
'agreed control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. Since this agreement 
has never been withheld ... " 
3.6. The annual report also specifies that: 
" In application of Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down conditions to 
I. Document 833, 28th March 1980. 
2. Document 875, 4th May 1981. 
3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively and making provision for due process of 
law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels 
Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd 
October 1954. (Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but 
ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.) 
182 
enable the Council to fix levels of chemi-
cal weapons that may be held on the 
mainland of Europe by those countries 
which have not given up the right to pro-
duce them, and in accordance with the 
Council decision of 1959, the Agency 
asked the countries concerned in its ques-
tionnaire whether production of chemical 
weapons on their mainland territory had 
passed the experimental stage and entered 
the effective production stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 
1982. 
In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous 
years, asked the member states to declare 
any chemical weapons that they might 
hold, whatever their origin. In reply to 
this questionnaire, no country reported 
holding any chemical weapons and, 
because of this, the quantitative control 
of weapons of this nature raised no 
problems. " 
3.7. On the subject of biological weapons the 
Council's report states: 
" All the member countries reported their 
agreement on the renewal in 1982 of the 
list of biological weapons subject to 
control as accepted by the Council in 
1981. The Council noted the fact. " 
The Committee calls as far as possible for the 
revised list of biological weapons subject to 
control to be communicated to the Assembly, 
together with the list of chemical weapons 
subject to control, a first version of which was 
communicated to the Assembly in the annual 
report for 1960, whereas the list of chemical 
agents which the Council has added to the list 
in the meantime has been communicated only 
to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI)1• 
(b) Acti11itks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.8. Although the WEU controls have lost 
their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of 
activity remain limited solely to conventional 
weapons, the number of inspections carried out 
by the Agency each year shows that generally 
speaking there has been no reduction in its acti-
vities, as may be seen from the following table. 
Non-production controls no longer apply to 
I. The list of chemical agents subject to control, appro-
ved by the WEU Council, was published by SIPRI in 1973 
in "The problem of chemical and biological warfare", 
Volume 11, " CB weapons today ", page 21 7. 
German shipyards because, following a recom-
mendation to that effect by the Assembly, the 
Council in 1980 deleted warships from the list 
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of armaments not to be produced in Germany. 
Quantitative controls still apply to shipyards 
of all member countries on the continent. 
Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Non-production 
Quantitative control measures control 
measures Total 
control 
at units (of which measures 
at under at at non- (all 
depots national production Sub-total production production categories) plants plants of chemical command weapons) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 (2) 63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 (2) 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 (4) 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 
-
(4) 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 79 
9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
2 * * * * * n.a. 66 
3 * * * * * n.a. 66 
4 * * * * * n.a. 71 
5 * * * * * n.a. 72 
6 * * * * * n.a. 71 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 68 
9 * * * * * n.a. 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. 70 
1 * * * * * n.a. 70 
2 
* * * * * 
n.a. 70 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth 
counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of 
figures (old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a.: Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the 
Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the 
published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those 
for 1970 to 1982 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permis-
sion to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and 
are without significance. 
• Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
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3.9. The committee finds particularly useful 
the lists of armaments currently being produ-
ced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E on the 
state and problems of control in certain 
particular fields which is a summary of current 
armaments production programmes in member 
countries. However, in the present annual 
report the Council has cut down this section 
considerably. The committee asks the Council 
to retain in future reports all the useful infor-
mation which the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments can provide. 
(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments 
3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses 
the limited nature of the field control pro-
gramme, particularly visits to private firms, but 
it is clear that the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in 
those fields which are open to it. 
3.11. For the reasons given above, the com-
mittee now recommends that the Council 
abolish non-production controls of conventional 
weapons and consider abolishing quantitative 
controls. The Council is empowered to take 
this step under the terms of Article V of 
Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, by modifying the list at Annex IV 
to Protocol No. Ill. This step will leave in 
force the unilateral undertaking by Germany 
not to manufacture nuclear, biological or che-
mical weapons on its territory. It continues to 
be the policy of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many not to manufacture such weapons. While 
controls on these non-production undertakings 
would remain in force under the treaty, 
as noted above the Council applies them only 
in the case of chemical weapons and then only 
in the form of "agreed verifications". The 
unilateral undertaking by Germany not to 
manufacture specified conventional weapons on 
its territory would come to an end with the 
cancellation in accordance with Article 11 of 
Protocol No. Ill of the only weapons still on 
the list: long-range surface-to-surface missiles 
and strategic bombers. 
(d) Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.12. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments conducts important studies on the princi-
ples of arms control, sometimes in technical 
fields. Its experts are in contact with various 
outside bodies. In the past the Agency has 
co-operated with the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly 
in connection with the observation of military 
manoeuvres organised by ACDA on Salisbury 
Plain (England). But this United States agency 
which, since it was set up, had acquired 
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a worldwide reputation for the objectivity of 
certain of its publications•, has been partly 
dismantled by the present United States admi-
nistration2. The committee proposes that the 
WEU Agency re-establish its former contacts 
with ACDA to examine to what extent it might 
take over from it, for the benefit of the alliance 
as a whole, certain major studies on principles 
governing the control, verification or export of 
armaments which ACDA is having to relin-
quish for lack of funds. Such a contribution 
on the part of the WEU countries to studies 
hitherto conducted by the United States alone 
would be a further contribution to defence 
burden-sharing in the alliance. 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. As in recent years the work of the 
Standing Armaments Committee in 1982 was 
concentrated chiefly in exchange of information 
by countries in Working Group No. 8 on 
operational research. It is also updating the 
economic (first section) part of its study of the 
situation of the armaments sector of industry in 
the member countries of WEU. An unclas-
sified version including the updated legal 
section and the " presentation " of the first sec-
tion of the economic part was communicated to 
the Assembly on lOth May 1982. 
4.2. The Council has agreed, in its reply to 
Recommendation 331, to consider the possi-
bility of the SAC assisting the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to under-
take specific studies " within the competence of 
the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 
1955" (the Council decision whereby the 
Standing Armaments Committee was estab-
lished) and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to 
the French Minister of Defence, addressing the 
Assembly on 12th December 1981, added: 
" And rather than need to obtain the 
Council's consent each time, could not 
the SAC be authorised, at each session of 
the Assembly, to give help with the 
various studies decided upon?... If the 
political will exists, I do not think 
anyway that institutional obstacles could 
hinder the expansion of the SAC's role. " 
l. See for instance the series "World military expendi-
tures and arms transfers ". 
2. Since President Reagan took office the ACDA annual 
budget has been reduced from $ 18.5 m to$ 15 m; its staff 
reduced from some 200 to 150 and one-third of senior posts 
left unfilled; its operational analysis office abolished; its 
computer removed and twenty years of research material 
transferred to a Washington University. Mr. Eugene Ros-
tow, the Director originally appointed by President Reagan, 
was dismissed on 12th January 1983 and replaced by Mr. 
Kenneth Adelman after a controversial confirmation by the 
Senate. Mr. David Emery, who has now been nominated 
as Deputy Director, is likely to face equally controversial 
confirmation hearings. 
However, in its reply to Recommendation 379, 
communicated to the Assembly on 24th Novem-
ber 1982, the Council unfortunately did not 
follow Mr. Lemoine: 
" As regards the Standing Armaments 
Committee, which also was the subject of 
proposals by the State Secretary of the 
French Ministry of Defence, the Council 
recall that this body was set up on 7th 
May 1955 to promote co-operation in the 
matter of armaments. If in this respect 
the international secretariat of the SAC 
were occasionally to assist the Assembly 
in the study of clearly-defined themes, 
this could only be done under a proce-
dure involving a case-by-case examina-
tion by the Council, under whom the 
SAC is placed. It is clear that such work 
could not have the effect of relieving the 
SAC of its responsibilities nor could it 
affect its competence, these being the 
Council's exclusive responsibility. " 
4.3. However, agreement has now been 
reached with the Council to allow the secreta-
riat of the SAC to assist in the preparation of 
the major report by the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
on the harmonisation of research in civil and 
military high technology fields1• The commit-
tee welcomes this first attempt at co-operation, 
which will have to be extended in the future. 
As Mr. Lemoine said in the abovementioned 
address: 
" With, as it were, an information and 
research department available to it, the 
Assembly would be in a position to ini-
tiate more ambitious studies. " 
4.4. The Standing Armaments Committee 
could make a further useful contribution to 
joint production among the allied countries if it 
were to extend its study of the armaments 
industry to include a survey of the present sta-
tus of the two-way street, and an analysis of the 
I. However, it appears that the SAC secretariat has been 
unable to assist in the collection of data from public sources 
for the Scientific Committee's report. The committee 
accordingly recommends that the SAC be empowered to 
collect information. 
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factors which help to increase the proportion of 
European equipment in the armed forces of all 
allied countries. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation which 
relates to this explanatory memorandum as 
follows: 
Draft recommendation Explanatory memorandum 
Preamble 
(i) and (ii) Appendix and Chapter I 
(iii) Paragraphs 2.14; 3.4. 
(iv) Paragraphs 3.8 to 3.12 ; 4.2 to 4.4. 
(v) Paragraph 3.12. 
(vi) Paragraphs 2.3 to 2.8. 
(vii) Paragraphs 2.7; 3.7; 3.9. 
Operative text 
1 and 2 
3 
4 
5 
6(a) 
6(b) 
6(c) 
Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.14; 3.10 and 3.11. 
Paragraph 3.12. 
Paragraph 4.4. 
Paragraph 4.2 ; 4.3. 
Paragraph 2.7. 
Paragraph 3.9. 
Paragraph 3.7. 
5.2. In paragraph 2.6 above the committee 
also notes the need for assurance in future years 
concerning the levels of United Kingdom forces 
on the mainland. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 
15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention. The minority 
which voted against did not state in committee 
its reasons for so doing. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX 
RECOMMENDATION 3801 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 2 
APPENDIX 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto; 
(ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their 
full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instru-
ment of European security; 
(iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve 
any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that "in applying the provisions of Protocol No. 
Ill and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe "; 
(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel para-
graphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by redu-
cing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill; 
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not 
already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. 11, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level 
of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed 
with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties; 
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces; 
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 908). 
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The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of 
security. 
1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. Ill 
and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situa-
tion in Europe. This is why Annex Ill of that protocol has been amended on several occasions 
since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV (" Long-range missiles and guided missiles ") and VI 
(" Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ") of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill according to the 
procedure laid down in Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, the Council welcome the fact that, 
as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to 
take account of certain legal and political considerations. 
The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem. 
3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of 
which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be 
informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to 
SACEUR for the common defence. 
The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in 11.5 and 6 and IV of the final act 
of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The 
forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the 
basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from 
the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and 
with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces. 
Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral 
declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral 
context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports 
any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given. 
5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly 
before the end of February. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982. 
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The Assembly, 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 388 to 392 
RECOMMENDATION 388 1 
on the problems for European security 
arising from pacifism and neutralism 2 
30th May 1983 
Considering that the development of neutralist and pacifist movements in Europe and 
throughout the world makes it all the more necessary to examine the justification of the security, 
defence and disarmament policy pursued by the western countries; 
Noting that deterrence, which is the basis of this policy, depends largely on the existence of 
strategic nuclear weapons; 
Considering that implementation of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 is 
encountering negative reactions from citizens of WEU member countries; 
Welcoming the opening of the START negotiations - including the part of the Geneva 
negotiations on so-called Eurostrategic weapons - and the resumption or revival of other negotiations 
designed to reduce the level of forces and armaments in Europe and elsewhere; 
Considering that unilateral initiatives in disarmament matters would cause those negotiations io 
fail and would jeopardise the foundations of Europe's security and deploring the growing evidence of 
Soviet involvement with and funding of pacifist movements pursuing unilateral disarmament in the 
West; 
Considering that pacifist movements are entitled to call for new initiatives from the members of 
the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on 
disarmament; 
Considering that assistance to the third world is morally, economically and politically essential 
for all industrialised countries, quite apart from any considerations relating to their defence budgets; 
Noting that the situation of each Western European country forces each country to shape its 
defence policy and attitude towards disarmament according to its own particular conditions and 
strongly influences the course followed by pacifist movements; 
Considering nevertheless that any serious progress towards European political union requires 
close co-ordination of national policies in these fields: 
Considering that WEU is an appropriate framework for consultations between the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance on all matters relating to defence and disarmament; 
Regretting that Recommendation 379 on the activation of the WEU Council and its dependent 
bodies has not been effectively followed up by the Council, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Demand that participating states strive to ensure the success of the various ongoing 
negotiations on the limitation or reduction of armaments and forces in Europe and in the rest of the 
world; 
2. Announce its unambiguous support for any proposal for the complete renunciation by the 
United States and the Soviet Union of medium-range nuclear weapons or, failing that, for the 
establishment of a true balance at the lowest possible level and to agree to the deployment of such 
weapons on the territory of member countries only as long as this goal has not been attained within 
the time limit laid down in the NATO decision of December 1979; 
3. Ensure that full, accurate and objective information on the levels of forces and armaments of 
the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact is regularly made public; 
4. Ensure that in any event Western Europe's development assistance policy is pursued and 
strengthened, particularly in the framework of the European Communities; 
5. Effectively concert the defence policies of member countries and their positions towards 
disarmament with a view to working out a European approach to such matters. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
(9th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
934). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 388 
The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 388 on the problems for European 
security arising from pacifism and neutralism, which illustrates the importance attached by the WEU 
Assembly to the security aspirations voiced by public opinion in the member countries. 
l. The Council take this opportunity to reassert that for the maintenance of peace it is essential to 
establish a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. They are wholeheartedly in favour of a 
successful conclusion to the current negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet 
Union on their respective nuclear forces. For their part, the member countries of WEU fully 
support the efforts made in this direction by the United States, whose so-called "zero-zero option" 
proposal relating to INF constitutes an important initiative, and whose global approach they fully 
endorse. They hope that the Soviet Union will also contribute to the achievement of speedy 
progress. 
The WEU member countries are also very concerned by the imbalance in favour of the USSR 
and the countries of the East which characterises the force relationship in conventional weapons. 
WEU member countries, who are all taking part in the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, are in 
favour of the speedy conclusion of this meeting with a balanced and substantial concluding document 
which includes a mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe, as proposed by France. 
Those of them who take part in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna are striving to achieve a more 
stable situation in Europe through the establishment of parity in the conventional forces in Central 
Europe in the form of a common and collective ceiling. 
2. The decision of 12th December 1979 providing for a limited modernisation of intermediate-
range nuclear forces, combined with a parallel offer of negotiations on American and Soviet weapons 
of this kind, was referred to clearly and fully in the communique issued after the last ministerial 
session of the North Atlantic Council (9th and lOth December 1982). The member countries of 
WEU wish to reaffirm their commitment to the terms of this communique of the Atlantic Alliance to 
which they all belong. 
3. As the Council have repeatedly stated, they take the view that the security policy of the 
member countries - consisting of deterrence and defence as well as of arms control and disarma-
ment - enjoys the genuine support of the overwhelming majority of public opinion. The informa-
tion activity carried out within parliamentary bodies can also contribute to this support; this task 
requires that the fullest possible information be given on the alliance's position and on the threats 
facing its members. With this end in mind, the member states of WEU will continue to answer any 
questions on this topic which might be raised by public opinion in their countries. 
4. The policy of Western Europe on development aid is a natural component of its foreign policy; 
the member countries of WEU are convinced that this policy secures international stability. 
This aid - already reflected in the considerable efforts made bilaterally by the countries repre-
sented on the Council - is also provided continuously and actively on a multilateral basis. This is 
evidenced by the Lome Conventions concluded by the European Communities and the many consul-
tations which have been held over the past year and which are continuing with the aim of achieving 
better co-ordination and consolidation of the measures taken by the international aid institutions. 
5. The member countries of WEU will continue to seek ways of strengthening their concerted 
action within various bodies and at various levels on matters of security and disarmament; in so 
doing they will affirm the specific nature of their common interest in the matter. Better co-operation 
between European states in the field of security and disarmament offers possibilities for strengthening 
the dialogue and co-operation with the United States. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th March 1983. 
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unity; 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 389 1 
on European security and the evolution 
of the situation in South- West Asia2 
Recalling Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371 and 386; 
Deploring and condemning the massacres in Lebanon from 16th to 18th September 1982; 
Nevertheless welcoming the determination shown by the Lebanese people to restore national 
Welcoming the presence of French, Italian and United States armed forces to protect the 
civilian population; 
Considering that the occupation of Lebanon by the Israeli and Syrian armies makes it 
impossible to restore unity and terminate the acts of violence being committed there; 
Considering further that a settlement of the Palestinian problem is one of the prerequisites of 
the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East; 
Considering that this settlement implies the application of Resolution 242 of the United 
Nations Security Council, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and recognition of the 
right of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers and of the right of the 
Palestinian people to independence and sovereignty; 
Considering that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank is an 
obstacle to the restoration of peace and casts doubt on the will of the Israeli Government to achieve 
this; 
Welcoming the fact that the final act adopted by the heads of Arab states at their meeting in 
Fez on 9th September 1982 contains elements of substance which show considerable progress towards 
the application of Resolution 242; 
Noting that recent events show more clearly than ever that the Palestinian people needs a 
homeland; 
Considering that at the present juncture the PLO is the only organisation which can speak for 
the Palestinian people; 
Considering that the dispersal of the Palestinian people in the Arab countries will not solve the 
problem but will create unacceptable conditions for the persons concerned; 
Welcoming the declaration by President Reagan on 1st September 1982 as an essential 
contribution to the restoration of peace in the area; 
Considering that the pursuit of the' war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to the security 
of the whole area; 
Condemning the continued Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a serious violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations, a grave threat to the countries in the area and a negation of Soviet 
proposals for demilitarising the Indian Ocean; 
Condemning recourse to chemical weapons and the continual massacres of the civilian 
population in Afghanistan; 
Reaffirming the close relationship between the security of Europe and the peaceful solution of 
conflicts which upset political balances in the Middle East and South-West Asia, 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
(lOth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
927). 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Reaffirm the support of all its members for any initiative aimed at applying Resolution 242 
and its radical opposition to the establishment of further Israeli settlements on the West Bank; 
2. Urge the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon except if their presence has 
been requested by the Lebanese Government; 
3. , Use all the means available to member countries to support the restoration of the Lebanese 
state; 
4. Supply humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people and to all foreign minorities in Lebanon 
which require it; 
S. Urge the Israeli Government to disclose without delay what it intends to do with those 
imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon; 
6. Urge the Israeli Government to allow the International Red Cross immediate and full access to 
those imprisoned during the occupation of southern Lebanon, to arrange their earliest possible release 
and to publish in full the conclusions of the inquiry into the massacres at Sabra and Chatila; and call 
on the Lebanese Government to complete their inquiry into the Beirut massacre and to publish a full 
report on the inquiry; 
7. Demonstrate its belief that the question of Palestinian refugees cannot be solved by dispersing 
them but only by the early establishment of a Palestinian homeland; 
8. Call for the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan; 
9. Urge member countries to refuse any connection with the Afghan regime and to assist the 
Afghan resistance movement as long as there is Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan; 
10. Increase member countries' financial and technical assistance to Pakistan and food aid to 
Afghan refugees. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 389 
1 and 7. The Council again voice their deep concern and outright opposition to the continuing 
Israeli policy of settlement on the West Bank, particularly in view of the fact that it is being pursued 
at a time when it is more important than ever not to jeopardise the opportunities offered last autumn 
by the Reagan plan and by the declaration of the Arab conference in Fez for a negotiated settlement 
to the Middle East crisis. They therefore reaffirm their continuing commitment to the promotion of 
a global solution based on Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council leading to the 
mutual recognition of the rights of the parties involved. In particular such a solution should allow 
the Palestinians to realise self-determination with all that this implies as well as security for all the 
states in the region, including Israel's right to exist. 
2. The Council, in affirming their complete solidarity with the Lebanese Government, consider it 
vital for the purposes of achieving lasting stability in Lebanon and for the restoration of its full sove-
reignty and political independence that all foreign forces whose presence is not explicitly requested by 
the Lebanese Government be withdrawn from the country. In this context, the Council express the 
hope that the current negotiations on this matter will meet with success. 
3. The Council support the full re-establishment of the authority of the Lebanese Government 
over all its national territory and in this connection emphasise the worthwhile and substantial contri-
bution made by some WEU member countries and the United States, in deploying a peacekeeping 
force in the Beirut area. 
4. Accordingly, the Council pledge their support for all humanitarian aid to the civilian popula-
tion of Lebanon who have been so cruelly afflicted by recent events. 
5 and 6. The Council note the importance that the Assembly attaches to the Sabra and Chatila mas-
sacres being fully clarified. They note that up till now, as far as Israel is concerned, the publication 
of the report of the commission of inquiry has helped to shed some light on these tragic events. 
8 and 9. The Council express their deep concern at the continuing Soviet military occupation of 
Afghanistan which, together with the continuing violations of human rights which this involves, 
shows flagrant disregard for the principles of the United Nations Charter and remains a serious source 
of tension in East-West relations; this occupation was recently condemned by an overwhelming 
majority of the member countries of the United Nations for the fourth time on 29th November 1982. 
The Council stress the urgent need for a negotiated settlement to the Afghan problem in 
accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions, i.e. one based on an immediate and 
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, respect for the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of 
Afghanistan and the restoration of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination and conditions 
in which the Afghan refugees can return to their homeland in safety and honour. Only in this way 
will it be possible to find a genuine political solution which can put an end to the grief and destruc-
tion inflicted on the Afghan people. 
10. The Council also stress the need to take all possible measures to alleviate the suffering of the 
Afghan refugees who have found welcome shelter in Pakistan from the horrors of an externally 
imposed war. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1983. 
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RECOMMENDATION 390 1 
on the state of European security2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting the continued increase in the ocean-going capability of the Soviet navy and concerned 
at the increased opportunity this provides the Soviet Union to project its power, particularly in 
unstable parts of the world; 
(ii) Believing therefore that more attention should be paid to maritime surveillance; 
(iii) Recalling its Recommendations 254, 278 and 288, welcoming the accession of Spain to the 
North Atlantic Treaty with the full approval of that country's democratically-elected parliament, and 
hoping that European security will be strengthened in due course through the integration of Spanish 
forces into the military structure of NATO; 
(iv) Recognising the important special nature of the contribution to allied defence made by many of 
the smaller countries of the alliance through their geographical position as well as through their 
defence effort; 
(v) Noting, however, the small proportion of national product devoted to defence by certain allied 
countries, including those with above average per capita income; 
(vi) Welcoming the increased emphasis being placed on conventional defence but reiterating its 
view that a balanced security policy must be designed to prevent all war, not only nuclear war, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments, acting where appropriate in the North Atlantic Council: 
I. To improve further existing NATO and bilateral co-operative arrangements for NA TO-area 
and world-wide surveillance of Soviet naval vessels, surface and sub-surface, and of other militarily-
significant Soviet vessels, in particular through: 
(a) stressing the need to make use of all surveillance resources - satellite, airborne, surface and 
sub-surface, shore and bottom-based; 
(b) remedying shortages of modern maritime patrol aircraft, and retaining in service adequate 
numbers of diesel-electric submarines and frigates; 
(c) modernising NATO surveillance co-ordinating centres, and improving communications 
links between these centres and between them and national centres; 
2. To co-operate fully with other NATO governments: 
(a) to invite Spanish liaison officers to be appointed to all appropriate NATO command 
headquarters; 
(b) to plan and adjust command arrangements to accommodate the contribution of Spanish 
forces to NATO; 
3. To urge on all allied countries the need to maintain and improve the defence effort, despite the 
general recession, and at the same time to pursue actively arms control negotiations in all forums. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on lst December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
(IIth sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 936). 
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1. The member governments of Western European Union share the Assembly's belief in the 
necessity of effective arrangements regarding co-operation on the surveillance of Soviet naval vessels 
within the NATO area and throughout the world. They wish to assure the Assembly that the 
measures taken collectively or unilaterally by the members of the Atlantic Alliance already work very 
effectively. Despite the inevitable restrictions on resources flowing from the current economic 
situation the member governments of Western European Union continue to seek ways of enhancing 
their efforts in this area with particular reference to the use and co-ordination of the surveillance 
resources to which the Assembly refers. 
2. The member governments of Western European Union warmly welcome Spanish membership 
of the Atlantic Alliance. However, the Assembly will be aware that the Spanish Government has 
decided to freeze discussions with the NATO authorities on the arrangements for the integration of 
Spain's armed forces into NATO's military structure. The Council observe that in view of this fact, 
action on the second paragraph of the Assembly's recommendation will have to await the decision of 
the Spanish Government as to the manner in which it wishes to proceed on the issue. 
3. The Council agree with the Assembly that all members of the alliance need to maintain and 
improve their defence efforts, and note that to this end the countries which participate in the 
integrated military structure have agreed a target of an annual increase in defence spending in the 
region of 3% in real terms. The limitations imposed by current economic circumstances on the 
additional resources available for defence emphasise the need for the member countries of the 
alliance to make even more effective use of their existing resources. The Council agree that these 
efforts need to be accompanied by the active pursuit of arms control negotiations with a view to 
achieving balanced, equitable and verifiable agreements leading to enhanced security at a lower level 
of forces. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd March 1983. 
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RECOMMENDATION 391 1 
on the Falklands crisis2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Firmly condemning the armed invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina on 2nd April 
1982 in flagrant violation of international law and of the statement by the President of the 
Security Council the previous day; 
(ii) Taking note of the rapid and effective operation of European political consultation leading 
to the statement of condemnation issued by the Ten on 2nd April and the declaration of 
economic sanctions on I Oth April; 
(iii) Taking note of the agreed statement of the President of the United Nations Security 
Council on 1st April and of Security Council Resolution 502 of 3rd April 1982, but regretting 
that the Security Council was unable to ensure implementation; 
(iv) Regretting that the initiatives of the United States Secretary of State, the President of 
Peru and the Secretary-General of the United Nations failed to secure a negotiated withdrawal 
of the Argentine forces; 
(v) Welcoming the position adopted by the United States and by NATO after the failure of the 
attempted negotiations; 
(vi) Regretting that the Council was not convened in application of Article VIII.3 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty; 
(vii) Welcoming the determined and successful action taken by the United Kingdom to restore 
international order in application of Resolution 502 of the Security Council and in conformity 
with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; 
(viii) Deploring the loss of life that resulted from the conflict; 
(ix) Concerned at the weakening of allied forces in the North Atlantic Treaty area following the 
necessary deployment of larger British forces outside the area for the long-term defence of the 
Falkland Islands, and noting that NATO can learn many lessons from the conflict; 
(x) Concerned at the deterioration in relations between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
and Latin America, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments to seek agreement in the European Community and in NATO 
on the following objectives: 
1. Measures to be considered by NATO countries within the treaty area to compensate for 
the deployment of British forces outside the area as long as these forces are necessary for the 
defence of the Falklands; 
2. The early restoration of good relations between the countries of the alliance on the one 
hand and of Latin America on the other, and in particular the normalisation of relations between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina; 
3. An urgent study by NATO of the lessons it can learn from the conflict including: 
(a) the need for consultation and decisions not only on developments beyond the NATO 
area which may threaten vital allied interests, but also on those which may threaten 
national interests in cases of self-defence, even if the Soviet Union is not involved; 
(b) the need for proper assessment of voluminous and conflicting information to permit the 
early identification of attack; 
(c) the performance of defence equipment; 
(d) the need for a common and restrictive policy on the export of defence equipment to 
non-allied countries. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
(12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 935). 
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to Recommendation 391 
1. The Council welcome the Assembly's interest in the Falklands crisis and in the lessons which 
may be drawn by the alliance as a result. Despite the present situation in the South Atlantic area, it 
does not appear that the deployment of British troops in the Falkland Islands need give rise to 
concern about the strength of allied forces in the North Atlantic. The detailed consequences for 
NATO of the deployment of British forces to the South Atlantic will be discussed within the alliance 
as part of the normal planning process. The Council note that in the meantime British forces in the 
South Atlantic remain committed to NATO albeit at a lower level of availability. 
2. In the view of the Council it may still be too early to evaluate all the consequences of the 
Falklands crisis, but the Council note that economic relations between members of the alliance and 
Latin America are returning to normal. 
Discussions and voting in the 37th United Nations General Assembly on the Falklands 
resolution, the attitude assumed by Latin America within the non-aligned movement and the slow 
process of normalisation between the EC and Latin America after the lifting of EC embargo however 
are underlining the fact that further efforts should be made to improve relations between the 
countries of the alliance and Latin America. 
The Council note that since the cessation of hostilities the United Kingdom has declared its 
willingness to resume normal relations with Argentina, but that the Argentine Government has not 
up to now agreed to a formal ending to hostilities. Member countries of the European Community 
have pursued the question of resuming normal trade relations for all of them with Argentina, but 
although these approaches have not yet led to concrete results as desired, it is hoped that future 
efforts will be reciprocated and that the obstacles still existing will be surmounted. 
3. As regards the implications for members of the alliance of events beyond the NATO area 
which threaten vital allied interests, and in particular the consequences for NATO of deployments 
outside the area to meet such threats, the Council note that these are already under study in the 
alliance. The Council emphasise that the question of consultation within the alliance on threats 
outside the NATO area to the purely national interests of allies is a matter for ad hoc decision at the 
time. 
4. Insofar as the accurate assessment of information permitting the early identification of attack is 
concerned, the Council wish to stress that this activity represents a continuing concern of the 
alliance. 
5. The Council note that the experience of the United Kingdom as regards the performance of 
defence equipment in the South Atlantic will be shared with her allies and be subjected to appro-
priate study. 
6. The Council note the Assembly's interest in the field of policy concerning the export of 
defence equipment to non-allied countries, and stress in this regard that policy on the export of arms 
is a matter for individual countries, although consultation on the subject takes place within the 
alliance when appropriate. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 9th May 1983. 
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contribution to meeting these requirements2 
The Assembly, 
DOCUMENT 949 
Considering the need for close relations between Western European countries and Norway on 
such subjects as security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies; 
Considering also the relationship between the Norwegian energy supply and other important 
energy resources outside Western Europe and the fact that before 1990 more Norwegian gas cannot 
be available to replace all or part of Soviet gas ; 
Aware of the risk of all Western European countries importing concurrently their energy 
supplies from outside Western Europe and of the wastefulness of duplicate pipelines; 
Considering that Western Europe and the United States do not always make the same analysis 
and do not always have the same view of East-West economic relations; 
Considering the need for a close study of European energy requirements in the next decades so 
as to ensure Europe's energy supplies, particularly natural gas, essential for its security ; 
Considering also the need to study the present role of COCOM, the co-ordinating committee of 
the allied countries which. supervises high technology and defence exports to Eastern European 
countries, and to update COCOM's list of prohibited items, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Promote and reinforce relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe in 
security, economic, energy, space and other research and development policies; 
2. Promote studies on: 
(a) European energy requirements in the next decades and the consequent problems for 
Europe's security and defence; 
(b) high technology exports to Eastern European countries liable to have military applications; 
(c) the possibilities of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network; 
and report to the Assembly on the results of these studies; 
3. Promote an energy policy designed to guarantee member countries regular and adequate 
supplies of energy to meet their security requirements. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1982 during the second part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session 
(12th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 930). 
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1. The Council recognise the importance of good relations between Norway and the other coun-
tries of Western Europe, especially in the sectors mentioned in the Assembly's recommenda-
tion. Close relations between Norway and the other countries of Western Europe exist, in particular 
in the security field, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Consultation on co-operation in 
the field of economics and energy takes place not only within the alliance, but also within the frame-
work of the OECD, of which Norway is also an active member. As for co-operation with Norway in 
the field of space research and development policy, the Council refer to the activities which take 
place within the framework of the European Space Agency. 
2. (a) The Council consider that detailed studies on future European energy requirements are 
already available or taking place. For instance, there is the OECD and International Energy Agency 
study entitled "World Energy Outlook", which contains a thorough analysis of European energy 
requirements in the next decades ; there is also the study on the energy supplies of OECD member 
countries and their security, currently being carried out within that organisation. 
(b) As regards point 2 (b) of this recommendation, the Council note that concrete proposals 
have been made by the United States in this area. 
(c) Since the result of the abovementioned initiatives may provide further criteria for assessing 
the desirability of setting up an interconnected intra-European gas pipeline network, the Council 
would prefer to wait for the outcome of these initiatives before taking a more definite stand on this 
subject. As the initiatives mentioned under 2 (a) and 2 (b) have already been taken in other fora, 
the Council will inform the Assembly in due time as far as possible on the further developments in 
these fields. 
3. The Council are confident that the measures, which WEU member countries have taken both 
individually and collectively within the framework of the International Energy Agency and of the 
European Community, for example, will be sufficient to ensure regular and adequate supplies of 
energy in order to meet their security requirements. The measures relate inter alia to the pursuit of 
policies of conservation and of diversification by developing all sources of energy. The member 
countries are firmly determined to promote effective implementation of these measures. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th April 1983. 
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Written question 232 
and the reply of the Council 
QUESTION 232 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett 
on 15th February 1983 
Do the governments of the WEU member 
countries have non-classified information about 
the extent of financing from exterior sources of 
" peace movements " in their countries to 
supplement and update the statement in 1981 
to that effect by the Secretary-General of 
NATO and the evidence put before the Sub-
Committee on Oversight of the United States 
Permanent Select Congressional Committee in 
1980, specifying an annual total of at least 
$63,000,000 of KGB funding of international 
front organisations serving " to co-ordinate and 
further Soviet foreign policy goals and military 
strategy " ? Are the Council able to give 
further detailed information in regard to the 
situation in this context obtaining in the 
various member states of WEU ? 
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communicated to the Assembly 
on 27th Aprill983 
From the non-classified information avail-
able, there is no precise evidence for the 
governments of the WEU member countries to 
claim that the peace movements in their coun-
tries are in receipt of Soviet funds, for example 
through the KGB. 
However, it appears that the activities of 
certain peace movements in certain WEU coun-
tries may receive indirect financial support 
from some East European countries from 
profits made from the sale of vast amounts of 
propaganda material. These profits contribute 
to the financing of meetings and demonstrations 
against the NATO modernisation programme. 
In any event, the governments of the WEU 
member countries are aware of this problem, 
which they are following very closely in view of 
its connection with their countries' peace and 
security policies. 
IMPRIMERIE ALEN<;ONNAISE 
Rue Edouard-Belin, 61002 ALEN<;ON 
Dep6t legal : 3• trimestre 1983 
N° d'ordre: 98810 
PRINTED IN FRANCE 


